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Preface
First, I want to thank the readers for starting to read my book. Somehow it got your 
attention despite the daily tsunami of information, infotainment and entertainment 
that is thrown at you. Most of us are pressed for time, even in months of lockdown 
because of COVID-19, so I will keep this introduction short. I will do without the 
usual clever well-worded academic introduction, referring to Aristotle, Popper and 
Foucault. I will go straight to the relevant question any reader from academia, pub-
lic or policy could ask with no need to be ashamed of:
Why a book about Open Science? It is a hype isn’t it? So, is there not a lot already written 
about it? Ok, it is a big thing in Europe, Australia, and even China it seems, but what about 
the USA and Canada, and are the Germans really in? I do recall, in the USA during the 
Obama administrations there was some action of Open Access and Open Data, and academ-
ics who started DORA in 2012 in San Francisco.
or
A book about Open Science? Open Access you mean? Does that start again? Wasn’t that the 
movement that, since the year 2000 had a few starts already, sympathetic but that just didn’t 
take of? Does the EU still believe in it? Really? Why?
In this book I address these questions, without any beating around the bush. It 
is truly amazing, that a way to do science and research, that for the majority of its 
practitioners and the public and policy makers makes a lot of sense, and which has 
been around for quite some time, has not been embraced to become common 
practice. To answer this question, we have to delve deep into the science of sci-
ence and research. We have to understand ‘the idea of science’ that does exist in 
the plural. We have to analyse why in particular one of these concepts and its cor-
responding public image has been dominant practically since 1945 and what that 
has done to science and scientists. That philosophical/sociological idea has been 
the basis for the ideologic narrative with which science has been internally orga-
nized and is being used to claim a unique position, authority and funding for sci-
ence. With this narrative, the scientific community promised that science would 
be there to the benefit of society, at least when her autonomy and neutrality are 
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respected. How come that although this legendary image and its narrative by the 
philosophers, historians and sociologists has no philosophical and timeless foun-
dation, scientists apparently without knowing this demise of their Legend keep 
using that narrative? It may well be the fear, the insecurity that comes with the 
awareness that knowledge production in science is based not on a given meta-
physical foundation, but rests on a firm social process of a community of inquirers 
that relentlessly criticize, question, debate what the best knowledge claims are. 
Knowing very well that the consensus reached may work well but is never abso-
lute and may be replaced by better ones by this same process of inquiry called 
science. Having said this, we realize that, despite the commonly held views, the 
‘method’ of the ‘hard’ sciences and that of the ‘soft’ social science and humani-
ties may not be all that different after all!
In our present-day world of hyper-modernity, where knowledge is everywhere to 
be found and always contested by some, the process of the production of knowledge 
cannot be insulated from potential users and interested critical other parties. 
Clinging to the idea of a unique method for absolute truth and a foundation for sci-
ence is understandable but a wrong reflex in debates with the public about its prob-
lems. Explaining how science really works and produces knowledge would be the 
best response.
In this book, I and you readers need to be totally frank about science, and we 
need to be ‘biting the bullet’ and bringing up several difficult  issues. We need to 
discuss ‘therapeutic’ interventions required to opening up research and academia 
for transition to a more open science that works better for the world. You may won-
der, ‘is the relationship with the public then the problem?’ It sure is, since I believe, 
with many colleagues, that scientists have a moral obligation to engage with the 
major societal problems and challenges of their time. I may seem very optimistic, 
but I am not naïve, to think that the practice of Open Science will be a major 
improvement regarding the relationship between science and society in several criti-
cal ways.
In contrast to the critical questions, it appears that since 2016 the idea of Open 
Science has been adopted by many institutions and governments around the 
world and it is well possible that we have passed the tipping point of its global 
breakthrough. Life is never perfect, and as we know Open Science to function 
properly needs an Open Society, but this requirement is not universally fulfilled 
and needs the attention of academia. I clearly see an opportunity for a leading 
role of the Open Science approach of the EU, now the USA has lost a lot of its 
position as a world leader in science. I have touched upon the problem of geo-
politics, for instance in relation to China, the new science superpower, as this is 
not specific for science but  a general problem of democracy it is  outside the 
scope of this book.
The good news is that in the heat of the catastrophic COVID-19 pandemic, with 
its unprecedented global threat to public health and our socio-economic life, we see 
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the opening up of the different practices of science, publishing, data and biomaterial 
sharing, and doing research and in real time opening up to public, at national and 
international levels. It is argued here that science should always be done like that, as 
Open Science.
 My Journey
This book results from my journey in science since the early 1970s. I had the oppor-
tunity of being at the bench of biochemistry laboratories of different knowledge 
institutions: in the Netherlands at The National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment, the non-profit Blood Supply Foundation and two University Medical 
Centres, with a six months ‘sabbatical’ in 1994 at DNAX Research Institute, Palo 
Alto, CA. From 1975 on, I was intrigued by the social aspects of science. While in 
my academic development I discovered the practice of research, in parallel I discov-
ered the science of science and developed an interest as a science observer. Ever 
since, while being totally engaged in research, at the same time I was a science 
observer and obsessively studied the many aspects of that social game called sci-
ence. It is this dual experience and the broad view of science that has led to my 
writings and actions to improve science of which this book gives witness reporting 
from both tracks of my journey in science.
Finally, I have provided a broad and, in some cases, an in-depth background 
analysis of different aspects of science. Importantly, regarding the images of science 
that still distort our image and practice of science, most writers about the practice of 
science mention the problem but almost all refrain from such in-depth analysis. 
Almost all stay even further away from the directly connected discussion of the 
incentive and rewards systems because that unavoidably opens the black box, or 
rather the can of worms of academic politics, the game of reputation, power and 
money. Since, as I argue in Chap. 2, I believe that the obsolete philosophy and pub-
lic image of science are the major cause of many problems in the practice of sci-
ence, I went all out to present the major different arguments for the lack of foundation 
for the methods of empirical positivism, and its analytical foundational philosophy. 
I also dwell on the analyses of the problems of the practice of science in academia, 
since I do regard this in many ways an important and necessary step for the transi-
tion to Open Science. Finally, there is a lengthy description of the development, 
from early initiatives to finally the institutional start of Open Science in the research 
agenda of the European Union. I realize that most of you shall want to read selec-




 Four Recommended Reading Tracks
 0. For the general concise view of science and society since 1945
Chap. 1.
 1. Philosophy and sociology
If you are more interested and have read in the philosophical and sociological 
origins of our current ideas about science, Chaps. 2 and 4 will be serious reading 
but are highly recommended.
 2. A critique of science
If you want to grasp the more recent critical thinking about science, with 
analyses and arguments in the pre-Open Science time, then go for Chaps. 1, 
3 and 6.
 3. New avenues
If you don’t want the diagnosis, but rather read about attempts and ideas how, 
by engaging with society, to improve the relationship of science with society, 
that is to be found in Chaps. 5, 6 and 7.
 4. Transition to Open Science
If you want an impression about early actions in the past 20 years and the 
more recent actions taken to promote Open Science, go to Chaps. 5 and 7, and 
for some of the local initiatives in Utrecht, I refer to Chap. 6.




 Chapter 1 : Science and Society An Overview of the Problem
Science promised to society to contribute to the grand challenges of the United 
Nations, WHO, the EU agenda and national agendas for change and improvement 
of our life. It will be discussed how this social contract between science and society 
has developed since 1945. The first phase from 1945 till 1960 was characterized by 
autonomy, building on the successes of the natural sciences and engineering in 
World War II. In the second phase, the late 1960s till approximately 1980, govern-
ment and the public lost trust and saw the downside of science and technology. The 
response from politics and the public was a call for societal and political responsible 
research inspired by broader socio-political developments in society. The third 
phase from 1980 till 2010 was built on the idea that science and technology would 
bring economic growth, which should make nations internationally competitive. 
There was also increasingly room for societal problems related to environment and 
sustainability, health and well-being. In this approach of the so-called knowledge 
economy, strong relations with government and the private sector were established 
characterized by short-term accountability, control from government and funders at 
the level of project output, using accordingly defined metrics and indicators. This 
model became firmly and globally institutionalized.
Within science, since 2010 among scientists there is growing frustration, mostly 
implicit but increasingly explicit disillusion of scientists, regarding governance, 
agenda setting in relation to the outside world and significant impact of the research. 
Science fails, it is felt, its promise to society to contribute to the quality of life as the 
system has adapted to the culture of new public management. Production of robust 
and significant results is mainly secondary to output relevant for an internal credit 
system for academic career advancement at the individual level. At the higher orga-
nizational level output and impact are focused on positions on international ranking 
lists which drive highly competitive social systems which results in a widely felt 
lack of alignment and shared value in the academic community.
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 Chapter 2: Images of Science: A Reality Check
It will be argued that the dominant form of current academic science is based on 
ideas and concepts about science and research that date back to philosophy and 
sociology that was developed since the 1930s. It will be discussed how this philoso-
phy and sociology of science has informed the ideas, myths and ideology about 
science held by the scientific community and still determines the popular view of 
science. It is even more amazing when we realize that these ideas are philosophi-
cally and sociologically untenable and since the 1970s were declared obsolete by 
major scholars in these same disciplines. To demonstrate this, I delve deep to dis-
cuss the distinct stages that scholars in philosophy, sociology and history of science 
since 1945 to 2000 have gone through to leave the analytical-positivistic philosophy 
behind. I will be focusing on developments of their thinking about major topics such 
as how scientific knowledge is produced, the scientific method, the status of scien-
tific knowledge and the development of our ideas about ‘truth’ and the relation of 
our claims to reality. It will appear that the positivistic ideas about science produc-
ing absolute truth, about ‘the unique scientific method’, its formal logical approach 
and its timeless foundation as a guarantee for our value-free, objective knowledge 
were not tenable. I took the trouble to go into this deep to show how thoroughly the 
myth has been demystified in philosophy and sociology of science. You think after 
these 50 pages I am kicking a dead horse? Not at all! This scientific demystification 
has unfortunately not reached active scientists. The popular image of science and 
research is still largely based on that Legend. This is not without consequence as 
will be shown in Chap. 3. These images of science have shaped and in fact distorted 
the organizational structures and the interaction between its institutes and disci-
plines. It also affects the relationship of science with its stakeholders in society, its 
funders, the many publics private and public and policy makers in government. In 
short, it is about the growth of knowledge.
It will throughout the book be accompanied by a narrative in which I will take 
my own intellectual and scientific journey from 1971 as a chemistry student 
who did a minor in the philosophy of science in academic year 1975–1976. 
Since then I followed the classical career path of a professional biochemist/
immunologist, as PhD student, post-doc, group leader, department head, 
director of a small research institute, to finally become dean and board mem-
ber of a large university medical centre. Going through this professional 
sequence, I kept a persistent and ever stronger interest in the science of sci-
ence. It is from the perspective of a true understanding of the practice of sci-
ence in its various aspects that I will use specific authors a lot, but others much 
less or even neglect work of many scholars that to specialists in the different 
fields are considered important but are of little or no relevance for the daily 
practice of active researchers and most other actors in the field.
Synopsis
xiii
 Chapter 3: Science in Transition How Science Goes Wrong 
and What to Do About It
It has in the previous chapters become clear that the ideology and ideals that we 
are brought up with are not valid and are not practiced; despite that even in 2020 
they are still somehow ‘believed’ by most scientists and even by many science 
watchers and journalists and used in political correct rhetoric and policy making by 
science’s leadership. In that way these ideologies and beliefs mostly implicitly but 
sometimes even explicitly determine debates regarding the internal policy of sci-
ence and science policy in the public arena. These include all-time classic themes 
like the uniqueness of science compared to any other societal activity; ethical supe-
riority of science and scientists based on Mertonian norms; the vocational disinter-
ested search for truth, autonomy; values and moral (political) neutrality; dominance 
of internal epistemic values; and unpredictability regards impact. These ideas have 
influenced debates about the ideal and hegemony of natural science; the hierarchy 
of basic over applied science; theoretical over technological research; and at a 
higher level in academic institutions and at the funders the widely held supremacy 
of STEM over SSH. This has directly determined the attitudes of scientists in the 
interaction with peers within the field, but also shaped the politics of science within 
science but also with policy makers and stakeholders from the public and private 
sector and interactions with popular media.
Science it was concluded was suboptimal because of growing problems with the 
quality and reproducibility of its published products due to failing quality control at 
several levels. Because of too little interactions with society during the phases of 
agenda setting and the actual process of knowledge production, its societal impact 
Science in Transition which  started in 2013, is  a small-scale Dutch initia-
tive. It presented a systems approach, comprised of analyses and suggested 
actions, based on experience in academia. It was built on writings by early 
science watchers and most recent theoretical developments in philosophy, his-
tory and sociology of science and STS on the practice and politics of science. 
This chapter will include my personal experiences as one of the four Dutch 
founders of Science in Transition. I will discuss the message and the various 
forms of reception over the past 6 years by the different actors in the field, 
including administrators in university, academic societies and Ministries of 
Higher Education, Economic Affairs and Public Health but also from leader-
ship in the private sector. I will report on my personal experience of how these 
myths and ideologies play out in the daily practice of 40 years of biomedical 
research in policy and decision making in lab meetings, at departments, at 
grant review committees of funders and in the Boardrooms and the offices 
of Deans, Vice Chancellors and Rectors.
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was limited which also relates to the lack of inclusiveness, multidisciplinarity and 
diversity in academia. Production of robust and significant results aiming at real- 
world problems is mainly secondary to academic output relevant for an internally 
driven incentive and reward system steering for academic career advancement at the 
individual level. Similarly, at the higher organizational and national level this reward 
system is skewed to types of output and impact focused on positions on interna-
tional ranking lists. This incentive and reward system, with flawed use of metrics, 
drives a hyper-competitive social game in academia which results in a widely felt 
lack of alignment and little shared value in the academic community. Empirical 
data, most of it from within science and academia, showing these problems in dif-
ferent academic disciplines, countries and continents are published on a weekly 
basis since 2014. These critiques focus on the practices of scholarly publishing 
including Open Access and open data and, the adverse effects of the incentive and 
reward system. Images, ideologies and politics of science were exposed that insu-
late academia and science from society and its stakeholders, which distort the 
research agenda and subsequentially its societal and economic impact.
 Chapter 4: Science and Society: Pragmatism by Default
To rethink the relation between science and society and its current problems autho-
rative scholars in the USA and Europe, but also around the globe, have since 1980 
implicitly and increasingly explicitly gone back to the ideas of American pragma-
tism. Pragmatism as conceived by its founders Peirce, James and Dewey is known 
for its distinct philosophy/sociology of science and political theory. They argued 
that philosophy should not focus on theoretical esoteric problems with hair-splitting 
abstract debates of no interest to scientists because unrelated to their practice and 
problems in the real world. In a realistic philosophy of science, they did not accept 
foundationalism, dismissed the myth of given eternal principles, the unique ‘scien-
tific method’, absolute truths or let alone a unifying theory. They saw science as a 
plural, thoroughly social activity that has to be directed to real-world problems and 
subsequent interventions and action. ‘Truth’ in their sense was related to the poten-
tial and possible impact of the proposition when turned in to action. Knowledge 
claims were regarded per definition a product of the community of inquirers, fallible 
and through continuous testing in action were to be improved. Until 1950, this was 
the most influential intellectual movement in the USA, but with very little impact in 
Europe. Because of the dominance of the analytic positivistic approach to the phi-
losophy of science, after 1950 it lost its standing. After the demise of analytical 
philosophy, in the 1980s, there was a resurgence of pragmatism led by several so- 
called new or neo-pragmatists. Influential philosophers like Stephen Toulmin, 
Hillary Putnam and Philip Kitcher coming from the tradition of analytic philosophy 
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have written about their gradual conversion to pragmatism, for which in the early 
days they were frowned upon by esteemed colleagues. This movement gained trac-
tion first in the USA, in particular through works of Bernstein, Toulmin, Rorty, 
Putnam and Hacking, but also gained influence in Europe, early on through the 
works of Apel, Habermas and later Latour.
 Chapter 5: Science in Social Contexts
Gradually since 1990 a growing number of critical analyses from within science 
have published on how science was organized as a system and discussing its prob-
lems, despite, or paradoxically because the growing size of its endeavour and its 
growing yearly output. Because of lack of openness with regard to sharing results 
of research, such as publications and data but in fact of all sorts of other products, 
science is felt by many to disappoint with respect to its societal impact, its contri-
bution to the major problems humanity is facing in the current times. With the 
financial crisis, in analogy, also the crisis of the academic system as described in 
Chap. 3 was exposed and it seemed that similar systemic neoliberal economic 
mechanisms operated in these at first sight seemingly different industries. Most of 
these critiques appeared with increasing frequency since 2014 in formal scientific 
magazines and social media and reached the leadership of universities, govern-
ment and funders. This awareness and support for the development of new ways 
of doing science, mostly intuitively and implicitly, but sometimes explicitly, is 
motivated by pragmatism aiming for societal progress and contribution to the 
good life.
To get to this next level we need the critical reflection on the practice of science 
as done in previous chapters in order to make systemic changes to several critical 
parts of the knowledge production chain. I will discuss the different analyses of 
interactions between science and society, in the social and political contexts with 
publics and politics that show where and how we could improve. The opening up 
of science and academia in matters of problem choice, data sharing and evaluation 
of research together with stakeholders from outside academia will help to increase 
the impact of science on society. It ideally should promote equality, inclusion and 
diversity of the research agendas. This, I will argue, requires an Open Society 
with Deweyan democracy and safe spaces for deliberations where a diversity of 
publics and their problems can be heard. In this transition we have to pay close 
and continuous attention to the many effects of power executed by agents in soci-
ety and science that we know can distort these ‘ideal deliberations’ and undermine 




 Chapter 6: Science in Transition Reduced to Practice
In the true spirit of Dewey and pragmatism, knowledge, insights and experience 
have to be translated into interventions and actions. Only when knowledge is 
‘reduced to practice’, its social robustness and value will be determined. In light of 
the conclusions of the previous chapter, to be able to have more impact and to hold 
up our promise to society, we have to reflect who our science is organized and how 
it could be improved. From these reflections, several interventions in the practice of 
research have been proposed. When we, the Science in Transition Team, started to 
make public our critical accounts of the practice of science, I was ‘friendly advised’ 
by influential older scientists to first clean up the mess in my own institution, instead 
of pointing to others and to the system. As a matter of fact, that is what we have been 
doing at University Medical Centre Utrecht (UMC Utrecht) since 2009. In this 
chapter I present a brief outline of our actions ‘on the ground’ in UMC Utrecht, their 
receptions and some early actions to promote these activities abroad.
 Chapter 7: Transition to Open Science
Many initiatives addressing different types of problems of the practice of science 
and research have been described or cited. Some were one-issue local actions, some 
took a broader approach at the national and some at EU level. Some stayed on, oth-
ers faded after a few years. Many of the issues addressed by these movements and 
initiatives were part of the system of science and appeared to be systemically inter-
dependent. This is how they converged and precipitated in the movement of Open 
Science, somewhere at the beginning of the second decade of this century. I discuss 
the major move that was made since 2015 in the EU to embrace the Open Science 
practice as the way science and research are being done in Europe. This elicited ten-
sions at first foremost relate to uncertainty regarding scholarly publishing, of how 
and where we publish open access. But also, with respect to what immediate sharing 
of data and results in daily practice of researchers means, how we value and give 
credit for papers and published data sets. It thus poses the question of recognition 
and rewards, how, if at all, we must compare incomparable academic work, how we 
get credit and build reputations in this new open practice of science.
It is indeed believed that Open Science with its practice of responsible science 
will be a major contribution to address the dominant problems in science that we 
have analysed thus far, or at least will help to mitigate them. Open Science holds a 
promise to take science to the next phase as outlined in the previous chapters. That 
is not a romantic naive longing for the science that once was. It will be a truly novel, 




The Transition to Open Science, as can be anticipated from the analyses above, 
will not be trivial. The recent discussions have already shown that the transition to 
Open Science, even in different EU Member States, is a very different thing because 
of specific national, cultural and academic contexts.
I will conclude this chapter reporting some of my firsthand experiences, in 
Brussels and during visits to several EU member states in the course of a 
Mutual Learning Exercise, but also encounters in North America, South-East 
Asia and South Africa where we in the past years have discussed Open 
Science. We know science and scholarship have many forms and flavours and 
that wherever you go around the globe, there is not one scientific community. 
For me discussing the Transition to Open Science in the past four years was 
really a Learning Exercise, an amazing, mostly encouraging, but many times 




The plan for writing this book originates from 2013, the time when we started 
Science in Transition. I had been writing essays and book reviews about science and 
had published some of them in English with Amsterdam University Press in 2012. 
With the start of the Science in Transition movement, we wrote and talked continu-
ously about science in the broadest possible sense. During my seminars since then 
philosophy, sociology and politics of science were admixed with personal experi-
ences that illuminated the analyses of how science works, has gone wrong and what 
to do about it. Rinze Benedictus, MSc in medical biology and long-term science 
writer, was from the start involved in Science in Transition and before that as staff 
member had been working with us on the UMCUtrecht 3.0 Strategy 2010–2015. 
From his dual experience he recognized the journalistic power of mixing theoretical 
analysis with personal experiences and urged me to write it up or, given my lack of 
free time, at least contract a professional science writer who could do that with/for 
me. An important ‘boost’ to Rinze’s ‘priming’ came unexpectedly from Daniel 
Sarewitz. As I describe in Chap. 6, during a breakfast meeting with Dan Sarewitz 
and Paul Wouters, in January 2017 at Washington DC, I told Dan the story of the 
organizational intervention at UMC Utrecht which prompted the change in our way 
of research evaluation later on. Sarewitz, being a successful writer himself, imme-
diately said that I should write it up since it demonstrates how evaluations (‘metrics’ 
if you like) follow strategy. Against Rinze’s advice, I waited until March 2019 when 
I stepped down from the Executive Board of UMC Utrecht, trusting that the story I 
had to tell would still be relevant.
I am most grateful to the Board of UMC Utrecht and the Board of Utrecht 
University to jointly appoint me, per March 1, 2019, as chairperson of the UU Open 
Science Program which was an additional inspiration for me to write this book.
During the process of writing, but in fact since 1971, I was encouraged by fre-
quent discussions with Siebren Miedema, my brother who is by four years my 
senior and emeritus professor in Educational Foundations and Religious Education.
The manuscript or parts of it have been read by Sarah de Rijcke, René von 
Schomberg, Anja Smit, Huub Dijstelbloem, Jerome Ravetz, Frank Huisman, 
Wijnand Mijnhardt, Gerard de Vries, Siebren Miedema, Rinze Benedictus and 
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Susanne van Weelden. The members of the Utrecht University Open Science Team, 
Judith de Haan, Tom Peijster, Suzanna Bloem and Sicco de Knecht I thank for daily 
discussions and support while I worked on the book.
I am indebted to Paul Wouters, Melanie Peters, Albert Meijer, Kees Schuyt, 
Floris Cohen, Stuart Blume, Barend van de Meulen, Paul Wouters, Hans Chang, 
Bas van Bavel, Ulli Dirnagl, Daniel Sarewitz, John Ioannidis, Steven Goodman, 
David Moher, members of the UU Ethics Institute (especially Marcus Duwell and 
Joel Anderson), Patrick Bossuyt, Lex Bouter, Joeri Tijdink, staff members of the 
Athena Institute VU (especially Jacqueline Broerse), the WTMC Graduate School 
(especially Anne Beaulieu), GEWINA (especially Martijn van de Meer), Margriet 
Schneider, Wim Kremer, Berent Prakken, Wilfrid Opheij, Anna Ridderinkhof and 
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Chapter 1
Science and Society an Overview 
of the Problem
Abstract Science in the recent past promised to society to contribute to the grand 
challenges of the United Nations, UNESCO, WHO, the EU agenda and national 
agendas for change and improvement of our life, the human condition. In this chap-
ter it will be briefly discussed how this social contract between science and society 
has developed since 1945. In the context of this book I distinguish three time peri-
ods, but I do realize slightly different time periods may be preferred, based on the 
perspective taken. The first phase from 1945 till 1960 is characterized by autonomy, 
building on the successes of the natural sciences and engineering in World War II. In 
the second phase, the late sixties till approximately 1980, government and the pub-
lic lost trust and saw the downside of science and technology. The response from 
politics and the public was to call for societal and political responsible research 
inspired by broader socio-political developments in society. The third phase from 
1990 till 2010 was one of renewed enthusiasm and hope that science and technology 
would bring economic growth, which should make nations internationally competi-
tive. There increasingly was also room for societal problems related to environment 
and sustainability, health and well-being. In this approach of the so-called knowl-
edge economy, with the world-wide embracing of neoliberal politics, strong rela-
tions with government and the private sector were established. This was accompanied 
by short-term accountability, control from government and funders at the level of 
project output, using accordingly defined metrics and indicators. Because of this, 
this model became firmly and globally institutionalized.
It is beyond any doubt that knowledge and innovation are more than ever critically 
needed to address the current global problems of society that affect our lives, that 
scientific investigation and the huge public investments involved, could have and 
must have significantly more impact. This is echoed and pursued by governments, 
NGO’s and others in recent reports and strategic plans (UN, EU, UNESCO, IS7). 
Do we need such frequent calls upon the responsibility of the science community? 
Aren’t they engaged? Do I need to write this book? Indeed, the calls upon science 
are timely as ever before, one must say. It is timely and rather urgent for quite dif-
ferent reasons. The factors I will discuss here relate to how science and academia 
have become and, in many ways still are organized and how this affects and distorts 
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productive interactions between science and society. From the perspective of soci-
ety this results in suboptimal agenda setting and thus suboptimal return on invest-
ment in science’s contribution to the major societal issues of our time and age. 
Before doing so, I will, like virtually every writer about science, scientific inquiry 
and academia, make it very clear, that science1 has produced and is producing 
many important results. The ‘hard’ natural sciences in particular since the indus-
trial revolution have had enormous impact on the human condition, on the quality 
of our lives. Scientific investigation and the community of its practitioners had in 
the seventeenth century gone through a critical change which enabled production 
of solid and practical knowledge that could be tested and certified (Cohen, 2010; 
Shapin, 1996). This relates in particular to the various fields of natural sciences like 
physics, chemistry and engineering. In the twentieth century it has been followed 
with major progress in especially biomedical research and the geosciences, but 
also research in psychology, sociology, economy, history and ethics and philoso-
phy have irreversibly changed our lives. New sources of energy, transport and com-
munication, availability of clean water, improvement of general public health 
mainly through novel measures of hygiene, vaccination and antibiotics, improve-
ment and efficiency of industrial production have impacted our material quality of 
life. Despite the criticism and the mistrust in science, especially when it brings 
insights with potentially socially or economically unpleasant consequences, the 
way scientific knowledge is produced makes it the best institution we have to 
increase our understanding of the world we live in and understanding ourselves 
and our life. 
Science is a community of peers that puts new findings and claims to the test, that 
purges and filters it to become robust, reliable, objective and trustworthy knowledge 
that can guide our actions. At the same time, it keeps producing new knowledge that 
may, if it survives the reliability tests, replace older beliefs by which mechanism our 
knowledge growths. This is most accessibly explained by John Ziman (1978, 2000).
Having said this, it does not mean that the organisation of science as it has devel-
oped in the past 70 years into an international institution cannot be improved to 
better serve the needs of the various societies and publics around the globe. It is 
exactly this notion that I am concerned with. It is about the question how knowledge 
grows. I will discuss which and whose values and ideas about science and society 
are involved when we determine its excellence and potential impact and how this 
determines the research agenda through funding and investments decisions. As the 
growth of knowledge is not autonomous, not random nor guided by the legendary 
‘invisible hand’, it must be possible to improve the impact of science by cognizant 
governance to aim at better alignment of the research enterprise with our major 
national and global societal needs.
1 I will use ‘science’ or ‘the sciences” when I mean to say something about research in all academic 
disciplines which comprise natural, life science, engineering, the social sciences and scholarship 
in the humanities. I will use ‘science’ also when I talk about the total of the academic institutional 
system of knowledge production.
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John Dewey in 1948 concludes in his Introduction to the reprint of his Reconstruction 
in Philosophy (Dewey, 1948), that science had freed us up from religion and ‘was 
regarded a deliberate assault on the morals that were tied up with the religion of 
Western Europe( p xii),… but the world and rationality of the natural and technical 
sciences had deeply entered human daily life (p xiii)’. The natural sciences have thus 
entered the domain which was initially ‘not only the domain of religious belief and 
practices, but of virtually all institutions that have been established before the rise of 
modern science (p xiii)’. By doing so, he concluded that the original compromise to 
keep these fields separated, to keep science insulated, had failed. He called for system-
atic deep philosophical analysis of how that has come about, how it had distorted the 
old institutions and how we should deal with the significant novel moral issues that 
come with it. Despite all the technological benefits ‘this had not resulted in a world 
with more security, peace, better governance and higher moral standards’. This clear 
critique of the adverse effects of modernity was a broad theme in the thinking of 
American pragmatism. The use of nuclear weapons, which had happened just 3 years 
before Dewey wrote these lines, was for many, including leading physicists as Einstein 
the reason to critically reflect on the societal impact and responsibility of science. 
Dewey: ‘The development of scientific inquiry is immature; it has not as yet got 
beyond the physical and physiological aspects of human concerns, interests and sub-
ject matters. The institutional conditions into which it enters, and which determine its 
human consequences have not yet been subjected to any serious, systematic inquiry 
worthy of being designated scientific’ (p xv) (Dewey, 1948).
I leave it to the reader to reflect on the relevance of these observations for our 
times. Obviously, science which formally in the US National Science Foundation 
(NSF) only since 1958 next to the  natural  sciences  includes the social sciences, 
humanities and engineering, has grown and matured and has become a major global 
factor in virtually all aspects and domains of public, private and social human life. 
The relationship between science and society has therefore even become more intri-
cate, more complicated and at the same time more critical regarding the major soci-
etal challenges we are facing in the third decade of the twenty-first century.
1.1  A Call for Action
The very week in October 2019, that I started the actual writing of this chapter, 
Nature featured an Editorial on the massive and sad waste in the global food supply 
system evidenced by research. In the same issue a major big data research paper on 
mortality in very young children showing global improvement, but still great 
inequalities in preventable mortality between different geographical regions. In the 
accompanying comment Michelle Bachelet, a former president of Chile and paedia-
trician with hands on experience of this problem in that country, argues for an inte-
grated research approach to understand the causes in terms not simply of access to 
health care, but of ‘broader ills: poverty, disempowerment, discrimination and injus-
tice’. ‘Hard data’, she writes, ‘must be followed up by action across a whole 
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spectrum of government and society’ (Bachelet, 2019). In that same issue of Nature, 
Diane Coyle, well known from ‘The Economics of Enough’, published a review of 
three recent books on economics by prominent authors and closes of with a couple 
of very gloomy lines: ‘as Soros asserts that intellectual framework of economics 
must adapt to a world ever more removed from a focus on individual choices. This 
trend is under way in economics, but a radical rethink is unlikely there: the incen-
tives of academia encourage conservatism and incremental progress”. She contin-
ues: ‘Better metrics and theories will not be enough to create a sustainable economic 
and social model. Or they could- but only if they convince policymakers and the 
public to act differently’. As the final blow she adds: ‘The future of capitalism is out 
of the hands of those who spend their time thinking about it’ (Coyle, 2019). That 
same week in an editorial in Science, Ian Boyd chairman of the UK Research 
Integrity Office, reflects with a strong sense of urgency on the failing interaction 
between scientists and government and politics (Boyd, 2019). Science should 
engage more with government and the public debates and let itself not be put in a 
box with a tight lid on it and being manipulated to become yet another ‘money grab-
bing vested interest’. ‘Advocacy is the surest and most rapid way to achieve such an 
effect’, he argues ‘although science should not be captured by normal politics’.
These quotes all argue, although in slightly different ways, that science, aca-
demic research should aim to have an effect in the real world. As I have argued: ‘A 
paper in Nature does not cure patients’. It does not change the life expectancy of 
young children, global socioeconomic systems and policies, the politics, logistics 
and trade of food, unless it is put into practice, translated to actions to change the 
condition of those whose quality of life is affected by the problem under study. 
Science, these writers in October 2019 say, in order to contribute and impact on 
society, has to connect with the publics, the stakeholders out there who have an 
interest, an expectation getting a problem solved, having their lives improved. It 
must result in actions, that then will be put to the test in practice. In this pick of 
weekend reading of October 19 and 20, 2019, the issues of socioeconomic inequal-
ity, public health, societal injustice and food waste are featured, but we also know of 
grand challenges like climate change; the transition to fossil-free energy; the threats 
to democracy and its institutions, which includes threats to science by populism and 
nationalism. In the twenty-first century, challenges are complex, mostly non-linear, 
which needs a different approach compared to most of the science done before 
(Beck, 1992; Nowotny, 2016). Science, to be effective must be much more mission-
oriented, inclusive, truly multidisciplinary. It should drive not mainly for economic 
and technological impact, but should also target public and social needs and keep in 
mind that technology for many problems is not the only solution as it reception by 
the public will often be poorly understood. Social sciences and humanities (SSH) 
have to engage since major issues in modern life are in the social and political 
domain where SSH including economy and political sciences have a lot to offer. The 
UN has defined seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that must be 
taken on through science and innovation.2 To address these goals, breakthrough 
2 https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
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knowledge and solutions will not only come from the natural, biomedical sciences 
and engineering (STEM). Major issues in these domains relate to problems that 
need to be investigated in a truly integrated way by researchers from STEM and SSH.
1.2  The Social Contract for Science, What’s the Problem?
Why do these authors feel that they have to make these strong pledges to science 
and the academic community to not only investigate and publish, but to take their 
academic results one stage further and engage throughout with the relevant agents, 
policy makers and publics and citizens to which the societal issues matter? What’s 
wrong here? Isn’t it, that almost every website of universities and academic institu-
tions around the globe says that its mission, ambitions and strategy are to contribute 
to the quality of life by excellent research and teaching? That even in most cases 
explicit societal themes and targets have been chosen in agreement with the 
UN SDGs?
From the perspective of the public, policymakers, charities and public and pri-
vate funders one would indeed trust and expect that academic science would be 
fully geared towards maximal and optimal impact to address and alleviate condi-
tions that interfere with the good life and to address human needs at whatever level 
in society: personal, structural or political. That is why we think large amounts of 
public tax money are invested, or to state it more realistic, are being spent.
The relationship, however, between governmental and charity funders and the 
researchers which have in the previous century become organised in academic insti-
tutions and governmental agencies is not that simple. The study of the history of 
science and its institutions in particular from World War 2 (WW2) on, shows that he 
connection and interaction between science and society is quite complex and that 
the aims of the scientific community on the one hand and government and the public 
on the other, are not always well aligned. The collective of institutions and the com-
munity of research and science has developed since 1945, as the result of a vigorous 
political debate in the USA as in other western countries. (Kleinman) (Guston & 
Keniston, 1994; Sarewitz, 1996, 2016) In the USA this resulted in the famous Social 
Contract for Science in which science was governed by scientists, spending public 
money without influence or interference by government. Science did rely on its own 
distinct dynamics in academia, in the different (sub)disciplines, faculties and insti-
tutes of universities and in the highly respected and influential learned societies.
Science has thus been established as a ‘state in a state’, the Scientific Estate 
(Price, 1965) or the Republic of Science (Polanyi, 1962b), with its own goals, rules, 
governance, ethics and (counter)norms (Bourdieu, 2004; Latour, 1987; Merton, 
1973; Ziman, 2000) Its culture and politics are until this day largely determined by 
old ideas originating from the first half of the twentieth century – from the classical 
philosophy and sociology of science about how science ought to be done. It still has 
that mythical narrative about ‘the scientific method’ of the ‘hard’ sciences, ‘pure 
versus applied’, about ‘the relation between science and technology’ and ‘the linear 
1.2 The Social Contract for Science, What’s the Problem?
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model of innovation’ which Vannevar Bush so effectively used to establish the 
Scientific Estate at the end of WW2. It is still used in the public debates to defend 
public funding and importantly secure autonomous governance for science and aca-
demia (Bush & United States. Office of Scientific Research and Development, 
1945; Greenhill, 2000; Kleinman, 1995). Moreover, as I will argue in detail in the 
following Chapters, it determines to a great deal still our academic culture: how 
excellence and quality is defined and how choices regarding the research agenda are 
made but also how it affects diversity and inclusiveness of research and researchers 
in academia.
1.3  Politics Outside In
In the scientific community and academia there are like in all institutions strong and 
sometimes opposing ideas at play about how science as a societal force for progress 
should be organized, positioned and governed in society in relation to need and 
expectations of the public. How it should be facilitated to be able to show maximal 
progress and finally and most relevant, how and by whom quality and progress is to 
be defined. These debates are in some respects quite academic and may sound eso-
teric but are in fact highly relevant for the daily practice of research. They directly 
affect questions regarding the effects of internal and external powers in science, for 
instance regarding internal distribution of credit which involves measures of excel-
lence, academic hierarchies, positions, standing and esteem, allocation of grant 
money. These politics of science directly and indirectly determine problem choice 
and thus the growth of knowledge and also the impact of science in a wider societal 
context. The reader could get the impression from this historical approach and my 
dominant reference of the seminal works of the second half of previous century, that 
this mainly is a problem of the past. Make no mistake, unfortunately, that is not the 
case, as recent empirical work has shown and will be discussed in the following 
chapters (Fochler & de Rijcke, 2017; Franssen et  al., 2018; Hammarfelt & de 
Rijcke, 2014; Hammarfelt et al., 2017; Kaltenbrunner & de Rijcke, 2016; Müller & 
de Rijcke, 2017; Rushforth & de Rijcke, 2015; Rushforth et al., 2018; Rushforth & 
de Rijcke, 2016).
This relates to persistence of classical ideas about the scientific method, truth, 
value-free science, academic autonomy, neutrality and the insulation of science 
from external non-scientific values, from politics and from society at large. These 
problems of engagement and responsibility, versus autonomy and academic free-
dom are not at all new and have been discussed in the sixties and seventies from 
different philosophical, sociological and political viewpoints (Rose & Rose, 1969; 
Ziman, 1996; Ravetz, 1971; Bernal, 1939; Polanyi, 1962b; Habermas, 1970a, b; 
Toulmin, 1964; Weinberg, 1963).
From 1960 the idea of science as a communitive action, a truly collective and 
social process with a professional culture organized to produce certified and robust 
knowledge became established. In particular since Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific 
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Revolutions published in 1962, in academia it became acceptable and was recog-
nized indispensable to study the various social aspects of science taking into 
account, other than strict scientific arguments to be able to explain the growth of 
knowledge (Kuhn, 1962). These developments originated from ground-breaking 
work by a few scholars that in a novel way started to perform studies of how science 
works and how we make and accept knowledge (Hanson, 1958; Toulmin, 1972; 
Polanyi, 1962a; Ziman, 1968). Their studies deviated from the until then dominant 
mainly normative philosophical discussion based on the natural sciences on the 
status of scientific claims, and instead focused on the practice of science and how 
knowledge and our common beliefs in practice are reached, instead of discussing 
how science ought to be done. As I will discuss later, despite that this work goes 
back 40–60 years, since it was mainly performed in the social sciences and humani-
ties faculties, in the faculties of natural sciences, geoscience and biomedical sci-
ences, this still has not been widely noticed. The majority of practitioners and 
administrators intuitively still go by the Standard Model, a popular image of science 
that does not correspond with the actual aim and practice of science. The classical 
ideologized images of science and its poor match with the actual practices of knowl-
edge making, is highly problematic since until this day it determines to a large 
extend how science is being done in academia. Obviously, a correct self- 
understanding of science is also of particular importance in debates where proper 
reflection on the status, the higher purpose and the position of science in society is 
required (Habermas, 1971).
1.4  The Social Contract of Science Revisited
Despite its own mythical claims of autonomy and of pure investigator-driven 
research as the highest ideal, science, especially natural science and engineering, 
but increasingly biomedical research from 1945 on, was driven and had grown 
immensely by infusion of public money that targeting mainly public issues of health 
and agriculture. In addition, science around the globe remained heavily connected 
to the corporate and military sector, also in times of peace after WW2. In the US 
investments especially the natural sciences were boosted by Eisenhower in reaction 
to the hysteria in science and education prompted by the first successful manned 
Soviet spaceflight of Sputnik in 1958 (Greenberg, 1999). In private discussions at 
that time with his adviser James R.  Killian, a former president of MIT, 
Eisenhower expressed his irritation about scientists who pursued their own interests 
instead of those of the nation with their work having too little benefit for society and 
its publics. Interestingly, despite this reprise of Vannevar Bush’s agenda of 1945 now 
provoked by Sputnik and the Cold War, Eisenhower in his famous farewell speech 
17 January 1961 expressed his deep worries about the fact that science had been 
hijacked by the military and the commercial interests of the connected industries.
This boost of the natural sciences in the USA seems in some respect in agree-
ment with C.P.  Snow’s even more famous, bold and original cultural and 
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philosophical critique of academia and science in his ‘The Two Cultures’ (Snow, 
1993). He argued in 1959 that academia in the UK held theoretical, pure scholarship 
of the humanities in much higher esteem than research in the natural sciences with 
their technical and practical applications. Stefan Collini in his most insightful intro-
duction to the 1993 reprinting of Snow’s book, elaborates on its cultural and social 
background, reception and the brutal dismissal by F.R. Leavis. Collini states the 
following: ‘The ‘Leavis-Snow controversy’ can obviously be seen a re-enacting of a 
familiar clash in English cultural history- the Romantic versus the Utilitarian, 
Coleridge versus Bentham, Arnold versus Huxley and other less celebrated 
examples(pxxxv.) Snow, according to Collini, was ‘clearly frustrated about the dom-
ination of the traditionally educated upper class and was motivated by class resent-
ment’ which places the ‘The Two Cultures’ also in a much larger and moral 
socio-political context than science. In the Second Look, indeed Snow confesses 
that the original title ‘Rich and Poor’ would have been better suited for his argu-
ment. He ends the book after he discusses major social and economic problems as 
follows: ‘With good fortune, however, we can educate a large proportion of our 
better minds so that they are not ignorant of imaginative experience, both in arts 
and science, not ignorant of the endowments of applied science, of the remediable 
suffering of most of our fellow humans, and of the responsibilities which, once they 
are seen, cannot be denied’(p100).
Eight years later, Peter Medawar, a famous observer of science, immunologist 
and Nobel prize winner, made a similar observation from within his domain of the 
biomedical sciences. His critique was based on the ‘pure versus applied’ distinction 
and he discussed the ‘motives which have led people to think (it) (these different 
forms of research) highly important, and above all to make it the basis of an intel-
lectual class-distinction.’ (p120) (Medawar, 1967). ‘The two conceptions are, 
roughly speaking, the romantic and the rational, or the poetic and analytical, the 
one speaking for imaginative insight and the other for the evidence of senses, one 
finding in scientific research its own reward, the other calling for a valuation in the 
currency of practical use’ (p10–11). ‘The notion of purity has somehow been super-
imposed upon it (Bacon’s distinction) and in a new usage that connotes a conscious 
and inexplicable sight-righteous disengagement form pressures of necessity and 
use. The distinction is….between polite and rude learning, between laudable use-
less and the vulgar applied, the free and intellectually compromised, the poetic and 
the mundane’ (p121–212). While pure science is a genteel and even creditable activ-
ity for scientists in universities, applied science, with all its horrid connotations of 
trade, has no place on the campus’(p126).
Medawar, who came very early in his life with his parents from Brazil to England 
and studied at Oxford, came from comparable social backgrounds as Snow, outside 
the traditional social elites (Collini here cites Trilling pxxxix). Medawar interprets 
these two distinct conceptions and cultures of science in the larger social cultural 
Anglo-Saxon context, which was ‘terribly English’, he remarks. Both clearly see 
the unproductive cultural and philosophic tension that even affects the organiza-
tional level of the academy. They argue explicitly for a proper balance between 
science and humanities, but also for a balance of pure and applied within the science 
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disciplines. They see this social and cultural divide and its academic hierarchy as 
obstructive to optimal societal impact of scientific research and of the academia as 
an institution. Medawar explicitly discusses criteria of (e)valuation of science, in his 
opinion being the ‘size of ..contribution to that huge, logically articulated structure 
of ideas’ and for humanists ‘by different but equally honourable standards, particu-
larly by the contribution it makes, directly or indirectly, to our understanding of 
human nature and conduct, and human sensibility’ (p126).
Medawar states that ‘pure’ nor ‘applied’ are specific criteria for evaluation of 
research. With the hindsight of 2019, we know, as we shall discuss later, that in the 
unwritten and written mores they most surely were, and to great extent still are and 
not only in the UK. Medawar at the same time concludes with a visionary remark 
that ‘The humanist fears that if we abandon the ideal of pure knowledge, knowledge 
acquired for its own sake, then usefulness becomes the only measure of merit. And 
that if it does become so, research in the human arts is doomed’ (p126).
This is indeed the major worry from the domain of humanities that Snow and 
Medawar, despite their complaints could have anticipated based on what had 
already happened in the politics of science after the ‘coup’ of the ‘hard sciences’ 
and in particular the physicists lead by Vannevar Bush. Interestingly, philosophers 
in these same years already saw a major problem with the dominance of the 
worldview and ideas of modernity and the corresponding reductionist positivist 
Cartesian way of doing science. This ‘scientific method’ appeared to have proven 
quite successful first for the technosciences, the ‘hard sciences’ and later biology 
and biomedical research but was not appropriate for the social sciences and 
humanities. Disciplines that studied the social domain of society and human life 
need the classical pre- modern methods of arguments, reason and rhetoric (Winch, 
1958; Toulmin, 1961, 1972). The present-day academic should not forget that 
SSH were in academia, in sharp contrast to the centuries before, for a large part of 
the twentieth century, not considered scientific nor serious rational endeavours. It 
took an extra 8 years before these disciplines were recognized as science and were 
included after the start in 1950 of the US National Science Foundation. As we will 
see later in this book, and as Shapin wrote in 2007, Snow was ‘not at a funeral of 
the natural sciences, but at a christening’. ‘In the academy and most modern 
research universities, it is the natural sciences that have the pride of the place and 
the humanities and social sciences that look on in envy and sometimes resent-
ment.’ (Shapin, 2007).
In the meantime, Project Hindsight, a study on the return of investments in sci-
ence aiming at military defence ran from 1963 until 1968, that was officially pub-
lished in 1970. The conclusions were quite shocking for the science establishment. 
Technology accounted for 91% of the impact, very little was attributable to applied 
science and nearly nothing to basic science (Sherwin & Isenson, 1967). In these 
days, the critical comments made by President Johnson at the signing ceremony of 
Medicare (June 1966), about a lack of clinical impact of publicly funded basic bio-
medical research (‘laboratory research’) elicited strong protests from the biomedi-
cal research community, which can still be heard in many biomedical institutes.
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1.5  The Politics of Scientific Choice
As a logical consequence of these critical views and evaluations of science, the 
unescapable question of how to deal with ‘the complexity of scientific choice’ 
came up. In a series of high-profile papers, published at the very start of the jour-
nal Minerva, between in 1962–1964.  They were written by authorities like 
Michael Polanyi, Alvin Weinberg, CF Carter and John Maddox and are very remi-
niscent of the current debates about Incentive and Rewards (Carter, 1963; Maddox, 
1964; Polanyi, 1962b; Weinberg, 1963). Stephen Toulmin wrote a review of these 
papers, discussing the quite different perspectives presented. Up-front he con-
cluded that ‘the questions about selection and priorities, implicit in all discus-
sions of science policy are both difficult and inescapable’ (Toulmin, 1964). The 
problem, he writes is there for both less developed and industrialised (developed) 
countries, but they are of course very different for them (p333). The difficulty is 
that we know too little about the consequences and long-term impact of in particu-
lar fundamental research since we know too little about the course that both sci-
ence and society will run and which problems will emerge. Toulmin suggests that 
we therefore should systematically study sociological, economic and organisa-
tional questions involved in the interactions between science and society. In addi-
tion, he concludes that we need to understand the issues at play in the formulation 
and administration of a science policy and ‘remove any fog due to ambiguities, 
cross-purposes or hidden assumptions’. Polanyi is well known for his advocacy 
for the autonomous and self- governed ‘Republic of Science’. Its higher aim being 
to reveal ‘a hidden reality for the sake of intellectual satisfaction’.  He argues 
strongly for the scientific community and its internal structures to decide on sci-
entific choice. “Guiding the progress of science into socially beneficent channels’ 
is ‘nonsensical’ and ‘guiding scientific research towards a purpose other than its 
own, will deflect the advancement of science’ (cited by Toulmin). Maddox agrees 
with him, pointing out that it takes debates between academics (intellectual con-
frontations and open discussions) to decide on research priorities, which he says 
will also have to be done for the technological applied sciences. This is all well, 
hard to do, even within a given branch or subdiscipline, but Weinberg taking the 
problem to a higher organizational level, is more interests in choices ‘which pit 
different fields against each other, for instance molecular biology, high energy 
physics and behavioural sciences’. Their potential impact and relevance in sci-
ence and society is incommensurable. He proposes and elaborates on three crite-
ria’s of merit: technological, scientific and social. For massive public support at 
least two should be highly rated. Social merit is to be decided on external argu-
ments (politics and values) about issues like ‘health, food production, defence and 
prestige’. He, being a physicists, offers some judgement: ‘molecular biology has 
all three merits, but high energy physics is somewhat overrated,… space-research 
is only masquerading as science, but if it is more on prestige (first man on the 
moon) or for military impact we should say so’. Carter comes from a very 
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utilitarian economic perspective and regarding pure research he believes that ‘any 
nation is at liberty to undertake pure research beyond its justification by its ulti-
mate application’. There is of course no one science policy, says Toulmin, and he 
points to the many science policy choices that continuously have to be made, in 
science and governments, as the way these obvious different perspectives, play 
out in reality. Because of the plurality of problems, in science and society they 
will be plurality of criteria and merits that are relevant in the many different con-
texts in which political choices regarding science policy have to be made. He also 
points out the problematic use of ‘the scientists’ and ‘the scientific community’, 
the lack of democracy of these communities with its ‘age-and-status structure’ of 
a gerontocracy which impedes assessing ‘the scientific opinion’. There are many 
interactions and contact points of science with government and these involve 
many different scientists who will apply ‘their minds to a different group of prob-
lems and the needs of each partnership will impose their own pattern of research 
priorities and criteria of choice’. Regards this debate, Toulmin distinguishes also 
four distinct types of research, from (1) pure natural science to (2) speculative 
technology, to (3) applied product- oriented and (4) problem-oriented research 
aimed at solving a particular practical problem that has different stakeholders in 
science and society. He continues this paragraph with an insightful statement rem-
iniscent of John Dewey’s pragmatism that at that time already was nearly forgot-
ten: “The urgent question to-day is, how the republic of science is to be integrated 
not only into the broader academic confederation, but into the whole community 
of citizens. For it is on the answer to this question that our broader criteria of 
scientific choice ultimately depend’.
This thinking was propagated before in the first wave of Science for Society in 
the UK in 1935 by the so-called ‘scientific humanists’ including J.D.  Bernal, 
Frederick Soddy and colleagues with their book ‘The Frustration of Science’ and 
the founding in 1938 of a new division of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science for the social guidance to the progress of science. 
Followed by the Royal Society’s initiative put to the universities in 1945 for ‘The 
Balanced Development of Science in the United Kingdom. All ‘at best pointless’ 
in the opinion of Polanyi. For Polanyi opening up science and research to politics 
and publics and being held responsible for the adverse effects of its research, was 
an absolute ‘no go’, which was based on his traumatic experiences in the less open 
and less democratic societies he had fled from (Guston, 2012). He was thus happy 
to conclude in 1962 that ‘this movement (by Bernal and colleagues) has virtually 
petered out’. He asks the for him rhetoric question ‘Have not even the socialist 
parties throughout Europe endorsed now the usefulness of the market?” We will 
see that maybe they did not in 1962, but they really did from 1980 on. His own 
‘Society for Freedom in Science’, however, established in reaction to Bernal et al., 
after its start in 1944 was also very short lived (Society for Freedom in Science, 
Nature, July 8, 1944).
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1.6  Conclusion
As of this writing, the relations and interactions between science and society and the 
issues of problem choice for the setting of the science agenda, obviously are still 
topics of hot debate. They touch upon many crucial aspects of the practice of sci-
ence, but also on the dangers of the possibility of abuse of science via the immense 
powers of multinationals in our deregulated neoliberal economies. We have to keep 
in mind the threat to free scholarship and research in many countries where democ-
racy itself is under threat. Before I discuss the more recent developments in light of 
these images of science in Chaps. 5, 6 and 7, I will analyse in more detail which 
images of science are involved, what their status is and where they originate from 
(Chap. 2). Then I will discuss how they determined and distorted our views, atti-
tudes, policies and the organization and potential of science and its interactions with 
stakeholders in society (Chap. 3).
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Chapter 2
Images of Science: A Reality Check
Abstract It will be argued that the dominant form of current academic science is 
based on ideas and concepts about science and research that date back to philosophy 
and sociology that was developed since the 1930s. It will be discussed how this 
philosophy and sociology of science has informed the ideas, myths and ideology 
about science held by the scientific community and still determines the popular 
view of science. It is even more amazing when we realize that these ideas are philo-
sophically and sociologically untenable and since the 1970s were declared obsolete 
by major scholars in these same disciplines. To demonstrate this, I delve deep to 
discuss the distinct stages that scholars in philosophy, sociology and history of sci-
ence since 1945 to 2000 have gone through to leave the analytical-positivistic phi-
losophy behind. I will be focusing on developments of their thinking about major 
topics such as: how scientific knowledge is produced, the scientific method; the 
status of scientific knowledge and the development of our ideas about ‘truth’ and the 
relation of our claims to reality. It will appear that the positivistic ideas about sci-
ence producing absolute truth, about ‘the unique scientific method’, its formal logi-
cal approach and its timeless foundation as a guarantee for our value-free, objective 
knowledge were not untenable. This is to show how thoroughly the myth has been 
demystified in philosophy and sociology of science. You think after these fifty pages 
I am kicking a dead horse? Not at all! This scientific demystification has unfortu-
nately still not reached active scientists. In fact, the popular image of science and 
research is still largely based on a that Legend. This is not without consequence as 
will be shown in Chap. 3. These images of science have shaped and in fact distorted 
the organisational structures of academia and the interaction between its institutes 
and disciplines. It also affects the relationship of science with its stakeholders in 
society, its funders, the many publics private and public, and policy makers in gov-
ernment. In short, it determines to a large degree  the growth of knowledge with 
major effects on society.
16
2.1  Part 1. Images of Science, a Reality Check
‘The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science does 
not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a 
swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the 
swamp, but not down any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it 
is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the 
piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being’. (p109) (Popper, 1959)
 Introduction
Unlike most natural scientists writing about science that are not philosophers or 
amateur philosophers like me, I am convinced that I need to discuss the origins of the 
philosophical ideas and concepts that are the basis of the dominant image of modern 
science that in 1981 still was ‘the widespread popular conception of science’ (p2) 
according to Ian Hacking in his influential book Representing and Intervening. 
(Hacking, 1983) I experienced time and again during my professional career that it 
are these obsolete and incongruous ideas about science and research that even now 
determine and distort to a large extent our views, attitudes, policies and politics, 
discourse, professional and collegial interactions in academia. I fully realize that the 
analysis that follows, to readers with less than average knowledge of the history of 
the philosophy of science, may feel as a much too deep dive. Understandably, they 
will wonder whether they need to know all that. The story of analytical philosophy 
and logical positivism and how it has impregnated our image of science, is essential 
for my argument to understand the origins and persistence of the problems of sci-
ence and academia. One can without a problem skip, the whole or Part 2 of this 
chapter and only take note of the conclusions of Part 1. For a more general quick 
read, I refer to Chap. 3 of my Science 3.0 (Miedema, 2012) or the very nice paper by 
(Pinch, 2001) or Shapin’s Science and the Modern World. (Shapin, 2007).
In this chapter, but throughout the book, I will present a narrative in which I 
will take my own intellectual and scientific journey from 1971 as a chemistry 
student who did a minor in the philosophy of science in academic year 
1975–1976. Since then, I followed the classical career path of a professional 
biochemist/immunologist, as PhD student, post-doc, group leader, depart-
ment head, director of a small research institute, to finally become dean and 
board member of a large University Medical Centre. Going through this pro-
fessional sequence, I kept a persistent and ever stronger interest in the science 
of science. It is from the perspective of a true understanding of the practice of 
science in its various aspects that I will use specific authors a lot, but others 
much less or even neglect work of many scholars that to specialists in the dif-
ferent fields are considered important but are of little or no relevance for the 
daily practice of active researchers and most other actors in the field.
2 Images of Science: A Reality Check
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The Frontstage and Backstage Paradox
The popular image of science, mainly of the natural and biomedical sciences is 
sometimes called the Standard Model. It is the well-known narrative of ‘the sci-
entific method’ and ‘the vocational noble’ scientists discovering nature and 
truths’. It is based on a blend of normative philosophy, mainly of epistemology 
designated the ‘Legend’ and normative sociology, both were developed in the 
first half of the twentieth century. This romanticised image is still widely used 
‘on stage’ in the media, in public debates not only when science is besieged or if 
scientists feel besieged or fear budget cuts. Paradoxically, contrary to this ‘front-
stage’ image, most scientists, ‘backstage’ in their training and daily professional 
life are somehow aware that there is no unique method, no formal logic which 
guides scientists to the truth. In contrast, when being introduced to the daily 
research practice, they are trained to use a set of instrumentalist principles and 
methodologies how to make reliable knowledge. Most of these are practical prin-
ciples referring to techniques, producing and reading texts being journal articles 
or books, how to set up experiments or investigations, about interpreting and 
discussing experimental results, the requirement of reproducibility, and thus how 
to conclude what is to be believed or if you will, is ‘true’. These are being passed 
on to new generations of researchers while they are doing their first rotations in 
laboratories and departments as master students or PhDs. Of course, there are 
courses on methods in the field of research -for instance in my case as a BSc 
chemistry and MSc biochemistry/immunology student since 1971 chemistry, 
biochemistry, immunology, bacteriology, virology, molecular biology-, and on 
methodologies like epidemiology, statistics, bioinformatics, spectroscopy, mass 
spectrometry, NMR, fMRI, genetics. Students are introduced to the state of the 
art of the discipline with its most novel technical developments and findings. In 
the natural and biomedical sciences introduction is done almost without refer-
ence to history, the pathways that led to that state of the art in the field.
We, as natural scientists do not worry too much about a formal timeless foun-
dation on which we build our investigations, experiments, claims and conclu-
sions. The most important thing you learn is that your claims must hold, that is, 
can be successfully used by others inside or outside the laboratory or depart-
ment. Those exceptional scientists who started to think and write about science 
did not spent too many words on the philosophy and sociology of science. In 
the natural and life sciences one can become a tenured professor without ever 
having to read or having read Popper, Merton or Kuhn although most of them 
want us to believe they once did. There is slightly more interest in the history of 
the sciences, which mostly are romanticized narratives about the classical gems 
with an even more classical linear narratives explaining how we arrived were 
we are now, with a lot of attention for the top scientists, the geniuses in the field. 
These histories until the 1970s were almost all written from the perspective of 
the Standard Model. The most famous and widely read exception still is James 
Watson’s The Double Helix published in 1968 which for that reason had a very 
critical reception that still is of great interest to our understanding of images of 
science and scientists for which I will return to below. (Watson, 1968)
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 The Standard Model and the Legend
Still the best-known image and narrative of science, of how inquiry and research is 
being done, I am afraid, is an idealized picture that has in the literature been desig-
nated the Standard Model sometimes also called the popular view. The Standard 
Model is an interesting composite. Its image is built on the one hand on the classical 
theory about scientific investigation, its unique method, the status of its knowledge 
claims and the belief system associated with it. This image coming from the phi-
losophy of science has been designated ‘the Legend’. Indeed, until this day, implic-
itly but also explicitly very much of the Standard Model echoes the ideas of what 
used to be the dominant philosophy and sociology of science until the 1960s.
These ideas about the theories and statements of science and the unique formal 
status of its knowledge claims, have been developed in the philosophy of science in 
the first half of the twentieth century. This originated from the seventeenth century 
Cartesian rationality of Modernity which takes its name after Descartes. There are 
some influences from early positivists like Comte but its form is mainly determined 
at the beginning of the twentieth century when it became admixed with elements of 
the logical positivistic tradition of the Vienna Circle, the analytical philosophy of 
science and the works of Popper. Descartes assumed a formal mathematical method 
that would be grounded on a set of timeless universal principles, an objective foun-
dation and even unique ‘God-given endowments to the human mind’ were invoked 
(Descartes, 1968). This would be the general solution to the problem of the logical 
formal relation between the observed and the observer. The positivists and Popper, 
however rejected this timeless and objective ‘God’s eye perspective’ or ‘Archimedean 
point’ as metaphysics, non-empirical and thus per definition as unscientific. To deal 
with the problem of objectivity- how can we objectively know without our own 
cultural biases and hidden personal values – an independent analytical foundation 
for the logical relations between theoretical statements and statements about 
observed entities and facts was postulated. The prominent members of the Vienna 
Cycle (Wieners Kreis) in the years before the second World War sought refuge in 
the USA and there started departments of philosophy in different universities there. 
In these departments with their approach to philosophy of science, in the analytical, 
empirical or logical- positivistic tradition, they made school. As a consequence, this 
philosophy was dominant for a long time around the globe. For a highly readable 
and informative history of the Vienna Circle see David Edmonds, ‘The murder of 
Professor Schlick’. Popper, was peripheral to the Vienna Circle, spent the years of 
the war in New Zealand and returned to London after the war. He had realized 
already that observational statements are theory-laden and eventually concluded 
that there is no ‘given’ foundation, no formal set of principles to build on. He wrote, 
‘we are drilling piles in quicks and until they stand, and we can build on them for 
the time being at least’. We believe and accept or reject theories after serious experi-
mental testing and scientific debate about the evidence he said (Popper, 1959). This 
Popperian fallibility reminds of Charles Sanders Peirce’ early works on how and 
why we believe, published in the last decades of the nineteenth century.
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The Standard Model thus explicitly, via the Legend largely follows the 
hypothetico- deductive cycle of proposing hypotheses and its derived statements, 
experimental testing of these statements, with the result of falsification or support or 
partly support from the observed evidence. This results in acceptance (‘belief’) or 
requires improvement and a new cycle of testing. From lower-level observational 
statements and laws, higher level ever more general laws are deduced which ideally 
conjecture universal and timeless truth as the most prominent results of scientific 
inquiry. The reductionist method it proposes is empirical, formal, logical and thus 
importantly a guarantee for objectivity, because it separates values from positive 
facts, scientific from non-scientific statements (Nagel, 1961; Hacking, 1983) The 
strict Cartesian dualism between observer and observed, between fact and value and 
between analytic and synthetic makes science per definition reliable, because its 
products are objective, value free and thus trustworthy. It was for a long time self- 
evident that this ‘scientific method’, with its rigor and potential for prediction and 
control building on the ideal of Euclidian mathematics, was the cause of the over-
whelming theoretical and practical technical successes of the natural sciences. It so 
happened that positivism and Popperian demarcation of falsification between scien-
tific and non-scientific knowledge became dominant.
It moreover, was generally believed to be the critical difference between the nat-
ural ‘hard’ sciences and the ‘soft’ social sciences and humanities. This demarcation 
is about methods of investigation, but also about its products, its theories and laws 
which can be tested and in the hard sciences preferably were expressed formally 
thus mathematically and were held to be universally true. If investigation was per-
formed in that tradition and thus modelled after the natural sciences, especially after 
physics, it would be recognized as science. Given its main philosophical sources, 
the type of research of the Standard Model aims for the ideal of timeless universal-
ity, wants to produce general laws, formal basic knowledge using reductionist meth-
ods to contribute to the body of knowledge. It is historically mostly confined to the 
classical academic disciplines and operates in an international global perspective. It 
aims for value-free research and neutrality, is in principle against interference from 
whatever powers outside academia or even from within academia outside the own 
discipline.
Based on its own criteria for what is considered to be science, research done in 
this way always was, and to a large degree still is the highest in rank within aca-
demia compared to the social sciences and the humanities (SSH). SSH until 1958 
not in the least for this reason was not regarded serious science or research and for 
instance not a discipline in the National Science Foundation in the USA. As I will 
argue in later chapters in more detail, still in the third decade of the twenty-first 
century, within virtually every discipline and faculty, there is a visible gradient of 
research esteem according to the degree of the use of formal quantitative methods 
that employ or at least imitate the methods of the Legend and thus of the natural 
sciences.
2.1  Part 1. Images of Science, a Reality Check
20
 The Mertonian Social Order
The Standard Model is a composite of the Legend of the scientific method described 
above, but in addition, explicitly builds on the classical sociological image of sci-
ence which has originally been developed by the famous American sociologist 
Robert Merton and his students between 1930 and 1970. (Merton, 1973) In this 
image of science, it is a human activity different from all other human activities in 
that scientists are altruistically looking for the truth. This is, according to Mertonian 
sociology, done in a open community, chatacterized by sceptical debates about each 
other’s work in order to get to the best knowledge. Knowledge is considered or at 
least aims to be universal and not bound or restricted to time and place. Importantly, 
the scientists are fair in discussing the works of their peers and are honest or at least 
strive for honesty. They are not in it for their own personal or intellectual interests. 
They publish their results for their peers to judge and to be used for further research. 
Their findings are thus expected to be made freely available and in all respects are 
considered common good. They can through the workings of the incentive and 
reward system, commissioned by the scientific community, get credit for their work, 
which is required to advance their careers and gain in reputation and standing in 
their respective field of research. Reputation is gained for instance  by so-called 
‘priority’, being the first to discover and report facts, theories and novel methods, 
and contributions that by peers are considered relevant and original. In this vision 
there is fierce competition and consequently to it stratification. There are elites in 
every discipline, which in the Mertonian social order is however not felt to be (too) 
problematic, but is considered instrumental for the functioning of the enterprise and 
thus reflects the natural order, a logical consequence of the type of activity the com-
munity is engaged in (Ben-David & Sullivan, 1975). Merton in 1968 did however 
already point out several unwanted effects of stratification inherent to the reward 
system (Merton, 1968). Although all researchers are in principle regarded equal, 
elitism is acknowledged but thought to be functional. Merton coined the term 
Matthew Effect for the famous, or more recently considered, infamous mechanism 
of accumulative advantage that elites in the system have. These advantages concern 
influence, authority and professional power which gets converted in material advan-
tages like, research facilities, grant support and access to the most prominent aca-
demic functions and positions. If you read the paper more then 50 years later, you 
are struck by the normative and outright naïve and idealistic wordings by which 
Merton describes his expectations how the top scientists will deal with or even 
counteract any perverse effects of the Matthew Effect if it would ever become ‘an 
idol of authority’. He has amazing faith in top scientists because of their unusual 
characters and high standards of integrity (Merton, 1968). In adhering to the norms, 
and so producing results and publications, scientists are recognized as good citizens 
by their peers and members of the community and accepted and respected as mem-
bers of the scientific enterprise. Moreover, by keeping up this academic social cul-
ture, science, it is believed is trusted and earns respect from the public and 
government as a reliable institute in society. In the Mertonian view, science is a 
closed social system within society that decides itself who is excellent and who is 
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not, who gets the credits, the jobs and the grant money. This implicates that the 
growth of knowledge in this view is an internal affair. Science is a value-free, neu-
tral, activity where autonomous individuals disinterestedly pursue their inquiries in 
the context of a social system governed by its own unique internal scientific criteria 
and norms.
Dispatches from the Trenches
I realized the problems the popular image of science, held by the science com-
munity and the public and started to study it, in the early 1980s during the 
start of my scientific career as a researcher on the pathogenesis of aids and 
HIV infection. That was in a truly unique setting in which my group, or as we 
say in our field ‘my lab’, worked on HIV/aids in Amsterdam in a cohort study 
of men who have sex with men (MSM) and IV drug users. In these Amsterdam 
Cohort Studies it had been clear from the start in 1985 that to understand the 
problem of aids and HIV infection, a truly multidisciplinary approach was 
needed. My colleagues came from the social and behavioural sciences, medi-
cal anthropology, epidemiology of infectious diseases, bioinformatics, inter-
nal medicine, pathology, pre-clinical and medical virology. Next to this array 
of scientific disciplines we interacted proactively with the participants of the 
cohorts, mainly homosexual men. Listening to their concerns, their problems 
and immediate needs but also to keep them informed about the work we did 
using their blood samples and the epidemiological and behavioural informa-
tion they provided in the questionnaires. The work was done the Municipal 
Health Centre, AMC and my group was working on viro-immunology in the 
Central Laboratory of the Blood Transfusion Service (CLB, now Sanquin). At 
my institute with respect to aids, research was done in the wider context of the 
safety of blood supply which was at that time of the highest daily concern. 
This bloodbank context involved cellular and protein chemistry, virology and 
technical issues of manufacturing of biologicals, but also sociology, econom-
ics and ethics of blood donation and screening of donors.
I read Latour’s Science in Action in 1987, as a young principal investigator 
working on HIV/AIDS already getting deep into international science (Latour, 
1987). The researchers that Latour followed in the lab and outside the lab talk-
ing to the different stakeholders, on their travels abroad were pretty busy. All 
of it was familiar to me. Only years later I discovered a major early source of 
Latour, Bourdieu who applied his theory of the ‘field’ to academia with its 
concepts of habitus, socialization, the power struggle, stratification and elit-
ism (Bourdieu, 1975, 2004). Few biochemists or natural scientists in their 
scarce time do read such scholarly studies about themselves, despite the 
insightful analysis of the familiar academic microcosm which we virtually on 
a daily basis  were deeply involved. It made me aware of quality and credibil-
ity, the standing of the different sciences and institutions, about competition 
and power games, reputation, getting credit, about the moral values and the 
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 The Mythical Image of Science
The Standard Model thus is an image of science that is a composite of two narra-
tives, based on a philosophical and a sociological theory established in the first half 
of the twentieth century. First there is a powerful ideal, derived from philosophies 
based on the natural sciences with an implicit positive image of scientist’s intentions 
and social interactions, in which the unique relation between theories and its knowl-
edge claims with reality stand out. Next there is the sociological image of a com-
munity of vocational altruistic investigators who in daily practice go through daily 
personal motivations involved in science, that implicitly and explicitly could 
be observed in daily verbal and non-verbal interactions.
After spending 35 years in that multidisciplinary environment in a highly 
competitive national and international world of science it was obvious that 
scientists from different fields and disciplines see the world differently and 
speak different languages. These are, however, minor issues compared to the 
much more serious and also widely held misconceptions and prejudices about 
research and inquiry, about the different academic disciplines and what the 
true aims of science are. These appeared to be mostly based on obsolete ideas 
derived from the classical philosophy and sociology of science.
This would not be a problem,
if it would not have adverse effects at the national or institutional level, for 
instance on agenda setting and the growth of knowledge
if this would not cause major science waste and production of much poorly 
performed and useless research
if this would not be the cause of major obstacles for translation of research to 
societal impact for those in the real world who need solutions and 
relief badly.
Unfortunately, daily experiences in the community of science already over 
a very long time show differently. It did and until this day does cause various 
serious problems that affect science and inquiry at many levels and affects its 
potential to impact society. It is because of this that I will in more depth dis-
cuss the popular images of science, their origins and problems and how they 
affect the practice of science. After that I will in this Chapter discuss the phi-
losophy and sociology that forms the foundation for these popular images and 
discuss how these ideological and normative concepts, with their respective 
famous dualisms have in the past 40 years been shown by philosophers, soci-
ologist and historians of science to be scientifically untenable.
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struggles and hard labour to discover the secrets of nature and come to a set of 
unifying ideas about the world. The Standard Model does not present a consistent 
idea of science because these two components synergize but fail to merge into an 
overall theory of science that explains how science really works and how that 
relates to its reliability, success and credibility. It is exactly because of this hybrid, 
with these two complementary faces, the Standard Model as an image and a general 
narrative about science has worked well for science in its interaction with the out-
side world in the past.
Obviously, it has had its value and advantages, but it is I will argue, also since 
long the root cause of the most urgent problems in the relation between science, 
government and society, and at the lower level in academia, between scientists and 
between scientists and their publics. Both aspects of the popular image or science 
described above do not resonate much with active researchers. The way we have 
made and make knowledge that works and leads to successful follow-up investiga-
tions and subsequent growth of knowledge as well as successful interventions in the 
real world, the practice of science in the natural sciences including physics, is fun-
damentally different from what the Legend holds on philosophical grounds to be the 
unique scientific method to arrive at true, believes, statements and insights. Active 
researchers in the different fields and disciplines do not pay too much attention to 
the rules of engagement of the Legend as far it concerns the celebrated scientific 
method. They don’t need to. In addition, with respect to the Mertonian norms, there 
are written codes of conduct and written and tacit mores, that researchers intuitively 
and indirectly are aware of it. As soon a sociologists started to actually take a look 
at the practice of science, they couldn’t help themselves seeing major and general 
aspects of behaviour and mores of active researchers not in agreement with the 
Mertonian ideal. This was observed at the individual level, but also at the institu-
tional level. This has in the past 10 years increasingly drawn attention within the 
scientific community and lately this was discussed in the media and public debates 
as well (Chap. 3).
 The Standard Model: A Reality Check
I will discuss the criticisms that have started to develop mainly since 1960 regarding 
the philosophical theory as well as on the sociological theory that formed the main 
pillars of the Standard Model. These criticisms are based on research in philosophy, 
sociology but also history of science. We will see that both components of the model 
have been shown to be normative in nature, not reflecting nor impacting much the 
practice of the sciences. 
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 Possessed by the Normative, Demeaning the Descriptive
Philosophers have long made a mummy of science. When they finally unwrapped the 
cadaver and saw the remnants of an historical process of becoming and discovering, they 
created for themselves a crisis of rationality. That happened around 1960. It was a crisis 
because it upset our old tradition of thinking that scientific knowledge is the crowning 
achievement of human reason. Sceptics have always challenged …but now they took ammu-
nition from the details of history (p1) (Hacking, 1983)
As described in the previous section, until 1960 the dominant philosophy of sci-
ence was based on concepts and ideas developed in the empiricist and logical posi-
tivistic tradition very much inspired and lead by the way of thinking of analytical 
philosophy. It is totally devoid of historical perspective and did not at all take into 
account the diverse research practices, the way research was being done and thus 
how in the laboratory we actually produce knowledge and decide what to belief. 
Even in recent times, members of the scientific community, when being asked, still 
belief in the ideals and norms of the Standard Model. Although deep inside they 
know that at the organizational and at the personal level science has never func-
tioned according to these rules and norms, as sociological and historical researchers 
have demonstrated in the past 40 years. (Hanson, 1958; Toulmin, 1972; Kuhn, 1962; 
Ravetz, 1971; Ziman, 1968, 1978; Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Mitroff, 
1974; Shapin, 1982). Furthermore, although the foundations and the logic of the 
scientific method were questioned already since the 1930s, in several disciplines, 
−biology, medicine, economics, including the social sciences- subdisciplines and 
research fields emerged that copied the formal quantitative methods and style of 
research of the ‘hard’ sciences. They have a craving for the type of science that 
never was which is also called ‘physics envy’. Toulmin for the field of economics 
describes this development in a chapter under the title ‘Economics and the Physics 
that never was’. (Toulmin, 2001).
As we already saw, which in this light is truly remarkable, the ideas, or as some 
say images, of science in these philosophies were by most scientists not only taken 
for granted but also somehow believed to be descriptive. One wonders why the sci-
ence community and the public did (does) go along so well with the Legend. Was it 
despite the fact, or is it because it is normative and ideal, and not in any sense related 
to how science was done in practice? Do we all still very much want to believe and 
hope that science is really different from all other human activity and do we like 
to deem scientists as virtuous and pious as the high priests and cardinals that never 
where. Even when confronted with flagrant deviations, when the Legend is in doubt 
‘there is often a significant shift in perspective. The image is no longer seen as 
descriptive but normative. Despite this shift, a connection with description usually 
remains. The problematic work is a deviation from the proper course of scientific 
activity, a course taken to be exemplified in the overwhelming majority of scientific 
investigation.’ (Barker & Kitcher, 2013).
In his ‘Human Understanding’ published in 1972, but also in his illuminating 
earlier and later work, Toulmin was one of the first to see this separation of the prac-
tice of knowledge from its theory as the major problem in our theories about science 
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and research and thus of human understanding. Early in his career in Oxford he 
says: ‘This was seen as being quite separate and independent and so a concern of 
different intellectual professions. At these times, natural scientists kept their eyes 
outwards, so as to avoid becoming entangled in philosophical word-splitting’p1. 
But he continues ‘There are in fact good reasons, both historical and substantial, 
for our establishing links between the scientific extension of our knowledge and its 
reflective analysis and reconsidering our picture of ourselves as knowers in the light 
of recent extensions to the actual content of our knowledge.’ (p2). On that same 
second page he already anticipated anxiety, uncertainty and scepticism, but he reas-
sured the reader that ‘a realistic appraisal of human understanding has often been 
an instrument for its systematic improvement’. (Toulmin, 1972).
Toulmin could have known better, his early work in the 1950s took a different 
position on rationality and reasoning from the then mainstream philosophy. His 
ideas about the philosophy of science were inspired and in effect went through a 
reality check when he was being exposed in the war to real physics research and the 
actions of researchers in the lab. After the war he returned to study with Ludwig 
Wittgenstein who in those days had reconsidered the formal approach in analytical 
philosophy. Toulmin took up the historical approach to studying science in a natural 
way blended with philosophy and sociology. In this ‘historical turn’ he was a front 
runner and was therefore side-lined and largely neglected for three decades by 
mainstream philosophy (Toulmin, 2001), which as Shapin wrote, still did hurt after 
40 years (Shapin, 2002). Interestingly, in line with my own experience as a student 
from 1975 on, those who in those days started to study the philosophy of science, 
somewhere in their career of an experimental natural scientist, gradually realized 
that the philosophy and sociology did not relate to practice of the natural science.
Introduction into Philosophy of Science
After obtaining a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from the University of 
Groningen, I spent the academic year 1975–1976 studying philosophy of sci-
ence. In my master study it was a minor with a major in biochemistry. This 
was inspired by my older brother who studied in the same period history and 
philosophy of education and philosophy in Groningen. Had my older brother 
chosen to study theoretical physics instead of pedagogy and philosophy, the 
course of my intellectual and personal life would most likely have been very 
different. Because I was completely ignorant, I had to study in the spring of 
1975 as introduction the first 300 pages of Ernest Nagel’s The Structure of 
Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (Nagel, 1961) in 
combination with Toulmin’s more idiosyncratic Philosophy of Science 
(Toulmin, 1953). This was meant to be a high-speed introduction to be able to 
study Kuhn’s ‘Stucture’ and Poppers ‘Logic’ followed by an intensive winter- 
course on the seminal book ‘Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge’, edited 
by Lakatos and Musgrave (1970). I found the image and discussion of science 
in Toulmin’s book logical and his metaphor of maps for theories plausible. I 
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recognized a lot of common sense in the description of instrumentalism by 
Nagel (1961, p129–140). Instrumentalism was down-played very much com-
pared to the overwhelming emphasis on the natural sciences, mathematics, 
geometry and physics and its empiricism and logical axiomatic systems of 
positivism. For me, despite my chemistry bachelors with introductions in 
math, chemistry, biophysics but even some quantum physics, it was simply 
too much. Until very recently I labelled Nagel as a diehard logical positivist. 
I however should have paid more attention to the introduction of his classical 
book. Nagel clearly shows his preference for pragmatism in the Peircean style 
which is a plain critique of the empiricist-positivist philosophy of the 
‘Legend’. I also could have paidd attention to his references to C.S. Peirce, 
Frank Ramsey and John Dewey’s ‘The Quest for Certainty’, although then I 
had no clue who these writers were and how their position was in the field. I 
think I should, at that time, have been made to study Nagel’s very interesting 
and illuminating chapters on the methodological problems of the social sci-
ences and humanities that are, he clearly explains much less different from 
those in physics then generally believed. The reviewer in The Times Literary 
Supplement thought these chapters were ‘the most interesting in the book’ as 
Nagel ‘is concerned to establish that the social sciences are capable of pro-
ducing useful general laws and explanations though their methods are neces-
sarily not completely identical with those of the physical sciences…For the 
defense of the social sciences he considers among other, the objectives of 
non-repeatability and subjectivity in the selection of materials.’ Unfortunately, 
as said these chapters were exempted from my examination and only very 
recently when preparing for this writing I returned to Nagel and read them 
45 years too late. Only very recently I realized that professor J.J.A. Mooij, a 
scholar of mathematics, physics, ethics, literature and analytical philosophy, 
who was the examiner, like Nagel, probably must have had affinity with 
American pragmatism, especially Peirce and must have also known Toulmin’s 
The Uses of Argument from 1958. Apparently, I was well primed by this pre-
parative reading, as I received Polanyi’s Knowing and Being, as a gift from 
close friends in February 1976 on the occasion of my BSc graduation. In 
Polanyi’s book the piece on The Republic of Science and comment on 
C.P.  Snow’s The Two Cultures are still quite amazing (Polanyi & Grene, 
1969). I then bought Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge in July 1976. Despite my 
disagreement with Polanyi’s ideas about the interaction between science and 
society, for me his work really was an eye opener presenting intuitive and 
pragmatic support for the new post-empiricist philosophy (Polanyi, 1962). On 
my shelves I still have also one of the books of C.A.van Peursen, Wetenschappen 
en Werkelijkheid published in Dutch in 1969, which I read and marked up in 
the fall of 1975 preparing for the course. Van Peursen, who was a leading 
philosopher in the Netherlands in his time, already concluded that the best 
philosophy of science was a mix of Popper’s and Dewey’s philosophy, also 
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As has been noted by many, the very first lines of Kuhn’s book immediately 
disclosed the exact same problem, I here in this book still feel must be addressed, 
although in 2020 for slightly different reasons: ‘History, if viewed as a repository 
for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in 
the image of science by which we are now possessed’. At few lines down he states: 
‘This essay attempts to show that we have been misled by them in fundamental 
ways. Its aim is a sketch of the quite different concept of science that has emerged 
from the historical record of research activity itself’….however this new concept of 
science will not be forthcoming if historical data continue to be sought and scruti-
nized mainly to answer questions posed by the unhistorical stereotype drawn from 
science texts. …a concept of science with profound implications about its nature 
and development (p1) (Kuhn, 1962).
It was immediately very clear that Kuhn dramatically changed the discourse of 
the philosophy of science and its research agenda by taking the ‘historical turn’. Ian 
Hacking has in his typical and eloquent but straight forward manner described the 
referring to the later work of Wittgenstein, Quine, Polanyi, Winch, Gadamer 
and Habermas. At the end of this book he critiques the idea of value-free 
inquiry and with Dewey and the pragmatists firmly states that scientists, here 
used as including scholars in SSH, don’t need to complement their work with 
‘diepzinnige’ theories about ‘reality’. ‘Diepzinnig’ may be translated with 
‘profound’, but also with ‘abstruse’ or even ‘esoteric’, and it is the latter word 
that Dewey used to criticize philosophy which in his opinion had lost touch 
with science and the real world. Science and knowledge, he states was not the 
goal, but that science and research are integral to the life we live and want to 
live and are an important means to the end of our responsibility to create 
instruments for the right policies and their actions. In August 1976 I bought 
Technik und Wissenshaft als Ideology by Jürgen Habermas which made a 
huge and lasting impression (Habermas, 1968). Habermas argues for an ethi-
cally and politically proper interaction between science and social life and 
offers a model for it that is explicitly based on Dewey’s pragmatism. My 
recent revisiting of this early work of Habermas made me realize that the 
discussions in those days about Science and Society took place in a very dif-
ferent public context than the current discussions about Open Science. Yet, 
the message to opening up science and engage and communicate with the 
publics is the same. Finishing this book in the early summer of 2020, I must 
hopefully add that the COVID-19 pandemic has made a lot of people in sci-
ence, society and government aware of the power of the practices of Open 
Science. As the corona crisis was not only a global public health catastrophe 
but also caused a deep global social and economic crisis, the idea that we can 
do science differently may even linger a bit longer than it did after both 
world wars.
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conceptual differences between Kuhn and the major concepts commonly held in the 
standard image of science (p6–16). (Hacking, 1983) These differences do concern 
issues of how science is being done in the real, but also affect the philosophical 
assumptions and prescriptions of the ‘unhistorical stereotype’. Differences do 
regard the classical image of individual inquiry compared to communities of inquiry 
bound by research traditions and paradigms and the idea of distinct phases of nor-
mal versus revolutionary science. The community aspect was not disputed, but a lot 
of subsequent modern historical work showed that the very distinct scientific revo-
lutions in time, as described by Kuhn in physics and chemistry, are not common and 
that most of the time in science different schools and paradigms do operate simulta-
neously until one of them is favoured. Kuhn’s work did not provide support for the 
use a general method which unifies science, an important aspect of the standard 
image of science for the positivists but also for Popper until then. But there was 
more. A paradigm in Kuhn’s view is a composite of classical internal formal scien-
tific rules, techniques and experimental methods and values, but also conveys values 
of external social, cultural, ethical and practical origin. These are involved in daily 
question on which grounds new results and claims are judged by peers and when 
major claims and theories are questioned, and their novel competitors have to be 
considered. Paradigms give guidance in deciding what to belief. Here we advance 
to the second level of criticism of the Legend. Kuhn based on his historical work 
deviates from the positivistic norm of what scientific statements are, the analytic- 
synthetic dualism and the criterium of objectivism, a major pillar of the Legend and 
the Standard Model, as we have seen above. He was, a bit to his own surprise, 
caught in serious long-lasting discussions about relativism, subjectivity and objec-
tivity. These discussions about the internal logic and consistency of the major theo-
ries and assumptions of the standard image of science were in 1962 already for quite 
some years ongoing between highly esteemed members of the discipline of analytic 
philosophy, as we shall discuss below. Hacking wrote a very concise and compre-
hensible explanation of the immense importance Kuhn’s book has had and still has 
(Hacking, 1983) Kuhn did not only question the Standard Model and Legend 
regarding the ideas about the scientific method versus its mismatch with the daily 
practice, but he also questioned the logical-positivistic ideas of rationality. He did 
not engage in their highly esoteric and technical discussion but showed based on his 
historical work that scientists simply did not comply with some of the major pre-
scriptions, and that anyhow even if they would have tried, they fail because these 
could not be followed in the practice of inquiry. He receded to some degree in this 
in response to his critics saying that he believed that internal empirical scientific 
data and findings ultimately were the most important criteria for believing or reject-
ing a claim, statement or theory. It is of interest to note that after Kuhn’s book 
appeared ‘fresh interactions between philosophers and historians of science’ came 
about. There may then have been several reasons for the separation of these now 
closely related disciplines, but Toulmin very critically points to ‘George Sarton 
from Harvard (who) ruled over academic History of Science in the United States’ 
and had declared collaboration taboo (p6). (Toulmin, 2001) Toulmin makes it clear 
that the study of the history of science stood in a lower rank than philosophy and 
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that the history of science field had its own ideas about what good history scholar-
ship was. With Kuhn, he concluded that historians held their distance from inquiry 
that involved study of external, social and cultural, economic and political factors. 
Bernal’s seminal work “The social function of Science published in 1939 also for 
that reason was neglected for a long time (Toulmin, 1977).
 The Empirical Turn in the Sociology of Science
The Other Mertonian Thesis. It is not only fair to say, but highly relevant for the 
logic of my book, that I until now presented the dominant and legendary interpreta-
tion of Merton’s sociology. This was the image of an autonomous social system 
which was governed in an ideal fashion by scientists who were not troubled by the 
moral and social defects of all other human beings in modern societies. But there 
was another side of Merton’s sociology which is in agreement with the sociology of 
science that became mainstream in the 1970s but is of of totally different kind as the 
Mertonian legend. Steven Shapin, and later Harriet Zuckerman, the latter who at 
Columbia was a collaborator of Merton and much later in life his married wife, 
demonstrated that Merton clearly recognised external influences on science and not 
only of the religious, but also of the utilitarian and military kind (Shapin, 1988; 
Zuckerman, 1989). Merton has become widely known, and criticized, for his thesis, 
following Max Weber’s well know theory, that Puritanism, Calvinism and Pietism 
are important external factors that may explain why the rise of modern science 
occurred in Western Europe (Cohen, 1994). Shapin quotes many lines and phrases 
from Merton’s early book on the history of science that was published in 1938 
(Merton, 1938), to show that Merton has not been properly read in this matter: 
‘Merton then proceeded to point to “further orders of factors,” some cultural, some 
social, that might be thought relevant to explaining the historical materials with 
which he was concerned. These included interesting speculations about population 
density, the rates and modes of social interaction characteristic of different societ-
ies, and other features of the cultural context not included in religious construct. 
Merton carefully noted that Puritanism only “constitute[d] one important element 
in the enhanced cultivation of science.” In other settings “a host of other factors - 
economic, political, and above all the self-fertilizing movement of science itself’- 
worked “to swell the rising scientific current.” Since science burgeoned in Catholic 
sixteenth-century Italy, Merton freely acknowledged that “these associated factors” 
might come to “outweigh the religious component’. p595–596. (See Shapin for ref-
erences to these citations of Merton.) Merton describes the mutual interdependency 
of science with other social institutions and their vested interests which has directly 
or indirectly influenced the direction of science and research through problem 
choice. This obviously is a problem in view of disinterestedness and objectivity of 
the Legend, which Shapin addressed upfront: ‘at the very core of his enterprise, 
historians nervous about the black beast of “externalism” should be reassured. 
Neither in his 1938 text nor in subsequent writings was Merton ever concerned to 
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adduce social factors to explain the form or content of scientific knowledge or sci-
entific method’. p594 (Shapin, 1988). Merton discusses the external socioeconomic 
effects on the dynamics of problem choice and subsequently that of scientific (sub)
disciplines. Issues of the different personal motivation’s scientist may have and 
which they often openly state which may relate to the potential practical and tech-
nological application of their research but also looking to the social status of 
research for their upwards social mobility. These studies about social interdepen-
dencies seem to have been collectively and selectively overlooked by historians and 
sociologists, verging according to Zuckerman on counterfactual history. For Merton, 
as Zuckerman points out, during his whole career the Puritanism Thesis was minor, 
compared to ‘military, economy, geography and society’ as is reflected in the num-
ber of chapters devoted to them in Merton’s book of 1938, reprinted in 1970) and 
subsequent writings. She refers to I.B.Cohen’s review of the book (after it was 
reprinted), who thought that this minimal interest in influence of socio-economic 
and military factors on science was in the 1930s not new because it was already a 
major theme in Marxist sociology of science, whereas the proposition of a connec-
tion between religion and science was novel. I argued above discussing the work of 
Bernal, in agreement with Shapin, that indeed these ideas were dominant in Marxist 
sociology and theory of science, but not acceptable outside these circles and surely 
not mainstream in the late 1930s. With McCarthyism in the late 1950s and after 
Sputnik, during the years of the Cold War these chapters on external factors were, 
to put it mildly, tainted with Marxism and Socialism and not ‘in sync’ with the ide-
ologies and images of science of the Legend.
In the 1970s and 1980s a new sociology and history of science was developed, 
called Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), from the perspective that in a 
‘sociological approach to knowledge-making, people produce knowledge against 
the background of culture’s inherited knowledge, their collectively situated pur-
poses, and the information they receive from natural reality.’ (Shapin, 1982). This 
research in sociology and history thus goes further than the classical dominant 
forms of history of science and further that Kuhn by bringing in external social 
values in the equation. It not only, as discussed above, shows how the practice of 
science really is, but is also shows how theory choice is done and how beliefs and 
scientific statements become accepted, and in that respect provide empirical socio-
logical evidence against the Legend. The quote above is from an early seminal paper 
by Steven Shapin, a historian who became in his own words a sociologist and was 
one of the pioneers leading the way in this new interdisciplinary field between his-
tory, sociology and to some extend philosophy of science. Shapin very explicitly 
contrasts the two main approaches to the study the sociology of scientific knowl-
edge. I will stay away from too much technical language but summarize the main 
points most relevant for the context of our present discussion of the demise of the 
Legend. Shapin builds a strong case, with a well-developed critique of the main- 
stream history of science, complemented by an overwhelming series of examples of 
more recent historical research with an empirical sociologically inclination. The 
latter research by among others Collins, Pickering, Geison, Wynne, Harvey, 
MacKenzie and Barnes, and Latour and Woolgar produced evidence obtained from 
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cases widely distributed in time, place, and discipline for influences of ‘non- 
cognitive’ external cultural and religious values, political principles, beliefs and 
ideas on the process and the ultimate outcome of scientific inquiry. In effect, sup-
porting the theoretical hypothesis as formulated in the quote on top of this paragraph.
We have seen above that the dominant history of science before 1960 or so, was 
confirmatory to the myth of the Legend and positivism under heavy direction of 
George Sarton. In a striking analogy, also in the history of sociology such a thing 
has been dominant for a large while. I will cite Shapin on the characterization of this 
sociology which he calls ‘the coercive model’. I will start with his conclusions: ‘….
more significant problem arises from a largely informal model of sociology of 
knowledge which seems to be prevalent among a number of philosophers and histo-
rians of science…..Its main characteristics can be briefly described: (i) it maintains 
that sociological explanation consists in claims pf the sort “all (or most) individuals 
in a specified social situation will believe in a specified intellectual position”; (ii) it 
treats the social as if one could derive it by aggregating individuals; (iii) it regards 
the connection between social situation an belief to be one of ‘determination’ 
although little is explicitly said about the nature of determinism; (iv) it equates the 
social and ‘irrational’; (vi) it sets sociological explanation against the contention 
that scientific knowledge is empirically grounded in sensory input from naturally 
reality.’ This has informed the classical sociology of science with respect to the role 
of individuals in the community ‘generally regarded as troublesome’ and ‘the con-
nection of the social and the cognitive would generally be sought through the use of 
individual orientation particularly through motivation…factors internal to the sci-
entific community would be viewed as non-social. Finally one would say as little as 
possible about the fact that scientists conduct experiments, look through micro-
scopes, go on field expeditions, and the like , for wherever ‘reality enters in, the 
sociological explanation is obliged to stop …the coercive model has two splendid 
advantages. First…no successful instance of its practice will ever be encountered. 
Second, it portrays the role of the social and of sociological explanation in an 
unpalatable normative light: as if it were said that “no rational person would ever 
allow himself to be socially determined! Nevertheless, there is one major prob-
lem…; namely that it is not an accurate picture of sociological practice’. P195 In a 
sociological approach to knowledge-making, people produce knowledge against the 
background of their culture’s inherited knowledge, their collectively situated pur-
poses, and the information they receive form natural reality. Perhaps the most puz-
zling charge sometimes laid against relativist sociology of knowledge is that it 
neglects the role played by sensory input. On the contrary, the empirical literature 
employing this perspective shows scientists making knowledge with their eyes wide 
open to the world’ p196.
Shapin explicitly elaborates on inquiry and its purposes and goal-directedness 
not set by ‘contemplative’ individuals, but by a community where by doing things 
with knowledge that its meaning is produced’. The purpose for which knowledge is 
produced and according to which it is evaluated may vary widely: they may include 
legitimation or criticism of tendencies in the wider society, or they may encompass 
goals generated exclusively within the technical culture of science.’
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Shapin argues that the ideal type of the modern scientist should take these sorts 
of considerations, of this broader spectrum of social and cognitive scientific inter-
ests, into account. In this view of science, which is not compatible with ‘rationality’ 
of the normative Legend, according to Shapin, ‘the role of the social is to pre- 
structure choice and not to preclude choice’ p198.
There clearly is in 1982 still a huge tension here with the Legend and its positiv-
ism: ‘While it may be banal to say that statements of scientific fact may be theory- 
laden. It is not, apparently banal to demonstrate this empirically and to pin down 
the specific networks of expectations and goals affecting the production and evalu-
ation of statements of facts…Historians act as if, after all, observed facts count as 
‘hard case’; making a fact into a historical product (an artefact) is an exercise 
which historians of science approach with great caution (even though scientist do it 
routinely)’ (p159). The latter remark is of interest and sounds familiar in the present 
context because it refers to the way how active scientists ‘pragmatically’ deal with 
these philosophical ideas. Shapin states that the classical historians of science 
assumed that with the professionalization of science the scientific community 
obtained autonomy towards social factors and their influences. Here social factors 
are regarded as limited to obviously external social and political values. “To many 
writers an ‘influence from Malthus (or from Paley) [on Darwin] has not been some-
thing to describe and explain, but something to be explained away, since from the 
present perspectives it would be regarded as an illegitimate inclusion in properly 
objective scientific thought.’ It is because of this influence, according to Gillispie, 
‘that it is inconceivable that the Origin of Species could have been written by any 
Frenchman or German or by an Englishman of any other generation.’p179.
Shapin draws attention to professional vested interests that are internal to science 
and research, but not strictly cognitive. Active scientists know these very well as 
they determine the ongoing discussions, at the moving front of research, with 
reviewers ‘from other schools’ at journals, grant review committees, scientific com-
mittees selecting conference contributions (selection of main speakers and of oral 
abstract presentations), academic promotions committees and decisions who writes 
or contributes to textbooks. All of these judgements determine what ‘we’ hold to be 
‘good’ research or ‘the best’ research at some point in time, which over my 40-year 
career developed and changed rather quickly (Miedema, 2012). An outstanding 
analysis of the diversity of private, professional, cultural, social and economic fac-
tors that influence the practice of inquiry and knowledge making is Gerald Geison’s 
study ‘The Private Science of Louis Pasteur’. (Geison, 1995) This book was by 
many especially French scientist considered to be debunking Pasteur. It was pub-
lished, at the same time as more hagiographic biographies at the centenary of his 
death in 1995, but by experts highly praised because it provides deep and detailed 
insights how knowledge, in basic but also in applied biomedical research with enor-
mous societal and economic impact, was and is produced. In a critical, humiliating 
review of Geison’s book, Max Perutz (1914–2002), who was a famous biophysicist, 
defended Pasteur, against Geison’s demonstrations and judgements of Pasteur’s 
obvious foul play (Perutz, 1995). The bottom-line of the defence was that in the end 
Pasteur had been proven right, only the facts count in Perutz’ opinion. The real issue 
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at stake, that clearly surfaced in the exchange that followed in the NYRB, was that 
an outsider, not a man or woman from the lab, apparently not with ‘pious reverence’ 
and excessive respect, was messing with men of science and its methods (Miedema, 
2012). Other writers of recent history of science, such as Crewdson have been 
overly critical, for instance regarding the role of Robert Gallo, in a study of the 
discovery of HIV, the aids virus in 1983 (Crewdson, 2002). Crewdson on the other 
hand has undue sympathy for the ‘underdog’ in this dispute that involved massive 
professional reputation including a 2008 Nobel prize, national politics and eco-
nomic interests (Miedema, 2002).
Shapin has since 1982, written a number of classical highly influential journal 
articles and books about the practice of science and the production of knowledge in 
the seventeenth century and in our times by doing in depth research using historical 
and sociological methods in which all of the above topics, theories and problems are 
addressed (Shapin, 1994, 1996, 2008; Shapin et al., 1985) In the last pages Shapin 
provides a balanced discussion of how to view the influence of external and non- 
cognitive factors on knowledge production. Some researchers simply regard it as 
wrong based on the ideal of objectivity and value free science and studies in sociol-
ogy or history that reveal these influences are considered damaging and ‘asper-
sions’. Some regard these influences as realistic, it happens and is difficult to avoid, 
but they are per definition corrupt because science is, and its institutions are in that 
way being hijacked by all kinds of powerful politically and socially organized 
groups and their interests. Shapin regards these views as ‘a misunderstanding’ as 
external values and concepts have had and may have beneficial effects on the growth 
of knowledge. Opening up science to less powerful publics has these risks and as 
discussed in depth in Chap. 5, it will require continuous debate to resist the capture 
of science by the economic powers in society.
 The Myths of Science: Frontstage and Backstage
Humans and scientist alike need certainty, a logical method, an algorithm, with 
timeless and thus objective foundations. But the Quest for Certainty has failed. We 
have in reaction to this in the 1990s seen academic debates and worries about loss 
of certainty and foundation of scientific truth. This mainly was a reaction against 
certain forms of excessive post-modernism, relativism and subjectivity. Several 
authors have discussed these worries to demonstrate that science is unique as a 
knowledge producing system, that produces robust, reliable and significant scien-
tific knowledge even if we acknowledge that there is no metaphysical, given formal 
method or rules and foundations to guide us at truth. I will return to that discussion 
in Chap. 4 when discussing the default of pragmatism for the philosophy of science 
after the era of the Legend.
For now I want to discuss the reasons for the anxiety and worries academics 
experience whenever it is publicly discussed that the legendary image of science 
does not match with the practice behind the doors of the sociology, psychology, 
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philosophy and history departments, but don’t make a mistake, behind the doors of 
laboratories of the natural, biomedical and geosciences as well. This anxiety almost 
every time pops up also at less public debates about the Legend and how to arrive at 
a more inclusive way of thinking about science and the design and organisation of 
our academic institutions. I use the vocabulary frontstage – backstage from a frame-
work developed by Goffman (1959). Thinking about the Legend, our popular image 
of science, the myth of which has been shattered by its novel criticisers but also by 
its erstwhile major proponents, Goffman’s dramaturgical model for social interac-
tions can be of use. Not only humans in their interactions knowingly assume differ-
ent behaviour and roles regarding the relationship, interaction and social context 
they operate in, but likewise public organizations and institutions show different 
behaviours in different situations, meant for different publics. In many instances in 
public theatres, formal meetings or media appearances presentations by representa-
tives from financial institutes, banks, government or institutes affiliated with gov-
ernment, the church, the hospital administration and private companies follow the 
frontstage narrative or storyline. This, of course, presents the perspective of a reas-
suring, sophisticated, empathic, politically and socially correct reflective organisa-
tion. Of course, for different organizations, different items may be considered for an 
idyllic frontstage story and attitude. It is precisely this function that the Legend has 
had, and to a still lesser degree still has for science and academia. Most of the writ-
ers I cited thus far and will be cited further on, in the introduction and epilogue, but 
often throughout their analyses in many different wordings relate to the worry they 
or the scientific community may have when they debunk the myth of the Legend. 
The myth of the Legend, as demonstrated above, has been debunked by a few in the 
60s, but openly many times since the 1970s by prominent thinkers which has 
reached a relatively wide audience, outside and inside science. Relatively, since in 
most cases even during the so-called Science Wars of the 90s when a larger audi-
ence got interested in a short while, it is a fairly limited readership. As pointed out 
above, active natural science researchers or even humanities scholars, in normal 
times take the Legend for granted, they intuitively know how to produce knowledge 
and now the mores of their field, but get nervous when the spell is broken, the myth 
of the Legend destroyed. All of a sudden one has to realize what the real backstage 
situation and the correct corresponding narrative is for that. That is very, very hard, 
since we are coming from the Era of the Legend, where scientific inquiry as we have 
seen is held to be unique, timeless, to provide for knowledge with absolute truths 
and because of its methods, rules and bedrock logical foundations has proven to be 
successful and to be successfully applied in the modern world. It may have been a 
problem for the philosophers who gradually saw the Quest for Certainty and their 
dreams and wonderful philosophies of timeless foundations, unified science, formal 
analytic methods, realism and positivity come to an end. For scientist and those 
working in science and academia the problem is less esoteric and practical but felt 
to be tricky. The fact that we can no longer use the Legend as a frontstage ideal nar-
rative of science, that has carried much weight since the 1940s, is indeed difficult. It 
has been rather effectively used to claim authority for science in public debates, 
about safety of vaccines, the cause of climate change and what should be done about 
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that. It has been used to discuss many public health and prevention and political 
issues relating to inequality, fair economics, the regulatory role of government in 
neoliberal times, but also on an annual basis by some about the absolute prominence 
of basic natural science.
So, one wonders if we admit that science in the real is done as we do it -produc-
ing the claims and insights we believe by a uniquely robust and open, continuous 
purging, process of testing, of experiments, repeating of experiments, a lot of criti-
cism and debate in a cycle of improving and rejecting- will that convince the public 
as well as we did convince them with the story of the Legend? Most of the writers, 
including myself, say yes, that shall do. Be honest, show how knowledge is and has 
been produced, how robust the process is also when we know that social interests of 
cultural and personal source are at play. Be frank about the fact that every claim, 
theory, method, action based on this process is fallible and may eventually be 
improved, corrected and rejected because it is replaced by a better alternative.
I will here not discuss the Science Wars of the 1990s. ‘The One Culture’ by 
Labinger and Collins (2001) presents a highly readable series of short papers of 
heavily involved authors with different perspectives on that. The Science Wars was 
a reaction of the natural science defenders of the Legend to claims in academia that- 
because postmodernist relativism had shown that there is no scientific method as 
held by empiricism and positivism- scientific theories and accepted beliefs are in 
essence not different from the beliefs derived outside science from superstition and 
all kinds of popular, religious and personal opinion. This image of science, which 
derives to be honest in some respects from Rorty’s bold interpretation of Willem 
James’ pragmatism, was at the far end of the spectrum opposite of the theory of 
inquiry of Peirce and Dewey, later extended especially by Putnam (see Chap. 4). 
The defenders or ‘bulldogs’ of science went all out with an appeal on the Legend 
which was not constructive. Fortunately, many philosophers have offered realistic 
and pragmatic views of science and its practice, without taking refuge to metaphysi-
cal and foundational myths of the Legend. I refer to Ian Hacking again, and espe-
cially his The Social Construction of What? where he in Chaps. 1, 2, 3 and 7 makes 
a very clear case for the realistic and naturalistic middle ground (Hacking, 1999) 
and to a very insightful and opiniated review by Shapin (1982). These studies show 
that there are clearly social and cultural factors at play, but that there are constraints 
to our claims and ideas in the confrontation with and observation of natural and 
social reality and these together in a continuous critical debate guide the process of 
how beliefs get accepted and hypothetical claims become facts. (p33) Our realistic 
understanding of the practice of scientific research, where collective reason, experi-
ment and action ground our beliefs which is constrained by conditions in the real 
world being the natural or the social world.
The good news in my mind is that we can pragmatically make a very good point 
for the reliability of science as follows. Since modern times we have this new robust 
collective way of doing science by hypothesizing and experimentation, its ever- 
improving methods, techniques, technologies and the ever-growing collective expe-
rience with judgements of claims and experimental results using ever improving 
sophisticated methods and methods of reasoning. This has resulted indeed in 
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impressive success, changing our lives by changing the unfriendly environment, 
improving our health and life expectancy, allow quick, convenient and mass trans-
portation, modern communication, increasing personal and global wealth, dealing 
with issues of energy, and so on. This all has been achieved despite the fact that even 
in the natural sciences we never had a unified formal objective value-free scientific 
method, an no timeless foundation for our knowledge to build on. Social and politi-
cal values have always at several levels been involved in our evaluations and criti-
cism of what to study and what to belief in scientific inquiry. This inclusive 
deliberation has steered science in society also in modern history to the good but 
sometimes to the bad. Our common-sense collective methods of inquiry have 
brought us time and again wonderful results that changed our life’s in the past 
200 years.
‘OMG…….There Is No Foundation!’
The epistemic core in the philosophy of science and the Legend is empty, was 
the conclusion of Nowotny et al in their Re-Thinking Science that I will dis-
cuss in detail in Chap. 5. But I use it here for its analogy with the evolution of 
the thinking that many of us have had regarding religious beliefs. The story 
about the Legend of science feels, I image, to many who were raised on the 
Legend since elementary school, high school and university as loss of cer-
tainty and loss of a familiar story that provides for calm and rest of mind. For 
me it compares to my growing up in a Calvinist family in the North of the 
Netherlands during the 1960s, where despite the non-academic background of 
our parents for them and us, reading and studying was part of life. Gradually, 
I came to realize at the age of 6, I think, that Santa Claus did not exist, but that 
was alright with me. Much more complicated was in the years between my 
14th and 20th year how to think about the origins, foundations and the revela-
tions of our Christian beliefs, ethics and ideal practices. Specially my father 
was convinced and believed the factual truth of the New Testament, from 
cover to cover, and this and the ethics and prescribed practices were regularly 
discussed at home. As a bachelor student I started reading modern theology 
amongst others Rudolph Bultmann, which made a lasting impression on me. 
In particular, his demythologization of the biblical texts and his rejection of 
the supranatural as world views belonging to another cultural context in the 
past, not appropriate for our modern time were strong images for me. He 
posed the idea that the biblical stories are not facts but language and texts 
describing acts of God. There is a core in the text, a message that in every time 
and culture can have its own narrative form. I had concluded that I did not 
believe in any of the supernatural, which until now has not caused me more 
than average anxiety. I was, however, for ever a Calvinist engaged by the eth-
ics and social-democratic politics that came with my upbringing and later 
reading the modern ethical and political interpretations of the Biblical texts by 
(continued)
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2.2  Part 2. The Crisis in Analytical Philosophy
The spirit of Cartesianism is evidenced not only by rationalists but by all those who sub-
scribe to strong transcendental arguments that presumably show us what is required for 
scientific knowledge, as well as those empiricists who have sought for a touchstone of what 
to count as genuine empirical knowledge.….the first attack was made by Peirce. Nevertheless 
it has taken more than hundred years for us to become fully aware of how the Cartesian 
view distorted the way in which science is actually practiced.’p71 (Bernstein, 1983).
The crisis in analytical philosophy started around 1960 in the philosophical dis-
cipline that created the problem in the first place. Crisis became apparent in open 
debates when philosophers officially declared the dead of positivism and empiri-
cism. Philosophers had admitted much earlier that there were already cracks in the 
idea of a foundation and other aspects of the Legend. C. S. Peirce was on one of the 
first ‘to attack the Cartesian framework especially in regard to characterizing sci-
entific knowledge’ (p71) (Bernstein, 1983). His work, in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century that was followed up by the American Pragmatists James and 
Dewey until 1940, did not belong to main-stream analytical (logical-empiricist) phi-
losophy and did not get much attention there, apart from Frank Ramsey who’s 
engagement with pragmatism was cut-short and almost forgotten by his untimely 
dead in 1930 and Nagel, which will be discussed below. Eventually the debate 
developed with the work of W.  V. O.  Quine in the 1950s; Popper and Michael 
Polanyi 1958, 1959; Kuhn in 1962; followed by Toulmin, Feyerabend, Apel and 
Habermas, Hesse, Hacking, Putnam, and Rorty in the 1970s early 1980s.
This critique on logical positivism and empiricism in the 1970s reached a much 
larger audience also outside the departments of the philosophy of science. Gradually, 
it was picked up some active natural scientists or SSH scholars who had an interest 
Bonhoeffer, Sölle, Bloch, Moltmann, and Pannenberg. These writers influ-
enced Kuitert a Dutch theologian who’s public intellectual and emotional 
struggle I with many others followed since 1971 until his dead in 2017. In a 
series of books, he goes through a sequence of phases in which he gradually 
peeled of the layers of classical Calvinist theology and its dogma’s. Eventually 
and it seemed inevitably, he had to admit in the 1980s that there was no foun-
dation, all our speaking and theology about the divine and the supranatural 
was the product of humans. He was also clear to point out that these revela-
tions thus were not Divine revelations and not God given. Here again the same 
question as for science comes up, do we have a good enough narrative about 
Christianity and religion in general if we demythologize its foundation and 
reduce it to ethics and action in contribution to human flourishing and the 
good life. Harry Kuitert argued that these ‘inspired’ ethics and this social-
political awareness based on diverse cultural and personal values may shape 
socialist, conservative or liberal worldviews and policies alike.
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in philosophy and sociology of science. However, it appeared -and even in 2021 
appears- to be hard for several reasons to go beyond the truly mythical Legend, let-
ting go of the ideas of a timeless foundation and the dreamed formal methods of a 
science, even when it was realized that it was a method of ‘a science that never was’.
Regarding what was at stake, I will again quote Bernstein who has discussed in 
great detail and transparency these debates and in strong statements the image of 
science that emerges in the post-empiricist philosophy of science in contrast to 
image of the logical-empiricists for which Ziman and Kitcher coined the name 
‘Legend’: ‘We can interpret this movement of thought as contributing to the demise 
of Cartesianism that has dominated and infected so much modern thought. The 
Cartesian dream of hope was that with sufficient ingenuity we could discover, and 
state clearly and distinctly, what is the quintessence of the scientific method and that 
we could specify once and for all what is the meta-framework or are the permanent 
criteria for evaluating, justifying, or criticizing scientific hypotheses and theories. 
The spirit of Cartesianism is evidenced not only by rationalists but by all those who 
subscribe to strong transcendental arguments that presumably show us what is 
required for scientific knowledge, as well as those empiricists who have sought for 
a touchstone of what to count as genuine empirical knowledge.….the first attack 
was made by Peirce. Nevertheless it has taken more than hundred years for us to 
become fully aware of how the Cartesian view distorted the way in which science is 
actually practiced.’p71 (Bernstein, 1983).
 A Detailed History of the Philosophical Demise of the Legend
As I pointed out at the introduction of this chapter, it is the analysis of the origins 
and effects of exactly this distortion that is the topic of this book. I will in these 
remainder of this Chapter discuss the philosophical arguments that convincingly 
show why the analytical and positivist philosophy failed. I will not go in great detail 
about the technical discussions. I chose to offer a diverse chronological selection of 
thoughts and conclusions of the most prominent scholars. I provide the most illumi-
nating citations taken from their work. Readers may wonder why I sometimes cite 
longer paragraphs. It is because in my opinion they are essential and because I want 
to give the reader the opportunity to directly read this primary ‘material’ with no 
need to have to rely on and trust my paraphrase’s and interpretations.
Below I discuss in historical order the work of the major scholars since 1945 the 
problems of positivism, the analytical philosophy and empiricism, which demon-
strates the collective developments in the field and in some cases the personal devel-
opment and struggle to break free from foundationalism. For the readers who do not 
know the authors which I am going to name in the remainder of this chapter, without 
exception they all were, or are when still alive, the absolute top scholars in their 
field. It makes you wonder that only the true elite, the leading scholars in exactly the 
field of interest were in a position to challenge the main theoretical ideas and con-
cepts of logical positivism and empiricism, largely the legacy of the Vienna Circle 
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that had been build up over the past 50 years. Most of them had actually trained with 
that previous generation of top philosophers who had all contributed and shaped 
exactly these philosophies. They were mostly students or second-generation stu-
dents of Wittgenstein in the UK, and Carnap, Reichenbach, Hempel, Quine in the 
USA. It apparently is quite difficult, and it requires a reputation and a position of 
intellectual power to change the thinking in a field, which is a case in point of 
Kuhnian paradigmatic revolution and of the power struggle in a ‘field’ as described 
by Bourdieu. (Bourdieu, 1975) Ludwick Fleck, who anticipated Thomas Kuhn’s 
major work by at least 30 years, writing in 1935 about criticism in science said that 
writers who trained as sociologist or in classics, ‘no matter how productive their 
ideas, commit a characteristic error (Fleck, 1979). They exhibit an ‘excessive 
respect, bordering on pious reverence for scientific facts’, cited by Ian Hacking, but 
Hacking adds: ‘The era of excessive respect has passed’ (p60) (Hacking, 1999). I 
believe that this excessive respect was not so much for ‘scientific facts’, but for the 
mythical power of the scientific method of positivism that claimed the status of 
these facts and the status it provided to the scientists.
I start with C. S. Peirce who wrote long before any of them and was part of his 
own “Metaphysical Club’ some 30  years before the Vienna Circle had started 
(Menand, 2001; Misak, 2013a). Peirce, as said, was later recognised as the ‘first to 
attack the Cartesian framework’ and influenced many if not all of major modern 
philosophers, before 1940 and after some lag time again directly or indirectly since 
the 1970s (Bernstein, 2010).
C.S. Peirce who did his most influential writing at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, was one of the first to attack the Cartesian framework (Bernstein p71). The 
framework of the idea of a transcendent foundation and the empiricist formal 
method. He was trained as a chemist in the natural sciences and is now considered 
to be exceptional regarding his many original ground-breaking contributions to 
natural science and in particular in the philosophy of science which are studied with 
renewed interest until this day. Many influential philosophers have payed tribute 
to Peirce.
Ernest Nagel in 1939:
‘Peirce’s distinctive contributions to logic as the general theory of signs, centre around his 
pragmatism, his critical commonsensism, and his fallibilism. By far the best known is his 
pragmatic maxim, proposed as a method for clarifying ideas, eliminating specious prob-
lems, and unmasking mystification and obscurantism hiding under the cloak of apparent 
profundity. In one form or another his proposal was adopted by a number of distinguished 
thinkers, for example, in this country by William James and John Dewey, so that to-day it is 
almost a common- place. Peirce’s own formulation of the pragmatic maxim leaves much to 
be desired in the way of explicitness and clarity; and more recent formulations, such as 
those by Professor Carnap and others, have the same general intent but superior precision. 
I nevertheless venture two general remarks on the Peircean version of pragmatism which, 
though obvious, merit attention. The pragmatic maxim was intended as a guiding principle 
of analysis. It was offered to philosophers in order to bring to an end disputes which no 
observation of facts could settle because they involved terms with no definite meaning. It 
was directed at the Cartesian doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, which found the terminus 
of analysis in vague abstractions claimed to be grasped intuitively, as well as at the com-
mon tendency to convert types of behaviours into unknowable agencies controlling the flux 
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of events. Above all, it pointed to the fact that the “meanings” of terms and statements 
relevant in inquiry consist in their being used in determinate and overt ways. Pragmatism, 
to employ Peircean language, was thus a proposal to understand general terms in terms 
of their concrete application, rather than vice-versa. ‘(bold case by FM)
At the risk of treading upon ground on which angels fear to step, I should also like to men-
tion the elementary point that in terms of Peirce's emphasis neither terms nor statements 
can be regarded as designating, independently of the habits involved in their use. 
Consequently, “the meaning” of expressions is not to be sought in self-subsisting “facts”, 
“essences”, or other “designata”, but must be construed in terms of the procedures associ-
ated with them in specific contexts.
‘Peirce claimed no infallibility for the beliefs of every-day experience, and indeed one of the 
cardinal tenets of his thought was a universal fallibilism. Peirce’s fallibilism is a conse-
quence of his regarding the method of science as the most successful yet devised for achiev-
ing stable beliefs and reliable conclusions; it has nothing to do with the malicious scepticism 
which rejects science on the ground that its conclusions are after all not established as 
being beyond the possibility of error, only to invoke a special set of imperatives as indubi-
table objects of human endeavour. Peirce noted that the conclusion of no scientific inquiry 
is exempt from revision and correction, that scientists feel surer of their general logic of 
procedure than of any particular conclusions reached by it, and that the method of science 
is self-corrective, both as to its own specific features and the specific conclusions gained 
with it.’ Read at the Fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science, Harvard 
University, September 3–9, 1939. (Nagel, 1940)
Habermas in his Erkenntnis und Interesse in 1968 translated in English in 
1971 (ref) devoted two chapters to Peirce: ‘What separates Peirce from both early 
and modern positivism is his understanding that the task of methodology is not to 
clarify the logical structures of our scientific theories but the logic of the procedure 
with whose aid we obtain scientific theories. We term information scientific if and 
only if an uncompelled and permanent consensus can be obtained with regard to its 
validity. This consensus does not have to be definitive but has to have definitive 
agreement as it goal….modern science distinguishes itself by a method of arriving 
at an uncompelled consensus about our views.’ p91 ‘For Peirce there was one 
method of inquiry, based on deduction, induction and to a small degree inference to 
the best explanation (designated abduction by Peirce). Truth was roughly, whatever 
hypothesizing, induction and testing settled down on.’ (p118) Peirce named it the 
‘scientific method’, the logic of or method of inquiry, but he did not mean to suggest 
that it is a logical formal system that allows us to get to the truth. Habermas: ‘For 
Peirce this concept of truth is not derivable merely from the logical rules of the pro-
cess of inquiry, but rather only from the objective life context in which process of 
inquiry specifiable functions: the settlements of opinions, the elimination of uncer-
tainties, and the acquisition of unproblematic beliefs-in short the fixation of belief.’ 
p119 Peirce resolutely rejected the Cartesian foundations, transcendental necessity 
and conditions, the so-called ‘spectator theory of knowledge’ that assumes the fact- 
value dualism. ‘For Peirce it is the method’, says Habermas, ‘that takes over the role 
of an unshakable foundation, the a priori judgements that per definition cannot be 
doubted because they are a ‘given’. p97 This thinking of Peirce was many years 
later followed up by great men like Sellars and Quine. Peirce assumed a constant 
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state not of scepticism but fallibilism, with continuous doubt about our claims in 
which he anticipated much of Popper’s falsificationism published in 1935.
John Dewey already concluded in the beginning of the twentieth century in many 
of his writings that philosophy appeared to be an internal debate for philosophers, 
esoteric and of little value to understanding and guiding the practice of scientific 
investigation and its relation to reality, society and human life. Dewey in The Quest 
for Certainty (1933) and elsewhere wrote extensively about what Bernstein called 
‘the ‘Cartesian Anxiety’, the belief of Descartes that the philosopher’s quest is to 
search for an Archimedean point on which we ground our knowledge’. (1983, p16) 
I will cite the crisp and concise remarks of Hacking about Dewey’s criticism of the 
philosophy of science of the empiricist and positivistic tradition. Hacking later con-
fessed (Misak, 2007) that he himself found it hard to read Dewey, ‘it goes on and 
on’ and that feeling is familiar to me. Hacking: ‘Truth is whatever answers to our 
present needs, or at least those needs that lie at hand. Dewey gave us the idea that 
truth is warranted acceptability. The world and our representation of it seems to 
become at the hands of Dewey very much a social construct. Dewey despised all 
dualism- mind/matter, theory/practice, thought/action, fact/value. He made fun of 
the ‘spectator theory of knowledge’. He said it resulted from the existence of a lei-
sure class, who thought and wrote philosophy, as opposed to a class of entrepre-
neurs and workers who had not the time for just looking.
Hacking, says about Dewey: ‘My own view, that realism is more a matter of 
intervention in the world, than of representing it in words and thought, surely owes 
much to Dewey.’ (p62) (Hacking, 1983). Pragmatism, from Peirce, Dewey, James, 
Nagel, Quine to Habermas and Hacking, is beyond Cartesian empiricist philosophy 
and holds that it is this relation to practice, intervention, and actions based on our 
accepted beliefs that gives value to our beliefs, and not timeless transcendent formal 
principles that cannot be tested.
Karl Popper (1902–1994), was a most influential philosopher of science who in 
his later years also wrote extensively about the open society, freedom and democ-
racy. He was in time and space close to the empiricist positivist philosophers of the 
Vienna Circle but did however not agree with most of their philosophy. In his “Logic 
der Forschung: zur erkenntnisstheorie der modernen naturwissenschaft” published 
in 1935, a translation of which appeared in 1959 under the title “The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery”, he criticised the positivist and empiricist philosophy on their 
major ideas. It has been said that this critique, after the members of the Vienna 
Circle having tried to incorporate some of it, eventually in the 1950s caused the 
declaration of the death of logical positivism. Popper wrote in his autobiography, 
Unended Quest (chapter 17), that he rather thought the Vienna Circle came to end 
because they did not address the real problems, but got immersed in debates about 
minor problem, puzzles and in particular the meaning of words. Although this 
echoes the critique on philosophy of Peirce, James and Dewey, they are not men-
tioned by Popper in this discussion of philosophy of science. Toulmin, but not even 
Kuhn is mentioned which is remarkable, given the impact of Kuhn’s work on the 
legacy of logical positivists, that was already tangible at the time of Popper’s writ-
ing (Popper, 1976).
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In the 1958 introduction to the English translation of The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, Popper states that he is a pluralist and he commends the philosophers 
‘who do not pledge themselves in advance to any philosophical method, and who 
make use of epistemology, of the analyses of scientific problems, theories, and pro-
cedures, and, most important, of scientific discussions. …Its most important repre-
sentatives… were Kant, Whewell, Mill, Peirce, Duhem, Poincaré, Meyerson, Russel 
and later in some of his phases Whitehead. Most of those …would agree that scien-
tific knowledge is the result of the growth of common-sense knowledge. But all of 
them discovered that scientific knowledge can be more easily studied. It’s very prob-
lems are enlargements of the problems of common-sense knowledge. For example it 
replaces the Humean problem of ‘reasonable belief’ by the problem of the reasons 
for accepting or rejecting scientific theories.’ p22 (Popper, 1959).
Hacking compared Popper’s philosophy with that of Carnap’s logical positivist 
philosophy, saying ‘They disagreed about much, only because they agreed on basics. 
It would be nice to have a criterion to distinguish such good science from bad non-
sense or ill-formed speculation.’ (p3) Hacking, who wrote that he has been most 
influenced in his early days in England by Popper, concludes that despite these dif-
ferences the positivists and Popper contributed a lot of the timeless image of science 
The Legend, that ruled before Kuhn, before 1960: ‘They thought that the natural 
sciences are terrific and that physics is the best. It exemplies rationality and from 
that they believed in the unity of science.’ p5 (Hacking, 1983).
As I have discussed above, the positivists started with observations from the bot-
tom, building it up into a system of verified statements about the world. Popper did 
reject this idea on philosophical logical arguments. In his view it starts top down 
with hypotheses, that are based on previously obtained knowledge, discussions with 
peers or simply wild ideas. These conjectures and their contexts determine how we 
subsequently observe and how we interpret the observations about the world. In 
Popper’s view the claims derived from these observations may after severe experi-
mental testing and discussion between scientists become accepted, held to be ‘true’. 
However, per definition they are not verified. On the contrary, theories and their 
statements are to be regarded falsifiable, open to refutation, at any time by further 
testing and criticism. Poppers ‘method’ of conjectures and refutations, and his fal-
sificationism reminds of the ‘scientific method’ described by Peirce 50 years before. 
Like Peirce, Popper completely rejected the idea of the independent, ‘given’ foun-
dation and the dichotomy between facts and values. Observation, ideas and theory 
were always entangled. In his thinking, like Peirce, Popper emphasized the power 
of the method of rigorous and endless testing and of criticism in the community of 
peers. “Basic statements are accepted as the result of a decision or agreement, and 
to that extent they are a convention. The decisions are reached in accordance with a 
procedure governed by rules’….. ‘Thus the real situation is quite different from the 
naive empiricist. Or the believer in inductive logic.’….‘Theory dominates the exper-
imental work from its initial planning up tot the finishing touches in the laboratory’. 
(p106) In a most fascinating metaphor of the ‘swamp’ he resolutely deals with the 
issue of the foundation and the ‘given’. It is the visualization of this powerful meta-
phor that I literally never got out of my mind after reading it in August 1975: ‘The 
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empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. Science 
does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, 
above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from 
above into the swamp, but not down any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driv-
ing the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop 
when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least 
for the time being’. (p109).
In his 1972 Addendum he added:‘1. My term ‘basis’ has ironical overtones; it is 
a basis but is not firm. 2. I assume a realist and objectivist point of view: I try to 
replace perception as ‘basis’ by critical testing’. Our observational experiences are 
never beyond testing; they are impregnated with theories. 4. ‘Basic statements …are 
like all language, impregnated with theories‘.(p109) In a later paper, The Rationality 
of Scientific Revolutions, which takes in to account the community of inquiry and 
some of the sociological and psychological aspects of the research process, he 
describes the problems that may arise from this phase of debate and criticism due to 
the human factor (Popper, 1981) which were discussed in his Conjectures and 
Refutations at length (Popper, 1972).
Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) is everywhere, when you read about the 
demise of the Legend and about his role, or not, in the resurrection of pragmatism 
(Misak, 2013b) Quine was familiar to the members of the Vienna Circle but 
worked whole his life in the USA. In most cases his contribution is very briefly told 
with short citations. He did not write much, but he made an immense mark through 
his famous dogma’s on empiricism especially by forever rejecting, on analytic logi-
cal grounds, thus by using their own weaponry, the analytic–synthetic distinction. 
This was a blow to the very important yardstick of logical-empiricism and the phi-
losophy of the Vienna Circle (Quine, From a logical point of view, 1956). He dem-
onstrated, or in fact built the argument that the principles of inference that we use to 
link theory with experience [observations done via our senses] are as Putnam 
(Putnam, 1981) says [not analytical, nor given or timeless foundations but] ‘are just 
as much subject to revision as any other aspect of our corporate body of knowl-
edge.’ (p30). These rules are thus not ‘given’, or a priori assumptions but result from 
our collective thinking, experience and discussion and are such that as Misak 
phrases: ‘everyone would assent to them’ (p200) (Misak, 2013a). 
Michael Polanyi wrote in 1959 a short fascinating comment on C.P. Snow’s Two 
Cultures that originally appeared in Encounter, a monthly Anglo-American journal 
of politics and culture that did fit Polanyi’s political ideas discussed above. This 
piece is written in the characteristic polemic style of Polanyi who also here puts the 
issue in a larger political neo-conservative frame, criticizing the hard-boiled scien-
tific ideals and naturalistic scientism of Bentham and Marx that in his view disre-
spects truth. ‘Our task is not to suppress specialisation of knowledge but to achieve 
harmony and truth over the whole range of knowledge. This is where I see the 
trouble. Where a deep-seated disturbance was inherently originally in the liberating 
impact of modern science on medieval thought and has only later turned pathologi-
cal’.. ‘Science rebelled against authority. It rejected deduction from first causes in 
favour of empirical generalisations. Its ultimate ideal was a mechanistic theory of 
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the universe, though in respect man it aimed only at naturalistic explanation of his 
moral and social responsibilities’. ‘..scientific rationalism has been the chief guide 
towards all the intellectual, moral, and social progress on which the nineteenth 
century prided itself- and to the great progress achieved since then as well. …Yet it 
would be easy to show that the principles of scientific rationalism are strictly speak-
ing nonsensical. No human mind can function without accepting authority, custom 
and tradition: it must rely on them for the mere use of a language. Empirical induc-
tion, strictly applied can yield no knowledge at all and the mechanistic explanation 
of the universe is a meaningless ideal….because the prediction of all atomic posi-
tions in the universe would not answer any question of interest to anybody’. 
‘Scientific obscurantism has pervaded our culture and now distorts even science by 
imposing on it false ideals of exactitude’. (p41) (Polanyi & Grene, 1969).
Ernest Nagel has been an influential philosopher, not only through his famous 
textbook The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. 
(Nagel, 1961) In that pre-Kuhnian seminal work he covered the whole of the phi-
losophy of science of those days, but mostly limited to mainstream analytical phi-
losophy, logical-positivism and empiricism and Popper’s philosophy. There is a 
very short discussion of ‘instrumentalism’ which refers to American Pragmatism. 
He was sympathetic to pragmatism as I will discuss later and in his introductory 
chapter he makes a few remarkable statements which are a critique of the empiricist- 
positivist philosophy of the ‘Legend’ that he discusses in the next 300 pages of his 
book. ‘The practice of the scientific method is the persistent critique of arguments 
in the light of tried canons for judging the reliability of the procedures by which 
evidential data are obtained and for assessing the probative force of the evidence on 
which conclusions are based’. ….‘the difference between the cognitive claims of 
science and common sense which stems from the fact that the former are the prod-
ucts of scientific method, does not connote that the former are invariably true.’…… 
‘If the conclusions of science are the products of inquiries conducted in accordance 
with a definite policy for obtaining and assessing evidence, the rationale for confi-
dence in those conclusions as warranted must be based on the merits of that policy. 
It must be admitted that the canons for assessing evidence which define the policy 
have, at best, been explicitly codified only in part, and operate in the main only as 
intellectual habits manifested by competent investigators in the conduct of their 
inquiries. But despite this fact the historical record of what has been achieved by 
this policy ….leaves little room for serious doubt concerning the superiority of the 
policy….’ (p18)
‘For in point of fact, we do not know whether the unrestrictedly universal (positivist- 
empiricist premises) assumed in the explanation of the empirical sciences are indeed true…
.’were this Aristotelian requirement adopted few if any of the explanations given by modern 
science could be accepted’… ‘In practice it would lead to the introduction …that explana-
tions are being judged to have merit by the scientific (p43)
Polanyi, who as we saw criticized positivism, concludes two different things 
from Nagel’s account of science: ‘Nagel implies that we must save our belief in the 
truth of scientific explanations by refraining from asking what they are based upon. 
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Scientific truth is defined, as that which scientists affirm and believe to be true. Yet 
this lack of philosophical justification has not damaged the public authority of sci-
ence, but rather increased it’(Polanyi, 1967)
Marxism? Critical Theory?
Before discussing Kuhn’s work and immense impact from the 2020 perspec-
tive, I want here from the 1977 perspective refer to another writer who has 
until this day influenced my thinking about science, research and society. In 
September 1976, after a year of philosophy, I had returned to the lab bench to 
study for my Masters in immunology at the Academic Hospital of the 
University of Groningen. I continued reading about science and in the Spring 
1977 I read Jerom Ravetz’s book ‘Scientific Knowledge and its Social 
Problems’ (Ravetz, 1971). Ravetz (1929-) is a mathematician who became a 
philosopher of science. After his graduation in the US, he came in the late 
1950s to the UK at a time when his even moderate Marxist sympathies were 
problematic with McCarthyism in the US. In Europe Marxist sympathies in 
the 1960s and 1970s were not at all a problem in academia and Critical Theory 
was very much under the influence of neo-marxist political and social think-
ing. At university in the early 1970s, there were hard-liners, but one was 
mostly exposed to Marxism-Light as I would call it. With this I mean, the 
analyses of socio-economic powers and dynamics, taken out of the Marxist 
view of inevitable collapse of capitalism and then post-capitalist utopia of the 
salvation state which had already then not proved realistic in rapidly changing 
and adapting capitalist economies. However, when re-reading the two collec-
tions edited by Rose and Rose from 1976, which I read in 1977, that provide 
a series of articles on science and society, from an downright Marxist perspec-
tive, the Marxist jargon, the mentioning of the blessings of Maoism and the 
illusion of the end of capitalism and the bourgeoisie is quite weird. Indeed, 
Stalinism and Leninism and then the Cold War as discussed had blocked these 
analyses of science and society in the US. Ravetz was most of his professional 
life affiliated with the Centre for Philosophy and History of Science in Leeds 
where he worked for a short period of time with Toulmin. Ravetz in his book 
presents a comprehensive analysis of science and research, starting with prob-
lems that he expected would become more prominent. He discusses in depth 
the consequences of what he called ‘the industrialization’ of science which 
goes against the Mertonion norms with its protection of property and top- 
down management. He argued that because of enormous increase in scale, 
loss of social and ethical control, the system would increasingly face poor 
quality ‘shoddy’ research because of the lack of shared value of individual 
researchers with the scientific community. On the other hand, he is deeply 
concerned about the external influences on the research agenda by powerful 
private parties, multi-nationals, but also the military and governments. We 
(continued)
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The huge impact of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pub-
lished in 1962, has already been mentioned many times. It has opened up the debates 
in the history and sociology of science, but at the same time affected the domain of 
the philosophers showing through historical and sociological research the problems 
of logical positivism. Kuhn presented a descriptive account of what scientists do, 
which sociologically, but also (methodo)logically deviates from the normative posi-
tivist scientific method. He did however not provide judgement about the way sci-
ence was actually done from the philosophical perspective (positivism) and did not 
propose an alternative correct formal method. This, in the eyes of his critics, was not 
logic or if it was logical, they did not agree. They asked the question whether Kuhn’s 
description wasn’t in fact normative. They make it, Kuhn writes in discussion with 
his critics, clear that they don’t like his normative prescriptions using terms as ‘cor-
rupt our understanding and diminish our pleasure’ and ‘a plea for hedonism’. 
(Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970) They accuse Kuhn not using logic while they them-
selves use normative non-cognitive arguments and language. (p237). ‘History and 
social-psychology are not, my critics claim, a proper basis for philosophical con-
clusions’ (p235). This is an important issue as it points to the gap between the phi-
losophy and the practice of science. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. 
Lakatos and Musgrave (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970) is based on the contributions to 
a symposium held 13 July 1965 in London. In the final chapter, Reflection on my 
Critics, Kuhn declares his epistemological viewpoints that are beyond positivism, 
foundationalism and Popper’s theory of falsification, but not sceptic nor relativistic. 
In fact, Kuhn states that his descriptive account of the process of inquiry at the same 
time indeed is normative. Because, if you want your inquiry to succeed you should 
use that process, that scientific method, which of course involves logic, mathemat-
ics, statistics and other accepted methods at a given moment in time in a research 
community. Indeed, science as Kuhn concluded, is a process of the community and 
not of an individual. A lot of the discussion in Criticism in my reading then indeed 
was about the differences between the descriptive historical and in some respect 
sociological mode of Kuhn’s approach versus the normative mode of especially 
Popper and to some degree Lakatos. Popper admits that normal science exists, but 
know noe  that Ravetz writing that book at that time was quite visionary. 
During his whole career he studied issues of uncertainty, risks and unwanted 
effects attached to the use of novel scientific knowledge and technology in 
society (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; Ravetz, 2011). He wrote about the ethics 
of science and scientists and criticizes the claim ‘of neutrality’ that was used 
by researchers to evade their social responsibility. At that early stage prepar-
ing for my professional life, reading this book for me was truly a transforma-
tive experience and Jerry Ravetz was an inspiration and it was special that he 
participated when in the late fall of 2012 through 2013 we prepared for the 
start of Science in Transition described in Chap. 3.
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finds it degrading and compares it to applied science and warned for the dangers 
normal science could pose to science. This is very reminiscent of the elitist scientific 
attitudes Snow and Medawar were criticising. Popper even suggested Kuhn did not 
seem to dislike normal science, whereby he exhibited his normative way, not only 
of theorizing about science, but also of judging scientists (p52, 53).
I cite some of the most interesting lines of Kuhn:
‘I am no less concerned with rational reconstruction, with the discovery of essen-
tials, than are philosophers of science. My objective, too, is an understanding of 
science, of the reasons for its special efficacy, of the cognitive status of its theo-
ries. But, unlike most philosophers of science, I began as an historian of science, 
examining closely the facts of scientific life’
Kuhn ‘discovered that much scientific behaviour, including that of the very greatest 
scientists, persistently violated accepted methodological canons,…’ p236
In the current context of course the question is: who exactly had accepted these 
canons? Philosophers, but apparently not researchers! In response to Lakatos, Kuhn 
describes succinctly his conceptual frame:
‘some of the principles deployed in my explanation of science are irreducibly sociological, 
at least at this time. In particular, confronted with the problem of theory-choice, the struc-
ture of my response runs roughly as follows: take a group of the best available people with 
the most appropriate motivation; train them in some science and in the specialties relevant 
to the choice at hand; imbue them with the value system, the ideology, current in their dis-
cipline (and to a great extent in other scientific fields as well); and, finally, let them make 
the choice. If that technique does not account for scientific development as we know it, then 
no other will. There can be no set of rules of choice to dictate desired individual behaviour 
in the concrete cases that scientists will meet in the course of their careers. Whatever scien-
tific progress may be, we must account for it by examining the nature of the scientific group, 
discovering what is values, what it tolerates, and what it disdains. That position is intrinsi-
cally sociological, and, as such, a major retreat from the canons of explanation licensed by 
traditions which Lakatos labels justificationism and falsificationism, both dogmatic, and 
naïve’. p237, 238.
It is important to take note that Lakatos, in his one-hundred-page long contribu-
tion to this book, wrote that this debate ‘did not start with Kuhn. An earlier wave of 
‘psychologism’ followed the breakdown of justificationism. For many, justification-
ism represented the only possible form of rationality: the end of justificationism 
meant the end of rationality …………After the collapse of Newtonian physics, 
Popper elaborated new, non-justificationist critical standards. Finding them unten-
able, they identify the collapse of Popper’s naïve falsificationism with the end of 
rationality self.’ P178. Lakatos, a true Popperian and believer in the ‘scientific 
method’ at that time, started to work on his concept of Research Programmes, a mix 
of Popperian and Kuhnian thought.
In the remainder of the chapter, Kuhn responds to the critique that his description 
of science, without a rejection of the methods used, opens the doors to relativity and 
nihilism. It was argued that personal opinion, mob psychology and elites with power 
and vested professional interests could determine the outcome of discussions 
regarding theory choice. He cites the non-cognitive, but important criteria and 
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values that are being used and accepted in communities of inquirers and have been 
implied by Popper in his normative description of theory choice, including ‘accu-
racy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness’. (P261, 262) Kuhn emphasizes that these are 
not rules that can be applied in a straightforward manner and his historical research 
has shown that they may evolve and change over time in the community.
When Kuhn prepared his book, in the late 1950s, logical positivism despite the 
prominent works by Quine and Sellars, still ruled in the philosophy of science and 
pragmatism was not considered to be a sound and fruitful alternative. Many still 
believed that the problems of positivism could be solved by analytical philosophy. 
But Kuhn’s analyses and conclusions as expressed above are, although not cited by 
him, reminiscent of American pragmatism and the critiques of Peirce and Dewey on 
the dominant philosophy of science of their times.
John Ziman (1925–2005) was a physicist who between 1960 and 2000 was one 
of the first to write systematically, in depth and broadly about science. In 1968 he 
published Public Knowledge (Ziman, 1968) his first of nine books on science and as 
Jerome Ravetz, Ziman’s contemporary colleague and science writer, in his obituary 
wrote: ‘In this he bypassed the debates among the philosophers who saw science as 
a collection of “theories” requiring some sort of logical proof; for him the essential 
feature of scientific knowledge is its social character.’ (Jerry Ravetz, Guardian, 
February 2005).
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It’s Anthropology, Stupid!
In most of their books, Toulmin, Hanson, Ravetz and Ziman, but also Polanyi, 
take all aspects of the scientific enterprise into account in their analyses of 
how consensus regarding reliable knowledge is produced and thus what dis-
tinguishes science as a social activity. In their opinion it is exactly the com-
plex of the methods, personal psychology, the community and the sociology 
of the researchers in organizations that determines what science is. Their writ-
ings went against the widely held believes about science and as a consequence 
were virtually neglected by main-stream philosophy, history and sociology. 
Because of its multidisciplinarity, in addition their work did not belong to one 
of these classical academic disciplines. Similarly, even Bruno Latour in his 
We were never Modern complained about the slow recognition of Latour and 
Woolgar’s Laboratory Life by philosophers and sociologist of science. 
(Latour, 1993; Latour & Woolgar, 1979) This was duly confirmed by Hacking 
in his very late 1988 (!) review of ‘Laboratory Life’. With regard to this semi-
nal book of 1979 and his own 1983 book that I here cite a lot and wherein he 
argues to take a look at the practice of science, he declares that ‘it was shame-
ful not to examine the one outstanding piece of work then available that took 
laboratory science seriously and argued the strong anti-realist doctrine in 
existence’.(p278) (Hacking, 1988) Latour pointed out that we do accept 
anthropology crossing all these academic territories, but apparently we do not 
allow this for an anthropology of the tribe of humanity that is involved in 
science.
This may, Ravetz believed, be the reason that this type of work has had 
relatively little impact (Ravetz, personal communication 2013). That may 
well be the case, but as argued above, meta-science research drew in general 
very little attention from those active in research in the academic disciplines 
or in the ‘corridors of power’ of academia (Miedema, 2012). Lack of impact 
has also been blamed on the fact that the work of these authors lacked a novel 
theory, theoretical frame or a specific novel concept. Exceptions to this are 
Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge and Toulmin’s metaphor of maps for 
theories (1953) and his evolutionary concept of progress in science (1972). I 
disagree with this critique, as I my opinion the main hypothesis for which they 
provided evidence and which is the basis for this book, is that in the history of 
science, the dominant image of science which proved philosophically wrong 
around 1960, was strongly politically and culturally determined and has until 
now distorted and hurt the practice of science in many different ways. It is on 
the basis of these insights, that many scholars have since then began to study 
the practice of science. These studies in the recent past have resulted in 
renewed movements to improve the practice of science and make it more suit-
able to contribute to solve the grand challenges of the twenty-first century. 
John Ziman already in his early books Public Knowledge and Reliable 
Knowledge has provided insights from the trenches of science about the 
(continued)
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John Ziman could in those days, find virtually no literature on consensus build-
ing by the community and the social process and ‘that makes the Philosophy of 
Science nowadays so arid and repulsive. To read the latest volume on this topic is to 
be reminded of the Talmud…’ It is fiercely professional and technical and almost 
meaningless to the ordinary working scientist. This is unfortunate ..I shall try to 
heal the breach by talking semi-philosophically about the intellectual procedures of 
scientific investigation.’ (p31).
In Reliable Knowledge: an exploration of the grounds for belief in science 
(J. M. Ziman, 1978) an important book in this context, Ziman did the same bypass 
as in Public Knowledge as in all his books regarding the philosophical basis of the 
Legend. In the introductory paragraph 1.4 he firmly states that from data, diagrams, 
models or pictures, ‘meaning cannot be deduced by formal mathematical or logical 
manipulation. For this reason scientific knowledge is not so much ‘objective’ as 
‘intersubjective’ and can only be validated and translated into action by interven-
tion of human minds’ (p7). Ziman is very realistic and knows the daily practice of 
physics and does not conceal weaknesses known to investigators but disguised by 
the believers of the Legend: ‘The achievements of intersubjective agreement is sel-
dom logically rigorous; there is a natural psychological tendency for each individ-
ual to go along with the crowd, and to cling to a preciously successful paradigm in 
the face of contrary evidence. Scientific knowledge thus contains many fallacies, 
mistaken beliefs that are held and maintained collectively and which can only be 
dislodged by strong persuasive events.’ (p8.) He describes how scientist are ‘brain-
washed’ during their training in the concept, accepted beliefs and methods in the 
current paradigms of their field. He explains in great detail and nuance how in the 
‘social model of science’, the scientific community produces the knowledge we 
problem of the myth of the ‘scientific method’, which at that time still few 
others understood and for which Ziman later coined the term ‘the Legend’ 
(Ziman, 2000). He wondered in 1968 (!) (Ziman, 1968) how this ‘logico-
inductive’ metaphysics of Science.. can be correct, when few scientists are 
interested in (it) or understand it, and no one ever uses it explicitly in his 
work? But if Science is not distinguished from other intellectual disciplines 
neither by a particular style or argument nor by a definable subject matter, 
what is it? (p8). He then sketches the social process of inquiry, hypothesis, 
testing and criticism and states that ‘it is not a subsidiary consequence of the 
‘Scientific Method’; it is the scientific method itself.’‘The defect of the conven-
tional philosophical approach to Science is that it considers only two terms in 
the equation. The scientist is seen as an individual, pursuing a somewhat one- 
sided dialogue with taciturn Nature. But it is not like that all. The scientific 
enterprise is corporate. It is never one individual that goes through all steps 
of the logico-inductive chain; it is a group of individuals, dividing their labour 
but continuously and jealously checking each other’s contributions’. (p9)
2 Images of Science: A Reality Check
51
designate as scientific knowledge and what makes it unique and reliable. Ziman 
builds further on the work of those who criticised positivism and the Legend  - 
Polanyi, Hanson, Toulmin and Kuhn- published in the decade before. Ziman points 
to fact that there is not one scientific method, there are many dimensions to scien-
tific knowledge and ‘that explains the strange sense of unreality that scientist feel 
when they read books about the philosophy of science’ (p84). From this point of 
view from the natural sciences, he concludes that the social sciences and humanities 
of course can produce reliable scientific knowledge and he states in an unexpected 
humanistic lyric paragraph that ‘the challenge to the behavioural sciences is not 
coming from physics but from the humanities’. (p185).
Jerome Ravetz in his, in the STS fields well-known, Scientific Knowledge and its 
Social Problems presented a unique philosophical-sociological analysis. (Ravetz, 
1971) It provides an integrated very rich view of science, its theoretical assump-
tions, its ideologies, power games, issues of ethics and social responsibilities and 
the sociology and politics of the system and the interaction with society. Ravetz 
cites a broad body of the most relevant scholars at that time. He refers frequently to 
the work of his temporaries Toulmin, Ziman, Rose and Rose and especially Polanyi’s 
‘Personal Knowledge’ (Polanyi, 1958, 1962). He really ‘took a look’ at the practice 
of science and especially emphasizes science as craftmanship and subsequently dis-
cusses the philosophical assumptions about the special status of theories and how 
knowledge is produced. He, on the basis of his understanding how science and 
research is being done, rejects the positivist and foundationalist ideas With respect 
to ‘the scientific method’ and positivism he clearly states that in research the under-
lying ‘principles and precepts that are social in their origin and transmission, with-
out which no scientific work can be done.. guide and control the work of scientific 
inquiry.’ (p146) More explicitly: ‘The individual scientist; and the criteria of ade-
quacy are set by his scientific community, not by Nature itself.’ (p149) With respect 
to ‘the maturity of a field an important part lies in the strengthening of the criteria 
of adequacy. This is not all of course; the development of new tools, and the creation 
of an appropriate social environment are equally important. Nor can the strength-
ening of criteria of adequacy be done in an abstract, automatic fashion, as by 
attempted imitation of a succesful field (p157). About the relation between philoso-
phy and the practice of science he says: ‘Philosophers of science have attempted, 
with some success to provide a rationale for the different basic patterns of argu-
ment, showing why it is reasonable for an intelligent person to place reliance on 
them….But as these philosophical arguments become more refined and sophisti-
cated, they drift further and further from the practice of science.’ Finally, for the 
present discussion it is of interest to close with the following citation on the dichot-
omy of values and facts. Ravetz, unlike Polanyi, but like Bernal whom he also per-
sonally knew, sees research primary as a social activity that needs conscious 
strategies to be able to make proper judgements regarding problem choice. He 
explicitly mentioned values other than strict cognitive arguments that have to enter 
into these evaluations (p161). ‘The criteria of value, and judgements based upon 
them, form an interesting contrast to those of adequacy. …we shall find ourselves 
involved in problems of the social activity of science. …The exclusion of problems 
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of value from the traditional philosophy of science has its roots in the ideology of 
modern natural science as it was formed through many generations of struggles…..
the considerations of social value by which all other human activities are assessed 
were declared irrelevant’ p160.
Mary Hesse (1924–2016) studied mathematics, physics and philosophy and 
taught mathematics and philosophy at several universities in England. She has writ-
ten extensively on the philosophy of science. Mary Hesse wrote in 1972: ‘During 
the last half-century much of professional Anglo-American philosophy of science 
has been devoted to detailed development of internal logic of natural science based 
on empiricist criteria, and also on attempts to show how this logic applies also in 
the social sciences and in the study of history. Suggestions….to the effect that there 
are other modes of knowledge than the empiricist were sometimes actively resisted 
but more usually totally disregarded’. ‘It was held that adoption of at least a modi-
fication this empiricist method is required for human sciences ‘to attain knowledge 
status at all’ which in her view is ‘imperialism claimed for natural science’ (p27) 
(Hesse, 1972).
‘These distinctions that I believe are made largely untenable by recent more 
accurate analyses of natural science.
 1. In natural science experience is taken to be objective, testable, and independent 
of theoretical explanation. In human science data are not detachable from the-
ory, for what count as data are determined in the light of some theoretical inter-
pretation, and facts themselves have to be reconstructed in the light of 
interpretation.
 2. In natural science theories are artificial constructions or models, yielding expla-
nation in the sense of logic of hypothetic-deduction: if external nature were of 
such a kind, then data and experience would be as we find them. In human sci-
ence theories are mimetic reconstructions of the facts themselves, and the crite-
rion of a good theory is understanding of meanings and intentions rather than 
deductive explanation.
 3. In natural science the law-like relations asserted of experience and external, 
both to the objects connected and to the investigator, since they are merely cor-
relational. In human science relations asserted are internal, both because the 
objects studied are essentially constituted by their interrelations with one 
another, and also because the relations are mental, in the sense of being created 
by human categories of understanding recognized (or imposed? By the 
investigator.
 4. The language of natural science is exact, formalizable, and literal; therefore, 
meanings are univocal, and a problem of meaning arises only in the application 
of universal categories to particulars. The language in human sciences is irre-
ducibly equivocal and continually adapts itself to particulars.
 5. Meanings in natural science are separate from facts. Meanings in human sci-
ence are what constitute facts, for data consist of documents, inscriptions, inten-
tional behaviour, social rules, human artefacts, and like, and these are 
inseparable from their meanings for agents.
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‘Let us however concentrate for a moment on the natural science half of the dichotomy what 
is immediately striking about it to readers versed in recent literature in philosophy of sci-
ence is that almost every point made about the human sciences has recently been made 
about the natural sciences. And that the five points made about the natural sciences presup-
pose a traditional empiricist view of the natural science that is almost universally discred-
ited’ (p277) (Hesse, 1972)
Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature published in 1979 had 
enormous and immediate impact and for most scholars of pragmatism was the start 
of the pragmatic turn (Rorty, 1979). Rorty, in chapters III and IV, starts by discuss-
ing in depth the serious critiques of Quine and Sellars on the classical dichotomies 
of logical positivism. In addition, he took the pragmatic turn in chapter VII discuss-
ing at length Kuhn’s work and putting it firmly in the larger context of the pragma-
tism of John Dewey. He concludes that ‘analytic’ epistemology (i.e. “philosophy of 
science”) became increasingly historicist and decreasingly “logical” (as in Hanson, 
Kuhn, Harré and Hesse) (p168). He discusses the ‘behavioristic’ critiques of Quine 
and Sellars, following Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations published at the 
same time in 1953, on ‘the two distinctions the “given” and “that what is added by 
the mind” and that between the “contingent” (because influenced by what is given) 
and the “necessary” because entirely “within” the mind and under its control)…he 
presents them as forms of holism. As long as knowledge is conceived of as accurate 
representing- as Mirror of Nature- Quine’s and Sellar’s holistic doctrines sound 
pointlessly paradoxical, because such accuracy requires a theory of privileged rep-
resentations, ones which are automatically and intrinsically accurate. …I shall be 
arguing that their holism is a product of their commitment to the thesis that justifica-
tion is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) but of conversa-
tion, of social practice. …we understand knowledge when we understand the social 
justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of 
representation.’(p170)…this is, Rorty says, ‘the essence of what I shall call episte-
mological behaviorism, an attitude common to Dewey and Wittgenstein’. (p174) 
‘Epistemological behaviorism (which might be called “pragmatism” were this term 
not a bit overladen)…is the claim that philosophy will have no more to offer than 
common sense (supplemented by biology, history, etc) about knowledge and truth. 
(p176). The term ‘behavioristic’ may seem peculiar, but refers to the social process 
by which a community of inquirers come to produce and accept knowledge and 
beliefs.
In the pages that follow Rorty dispenses with foundationalism and even with 
philosophy at large, the latter goes much too far for philosophers like Kitcher, who 
see enough problems to philosophize about. Indeed, since the demise of the Legend, 
there is no systematic ‘grand unified theory’ in the philosophy of knowledge. As I 
will argue in Chap. 4, pragmatism has a lot to offer with regard to our understanding 
and philosophizing about knowledge and knowledge production. As Rorty dis-
cussed (p367), it may not provide a systematic alternative, but it does provide a 
hermeneutical method and viewpoint about science and inquiry (see also Kuhn The 
essential tension p xiii and xv). This, to many a philosopher of the analytic tradition 
may have been disappointing and the main reason to not take pragmatism serious as 
2.2  Part 2. The Crisis in Analytical Philosophy
54
philosophy, but must be understood in that pragmatism is a reaction by ‘peripheral’ 
philosophers (James, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Heidegger) to a ‘systematic’ philosophy 
which Rorty designates a mainstream analytic ‘superstition’. These ‘peripheral’ 
philosophers are according to Rorty the ‘edifying’ philosophers. They do not pro-
vide a system with a set of rules but offer moral and intellectual instructions and 
enlightenment.
As Flyvberg (2001) argues, hermeneutics is not only relevant for the social sci-
ences but also for the natural sciences ‘as it is now argued that natural sciences are 
historically conditioned and require hermeneutic interpretation. Natural scientist, 
too, must determine what constitutes relevant facts, methods, and theories; for 
example, what would count as “nature”. (p28).
Nancy Cartwright, a mathematician and philosopher who has studied the prac-
tice of physic in relation to the myths of analytical philosophy. She wrote The 
Dappled World (Cartwright, 1999) in follow up of How the Laws of Physics Lie 
(Cartwright, 1983), in which she discusses the classical ideas of the unity of science 
and the myth of the universality of physics and she takes for comparison economics, 
the discipline that is famous for imitating (or since the financial crisis having imi-
tated?) physics. The physics that never was, as Cartwright shows. The Dappled 
World is a very technical book, but its conclusions (p9 and 10) are clear theories and 
claims have been stablished in very artificial settings in the laboratory or as in eco-
nomics by keeping everything else the same (ceteris paribus) both which in the real 
world are rare to occur: ‘I conclude that even our best theories are severely limited 
in their scope. For, to all appearances, not many of the situations that occur natu-
rally in our world fall under the concepts of these theories…..’‘The logic of the 
realist’s claim is two-edged: if it is the impressive empirical successes of our pre-
mier scientific theories that are supposed to argue for their ‘truth’…then it is the 
theories as used to generate these empirical successes that we are justified in 
endorsing. How do we use theory to understand and manipulate concrete things- to 
model particular physical or socio-economic systems? The core idea is … the belief 
in one great scientific system, a system of a small set of well-co-ordinated first prin-
ciples admitting a simple and elegant formulation, from which everything that 
occurs, or everything of a certain type or in a certain category that occurs, can be 
derived. But treatments of real systems are not deductive, ….(not) even if we tailor 
our systems as much as possible to fit our theories, which is what we do when we 
want to get the best predictions possible.’
This is the reason, and that is well known, why many drugs shown to have benefi-
cial effects in a highly selected patient population and well-controlled clinical trials, 
don’t do as well in clinical practice. Cartwright got a lot of criticism to the kind of 
criticism she articulated in How the Laws of Physics Lie but her response is clear, 
and relates to the myth of the Legend: ‘I agree that my illustrations ….are ‘a far cry’ 
from showing that the system must be a great scientific lie. But I think we must 
approach natural science with at least as much of the scientific attitude as natural 
religion demands’.
Her examples are from physics, economics, medicine and genetics. Her conclu-
sions reminds on the one hand of the arguments of Nagel discussed above, and on 
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the other hand of the persuasive work of Richard Lewontin, which in a less analytic 
and technical way, criticizing the ideologies of biology, genetics, molecular biology 
and the dream of the human genome project and thus of the positivist molecular- 
biologists and clinicians-researchers who believed would reductionist science solve 
the problem of our diseases- cancer, cardiovascular, and mental illnesses alike. 
(Lewontin, 2000; Lewontin et al., 1984).
Hillary Putnam (1926–2016) was a mathematician and philosopher who has had 
a broad and deep impact on mathematics, ethics and the philosophy of science. He 
is famous and admired for his critical thinking about the work of others, and inter-
estingly, as well as about his own work and has as consequence changed his philo-
sophical ideas and positions several times in his long career. He started as a student 
with Hans Reichenbach, a major figure in pre-war analytical philosophy. Via posi-
tions amongst others at Princeton and MIT he worked at Harvard until 2000. In his 
later years he wrote widely about American pragmatism (Putnam, 1995; Putnam & 
Conant, 1994) and in particular how it could overcome the problems of the analyti-
cal philosophical tradition including foundationalism, and the various dualisms 
such as the analytic-synthetic, the objective-subjective and the fact-value dichoto-
mies. His Reason, Truth and History (Putnam, 1981) is illuminating with respect to 
the flaws of the positivist philosophy of the Legend. In particular Chap. 3, but also 
more broadly the thinking presented in Chap. 8 are insightful. In 2004 he published 
The collapse of the Fact/Value dichotomy (Putnam, 2002) where he discusses how 
most ‘analytical philosophy of language and much metaphysics and epistemology 
has been openly hostile to talk of human flourishing, regarding such talk as hope-
lessly “subjective”- often relegating all of ethics, in fact, to that waste baker cate-
gory’ (p viii), and he argues for the economics approach of Amartya Sen. He delves 
deep, as always, and I will leave that to the more experienced reader but here I cite 
the very last paragraph which is in plain English but boldly worded which makes his 
position after a lifetime hard work on exactly these matters very clear:
‘I have argued that even when the judgments of reasonableness are left tacit, such judg-
ments are presupposed by scientific inquiry (indeed, judgments of coherence are essential 
even at the observational level: we have to decide which observations to trust, which scien-
tists to trust-sometimes even which of our memories to trust.) I have argued that judgments 
of reasonableness can be objective, and I have argued that they have all of the typical 
properties of value judgments. In short, I have argued that my pragmatist teachers were 
right: “knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values.” But the history of the phi-
losophy of science in the last half century has largely been a history of attempts - some of 
which would be amusing, if the suspicion of the very idea of justifying a value judgment that 
underlies them were not so serious in its implications- to evade this issue. Apparently any 
fantasy -the fantasy of doing science using only deductive logic (Popper), the fantasy of 
vindicating induction deductively (Reichenbach), the fantasy of reducing science to a sim-
ple sampling algorithm (Carnap), the fantasy of selecting theories given a mysteriously 
available set of “true observation conditionals,” or, alternatively “settling for psychology” 
(both Quine)- is regarded as preferable to rethinking the whole dogma (the last dogma of 
empiricism?) that facts are objective and values are subjective and “never the twain shall 
meet.” That rethinking is what pragmatists have been calling for for over a century When 
will we stop evading the issue (“knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values.”) 
(insert FM) and give the pragmatist challenge the serious attention it deserves? (p145)
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I have in this philosophical time-travelling now arrived in the twenty-first cen-
tury. I want to discuss Philip Kitcher’s work, which for several reasons is of interest 
in this context. Starting like Putnam from the analytical science tradition, he has 
described his intellectual history since the 1980s, in the beginning criticizing some 
and defending other parts of the Legend but gradually losing faith. Kitcher has been 
reflecting on the philosophical transition he went through, from empirical positiv-
ism, natural empirism to a form of neopragmatism. Even in times when the more 
general pragmatic turn was already going on in the field (Bernstein, 2010; Putnam 
& Conant, 1990), he experienced how different this philosophical approach was, not 
in the least in the eyes of his mainstream analytically thinking peers (Kitcher, 2012). 
Kitcher in 1999 was appointed as John Dewey Professor of philosophy at Columbia. 
From his website: ‘Following Dewey, I believe in the need for a reconstruction of 
philosophy (so that it will not be a “sentimental indulgence for the few”), and I 
worry about the increasing narrowness and professionalization of academic phi-
losophy. In working with graduate students, I hope to instil a capacity for clarity 
and rigor without sacrificing the sense of why philosophy matters.’
In his The Advancement of Science (Kitcher, 1993), which carries the strong 
subtitle “Science without a Legend, Objectivity without Illusion’, this struggle is 
throughout the book most visible, but Kitcher is to be recommended for being very 
explicit about it upfront and in the epilogue: ‘Once, in those dear dead days, almost, 
but not quite, beyond recall, there was a view of science that commanded wide 
spread popular and academic assent’….‘Legend celebrates scientists as well as sci-
ence’. …..scientists have achieved so much through the use of the SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD.’..’there are objective canons of evaluation of scientific claims; by and 
large, scientists (at least since the seventeenth century) have been tacitly aware of 
these canons and have applied them in assessing novel or controversial ideas….’ (p3).
‘So much for the dear dead days. Since the late 1950s the mists have begun to 
fall. Legend’s lustre is dimmed. While it may continue to figure in textbooks and 
journalistic expositions, numerous intelligent critics now view Legend as a smug, 
uninformed, unhistorical, and analytically shallow. Some of the critiques, science 
bashers, regard the failure of science to live up to Legend’s advertising as reason 
enough to question the hegemony of science in contemporary society. I shall not be 
concerned with them, but with the critiques of the Legend bashers, those who believe 
that Legend offered an unreal image of a worthy enterprise.’(p5) Kitcher acknowl-
edges that although he believes that the classical philosophy ‘belongs amongst the 
greatest accomplishments of philosophy of our century’, it has been shown to have 
its problems. He only once in a footnote (!) (p7) cites the devasting critique of 
Popper discussed above and admits that ‘despite efforts of a few philosophers, little 
headway has been made in finding a successor for Legend. If anything, recent work 
in the history of science and the sociology of science has offered eve more sweeping 
versions of the original critiques’……, I am not yet ready to abandon the search for 
generality’ (bold applied by FM) p8.
Kitcher is much concerned with the objectivity of theory choice where indeed 
(social) criteria are at play which according to Legend are non-epistemic because 
external. He also wrestles many pages with the classical problem of representation 
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of reality by theory and of realism of the objects of science and in these discussions 
uses, as per Legend, the success of natural science as kind of foundation, a warranty 
for objectivity and realism. This feels like causality reversed. Kitcher at that time 
believed that Legend could philosophically and sociologically be rescued, in his 
way or another. He believed that ‘the Legend was broadly right about the character-
istics of science. Flawed people, working in complex social environments, moved by 
all kind of interests, have collectively achieved a vision of parts of nature that is 
broadly progressive and rests on arguments meeting standards that have been 
refined and improved over centuries. Legend does not require burial but metamor-
phosis.’ p390 This defence of Legend is remarkable since writing this in 1993, he is 
aware and discusses the seminal work of the scholars who convincingly showed, as 
I discussed above, that the myth of ‘the scientific method’ and its normative canons, 
never did relate much to daily practice of inquiry and the idea of foundationalism 
did not hold. Kitcher (p10) admits that the Legend was a normative construction, 
but incorrectly seems to suggest it came from studying science and can be rescued 
by studying the practice of science again. Kitcher was at that time critized by Shapin 
(cited by Kitcher p303) that he still worked from the Legend’s ‘individualism’ of the 
scientist instead taking the work of many scholars to heart that shows the social 
process and the community of inquiry in practice. Very interestingly, in the final 
pages he suggests that philosophy should be normative and could suggest ethics and 
values for how the enterprise of science could (and should) be organized to opti-
mally contribute to human flourishing: ‘Yet even if the metamorphosis of Legend 
attempted here clears away those errors, it does not address the issue of the value 
of science. To claim as I have done that that the sciences achieve certain epistemic 
goals that we rightly prize is not enough- for the practice of science might be disad-
vantageous to human well-being in more direct was, practical ways. A convincing 
account of practical progress will depend ultimately on articulating an ideal of 
human flourishing against which we can appraise various strategies for doing sci-
ence. Given an ideal of human flourishing, how should we pursue our collective 
investigation of nature……..how should we modify the institution as to enhance 
human well-being?…. The philosophers have (no the Legend has .., FM) ignored 
the social context of science. The point however is to change it.” (p391) I will return 
to the later work of Kitcher, which shows his sharp pragmatic turn, when this topic 
is discussed further in Chap. 4.
Helen Longino (born 1944) has focussed throughout her career as philosopher 
on the social character of scientific inquiry. She is motivated in this work by 
Women’s Studies, the role of social values and criteria, equality, gender and inclu-
siveness. She has studied it from different theoretical and practical viewpoints. She 
understands the Legend and the struggle of the classical philosophers, including 
Kitcher, to break free from the classical view of the scientific method, the Legend. 
She is avoiding the extreme, that there is no objectivity in scientific inquiry at all, 
argued by those who claim that it is  determined by values and interests 
only  and  unconstrained by empirical observations. In her widely appreciated 
‘Science and Social Knowledge’(Longino, 1990) her tour the force on this is 
described for the first time in an analysis contrasting the logical positivist 
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philosophy of Hempel with the ‘Wholism’, as she calles it, of Hanson, Kuhn and 
Feyerabend. She goes basically through the same intellectual moves as the writers 
cited above and, in the end, tries to present a contextual empiricist ‘scientific 
method’ that is truly social in which the community of inquirers also takes social 
values pertinent to the context of the work into account. ‘My concern is that with a 
scientific practice perceived as having true or representative accounts of its subject 
matter as a primary goal or good. When we are troubled about the role of contextual 
values or value-laden assumptions in science, it is because we are thinking of scien-
tific inquiry as an activity whose intended outcome is the accurate understanding of 
whatever structures and processes are being investigated. If that understanding is 
itself conditioned by ours or others’ values, it cannot serve as a neutral and inde-
pendent guide.’ Against this she argues: ‘The dichotomy of these approaches should 
not be seen so much as a contraction to be resolved in favour of one or the other 
position, so much as reflective of a tension within science itself between its 
knowledge- extending mission (application in contexts) and its critical mission (bet-
ter theories)’ p34.
‘In assessing particular research programmes, it is important to keep in mind that knowl-
edge extension (testing the effects of claims in experimental and real-world settings) and 
truth (as accepted beliefs, Longino must mean to say) can guide scientific inquiry and 
serves as fundamental, but not necessarily compatible, values determining its assessment.’ 
Thus, while a demonstration of the contextual value ladeness of a particular research pro-
gram may serve to disqualify it as a source of unvarnished truth about its subject matter, 
such demonstration may have little bearing on one’s assessment of it as an example of sci-
entific inquiry.’(p36) (non-italic inserts are mine).
There is in Longino’s method, her epistemology, no timeless foundation, but 
there are background assumptions, ethical, political, social and other, and there is a 
practice of reasoning about them. They are under scrutiny, with full criticism and 
eventual acceptance by the community of inquirers thus correcting for subjective 
individual preferences (p216). These assumptions, like the classical scientific meth-
ods, are not insensitive to cultural and political changes brought about over periods 
of time by changes in the world views of citizens wherever they live their life. The 
myth or the Legend, Longino correctly observed, has served as a timeless and sta-
bile disguise providing an account that can ‘render invisible the background assump-
tions. The methodologies associated with logical positivism did render them 
invisible, which is, I suspect, one reason they remain persuasive among scientists 
even after being abandoned by philosophers……The myth of value neutrality, that 
is the consequence of the more general view that scientific inquiry is independent of 
its social context, is thus a functional myth.’ (p225).
This is an important insight. In fact, by employing this myth of neutrality, scien-
tific inquiry and science as a knowledge system in society is in first instance mainly 
conservative, resisting critique regarding its accepted theoretical core, and its reflec-
tion on its own societal activity. It prohibits, or at least discourages on methodologi-
cal (epistemic) grounds, also the critique through scientific inquiry of the institutions 
and social developments and conceals the interaction of science with public and 
private power structures in society. This is as an example reflected in the negative 
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response of Polanyi and Russell, key opinion leaders in UK physics on BBC radio 
broadcasted the beginning of 1945, to a caller’s question if something of practical 
use could be expected to be done with quantum physics. Much later in 1962 Polanyi 
‘actually,” admits, “the technical application of relativity…was to be revealed 
within a few months by the explosion of the first atomic bomb.” ‘Polanyi argued that 
because science is unpredictable, then its subsequent technical and social outcomes 
are even more so. He weaves an intricate analogy between the conduct of science 
and the play of the economic market, both of which exemplify how individuals can 
maximize socially beneficial outcomes by pursuing their own interests and adjust-
ing, mutually but independently, to the interests of others. The same “invisible 
hand” that guides the market guides science. While he allows that “Russell and I 
should have done better in foreseeing these applications of relativity in January 
1945,” he extends their own incapacity back a half century by also arguing that 
“Einstein could not possibly take these future consequences into account when he 
started on the problem which led to the discovery of relativity” because “another 
dozen or more discoveries had yet to be made before relativity could be combined 
with them to yield the technical progress which opened the atomic age” (Cited in 
(Guston, 2012) Guston 2012 Minerva). A bit dubious this evasion of one of the 
major ethical and political issues of twentieth century science, since Einstein and 
Szilard having fled the Nazi’s to the US, in 1939 urged Roosevelt to get an atomic 
bomb build before Hitler did. Its deployment against Japan had not been the idea of 
a pacifist Einstein and many involved scientists, they instead had seen it as a major 
means of deterrent. Einstein was until his dead active in the Federation of Atomic 
Scientists and the Pughwash Conferences against proliferation of nuclear arms.
Longino concludes that this myth of neutrality is detrimental to major aspects of 
the practice of modern science in chapters on research on sex differences, and the 
genetics and biology of behaviour where ‘hard’ data is interpreted based on uncon-
tested hidden social assumptions. Inquiry explicitly investigation and criticizing 
these cultural assumptions is per Legend declared non-scientific though, because of 
contextual assumptions that are made explicit.
Ten years after, in ‘The Fate of Knowledge’ (Longino, 2002) she has gone further 
down the road, further away from the timeless certainty of the Legend. She writes: 
‘My aim in this book is the development of an account of scientific knowledge that 
is responsive to the normative uses of the word “knowledge” and to the social con-
ditions in which scientific knowledge is produced. Recent work in history, philoso-
phy, and social and cultural studies of science has emphasized one or the other. As 
a consequence, accounts intended to explicate the normative dimensions of our con-
cept- that is elaborating the relation of knowledge to concepts such as truth and 
falsity, opinion, reason, and justification- have failed to get a purchase on actual 
science, whereas accounts detailing actual episodes of scientific inquiry have sug-
gested that our ordinary normative concepts have no relevance to science or that 
science fails the test of good epistemic practice. That can’t be right. The chapters 
that follow offer a diagnosis of this stalemate and an alternative account. I argue 
that the stalemate is produced by an acceptance by both parties of a dichotomous 
understanding of the rational and the social.’ (p1).
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This is one of the main problems in science and academia, nearly 20 years later 
because we still see this stalemate and in our debate about science its characteristic 
discourse. Longino addresses the underlying assumption of this classical dualism of 
the Legend and rejects them, which opens up the possibility of a concept of science 
where internal and external criteria of value both can be used to make choices in 
science. She in 2002 immediately (on p3) goes to the work of Mill, Peirce and 
Popper who early on realised that science and the method used to come to accepted 
beliefs is not an individual but a truly social process, which as we have discussed 
goes against the Legend. Regarding Popper she points out correctly that Popper, as 
cited above, praised philosophers who involve in their analyses ‘theories, and pro-
cedures, and, most important, (of) scientific discussions’, ‘contingent factors oper-
ating in the world of human affairs are beyond his epistemology’. ‘Unlike discussions 
by Mill and Peirce, Popper’s theory of knowledge deliberately bypasses the connec-
tion to science and inquiry as practiced and remains the ideal’ (p7). I cite her own 
resume of the book which is mainly dealing with the problem of what she calls the 
Rational-Social Dichotomy which as we saw is a main pillar of the Legend: ‘The 
work in social and cultural studies has stimulated a range of responses from phi-
losophers. Some simply rejected the relevance of this work to philosophical con-
cerns, or ….have seen it as empirically and conceptually misguided. Some like 
Philip Kitcher…have tried to take the sting out of it, by sifting through the claims of 
the sociologists and sociologically oriented historians attempting refutation of 
those they deem extremist, and then incorporating a sensitivity to history or socio-
logical analysis into their constructivist accounts of inquiry. …, I argue that these 
efforts, too, are vitiated by a commitment to the dichotomy of rational and the 
social. I offer an account of scientific knowledge that not only avoids the dichotomy 
but integrates the conceptual and normative concerns of philosophers with the 
descriptive work of the sociologists and historians.
Longino aims to integrate in the understanding of scientific inquiry the fact that 
‘cognitive capacities are exercised socially, that is interactively’ and argues that 
more ‘more complete epistemology for science must include norms that apply to 
practices of communities in addition to norms conceived as applying to practices of 
individuals. Following through on the consequences of the analyses breaking with 
conventional views of scientific knowledge as permanent, as ideally complete, and 
as unified and unifiable….means accepting provisionality, partiality, and plurality 
of scientific knowledge. ...I insist on an epistemology for living science, produced by 
real empirical subjects. This is an epistemology that accepts that scientific knowl-
edge cannot be fully understood apart from its deployments in particular material, 
intellectual and social contexts.’ She makes it clear that there need to be pluralism 
in these epistemologies.
Longino wants to take advantage in her epistemologies of both the Rational and 
the Social and takes us through some technical chapters, in which she makes it clear 
that we have a lot to figure out if we (want to properly) use a mix of rational norma-
tive criteria from the philosophers and the social criteria and norms the sociologists 
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have revealed. This is especially interesting knowing that scientists do use in their 
field validated standard, methods and accepted ways of reasoning, but do not take 
the normative canons of the Legend to seriously in their daily practice, whereas they 
use consciously and unconsciously the social norms and values derived from their 
cultural upbringing in all its aspects of a society. In the last ten pages she concludes 
that the Rational-Social classes of criteria and norms are thus not used in separation, 
‘sociality does not come into play at the limit of or instead of the cognitive. Instead, 
these social processes are cognitive. ….and the social epidemiologist must have 
resources for the correction of ..epistemically undermining possibilities.’ This is 
required since opening up to the social, the stakeholders in society, opens up to 
power games which may be to the disadvantage of those problems which are vulner-
able to ‘inappropriate exercise of authority and biases. This is as we discussed (in 
Chap. 1) a problem of all times, past and yet to come, because scientific inquiry is 
not autonomous, value-free and not neutral and is not guided by the invisible hand 
of the Legend who tells us how best to allocate our public and private funds. Longino 
offers at the very end of the book a set of questions that demonstrate that she sees a 
lot of problems here for philosophers to work on for instance how goal-oriented 
inquiry and ‘different kinds of goal might affect philosophy and knowledge and 
practices. She goes one step further and involves in these questions ‘the institu-
tional organizations and how they affect the content of knowledge’ and asks ‘How 
can a society use science to address problems when scientific goals and community 
structures are not mutually aligned? These questions bring out the political dimen-
sions of science and broaden our conception of what philosophy of science can 
be about.’
Finally, she asks ‘What kinds of institutional changes are necessary to sustain 
the credibility, and hence value, of scientific inquiry while maintaining democratic 
decision making regarding the cognitive and practical choices the sciences make 
possible and necessary? The fate of knowledge rest in our answers’.
With these questions, that almost all philosophers of science like Popper con-
sider ‘beyond their epistemology or theory of knowledge and deliberately bypass’, 
we return to the main problems addressed here: how does the Legend still determine 
the ideas and politics of scientific inquirers which distorts the collective of scientific 
inquiry, causes the current problems of science. Legend and its legacy has detrimen-
tal effects on our interaction with society and their publics and thus the knowledge 
we produce, this is ‘the fate of knowledge’ Longino is concerned with. Longino, 
after her own struggle with the dualism of the Legend, boldly has been going where 
sociologists, physicists, chemists, historians, even anthropologists, but few philoso-
phers have gone before. Still, the reviewers of the book who praised her for that, 
criticize her for not presenting a detailed epistemology. Longino knew how the 
work of Dewey and James had been received by the ‘real analytical philosophers’ of 
their times, that must have offered some consolation.
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2.3  Conclusion
 Towards a Realistic Pragmatist View of Science, Natural Science 
and Social Science and Humanities
From the late 1960s philosophers, sociologist and historians of science gradu-
ally, but definitely showed the Legend of the ‘Scientific Method’ to be untenable:
• There is no one formal scientific method that leads us to the truth
• There is no God-given or timeless, universal foundation for such a method 
to build on
• Knowledge is arrived at, not by individuals in isolation ‘talking to nature’
• There are many ways (methodologies) to do good research
• In sharing ideas and experimental results and methods, for debate and scru-
tiny in a rigorous and communitive process by the community of inquirers
• Inquiry is a social process producing reliable knowledge that produced 
objective (intersubjective) knowledge
• Research is guided by our common cognitive and cultural values, when 
tested in experiments and discussions with peers constrained by natural and 
social reality
• Knowledge is tested in interventions and (social) actions in practice
• It is then either rejected, improved or it is accepted for the time being
• Knowledge claims are fallible, absolute and always up to scrutiny and tests
• It is this communitive open, independent and transparent process that is 
unique to science which has produced knowledge which has been proven to 
be reliable over the past centuries.
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Chapter 3
Science in Transition How Science Goes 
Wrong and What to Do About It
Abstract Science in Transition, which started in 2013, is a small-scale Dutch ini-
tiative that presented a systems approach, comprised of analyses and suggested 
actions, based on experience in academia. It was built on writings by early science 
watchers and most recent theoretical developments in philosophy, history and soci-
ology of science and STS on the practice and politics of science. This chapter will 
include my personal experiences as one of the four Dutch founders of Science in 
Transition. I will discuss the message and the various forms of reception over the 
past 6 years by the different actors in the field, including administrators in univer-
sity, academic societies and Ministries of Higher Education, Economic Affairs and 
Public Health but also from leadership in the private sector. I will report on my 
personal experience of how these myths and ideologies play out in the daily practice 
of 40 years of biomedical research in policy and decision making in lab meetings, 
at departments, at grant review committees of funders and in the Board rooms and 
the rooms of Deans, Vice Chancellors and Rectors.
It has in the previous chapters become clear that the ideology and ideals that we 
are brought up with are not valid, are not practiced despite that even in 2020 they are 
still somehow ‘believed’ by most scientists and even by many science watchers, 
journalists and used in political correct rhetoric and policy making by science’s 
leadership. In that way these ideologies and beliefs mostly implicitly but sometimes 
even explicitly determine debates regarding the internal policy of science and sci-
ence policy in the public arena. These include all time classic themes like the 
uniqueness of science compared to any other societal activity; ethical superiority of 
science and scientists based on Mertonian norms; the vocational disinterested search 
for truth, autonomy; values and moral (political) neutrality, dominance of internal 
epistemic values and unpredictability regards impact. These ideas have influenced 
debates about the ideal and hegemony of natural science, the hierarchy of basic over 
applied science; theoretical over technological research and at a higher level in aca-
demic institutions and at the funders the widely held supremacy of STEM over 
SSH. This has directly determined the attitudes of scientists in the interaction with 
peers within the field, but also shaped the politics of science within science but also 
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with policy makers and stakeholders from the public and private sector and with 
interactions with popular media.
Science it was concluded was suboptimal because of growing problems with the 
quality and reproducibility of its published products due to failing quality control at 
several levels. Because of too little interactions with society during the phases of 
agenda setting and the actual process of knowledge production, its societal impact 
was limited which also relates to the lack of inclusiveness, multidisciplinarity and 
diversity in academia. Production of robust and significant results aiming at real 
world problems are mainly secondary to academic output relevant for an internally 
driven incentive and reward system steering for academic career advancement at the 
individual level. Similarly, at the higher organizational and national level this reward 
system is skewed to types of output and impact focused on positions on interna-
tional ranking lists. This incentive and reward system, with flawed use of metrics, 
drives a hyper-competitive social system in academia which results in a widely felt 
lack of alignment and little shared value in the academic community. Empirical 
data, most of it from within science and academia, showing these problems in dif-
ferent academic disciplines, countries and continents are published on virtually a 
weekly basis since 2014. These critiques focus on the practices of scholarly publish-
ing including Open Access and open data, the adverse effects of the incentive and 
reward system, in particular its flawed use of metrics. Images, ideologies and poli-
tics of science were exposed that insulate academia and science from society and its 
stakeholders, which distort the research agenda and subsequentially its societal and 
economic impact.
3.1  The Royal Response (1)
In the fall of 2012, there were a few high-profile academic public events that were 
related to the discovery in the year before of a few serious fraud cases in The 
Netherlands in biomedicine and social psychology. The latter case was shocking 
and notorious for how it had been done with unflinching arrogance over many 
years. Because of its size and impact, it became worldwide known. I was present at 
the meeting held in September at the Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences where 
Kees Schuyt, a prominent sociologist and law scholar, as chair of a committee of 
the Royal Academy presented the advice that was focussed on responsible handling 
of research data (KNAW, 2012). The conclusions of the advice and of the meeting 
at the Royal Academy was that fraud and violation of the principles of integrity in 
research was believed to be very rare, but that it should be investigated. The feeling 
was that education of researchers about integrity, but also in the institutions techni-
cal proper handling of data should be promoted and enabled. Very cautiously the 
idea was mentioned of the obligation for researchers to making data available that 
supported claims in a journal paper to improve peer review. Finally, it was con-
cluded that informal peer pressure in the community and in the later stages more 
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formally through peer review should be improved. Despite a classical reference to 
the ‘leading values of science which are distinct from any other social activity’ and 
cautious conclusions, the committee did pose a series of critical questions that they 
believed should not be evaded. They suggested that the social system in which 
individual researchers do their work might allow or even invite misconduct. In that 
context they mention the incentive and reward system with its academic hierarchies 
and publication pressure (p60). The panel with members of Academy and Young 
Academy largely agreed. Of interest was the mentioning of some examples of seri-
ous fraud in physics (amongst others ‘the Schön’ case). In response to this, a very 
senior Royal Society member from the natural sciences remarked that of course 
this issue of quality is typical for ‘the soft sciences and biomedicine, but not for us 
in the hard sciences, because in physics, through our experimentation, we ask a 
question to nature and nature gives a clear answer, so physics is beyond fraud’. 
The chairman, a theology scholar who early in his career had become a profes-
sional university administrator, who knew about the problem of foundations, 
decided to let that one go. At the conclusion of the debate, I made a short critical 
remark from the floor, that something is really wrong with science if we focus on 
the rare fraud cases but are looking away from to the growing evidence of a large 
‘grey zone’ of shoddy science, also in other disciplines than biomedicine and social 
psychology. This grey zone is not populated with fraudsters or bad people who are 
to blame, but honest researchers that try to survive in our crazy academic system 
driven by perverse incentives and rewards. This I thought should be acknowledged 
and discussed. What I had in mind then was in fact to become one of the corner 
stones of Science in Transition and of this book. The chairman’s reply was ‘that 
may be so, but we cannot change a whole system’ and then there were drinks, gos-
sip and appetizers (typically Dutch ‘bitterballen’) in the foyer.
Kees Schuyt was interviewed in a national newspaper and to my relief was much 
more open about the likely systemic cause of the problems. In October at a meeting 
held in Spui 25, a University of Amsterdam open podium/debate centre, Huub 
Dijstelbloem took part in the panel discussion with Kees Schuyt and Andre 
Knottnerus an authority in the Dutch health science and governmental science 
advice system. The debate was much more open and critical and did not evade the 
problems of the system.
November 28, 2012, at the Royal Academy again, a committee chaired by Pim 
Levelt, a former President of the Academy, presented its investigation of fraud and 
misconduct of Diederik Stapel. (https://www.rug.nl/about- us/news- and- events/
news/news2012/stapel- eindrapport- ned.pdf). This case, together with a case at 
Erasmus Medical Centre, since their discovery in September and December 2011, 
dominated the debate about trust in science in the country. The committee revealed 
the technical and methodological aspects of the case in great detail. In their final 
comments they state that ‘Committees that have evaluated the research of social 
psychology, have not recognized some of the signals that the committee in this 
3.1 The Royal Response (1)
70
report do describe. They simply were relying on peer review both with respect to 
methodology and contribution to theory. Another issue in this context is to what 
degree these evaluation committees are instrumental in sustaining the assumed 
undue publication pressure and connected mores and behaviours. This specifi-
cally concerns requirements of numbers of publications, the order of authors, 
responsibilities of co-authors and repeated publication of similar results.’ (trans-
lation FM).
The Science in Transition Team
A year later in November 2013, the public start of Science in Transition took 
place at the same prestigious venue of the Royal Academy of Arts and 
Sciences on one of the channels in the centre of Amsterdam. The Science in 
Transition team started its work in January 2013. Huub Dijstelbloem, whom I 
already mentioned, had the years before been very active in national debates 
about incentive and rewards focussed on inclusive indicators and methods for 
evaluation of the impact of research. He also studied public participation and 
policy making which is discussed in Chap. 5. The other three members of the 
group that started Science in Transition, were Jerome Ravetz and professors 
Frank Huisman and Wijnand Mijnhardt. The five of us did not really know 
each other, but we shared our thinking about science which brought us 
together.
Jerome Ravetz (1929), Jerry, as we call him, replied promptly and enthusi-
astically, full of energy looking for action when I had send him in the fall of 
2012 my little book about science, Science 3.0, Real Science, Significant 
Knowledge (Miedema, 2012). I did not know him, but knew his 1971 book 
(see Chap. 2). Ravetz with a small group of colleagues had published in 1993 
a paper in which they described another way of doing science, explicitly with 
the aim to deal with policy issues of high risk and high uncertainty for science 
is critical but for which the time for deliberation is limited. They coined the 
name Post-Normal Science for an approach in an integrated and democratized 
process in which all relevant knowledge and social values and the relevant 
publics are fully acknowledged and participate (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). 
In the months that followed Jerry received a Fellowship of the Descartes 
Centre of Utrecht University which brought him and his wife frequently to 
Utrecht. His first visit was to Amsterdam on January 4, 2013 when we talked 
the whole day and part of the evening about his work, his thoughts about sci-
ence in 2013 and the actions to be taken.
(continued)
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Frank Huisman, Huub Dijstelbloem and Jerome Ravetz. (Amsterdam, February 2013)
Frank Huisman (1956) is at Maastricht University, the interdisciplinary group 
of Science, Technology and Society Studies (MUSTS) and since 2006 full profes-
sor of the History of Medicine at UMC Utrecht. His interest is the history (and 
sociology) of modern medicine. Together we started in 2009 a selective advanced 
PhD course on philosophy and sociology of science, called This thing called 
Science. The course proved to be an immediate success: 120 PhDs applied to be 
enrolled in the course which offered place to only 45 of them, and students 
declared it to be the best course offered by the Graduate School of Life Sciences. 
There was clearly a great need among some PhD students to learn about the his-
tory, philosophy, ethics and politics of science, and be socialized into the biomedi-
cal sciences in a different way. We felt very happy to be able to create this new 
awareness among a new generation of biomedical researchers.





Wijnand Mijnhardt is an international well-known historian of culture and 
science and at that time served as Chair of Comparative History of the 
Sciences and the Humanities. He is founder and past director of the Descartes 
Centre for the History and Philosophy of the Sciences at Utrecht University. I 
told Wijnand I was honoured that he came to my room and I pulled his leg 
stating that ‘his Centre, to the best of my knowledge, preferably studied scien-
tists and scholars that had already passed away a long time ago. I under-
stood, I said, that this nicely avoids the political issues that in our time trouble 
academia and society, but’, I said, ‘my goals are quite the opposite. Our think-
ing about science should, in the good tradition of pragmatism lead to action 
in the real world to improve the academic lives of our stakeholders: gradu-
ates, post-docs, students and professors in our universities and those in soci-
ety alike’. Wijnand appreciated the humour and loved this idea for the project. 
He in the following years eloquently brought to the table his strong opinions 
with colourful flavours in the context of Science in Transition.
 
Sarah de Rijcke, photo taken by Bart van Overbeeke
Regarding the composition of the team, we were criticized and had to admit, 
that we had a problem: we were five, and later four, older white males who each 
had done well in the system. This was corrected in part very soon, when Sarah de 
Rijcke a well-known researcher in STS at CWTS Leiden and an expert on all the 
issues Science in Transition was addressing joined the team. We did not have 
graduate students or early career scientist in the team. Our best defence to this was 
that, given the idea that changing a social system goes against the elites and the 
most powerful in that very system, we were not vulnerable to the classical fram-
ing of ‘being a couple of losers complaining about the system in which they had 
failed’. Many who question the mores and rules of the system indeed are told ‘If 
you cannot stand the heat, get out of the kitchen’.
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 Science in Transition
We started from the optimistic, some thought naïve, perspective of the possibility to 
improve science. Our analysis of the problem had a broad scope, from quality 
issues, fraud, poorly conducted or irrelevant science, agenda setting and responsive-
ness to issues in society, assumptions, ideologies and hierarchies that distorted the 
system internally in academia and in interaction with society. We wanted at all cost 
to avoid the well-known type of general academic discussions about problems of 
‘the university’ and easy blaming of ‘incompetent’ administrators, lazy students or 
neoliberal economics’. Angry complaining and blaming without realistic directions 
for improvement would stifle our initiative like has happened to many initiatives 
before. For all of us it was clear that these problems had to be approached in a larger 
context of the socioeconomics of the institutional organization of science. From the 
start it was clear that we needed to more specifically discuss the contribution of the 
incentive and reward system. Persistence of specific problems, in our view, seemed 
to be related to the system of research evaluation in institutions and by funders as it 
had gradually developed since the 1980s. Our focus was very much on research, but 
in the incentive and rewards structures in academia this related to the poor apprecia-
tion of teaching and teaching careers and so this was discussed as well.
All of these issues one by one were not new, but we believed that an integral 
approach of the issues seen as parts of one social system was going to be quite 
unique. Many science writers and philosophers discussed their favourite views and 
worries, but a consistent system approach to science to our knowledge was very 
rare, if available at all. Apparently, without such an explicit awareness, we felt con-
fident as a team to have enough complementary experience in science and aca-
demia, both in theory and practice, to take on this ambitious project. We decided 
that we had to get a proper analysis and comprehensive picture first. We agreed that 
going from there, to achieve long-lasting improvements, concerted actions of the 
community were required. This involved systemic institutional change in which 
academic leadership at universities, especially from Rectors, Deans, Royal 
Academies and prominent scholars, public and private funders should be engaged 
and committed.
Three workshops were held on Image and Trust, Quality and Corruption, 
Communication and Democracy in April, May and June 2013. Next to the initiators, 
about ten scientists from the Netherlands were invited to participate in each of the 
workshops. Participants were hand-picked by us, known for their expertise, critical 
thinking and outspoken views about science. (See website scienceintransition.nl for 
the lists of participants and the workshop presentations.) Based on the results of 
these three workshops in the summer of 2013, a draft position paper was produced 
by the initiators, mainly by exchanges via the mail.
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3.2  The Royal Response (2)
We were not alone in this endeavour. In the Royal Society, in that same period, a 
committee was working on a report on trust in science. With reference to the 
recent high-profile fraud cases, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 
(OCW), in January 2012 had formally asked the Royal Academy to advise the 
Ministry regarding trust in science. In it there was a specific request to advice on 
possible actions by the main actors in the domain of science, including research 
institutes, funders and government, that could help improve integrity and trust. 
This committee started in March 2012 and published their advice in May 2013. 
The report was presented in May 2013 by the committee chaired by Keimpe 
Algra, a humanities scholar, who was to become Dean of the Faculty of the 
Humanities of Utrecht University the next year (KNAW, 2013). The committee in 
response to the questions from the Ministry had taken a broad approach, explicitly 
including the wider system and community of science. They concluded that the 
Mertonian rules were under pressure because of changes in the scientific system 
that had occurred in the past 30  years, with consequences for the practice of 
research. This agrees with the analysis of the legacy of Merton presented in Chap. 
2. From this analysis the committee concluded that there is, with respect to integ-
rity and quality, a duty for the individual to show ‘honesty about the research 
goals and intentions’. At the same time and with even more emphasis the institu-
tions, universities and funders were urged to take responsibility for the culture of 
science where it did not promote or even obstruct proper behaviour and integrity 
of researchers. A couple of times the committee suggested that it would be a good 
idea to have institutional accreditations for research to help the institutions in set-
ting up and uphold the relevant practical policies. The example of quality assur-
ance policies in health care were mentioned. Although the committee was cautious 
with respect to top-down programming of research, they made it clear that not 
only should research be done right, but also the right research should be done, 
which brought ‘agenda setting’ and external values as a novel dimension in the 
discussion. It was proposed to invest in more practical awareness and social con-
trol in the form of positive peer pressure with important roles for the research 
communities in universities and research institutes. For this, they said an open and 
safe academic culture was required.
The committee, in contrast to previous reports discussed the problematic 
effects of the external forces on the practice of academia. This related to alloca-
tion of funds and collaborations with private commercial partners. The increasing 
influence on academic life also of tenured staff, of short-term funding schemes, 
being focussed on ‘sexy topics and hypes’ and the researcher’s temptation to 
promise unrealistic impact and novelty were mentioned as a distortion of the 
dynamics of academia. This induced bias against replication and negative results, 
also at the journals, goes against long term more difficult research. The committee 
states that this is reflected in national research evaluations which enforces these 
practices and on a focus on numbers of publications. Concluding with 
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constructive suggestions, the committee did not suggest to really rethink the issue 
of cause-and-effect regarding the problems discussed. They were nearly there but 
did not take that logical next step to conclude or at least suggest that the institu-
tional organization with its incentive and reward system, and specifically its indi-
cators for excellence, critical for decisions on funding and career advancement 
might provoke strategic behaviours that caused or at least promoted many of these 
interdependent problems.
This advice, ‘Trust in Science’, was discussed at a meeting at the Royal Academy 
in September 2013 where I was invited to give a talk and presented the Science in 
Transition Position Paper and ‘A Toolbox for Science in Transition’ to reassure the 
audience, of mainly early career scientists, that national and international change 
was possible (Supplement 1).
3.3  Science in Transition Position Paper, October 2013
A final version of the Position Paper, incorporating comments that we had received 
thus far was published on the website on October 17, 2013.
https://scienceintransition.nl/en/about- science- in- transition/position- paper
The Position Paper is composed of the chapters: Images of Science, Trust, 
Quality, Reliability and Corruption, Communication, Democracy and Policy, 
University and Education, and a brief Conclusion paragraph.
3.4  Science in Transition: A Systems Approach
Science in Transition as an initiative and movement to improve the impact of 
science and research entered a field where many had gone before. We were 
heavily inspired and influenced by many different scientists and scholars who 
had been writing about science and society, as the reference list of the Position 
Paper duly reflects. These writings and actions go back to the 1970s and deal 
with the ideology of science and its Legend, the sociology and social organiza-
tion of science and with problems of science in and with society. In the years 
before 2012, major initiatives with respect to quality and reproducibility in 
research had started. This in reaction to the increasing evidence from empirical 
research showing poor quality and unexpectedly low reproducibility in biomed-
icine and psychology, but also other fields of research (Altman, 1994; Begley & 
Ellis, 2012; Prinz et al., 2011) (Ioannidis, 2005; Ioannidis et al., 2012; Moffitt 
et al., 2011; Moore et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 2012). I will not discuss the history 
of this meta-science work on poor quality research and replication, as that has 
been done by experts before. Our interest in the context of Science in Transition 
was to understand why poor research is being done and published. It had not 
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been  decreasing even as we know about it but had apparently rapidly been 
increasing to be a problem in the more recent years. Many studies had already 
shown the relation between the use of bibliometric indicators in research evalu-
ation, thus in the incentives and rewards system and strategic behaviour of 
researchers (Hammarfelt & de Rijcke, 2014; Moore et al., 2017; Wilsdon, 2016; 
Wouters, 1999, 2014; Wouters et al., 2015).
It is this problem that is, more implicitly though, addressed by the San Francisco 
Declaration On Research Assessment, known by its acronym DORA, that started in 
December 2012:
There is a pressing need to improve the ways in which the output of scientific research is 
evaluated by funding agencies, academic institutions, and other parties. To address this 
issue, a group of editors and publishers of scholarly journals met during the Annual 
Meeting of The American Society for Cell Biology (ASCB) in San Francisco, CA, on 
December 16, 2012. The group developed a set of recommendations, referred to as the San 
Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment.
The debate about quality and impact of research in biomedicine reached a novel 
international level in January 2014 with a series of articles under the heading 
Research: Increasing Value, Reducing Waste in the Lancet on January 8, 2014. This 
was the result of an initiative of a group of very established biomedical researchers, 
who in some case already for many years had focussed on quality issues related to 
methodology, design and problem choice in clinical studies in humans, but also in 
animal studies. Internationally the best known are: John Ioannidis (METRICS 
Stanford University), Doug Altman (Oxford University), Ian Chalmers (Oxford 
University) and Paul Glaziou (Bond University) (http://www.thelancet.com/series/
research) and the initiative is called Reward Alliance (http://rewardalliance.net/
increasing- value- reducing- waste/).
In the same month, a paper was published in Nature by the NIH leadership, 
Francis Collins and Lawrence Tabak, announcing the NIH reproducibility project. 
This project is an adequate reaction to the seminal study by Begley and Ellis pub-
lished 2 years before also in Nature on poor reproducibility of pre-clinical bio-
medical research published in Nature, Science and Cell and an earlier study by 
Prinz et al. This was boosted in March 2012 by a paper in PNAS with the ominous 
tittle Rescuing US biomedical research from its systemic flaws, written by five 
very high- profile authors, from the US biomedical science community. The best-
known authors included Bruce Alberts, a former long-serving editor of Science, 
Shirley Tilghman a former president of Princeton and Harold Varmus, a former 
Director of NIH, former president of Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Centre 
and then director of the National Cancer Centre of NIH and last but not least the 
1989 Nobel prize winner (https://www.pnas.org/content/111/16/5773).
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2013
• San Francisco Declaration On Research Assessment: 
stop using bibliometric indices for evaluation of 
researchers
• NIH: Reproducibility initiatives in life sciences and 
psychology
• Economist: How Science Goes Wrong, Trouble at the 
lab
2014
• Lancet: increase value and reduce waste in biomedical 
research
• Nature NIH, F. Collins & L.Tabak: increase 
reproducibility and change academic incentive system. 
• PNAS March 2014 Alberts, Varmus et al. Rescuing US 
biomedical research from its systemic flaws
• Nobel prize winners Schekman and Brenner call for 
change, away from quantity and impactfactormania
 
3.5  How Scientists Get Credit
This discussion about quality of reporting and actions to be made to improve sci-
ence was, in agreement with the initiators’ professional backgrounds, for years 
mostly focussed on methodology, statistics and trial design. However, with these 
papers in different so-called prestigious ‘high impact factor’ journals, that attracted 
quite some international attention, the discourse broadened to take in to account 
another critical aspect. To the best of my knowledge, for the first time the distort-
ing systemic effects of research evaluations were explicitly mentioned in public 
debates and discussions in academic circles. Indeed, that is the most dangerous of 
‘elephants in the room’ of science and academia, that almost all writers of papers, 
policy reports and Royal Academy advisors about trust and quality had evaded.
We, in Science in Transition, were convinced that without including in our analy-
ses and actions this crucial part of the system, little progress can be expected. It was 
a corner stone of the Position Paper and we have argued strongly for it, although the 
critique was that it would be impossible to change because many different players 
with divergent and contrasting interests are involved. Most of the problems that 
were pointed out by Science in Transition and the national and international initia-
tives described above, may at least be maintained or even institutionalized by the 
incentive and reward system. For some time now since 2013 the ‘metrics’ the use or 
in fact abuse of bibliometric indicators has been a central issue. We had the fortune 
to have Paul Wouters, an international distinguished researcher in the field of biblio-
metrics in our team and soon as remarked before, Sarah de Rijcke affiliated with 
CWTS joined the team.   Paul Wouters was in 2012 appointed as Director of the 
Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS) at Leiden University.
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In the second workshop of Science in Transition held in June 2013, Paul Wouters 
gave a seminar largely based on his article, The citation from culture to infrastruc-
ture, which was published later that year (Wouters, 2014). Wouters presented an 
overview of his own work and major studies of other bibliometricians on the differ-
ent types of effects of research evaluation, and specifically the use and abuse of 
bibliometric indicators. As virtually every debate about Incentives and Rewards is 
still dominated by the use and abuse of metrics this appeared to be a corner stone of 
the analyses that we did in the context of Science in Transition.
In the 1960s, at the advent of bibliometrics, its focus was on studying the dynam-
ics of the different fields of scientific research to help understand nearly real time 
where science and the scientist are going. To know what the scientist are working 
on, what the big questions are in the different fields and, also of interest, what they 
do not (yet) study. Dynamics was in terms of changing numbers of papers and 
authors and thus researchers and funding. Tracking citations and citation patterns 
was done to discover networks of researchers working on somehow related prob-
lems and the relative importance of specific research questions based on citations to 
that work. Paul Wouters has studied the history of the Science Citation Index (SCI) 
which was developed and launched by Eugene Garfield in the early 1960s. I 
Use and Abuse of the Metrics
The five initiators of Science in Transition have been introduced, and I will 
introduce some of our fellow travellers with the progress of the narrative. 
From the summary of Paul Wouters’ contribution to the second workshop it is 
clear that his expertise and broad experience with both theory and practice of 
bibliometrics and of the social organization of science were of utmost impor-
tance. In the public debate, Paul was very visible and strongly connected with 
the Incentive and Rewards theme of Science in Transition. Paul appeared to 
have a very interesting and colourful career. He has a Masters in biochemistry 
(Free University of Amsterdam, 1977) and a PhD in science and technology 
studies (University of Amsterdam, 1999). His PhD thesis titled “The Citation 
Culture” (1999) is on the history of the Science Citation Index, on and in 
scientometrics, and on the way the criteria of scientific quality and relevance 
have been changed by the use of performance indicators. In between these 
degrees he has worked as science journalist and as editor-in-chief of a daily 
newspaper (“De Waarheid”). This newspaper was the daily newspaper of the 
Dutch Communist Party (CPN) that in 1990 was stopped when the CPN 
merged with the Green Left political party. From 2010 to 2019 he was Director 
of The Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS). From 2016 on, 
Wouters served on several EU expert groups that were started by the DG 
Research and Innovation to advice on the transition to Open Science. Since 
January 2019, Paul Wouters is Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden 
University. (Source and citations: from The Leiden University website)
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/staffmembers/paul- wouters#tab- 2
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remember them from my first visits to NIH, and readers of my age will remember 
these enormous yellow SCI books in the library. They allowed you to track who had 
recently cited your papers and which papers of colleagues and competitors were 
cited or not. It took some time for the SCI to be used by a larger fraction of the com-
munity other than bibliometricians. ‘This use increased markedly’, as Wouters 
wrote in 2017 his obituary of Garfield, ‘after the Journal Impact Factor was mar-
keted in the SCI Journal Citation Reports starting in 1975’. Garfield like many 
other bibliometricians with regard to JIFs ‘was uncomfortable with their misuse as 
performance indicators’ (Paul Wouters, 2017).
The bibliometricians, were not naïve, they did not believe that science was 
guided by a neutral ‘invisible hand’ or Polanyi’s autonomous ‘Republic of Science’. 
The use of ‘their’ indicators in the evaluation of research, research institutions, and 
even at the level of individual scientists as performance indicators, was unwanted 
and mostly incorrect use of their work. From the early papers on this issue one 
sometimes gets the impression that they had not in full anticipated this cross-over 
between bibliometrics and sociology of science and later research management and 
research governance. In that cross-over, the indicators were used not to understand 
the dynamics of research by looking back at its recent past, but to steer and manage 
the direction and the agenda of research in a forward-looking approach (Whitley & 
Gläser, 2007). This had wide ranging effects outside academia. Wouters argued that 
there is convincing evidence that worldwide, since the 1980s research evaluations, 
and the indicators employed, to a great extend shape the research agenda (‘problem 
choice’) at universities and funders. The greatest impact of these performance 
assessments is, as will be discussed below, the direct effects it has on the allocation 
of research funds at the EU, national and university levels. This was until 2000 rela-
tively rare, but he cites the paper by Diane Hicks on this saying that: ‘By late 2010, 
14 countries had adopted a system in which research funding is explicitly deter-
mined by research performance (Hicks, 2012). Examples of indirect effects of per-
formance indicators have been described, for instance the Standard Evaluation 
Protocol (SEP) in the Netherlands. In the SEP evaluations with comparisons of 
research done in similar fields of research in all universities have been done which 
has since 1990 increasingly been based on quantitative metrics. In this national 
research evaluation, funding is not directly distributed based on such rankings but 
the effects on reputation, esteem and standing in the field are well recognized and 
anticipated (Van der Meulen, 1997). It thus has become common practice to show 
in resumes a publication list with JIF’s and the most current h-index. The latter has 
since its launch in 2005 (Hirsch, 2005) seen a very rapid and world-wide use which 
as Wouters said ‘makes the h-index itself an indicator of indicator proliferation’.
Even more important, in a natural human reflex, researchers anticipate the use of 
these metrics when their work will be judged and started to show several strategic 
behaviours. It has been shown that when evaluations focus on numbers of articles 
and on the JIF, that is the venue where these articles are published, this will be 
directly affecting the type of output of the researchers. If books, or articles in profes-
sional journals or publications in the national language are not valued, and don’t 
score in the system, despite intrinsic interest or possible impact they will have for 
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specific fields, researchers will undertake much less efforts in that direction (Butler, 
2007; Laudel & Glaser, 2006). Even more important is the effect on the choice of 
research topics and engaging in multidisciplinary work. As will be argued and dem-
onstrated in later chapters, the use of metrics can have detrimental effects on types 
of more applied research which has large and urgent societal impact but does not 
bring credit points to the researchers because results do not get published in journals 
with a high JIF.  Active researchers, dependent on grant money, recognize these 
survival mechanisms immediately and most of them as we shall discuss later obvi-
ously find this very frustrating. When talking to university administrators, board 
members of academic medical centres and directors of funding agency’s many 
times I heard them say in all honesty that this description of the behaviour of 
researchers must be a gross exaggeration. One may safely assume, they said, that 
the behaviour and choices of our highly educated scientists and staff are not likely 
to be so simply influenced by these metrics and indicators. Having been on commit-
tee’s with scientists that evaluate resumes for academic promotions or grant propos-
als this behaviour is explicitly visible and audible, both by the committee members 
and by the candidates and from the materials under review.
In the final paragraph of the 2014 paper, Wouters says that it has to be seen how 
in the future these behaviours will develop and whether they will persist. As we 
know now, they did persist and are used to rank the universities world-wide 
(Hazelkorn, 2011) The topic of the perverse effects of the abuse of metrics and how 
they invite or even enforce strategic behaviour of scientists was and is still hot. This 
is sad but not unexpected given the analyses in this book that show how hard it is to 
change the indicators in order to make the system more inclusive, qualitative and fair.
Wouters as Director of CWTS was prominently interviewed by NRC, Trouw and 
Volkskrant in the months after the first symposium. In May 2014, together with 
John Ioannidis, we were interviewed in an article about incentives and rewards in 
“Medisch Contact’, a Dutch weekly widely read by the medical profession pub-
lished by The Royal Dutch Medical Association (RDMA).
At CWTS, Paul Wouters and colleagues had launched a research programme in 
2012 that took the role of metrics in science head-on. Paul Wouters and Sarah de 
Rijcke were also members of the team that wrote during 2014 and 2015 a thorough 
‘Independent Review of the Role of Metrics in Research Assessment and Management’ 
in the UK Research Excellence Framework, with the title ‘The Metric Tide’ (Wilsdon, 
2016). This report, came on the basis of broad and detailed research, to quite similar 
conclusions as Science in Transition but had a strong focus in addition on scholar 
publishing and bibliometrics. In the accompanying literature review, new empirical 
studies are cited that paint a detailed picture of how metrics are not only being taken 
up in research management and decision-making, but also feed into quite run-of-the-
mill choices scientists make on the shop-floor: metrics-infused decisions that structur-
ally influence the terms, conditions and content of their research (Rijcke et al., 2015; 
Wouters et al., 2015). Around the same time, Paul Wouters and Sarah de Rijcke, then 
both at CWTS Leiden, with three colleagues among which Diana Hicks, published 
The Leiden Manifesto (Hicks et  al., 2015). It calls for a different way to evaluate 
research based on an inclusive set of ten principles (Supplement 3).
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Entering the Field (1)
I did bench research on bacterial vaccines as my military conscription, at 
The Netherlands Institutes of Health (RIVM), just outside Utrecht. In that 
way as a researcher, I entered the field of science and was pretty much imme-
diately introduced to the credit cycle. Being trained in immunology in 
Groningen, at RIVM I joined a small research team that made a new type of 
experimental (so called conjugated) vaccine ragainst bacteria (Neisseria 
meningitidis) that cause disease among children and young adults. The com-
pounds were tested for induction of a protective immune response in mice. 
We did in that year 1980, quickly a lot of experiments with nice positive 
results that were presented at meetings and published the years after I had 
already left, with me being a second or third author. The senior investigator 
had set up a very productive and original collaboration with a high-profile 
pyrolysis mass- spectrometry group at AMOLF in Amsterdam, then ‘the 
heaven of physics’ in the Netherlands. A grant was obtained for me to pursue 
our work as a PhD student. AMOLF wanted to do more biophysical life sci-
ence research, so I did a job interview in the fall of 1980 with the director. I 
was quite nervous since the director was professor Jaap Kistemaker, an 
impressive man, well known for having developed the principle and technol-
ogy of uranium enrichment with ultracentrifugation. I was offered the job 
but chose not to join AMOLF which I had to tell Kistemaker over the phone. 
I preferred a job offer per January 1981, in a PhD position at CLB in 
Amsterdam. CLB then was regarded as one of the finest immunology insti-
tutes in the country. Kees Melief, a MD PhD then in his early forties, was 
heading the unit. He had returned from the US after a very productive stay in 
Boston. He had published well and was considered one of the new genera-
tion biomedical scientists with strong vision and a modern view of science 
and research. Melief took with him the American research culture and knew 
how to lead his team to the top of the field. We were a modern immunology 
lab where consciously strategic choices were being made on what to study. 
We were closely following the international fronts of the field and develop-
ments at the funders. In those days funding for biomedicine was rapidly 
increasing on the promise of new insights from molecular biology. The lab 
culture was to drive for results and publications and was already aimed at the 
top journals and we played the journal impact factor game. We were con-
scious of national competition and competitors abroad and thus highly com-
petitive. New technologies like the generation of monoclonal antibodies, 
molecular biology, oncogenes, novel methods in molecular virology and 
immunology were immediately incorporated, experiments were done in the 
mouse and with blood samples obtained from patients.
(continued)
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3.6  The Credibility Cycle: Opening Pandora’s Box!
Despite being heavily criticized by papers like The Metric Tide and, The Leiden 
Manifesto and despite high profile and widely endorsed actions from within the 
community of science, such as DORA, the abuse of metrics clearly still is common 
practice around the globe. To understand this persistence of the use of metrics, we 
have to understand the role incentives and rewards, and of the critical role of metrics 
therein in the institutional and social organization of science and academia. As Paul 
Wouters argued, since the 1950s the sociology and management literature on the 
institutionalization and organization of science - in academia, universities and the 
various funding organisations- mentions incentives and rewards as an important 
component of the governance of the community of science. As discussed in Chap. 
2, that literature was too respectful of science and even more of scientists and was 
normative. In the early days from Merton to Popper and Polanyi, science was 
believed to be at the discretion of the community of science, interference was not 
appreciated. The reward system was part of the ‘Black Box of Science’, not to be 
questioned by outsiders, who anyway were believed to not understand science at all. 
 
Figure adapted from (Hessels et al., 2011)
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This Black Box was part of the magic of the ‘science knows best’ narrative of 
Vannevar Bush after the Second World War. Especially basic science, which also 
goes by the names of ‘blue skies’, ‘curiosity-driven’ or ‘free science’, when left 
alone, of course well-supported, so it goes, will have huge returns for society, for the 
military and economy. As discussed in Chap. 1, this was the power of the marketing 
and sales of natural basic science between 1945 and 1960 and the basis for the dis-
tinction between the natural and biomedical sciences and the humanities and the 
social sciences.
In the late 1950s, Peter Winch, in his The Idea of a Social Science, was the first 
to point out that the research in social sciences and the humanities is also science, 
albeit it a different form of the natural science and research and should not be judged 
by the frame of’the scientific method’ of the natural sciences. (Winch, 1958) Winch 
as many others, apparently was still under the impression at least left it open, that 
the natural sciences indeed were successful because they had a unique formal, well- 
founded and infallible method. This is, as I discussed in Chap. 2, in the positivist 
context of those days, not strange. The ‘successes of the natural sciences’ were the 
main reason why it was in these days, but still, mind-boggling even for most phi-
losophers to admit that even in the natural and biomedical sciences there is no gen-
eral, validated, formal and universal timeless method. I already pointed out that 
Ernst Nagel in his influential textbook of 1961, discussed this problem in general 
terms as well as other methods of inquiry appropriate for the social sciences 
(Nagel, 1961).
As we have seen when philosophers, historians and sociologist after 1970 started 
to study science as practice, eventually they also came closer to the social system 
and the Black Box that hid the rewards system from the eyes of outsiders. Stephen 
Toulmin (1972), John Ziman (1978), and a few other authors, after Winch, explicitly 
expressed a conceptual critique regarding the reward system of science and the indi-
cators used in research evaluations in comparisons between academic disciplines. 
This was at that time not yet about the type of metrics, but as discussed in Chap. 2, 
about the myth of the method of the natural sciences in contrast to the hermeneutics 
(interpretative methods) and reasoning (‘the vague methods’) of the humanities and 
the social sciences. As a consequence of this belief of the supremacy of the method 
of the natural sciences, the social sciences and humanities, these authors concluded, 
were systematically undervalued. They were getting a bad deal in academia. 
Toulmin was one of the first in his Human Understanding (Toulmin, 1972) to take 
this insight to the ‘corridors of power’ of academia and firmly attacked the positivist 
Cartesian dominance of the natural sciences and to point to it as the cause of this 
unequal fight between these disciplines in academia. He believed this was the pov-
erty of academia, a major problem for the enterprise of science and scholarship in 
society. Ziman in his early work criticizes the ideology of the legend and the natural 
sciences but struggles with the idea that SSH have their own field of inquiry with 
proven methods and huge impact. It is of interest to note, as I did in Chap. 1, that 
only 13 years before C.P. Snow had criticized the humanities for their snobbery 
regarding the natural sciences (Snow, 1993).
3.6 The Credibility Cycle: Opening Pandora’s Box!
84
We see the connect between the Legend, its philosophy of science, with the way 
science became organized and governed since 1945. From the 1960s on, but defi-
nitely in the past 40 years a multitude of complex often antagonistic interactions 
between society, academia, universities and knowledge institutes has shaped sci-
ence in all possible meanings of the word ‘science’. In these interactions, commu-
nication, debates and conflicts, contracts and agreements, serious power relations 
are at play that shape science and the growth of knowledge at many levels. This 
involves science as the national and global system of public knowledge production, 
science as the total of disciplines organized in the structures of academia, including 
the sciences and social sciences and humanities (Guston, 2000; Rip, 1994; Rip & 
van der Meulen, 1996; Whitley, 2000).
3.7  Distinction
At the institutional level, virtually the whole of academia became organized by a 
social system that is most adequately described by Bourdieu’s concept of ‘a field’ 
(Bourdieu, 1975, 2004). It is a truly social game of stratification, elites and distinc-
tion based on indicators about professional quality and excellence but also on habi-
tus and subtle social rules. We have seen in Chap. 1, that the idea of ‘pure’ and 
‘applied’ science has been and still is an ideological concept that is, by both sides, 
called upon in debates about science policy. Bourdieu, in his seminal book 
“Distinction’ published in 1979 in French and in English in 1984, provides amazing 
insight and understanding of the different cultural, political and social tastes and 
preferences of the two main social classes (Bourdieu, 2010). Based on empirical 
sociological research performed in France in the 1960s, this is primarily discussed 
for tastes of the arts, painting, literature, furniture and music. The ideas of ‘pure’, 
‘abstract’, ‘universal’, ‘disinterested’, ‘distance to necessity’ are indicators of the 
distinction of ‘high culture’. It is clear that ‘this distance to necessity’ that provides 
economic freedom for useless and free thinking is a privilege of the middle and 
upper class. Bourdieu shows how members born in families of these economic, 
socially and culturally distinct classes fare in education and academia. Building on 
these insights, and the concepts of habitus and field, a host of research has shown 
that this is not typically French. In Chap. 1 I already discussed the influence of class 
distinction in England on the preference for pure over applied science which was 
60  years go criticised by C.P.  Snow and Peter Medawar (Medawar, 1982; 
Snow, 1993).
This schism historically and philosophically runs deep. First Plato, of course, is 
mentioned by Bourdieu as a source (p47), but in a postscript (p487–502) this dis-
tinction between ‘pure’ and vulgar’ is taken to philosophy and academia with many 
citations from Kant’s Critique of Judgement. Indicators of high culture relate in the 
Greek classical natural philosophy to the opposite of charming, easy (pleasure and 
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listening), facile, bodily pleasure, common (as in common knowledge). ‘Pure’ thus 
suggest more difficult, requiring more perseverance compared to ‘applied’ which is 
crude, easy and with results to be readily obtained. The ‘taste of reflection’ is 
opposed to ‘the taste of the senses’. I like to use ‘high church’ versus ‘low church’ 
to designate this distinction.
Five years after Distinction, Bourdieu published Homo Academicus where he 
studied how citizens born in different social classes achieve in the respectively pre-
ferred educational trajectories leading to academia with distinct preferences for spe-
cific faculties and jobs in and outside academia (Bourdieu, 1988). Finally, Stokes 
presented in his Pasteur’s Quadrant, a critical survey of the idea of pure and applied 
science in relation to technological innovation (Stokes, 1997). Stokes discussed 
how since the times of classical Greek philosophy, philosophy per definition ought 
to be ‘pure’ and not deal with mundane and real-world problems. He cites 
A.C. Crombie saying ‘it remained characteristic of Greek scientific thought to be 
interested primarily in knowledge and understanding and only very secondarily 
with practical usefulness’. (p29) Stokes shows that this idea of pure science and 
research, next to the rise of technology and applied science since Bacon in the nine-
teenth century, survived with sharp ideological and organizational separations in the 
system in mainly France and Germany.
The ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ distinction, like the schism between the ‘hard’ and the 
‘soft’ sciences, has been to a great extent adopted world-wide and is very much 
alive within the natural sciences and biomedical research, but also within the 
social sciences and the humanities and has in the past 40 years in addition been 
institutionalized by the corresponding metrics. It still comes with the whole con-
notation of professional scientific but also political and cultural distinctions of 
‘high’ and ‘low church’ and, as described by Bourdieu, cannot be underestimated 
as part of the power games of the academic field. If a scientist explains that the 
does fundamental or basic science, this implicitly but really means to say that he 
or she in his or her field belongs to the class of scientist with highest reputation 
and highest standing. During the Covid-19 crisis experienced scientists from all 
academic different disciplines spontaneously started research in multidisciplinary 
teams to fight the virus and its public health, social and economic crises. Virtually 
all of the scientists that we saw in the media and who did the work, most of their 
professional lives did research on for instance biology, epidemiology or mathe-
matical modelling in the applied context of infectious diseases. Still, scientists 
from the ‘hard’ and ‘pure’ sciences argued that COVID-19 had demonstrated again 
that it was fundamental science that made major contributions in our dealing 
with the crisis, basic science should receive increased funding. Mind you, in most 
cases basic science in this type of political statements refers to basic natural 
sciences.
In the power struggle to enter a field and for upwards mobility, indicators and 
criteria for excellence are employed within science not by voting or a democratic 
process, but by colleagues (peers) in committees, advisory boards and promotion 
3.7 Distinction
86
Advancing in the Field (2)
We learned ‘science the modern way’ by doing. We learned how the write, 
how to present and how to do our networking at meetings. We learned by 
looking on how Melief organized the lab, how he was critical regards novelty, 
rigor and quality, played the game of networking and publishing, how he dealt 
with peer review, and wrote his grants. In the days before the internet, we 
combined meetings in the US with visits to relevant labs to present our work. 
My first roundtrip was in December 1982 with visits to Mount Sinai NY, NIH/
NCI at Bethesda, Stanford and a cellular immunology meeting at Asilomar, 
near Monterey and a laboratory at UCSF. Melief showed us how to move, 
discuss, pointed out the competition, criticized bad talks and introduced us to 
famous colleagues.
 
Melief Lab retreat Spring 1981
 
At Asilomar, December 1982
Grants, we learned, have to deal with the short cycle and be risk avoiding. 
You should pick problems that are considered relevant but should not be too 
complex or too difficult. If the grant is received, after the typical 4 years the 
(continued)
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committees populated by the elites of the various academic disciplines at any given 
time (Bourdieu, 2004; Polanyi, 1962). This is also how professional credits, reputa-
tion, academic positions and last but not least financial credit, research funds are 
distributed. This concept of a field and its credibility cycle was taken from the work 
of Bourdieu and visually depicted by Latour and Woolgar in their seminal study of 
the daily practice of knowledge production by biomedical scientists at the Salk 
Institute at San Diego (Latour & Woolgar, 1979).
3.8  Of High Church, Low Church
Over the years since the 1980s the system of science was increasingly held more 
accountable to its claims and promises on the return on investments. The external 
political causes relate to the growth of the system in researchers, the ever- 
increasing volume of investments required, the need for governments to make 
grant is running you must have something to show in order to be able to secure 
new grants. ‘Something to show?‘Yes, at least three accepted papers in good 
journals.‘In four years??? ‘. If the work takes longer, this may not allow for 
these papers and you failed and will not be funded anymore. Career over!’ I 
often close this part of my talk a bit ironically: ‘For him and me it worked 
well, I was first author, Melief, last author, he moved on to his next job and 
became a professor in 1986, I stayed behind and became a Fellow of the 
Royal Society and wrote my own grants and started my own lab on HIV/aids, 
was last author on the papers and became a professor in 1996. Science is as 
simple as that’. Of course, the research style of Melief also in 1981 was not 
unique. True, he was an early adopter of the way biomedical research was to 
be done after ‘the molecular turn’. This was the real Science in Action (Latour, 
1987) that Latour described which I in these days did read straight from the 
press. I must confess, I loved science from the very start. Some of the team 
and the department did not and still do not like it at all, as is also described by 
Latour (p155). They hated the need for networking and seeking allies, or to 
have to listen to the slick presentations of sometimes too weak data by com-
petitive group leaders at meetings, the discussions with peer reviewers riding 
their hobby horses and other aspects of marketing and sales techniques. This 
was in their view embarrassing and even pathetic behaviour, more fit for short 
term politics, but surely not appropriate for the solid research they were doing 
at the bench, that had attracted them to a career in science.
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choices that could be explained and defended, based on data to show results in 
relation to societal and since 1990 dominantly economic needs. In that develop-
ment, the life sciences and engineering were thriving, physics that did well in the 
Cold War with user-inspired basic research, suffered (Stokes, 1997). Increasingly 
also research on environmental sciences has been growing until now. As described 
(Rip & van der Meulen, 1996; Wouters, 2014), the national aim to compete with 
respect to the military during the Cold War and later mainly economically by 
investing in science, technology and development called for ways to quantitatively 
measure the impact of science. Since for societal impact to show a large lag time 
is required, short term quantitative measures were used mainly of publications and 
their impact via citations and numbers of patents. Gradually from 1980 the use of 
these metrics has become dominant to measure the performance of the system at 
the national and institutional levels and to the level of departments, laboratories 
and research groups.
Gradually since the 1980s it rapidly became normal practice in academia to 
use these indicators also for the evaluation of research of individual scientists. 
The nature of the indicators to choose were never discussed on beforehand in 
small committees or larger conferences and meetings. They evolved over the 
years and their use got established by the legendary ‘invisible hand’, being an 
interplay of concepts of science, and of interests and powers in the different aca-
demic communities as discussed in the previous chapters. Implicit and explicit 
ideas about hierarchies of journals had evolved and were linked to journal impact 
factors which became the measure, not only for the journal at large, but for the 
individual research paper published in the given journal. Not unexpectedly, in the 
natural, biological and biomedical sciences the idea of excellence became linked 
to a specific type of research inspired by the Legend. This modelled after the 
quantitative, formal and analytical type of the work done in physics. The empha-
sis like in the natural sciences was on more basic work resulting in general find-
ings, and theories of a more abstract and theoretical type which was suitable for 
international English language journals with a broad readership. These journals 
by definition thus had a higher impact factor and they started to actively game this 
process in order to become the hottest journal for researchers to publish. They 
started, for example to solicit more reviews on topical issues and focussed on and 
invited ‘sexy’ research papers that presented novelty about hot topics that changed 
over time given developments in the field. The 'normal' solid science was rejected 
and advised to go to ‘speciality journals’ in my field for immunology, virology 
and infectious diseases for instance. In the same vein, qualitative scholarly work 
and applied research and papers reporting negative results became less valued and 
less easy to publish properly. This translated to a shift to reductionist formal 
methods of research also in other fields like economy, the geosciences, social-
psychology, sociology, linguistics and even in the humanities. As ‘high church’ 
research scored in higher impact factor journals and was thus better regarded in 
career advancement or funding committees, it converted these academic credits 
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in monetary (funding) credits which in turn were used to produce more of the 
required type of papers. At the higher organizational level, this type of academic 
output is important for the institution’s position on international ranking lists.
Of note, this trend was coming from the gradually changing mores of the 
researchers serving on committees and via that route it became policy in commit-
tees at universities and funding agencies to use quantitative bibliometric indica-
tors for quality that referred to internal academic excellence and not societal 
value and impact. This all relates to the accumulation of credit, scientific and 
social capital required for career advancement at the individual level and has 
resulted in an academic culture characterized by massive production of papers, a 
bibliometrics game driving for particular types of publications. Metrics are even 
changing how scientists define quality, relevance and originality in the first place 
(Müller & de Rijcke, 2017; Wouters, 1999). Production of robust and significant 
knowledge and results are secondary to short term output complying with a quan-
titative credit system for academic career advancement. This is primarily evalu-
ated at the individual level which goes against collaboration and multidisciplinary 
team science in departments. There is, based on empirical data, wide consensus 
that this is the main factor that determines the semi-economical behaviour of 
researchers regarding problem choice, collaborations, networking, grantsman-
ship and publication strategies, funding and outreach (Bourdieu, 2004; Latour, 
1987; Stephan, 1996). This highly competitive social system does result in a 
widely felt lack of alignment and shared value in the academic community 
(Fitzpatrick, 2019). These normative, opposing and often conflicting ideas about 
what science should be and the type of research excellent scientists should be 
doing, indeed still are the cause of many problems in academia. Within the field 
(of the social game) of science and research it has resulted in unsound competi-
tion, power struggles, elitism, stratification and hierarchy between academic 
fields and of note, within disciplines that are based on obsolete or simple wrong 
ideas about science and research. It has been shown by numerous studies now 
that across academia because of a massive growth of the numbers of scientists 
and investments, because of hyper specialisation social and quality control by 
institutional and peer review fails. This has led to a generally felt frustration by 
the majority of scientists in academia, which however the academic leadership 
did not immediately recognise, flatly denied or recognized but rebutted with ‘this 
is how science is, if you cannot stand the heat get out of the kitchen’. When it was 
acknowledged, then one was advised by mentors and colleagues not to address it 
openly, in order ‘to not hurt one’s own career chances in academia’. It in this way 
has had and still has major impact, in particular on the lives and careers of stu-
dents, young and mid-career scientists.
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Problems of the Current Reward System in Science
















- Most papers still
behind paywalls
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3.9  Physics Envy
It is clear that this system is not incentivising and rewarding investigators who do 
work in too close connection with (‘messy’) problems in the real world, as it does 
appreciate more fundamental (‘pure) formal work in the natural sciences and bio-
medicine, but also in the social sciences. The criteria and norms of excellence and 
concomitantly the dominant metrics being used to evaluate science and scientists 
across the institutions in academia were and are still strongly determined by the 
classical ideas about science, with the historical preference for the methodology and 
type of formal products of the natural sciences. This forms in academia a major 
well-known disadvantage to SSH compared to STEM and the biomedical sciences. 
In a response to survive and compete, researchers in social sciences, economics and 
even humanities in the past 20 years took refuge to research with more quantitative 
methods aiming for more general theories and insights. This ‘physics envy’ serves 
to show that their methods and conclusions are ‘hard’ science as well. As a conse-
quence in  these academic disciplines, including the biomedical sciences,  there 
developed a visible gradient from quantitative physics-like research to classical 
scholarly humanities work not using math but reasoning and argumentation. This is 
the gradient from ‘high church to ‘low church’ as I call it.
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Playing the Games of the Field (3)
Getting his attention!
On a spring morning in 1991, Hanneke Schuitemaker and I had, after 
heavy negotiation with his secretariat, an 8.00 am meeting scheduled for just 
15 min. Knowing that he started in the office at 6 am and worked till very late 
and mostly on formal more important dossiers, we were prepared. I had 
adopted that practice and nearly every year visited NIH to discuss with the 
important researchers at NIAID, then and still (!) lead by Dr. Anthony (Tony) 
Fauci and his collaborators. Fauci, now 79 of age, is still very much in that 
job, now in daily White House press briefings because of the COVID-19 pan-
demic. He was already then busy and extremely efficient with his time, always 
1 day ‘in and out’ of conferences giving his famous ultra-speed keynote talks 
on data from his own laboratory. We were that morning going to show Fauci 
unpublished work from Hanneke with evidence for two different strains of 
HIV with pathological and clinical implications. We knew we had to talk for 
15 minutes straight without a pause to inhale, because we feared that Fauci 
would otherwise takeover and start to tell us about his work. It was a rehearsed 
marketing and sales pitch for our SI and NSI viral phenotypes. We apparently 
succeeded. Many years later after the molecular confirmation and identifica-
tion of their receptors from many labs, Fauci at a meeting referred to our 
pitch. So the advice is: ‘spread the news about your ‘important’ work at visits 
around the globe, at the corridors during coffee breaks of the meetings, ski 
lifts, and especially at the ‘gossip sessions’ at the bar during meetings, at 
speaker dinners and of course on TV shows if you get a chance. You never 
know for which major journals they are a reviewer or on which committees 
these people might serve. I hasten here to give Fauci the credit he deserves for 
his current role in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic in the US, but in the 
context of the early days of the aids pandemic for engaging with the gay com-
munity in New York and truly listening to their complaints and needs. Fauci 
has been more or less personally responsible for the formidable budgets com-
ing to NIH to fight HIV and AIDS. In those early years when the US govern-
ment was not that receptive, the gay community in their frustration unfairly 





3.10  Science in Transition: The Initial Reception
Before the official international start a symposium was planned on 7 and 8 November, 
but we first organized a small format on-invitation meeting to get a first response to 
a near final draft of the Position Paper and commitment from the field on September 
25, 2013. We had invited representatives of the various players in the domain of sci-
ence and society. These included the association of universities in Netherlands 
(VSNU), The Royal Academy (KNAW), governmental funder the Dutch Science 
Council (NWO/ZonMw), the representative of the joined federation of Dutch chari-
ties and directors of intermediate institutes that advice the government on science, 
innovation and development. The latter included the Netherlands Scientific Council 
for Government Policy (WRR), the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
(PBL) and The Rathenau Institute. The reactions were, as anticipated, quite mixed. 
Some, especially the representatives from the Royal Society, the universities and 
The Dutch Science Council felt that the tone was harsh and suggestive of a crisis for 
which data, they thought, were lacking since mostly anecdotal stories were reported. 
Some felt offended, and even doubted that something was wrong at all. In gen-
eral though, the fact that by our position paper this debate is now in the open was 
appreciated, although fear for backfire from politics and society was abundant in the 
group. It was believed that more empirical evidence was needed to better estimate 
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the size of the various problems and get a feel for the international and historical 
perspectives. It was agreed that the relation between research and teaching and the 
interaction with society, needed more attention. Finally, it was felt that given the 
issues that were brought up, the adverse effects of critical parts of ‘the system’ 
needed more research. Bert van der Zwaan, from geosciences and then the Rector of 
Utrecht University, after being critical and irritated about the logic and unpolite tone 
of our paper, was clearly in agreement with our idea that actions should be under-
taken to change the incentive and rewards system. Hans Clevers, an internation-
aly well-known researcher in biomedicine, then the President of the Royal Academy 
said that he, as an active researcher in stem cell and cancer biology, recognized the 
issues and was sympathetic to the proposed actions to be undertaken.
Rutger Bregman, historian and journalist at De Correspondent announced to 
start to practice investigative journalism into science, in analogy of how Joris 
Luyendijk researched the financial industry of the London City, to find out about a 
crisis of the system. This idea of Bregman was repeated by me as an invitation to the 
participants of a meeting of the Dutch science journalists held in October at the 
Royal Academy. In the weeks before the symposium of 7 and 8 November, 
Volkskrant a major national newspaper announced an investigative series on how 
science really works. The Utrecht University journal DUB started a science blog 
around the Science in Transition debate. Economist came in October with an impres-
sive well-researched issue on ‘How science goes wrong. Scientific research has 
changed the world. Now it needs to change itself’ https://www.economist.com/lead-
ers/2013/10/21/how- science- goes- wrong.
The articles in Economist, much to our surprise, followed largely the main criti-
cisms of our position paper with evidence. Our response was, ‘hey, they stole our 
thunder’, but we were pleased also, because those who questioned our analyses and 
called for more evidence were being served. Had we only known how much more 
of that evidence was to come in the next few years! Already in the days immediately 
before Thursday 7 November there was media coverage. Saturday, 2 November 
NRC Wetenschap had a very constructive main article about Science in Transition. 
Hendrik Spiering, Chief Editor of Science News/Wetenschap of NRC who was a 
columnist on Friday, had written a main Editorial in the newspaper of Wednesday 6 
November, on Science in Transition. The morning of 7 November, Volkskrant fea-
tured a large interview about the Science in Transition. Where I frankly explained 
the perverse incentives and argued for a more socially responsible research agenda 
to make research more relevant for society. Next to DUB and Folia, the magazines 
of the University of Utrecht and Amsterdam announced the symposium. As a sur-
prise at breakfast, the Saturday morning after the meeting Volkskrant had a large 
piece with a figure showing the credit cycle! This was based on a slide I had started 
to use in these years and still use, adapted from Laurence Hessels (Hessels et al., 
2009). Each day the symposium was attended by approximately 200 people. It was 
in the subsequent days and week covered in many newspapers and radio interviews. 
The evening of 7 November, I was in a nine-minute live interview on Nieuwsuur, a 
high-quality late-night news program. Some in the science community were 
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absolutely not amused by the tone and style of how we presented our conclusions 
and our case for change. ‘Not so much that there are no issues, but research is by far 
not as grim as your story suggest, and this is going to undermine trust and is going 
to decrease funding from government.’
Prof. Jan Vandenbroucke, in an exchange earlier that year, disproved of the con-
trast of the Legend of science, the positivistic idea of the objective ‘scientific 
method’ and its Mertonian norms (Chap. 2), with the less romantic social reality of 
how knowledge is produced in the workplaces of science and research. He argued 
that both are part of the more realistic practice of science and ‘fierce competition 
and jealousy’ do not inhibit or interfere with the growth of knowledge. It is, he says, 
exactly criticism and strong debates that are needed to arrive at reliable knowledge. 
He cites Stephen Gould who in the context of the Science Wars has argued that these 
views of research can be understood to be parts of our daily research practice and 
that this is the social way in which we produce ‘objective’ -or did Gould mean 
‘intersubjective’- knowledge that we accept as ‘truth? With this I agree. I have 
argued in Science 3.0 and the Position Paper, that once we leave the positivistic 
Legend behind, we can explain in honesty as Gould does, how we arrive at accepted 
claims that are not absolute timeless truths but always subject to tests and criticism. 
So, where is the problem between Vandenbroucke and us? In an email to me in 
response to the Position Paper in September 2013 and in follow up of the debate, 
Vandenbroucke clarified the issue. He does not, as I do, believe that the positivistic 
Legend has a deforming effect on the practice of science. I am fighting a ghost 
he says.
3.11  Science in Transition on Tour
After the symposium, Jerome Ravetz left the scene, he had done his job and found 
it too difficult to participate any longer from his home in Oxford. We were invited 
to organize an afternoon session on Science in Transition at the 2013 WTMC annual 
meeting, on November 29. Huub Dijsterbloem, Frank Miedema, Paul Wouters and 
Hans Radder presented, for an at least for me, quite intimidating audience of schol-
ars, including the members of the WTMC International Advisory Board, Aant 
Elzinga, Tom Gieryn, Steven Shapin and Andrew Webster. My point to them was: 
‘You have been studying and writing about science and its institutions. STS has over 
the past 30 years obtained the status of a well-respected discipline in SSH and aca-
demia. Now it is time ‘to translate this ‘pre-clinical’ knowledge to the ‘clinic’ were 
the patients are. We have a problem in university, and we need you and your knowl-
edge badly.’
The Dutch initiators received and accepted many invitations to present and 
explain the message of Science in Transition at universities in the country. On 
our website we had the agenda with these activities to show to interested people 
the reception and  that the movement was alive. In 2014, virtually at every 
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university and academic medical centre one of us presented and debated. In 
these days the audience recognized the issues and urged us to present more of 
the interventions needed. The Boards of universities, we were told at some of 
these meetings, were not all amused, they feared it could cause unrest. 
Particularly with regard to the use of metrics, it obstructed with all institutes 
heavily playing the Shanghai Ranking. I here must be honest, since I as 
researcher, professor and institutional administrator, also had until very recently 
been ‘addicted to the Journal Impact Factor’. A confession I still often use to 
start my seminars with. It must be said that the rectors of University of 
Amsterdam (UvA) and Leiden University in January and February in their Dies 
speeches supported the initiative. De Jonge Academie of the KNAW in February 
presented a Vision on science and research that echoed many of the issues. 
Science in Transition Conference: November 7 and 8, 2013, KNAW 
Amsterdam
Over the next few years, science will have to make a number of impor-
tant transitions. There is a deeply felt uncertainty and discontent on a 
number of aspects of the scientific system: the tools measuring scientific 
output, the publish-or-perish culture, the level of academic teaching, the 
scarcity of career opportunities for young scholars, the impact of science 
on policy, and the relationship between science, society and industry.
The checks and balances of our scientific system are in need of revi-
sion. To accomplish this, science should be evaluated on the basis of its 
added value to society. The public should be given a better insight in the 
process of knowledge production: what parties play a role and what 
issues are at stake? Stakeholders from society should become more 
involved in this process and have a bigger say in the allocation of research 
funding. This is the view of the Science in Transition initiators Huub 
Dijstelbloem (WRR/UvA), Frank Huisman (UU/UM), Frank Miedema 
(UMC Utrecht), Jerry Ravetz (Oxford) and Wijnand Mijnhardt 
(Descartes Centre, UU).
Location: Tinbergenzaal, KNAW Trippenhuis, Kloveniersburgwal 29, 
Amsterdam.
Key notes by Sheila Jasanoff (Pforzheimer Professor of Science and 
Technology Studies, Harvard Kennedy School) and Mark Brown 
(Professor in the Department of Government at California State 
University, Sacramento); Column: Hendrik Spiering (Chef Wetenschap/
Editor NRC Science): Nieuwe tijden, nieuwe wetenschap
(continued)
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Folia, the weekly of the University of Amsterdam featured Dijstelbloem and me 
in a discussion with UvA professors who were quite critical.
We were invited for a discussion with Jet Bussemaker, the Minister of Higher 
Education who was very interested. We discussed at the Royal Society with 
Directors of the KNAW Institutes where we were met with support, interesting sug-
gestions for improvement and heard the familiar objections: that ‘if we engage the 
public they will not allow for basic science and novel programmes’, that they don’t 
understand science, and of course from the natural sciences ‘When I am hiring, I 
judge scientists on the JIF of their publications. If that is abandoned, what shall we 
use instead? Anyhow, it will take much more time.’ We tried with: ‘…..uhhh, just an 
idea, whar about reading their selected papers?’
We met with the Board of NWO, the major Dutch government funder board, who 
were really not amused at all. In a meeting with the chair and director of the 
Association of Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU), who were much more 
engaged already we discussed the effects of the current Incentive and rewards sys-
tem. We pitched at the ‘Night of Science’ of UvA and Hans Clevers in his annual 
speech as President of KNAW discussed some of the hot topics. In June 2014 we 
published our evaluation of an academic year of Science in Transition and announced 
we would continue, because of enormous support and because we were even more 
convinced of urgency and need.
In the summer of 2014 the European Commission, the Directorate-General for 
Research and Innovation (RTD) and DG Communications Networks, Content and 
Technology (CONNECT) started a public consultation under the heading ‘Science 
Speakers: Sally Wyatt (Professor of Digital Cultures in Development, 
Department Technology and Society Studies, Maastricht University); 
Henk van Houten (General Manager Philips Research); Hans Altevogt 
(Greenpeace); Jeroen Geurts (Chairman Young Academy KNAW, 
Professor Translational Neuroscience VU Medical Center); Rudolf van 
Olden (Director Medical & Regulatory Glaxo Smith Kline Netherlands); 
Peter Blom (CEO Triodos Bank); Jasper van Dijk (Member of Parliament 
Socialist Party); Hans Clevers (President of the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). Panel discussion with: Jos 
Engelen (Chairman Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(NWO); André Knottnerus (Chairman Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR))Lodi Nauta (Dean Faculty of Philosophy, Professor in 
History of Philosophy, University of Groningen); Wijnand Mijnhardt 
(Director Descartes Centre for the History and Philosophy of the Sciences 
and the Humanities/Professor Comparative History of the Sciences and 
the Humanities, Utrecht University)
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2.0’: Science in Transition. The accompanying background document written by 
René von Schomberg and Jean Claude Burgelman presents an analysis of the cur-
rent state of science and how science could change to be more efficient and may 
contribute more to society (EU, 2014). In a section called Science in Transition a 
few ongoing initiatives driving for change are discussed. Many of the issues are in 
agreement with the Science in Transition analysis and the authors state: ‘In the 
Netherlands, an intensive debate has evolved on the basis of a position-paper enti-
tled ‘Science in Transition’. The ongoing debate in the Netherlands addressed, 
among other, the issue of the use of bibliometrics in relation to the determination of 
scientific careers. However, this debate went actually beyond the scope of what is 
described in this consultation paper as ‘Science 2.0’ and included also discussions 
on the democratisation of the research agenda, the science-policy interface and 
calls for making research more socially relevant. This questionnaire and the very 
informative analysis of the results were the start of the EU Open Science program 
in 2015. It appeared that many stakeholders preferred ‘Open Science’, not only as 
an alternative term over ‘Science 2.0’ but more importantly they liked to see science 
make the transition to the practice of Open Science. This policy transition to Open 
Science by the EU, in my mind was critical and will be discussed in more detail in 
Chap. 7.
A presentation on Science in Transition was given in September in Brussels for 
the policy advisors of Science Europe, the European association of public research 
performing and research funding organisations. One of them said that she like the 
ideas and plans a lot, but ‘did I know why the ERC was established next to FP7 and 
Horizon 2020? To serve those who want to get ample funds to do ‘free curiosity- 
driven research and not be bothered.’
The Dutch Ministry of Higher Education, Culture and Research, with reference 
to the debate elicited by Science in Transition organized debates to prepare for an 
integral vision and mission of research and science for the new government. Their 
The Elephant in the University Board Room
‘It was a bright and sunny afternoon in June 2014, when members of the 
Science in Transition team met with the Rectors of the Dutch Universities at 
Utrecht University’s Academiegebouw. The meeting took place 7  months 
after the first symposium, which had inspired a national discussion about the 
state of the art of in science and academia. The message of Science and 
Transition was initially met with a lot of sympathy by those who recognized 
the problems and their potential causes. Many liked the interventions sug-
gested by Science and Transition to improve science and academia. But some 
complained about the polemical way the message had been delivered in the 
media. While they agreed with the analysis, they were afraid that it might 
backfire on science and scientists.
(continued)
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Others said the analyses were not new at all, as they were being dis-
cussed for years already. Lastly, there were those who rejected the analyses 
of SiT altogether, arguing that there was no need to change: science is an 
international endeavour, and the Netherlands were doing an excellent job in 
the rankings. All of these criticisms were aired that Thursday in June during 
the first 30  min of our meeting. Then the Rector of the University of 
Amsterdam, Dymph van den Boom intervened. She stopped the discussion 
and said: ‘Dear colleagues, let’s face it, there is a big elephant in the room. 
It may not have been particularly nice how our guests talked about our sci-
ence and our universities, but they definitely have a point’. That started the 
conversation.’
In some respect the Rectors have to be excused for their slow response. 
Just before our public debate in 2013, Hans Radder, who had been engaged 
with us, had with Willem Haffman published an Academic Manifesto which 
put all the blame on the university administrators (Halffman & Radder, 
2015). They had sold academia due to the neoliberal evil of private interests, 
driving for patents (patenting they believed should be abandoned anyway) 
and financial gains. They had turned scientists into capitalist entrepreneurs 
instead of working for the public good. It may be that the Rectors also 
regarding Science in Transition sensed that something much worse was in 
the air. Indeed, 9 months later in Amsterdam a far more radical and uncon-
trolled up rise started in the University of Amsterdam with squatting of the 
Maagdenhuis, the home of the University Board which resulted in the step-
ping down of the Board. This movement called Re-Think was more in line 
with Radder and Haffman’s Manifesto, many complaints and a call for 
(continued)
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Science Vision was proudly presented in November 2014. December 3, the second 
Symposium was held at KNAW about transitions, with international and national 
discussants. At that occasion the Association of Dutch Universities signed DORA 
(for the first time).
3.12  Metrics Shapes Science
The style of the ‘high church’ of research remained the style of research with the 
highest esteem in academia and public research institutes. Accordingly, a credibility 
cycle with indicators derived from that type of esteem and excellence was domi-
nantly used in distribution of reputation and funds in heavy competition by classical 
peer review schemes. This is reflected in the appreciation of pure/basic over applied 
science, formal quantitative (modern) over qualitative and argumentative research. 
Also think of the scientific status of the ‘hard’ sciences over the ‘soft’ sciences and 
correspondingly the potential impact of investments in natural and biomedical sci-
ences over those in humanities and the social sciences. This system with its domi-
nant indicators thus has major effects on the agenda setting of our research. Since 
these problems have been put forward by a now increasing number of writers from 
within academia, the issues are also increasingly experienced by administrators in 
university, funding agencies, government and elite key opinion leaders in academia. 
In reaction to that conservative view and reward system from academia, alternative 
institutes and funding schemes were developed, initially mainly by governments to 
accommodate mission-driven science for which next to scientific excellence, qual-
ity criteria related to reliability, robustness in practice and thus to societal impact 
was important. Here, researchers do work in national and international teams and 
consortia on complex real-world problems, many times in collaboration with private 
partners and citizens involved. This was and still is to a large extent by the academic 
elites regarded as ‘low church’ research because it is done with less competitive, 
soft money and thus these types of grants, such as those from FP7 or Horizon 2020, 
come with much less esteem that a grant from the ERC. This is just the old aca-
demic elitist game being played over and over and here on the distinction between 
pure and applied science and on winning in competition. It needs no explanation 
academic autonomy and for the democratization of university government 
and in a sense arguing for insulation from influences from society. In their 
eyes we, Science in Transition, were not to be trusted because too close to 
the people in power in academia. In our eyes they were not forward looking 
and did not present a clear integrated vision on science and academia in the 
twenty-first century.
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Level Playing Field? (4)
The popular image of science, as we saw in Chap. 2, is based on a community 
of researchers with, if not unique, for sure, exceptional integrity and altruism. 
They follow their professional vocation to search for truth and do this openly, 
disinterestedly and with great unselfish honesty. It was admitted by Merton, 
there is the Matthew Effect and inequality and there are elites. It was believed 
that especially the top scientists are endowed with exceptional integrity to 
serve as role models for those who are in the heat of the daily competition. 
Advancing in the field, scientists realize there is more stake than finding sig-
nificant insights and knowledge. It is very much about who first discovered an 
insight. Moreover, major novel insights are threatening as they overthrow 
major previous results of leaders in the field and are generally resisted and not 
immediately accepted. When you are not generally seen as a major player, 
work has to be done to make the community aware of an interesting result and 
get the credits badly needed to survive in the system. During the first years as 
a group leader I learned some ‘tricks of the trade’, pushing the findings of 
your laboratory, which after reading Jim Watson’s The Double Helix were not 
that surprising anymore.
In 1987 in a collaboration with Hidde Ploegh and his colleagues, then at the 
Netherlands Cancer Institute, we observed that by inhibiting enzymes that are 
important for the sugar coating of the HIV envelope protein the interaction with 
the receptor on human T cells was disturbed. HIV was rendered non- infectious. 
This was biochemically of interest and opened up avenues for anti- viral drug 
development. Hidde was the major and thus last author and decided ‘to go for 
Nature’. The review reports, at that time by airmail, were not all that favour-
able. No problem for Hidde who had at that time already broad international 
experience and standing in the field as a top biochemist and immunologist. In 
my presence he simply called the editor, they discussed the comments and 
Hidde explained why the thought not all reviewers appreciated the significance 
of the work. A fourth expert was asked to review and November 5, the day after 
my oldest son was born the paper was published and was prominently fea-
tured in The Volkskrant, a respected national newspaper (Gruters et al., 1987).
Nine years later, in January 1995 two major, very innovative papers were 
published in Nature that shed new light on the dynamics of HIV infection and 
urged us to rethink the immunopathogenesis of AIDS (Ho et al., 1995; Wei 
et al., 1995). The authors were interviewed on CCN and made headlines in 
major newspapers around the world. We had been engaged in experiments to 
test the old hypothesis and came to the conclusion that the old hypothesis was 
wrong, but our data also provided unexpected amazing evidence against the 
major immunological component of the new hypothesis proposed by Ho et al. 
As David Ho then was one of the major scientist in the field, I thus anticipated 
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that research done with whatever type of money of course can result in excellent 
research in its own right.
3.13  It Is Contagious?
Could this view and this practice of science, the reader might secretly hope, not be 
a ‘Dutch Disease’, driven by dangerous liaison between Calvinism and neoliberal 
capitalism? The answer, I am afraid, is a clear no. This system of incentive and 
rewards, informed by the Legend and its legacy of the myth of the scientific method 
of reductionism, has shown to be highly contagious and has been disseminated as an 
infectious disease by academics travelling all over the globe. It has in the past 
20 years become common practice in Europe, Canada, Australia, India, Indonesia, 
China, Singapore and Hong Kong, Latin America and in Sub-Saharan Africa, most 
notably South Africa. The introduction of international rankings, especially the 
Shanghai Ranking in 2006 has accelerated the use and abuse of the metrics in the 
resistance from reviewers to our data and decided to make a bold action. In a 
rooftop restaurant overlooking the harbour of Vancouver, at the occasion of the 
XIth International AIDS Conference in Vancouver in July 1996, I met with an 
editor of Science. At the meeting, the new hypothesis was the hottest topic by 
far, with in the meantime new papers by these same authors in major journals.
Over dinner I explained our data and its implications in detail. She was 
very interested and after the desert and coffee, asked me to submit as soon as 
possible. As anticipated the reviewers thought the data, intriguing, but 
they were not sure and in the end found the data hard to believe. ‘Because’, 
one said, ‘if this is true then even the new immunology hypothesis is not cor-
rect’. The paper was improved by taking these comments into account and 
was published in Science in November 1996 (Wolthers et  al., 1996). 
Fortunately, our data were confirmed very soon.
You think I was addicted to the JIF? Yes, I was, because we knew that 
papers in these journals were regarded very important and instrumental to 
convince the community and our peers in the national review boards of our 
findings. They also definitely helped me to get my appointment as professor 
that same year. I hope that for experts, it was not the JIF, but our data that 
made the difference. Speaking about impact, David Ho, the major principal 
investigator and advocate of the new hypothesis of the Nature papers was 
elected Man of the Year of 1996 by Time Magazine.
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Who Sets the Research Agenda of the Field? (5)
When in 1981 the first aids cases presented in the US and later all over the 
world, it was quickly understood that an infectious agent, most likely a virus 
was the cause. It was sexually transmitted by body fluids, like blood and thus 
also blood products, for which good evidence was produced early on. Patients 
presented and died because of compromised immunity and it soon appeared 
to be associated with a loss of a specific population of white blood cells, so 
called helper CD4 T cells. At CLB, one of the predecessors of Sanquin, the 
Dutch Blood Supply Foundation, the new virus was a serious threat to the 
safety of the blood supply and called for immediate action. Virology at that 
time, was not a big thing. In times of COVID-19, knowing now, what has hap-
pened since 1980, with HIV, SARS and Ebola and major Flu pandemics, that 
is hard to believe. At that time, it was thought that we had won the war against 
viruses and not much academic reputation and funding was to be obtained in 
Distortions of the Practice of Science and Research
STEM dominate over Social Science and Humanities
Theoretical & pure science dominate over applied science and 
technology
Curiosity-driven research is believed the best for solving societal 
problems
Scientific knowledge is neutral and value free and science should be 
autonomous, not bothered by external publics or politics and their prob-
lems. Scientists cannot be held responsible for the knowledge they door 
do not produce
Quantity, Replication, Relevance and Impact are subordinate to nov-
elty and quantity
Individual Hyper-competition works against Team-Science, 
Multidisciplinarity and Diversity
Universities outsource talent management to funders based on flawed 
metrics, instead of having a research strategy according to their mission
Short-termism and risk aversion is rife because of four-year funding 
and evaluation cycles
Fields with high societal impact, but low impact in the metrics system 
suffer (aplied vs basic; local vs international)
The national and institutional research agenda is not properly reflect-
ing societal (clinical) needs and disease burden
Open Science research practices are just ‘nice to have’: stakeholder 
engagement, FAIR DATA, Open Code and Open Access
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human virology. There was, driven by medical microbiologists an effort on 
Hepatitis B Virus and to some respect on non-A- non- B Hepatitis Virus, 
which later was called Hepatitis C Virus. Medical microbiology was a very 
applied art, important for patient care and public health but academically 
regarded a done job. Identifying new viruses, for instance in seals, what our 
now famous colleague Ab Osterhaus at that time was doing, was pitied by 
scientists and compared to ‘collecting rare stamps’.
The Melief lab where I was, was involved in tumour-immunology in murine 
models. Given the career of Melief, an MD who was raised in the setting of 
blood transfusion and blood products, he was open to go to human research. 
He studied the development of murine leukaemia caused by mouse retrovi-
ruses, following the then widely held belief that viruses caused cancers also in 
humans. In the past 40 years there is much more evidence for that, but at that 
time this had been shown for Epstein Barr virus causing Burkitt’s Lymphoma 
and chronic Hepatitis C Virus infection associated with liver cancer. 
Retroviruses, related to those known to cause tumors in mouse and cats were 
sought in humans but not known this changed in 1980 when the first bonafide 
novel human retrovirus was identified by NIH researchers lead by Bob Gallo 
and a group in Japan lead by Hinuma. This virus caused a rare cancer of white 
blood cells prevalent in the population in Japan and the Caribbean. It happened 
that my project was on human T-cell leukaemia and Melief started a collabora-
tion with colleagues, who treated leukaemia patients in the Caribbean com-
munities in Amsterdam and London to study the involvement of the virus. I 
brought tests detecting immune responses to HTLV-1 to the lab from London 
and indeed found evidence for the presence of the virus in T-cell leukaemia 
patients. In 1982 when the first aids patients also presented in The Netherlands, 
there appeared a claim in the literature that HTLV-1 might be involved. We 
started a collaboration with Jaap Goudsmit a medical microbiologist and virol-
ogist at AMC, who was keen to find an interesting and challenging new 
research topic and had spotted aids as an ideal candidate. We tested whether 
evidence could be found for HTLV-1 infections in AIDS patients in Amsterdam. 
There was no convincing evidence, but my career had made a dramatic turn to 
research on HIV/aids already. From then, I worked on viro-immunology of 
HIV and aids which was driven by the urgent problem that HIV caused for the 
safety of various blood products. The murine virology at the institute had 
stopped in 1984 as Melief had followed the field to work on oncogenes in 
mouse and humans. Oncogenes had just then been discovered in models of 
murine and Rous sarcoma tumour viruses, research that was propelled by 
enormous technical progress in molecular biology in the late 1970s. So, in 
1984 Melief and his group logically left for the Netherlands Cancer Institute.
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incentive and rewards system. As we have seen this put most of the weight on the 
more basic science, and the publication and citation cultures of STEM.  Science 
nowadays must be ‘international’ to score, work on urgent national and regional 
problems normally does not get published in the English language top journals. The 
effect is that in order to get higher in the rankings, research in universities in for 
instance Indonesia or South Africa is steered towards topics that score in interna-
tional high impact journals, at the expense of research on topical problems and 
needs of the local publics. I don’t even mention that most institutions in developing 
countries cannot afford the subscription fees of the top journals, most which are not 
open access. Results of our HIV/aids research done in Amsterdam were not acces-
sible to researchers and medical specialists in developing countries that had the 
greatest disease burden with social disruption and literally millions of deaths from 
aids. Only in an acute crisis as the COVID-19 pandemic that we experience at this 
time, all data and papers are made immediately open and accessible to all. Will this 
openness be only temporarily?
3.14  Interventions Needed
Most of the different components of the analysis of Science in Transition, as out 
lined above, at that time were not new or original at all. I can cite many more well- 
written and well-documented texts, in journal articles and books that analytically 
tells us the same. A fine example is European Science Foundation Science Policy 
Briefing, written at the same time as our position paper (ESF, 2013) in 2012/2013 
by seven top experts amongst others Ulrike Felt, Alan Irwin and Arie Rip. The paper 
explicitly discusses the adverse effects of metrics on problem choice and the fact 
that public engagement is not being considered as part of the research and suggests 
interventions, as DORA (p20–21). The authors however did not take the next step to 
list a series of concrete actions to be taken by administrators and scientists who are 
responsible for that problematic and limited system of research evaluation. I have 
pointed out that in general most of these authors stayed at safe distance from the 
proverbial elephant in the room.
Discussions about changes in this part of the governance system of science and 
research have intensified in recent years. It was pretty normal in the 1960s and 
1970s to talk about science in terms of power, elites and money. Since the 1990s 
that talk seemingly was taboo. It seems to me that since 2015 or so the taboo has 
been broken, hopefully for good. We needed to open the black box, of how science 
as an industry is being run and by whom, to expose and make visible the machin-
ery of what the classical sociologist of science called ‘the invisible hand’. Like in 
an unregulated economy, the invisible hand, not unexpectedly, when made visible 
appears to belong to the powerful and the elites of the day. In this case thus very 
much the scientists who did well in the social system described above. They 
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strongly believe in the Legend and its metrics, some honestly and for real, but 
others used it as a masquerade, a ‘front stage’ mythical image that still sells sci-
ence well to public and politics. We have seen that the myth is scientifically but 
also socially untenable. In ‘modernity’, that is to say in our modern times, the 
public in the new social media is in uncompromising open interaction with sci-
ence in its many forms. On that boundary of the science of complex societal 
problems and society, there is no consensus, no absolute truth and the public 
increasingly gets to see more of the backstage practice of science, where the dis-
cussion have not settled but are raging as they always did. In these reflexive times 
in society, we need a more reflexive narrative about how we do, and with whom, 
and for whom we do science and research. There are as we see in the next chapter 
many small-scale ongoing movements and actions to build this reflexive narrative. 
In many of these this is done together with people from outside academia that 
have a stake in the research because it is their problem that is to be investigated. 
In these transitions there is awareness that the publics will talk back. We need to 
let go the idea of ‘The Quest for Certainty’ and relate to ‘The Public and its 
Problems’ in order to produce not absolute truths, but significant reliable knowl-
edge that benefits us all.
3.15  Sensing the Zeitgeist
During the Christmas break of 2014, reflecting on the start and the reception of the 
message of Science in Transition in the first year in The Netherlands, we were sur-
prised and amazed. We had expected some reactions and a bit of media attention 
when we prepared the paper and the symposium. We had not anticipated the enor-
mous and sustained support, from academia and outside academia nor the media 
attention and exposure. What we had expected was a typical half-hearted response 
from the leadership, with a standard reflex that this ‘was all already known and 
adequately addressed’ by the Boards and Deans. After that, we thought our message 
would for surely fade away quickly replaced by other news. We even had been pre-
pared for straightforward denial and rejection by the establishment. Some of these 
reflexes were heard and seen in writing. The response generally however was posi-
tive from many different corners and echelons inside and outside academia. Our 
analysis was widely recognized and brought palpable relief that it was now accept-
able to openly discuss these issues without being scorned as a complaining loser. In 
addition, the debates did not stop with pointing out the problems but included 
actions and interventions at the systemic level.
This description of the reception is provided here. Not to show how unique or 
enormously clever we were, because in fact we weren’t, as some colleagues were 
happy to point out. It is to illustrate the widespread criticism, critical insights and 
frustration that became tangible and had apparently been building up in academia 
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over the years. Obviously, this was not the effect of our initiative. It was already in 
the air, after years of critical thinking and writing by many colleagues in different 
countries. In addition, it was fuelled by increasing massification and digitalization, 
by the distorting effects of the neoliberal knowledge economy and its New Public 
Management. This somehow had been brewing for a decade and the science com-
munity was ready for this broad and international call for change. It was this 
Zeitgeist that had activated us to take action, to give, like others had been doing at 
the same time elsewhere, a small push.
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Chapter 4
Science for, in and with Society: 
Pragmatism by Default
Abstract To rethink the relation between science and society and its current prob-
lems authoritative scholars in the US and Europe, but also around the globe, have 
since 1980 implicitly and increasingly explicitly gone back to the ideas of American 
pragmatism. Pragmatism as conceived by its founders Peirce, James and Dewey is 
known for its distinct philosophy/sociology of science and political theory. They 
argued that philosophy should not focus on theoretical esoteric problems with hair- 
splitting abstract debates of no interest to scientists because unrelated to their prac-
tice and problems in the real world. In a realistic philosophy of science, they did not 
accept foundationalism, dismissed the myth of given eternal principles, the unique 
‘scientific method’, absolute truths or let alone a unifying theory. They saw science 
as a plural, thoroughly social activity that has to be directed to real world problems 
and subsequent interventions and action. ‘Truth’ in their sense was related to the 
potential and possible impact of the proposition when turned in to action. Knowledge 
claims were regarded per definition a product of the community of inquirers, fallible 
and through continuous testing in action were to be improved. Until 1950, this was 
the most influential intellectual movement in the USA, but with very little impact in 
Europe. Because of the dominance of the analytic positivistic approach to the phi-
losophy of science, after 1950 it lost it standing. After the demise of analytical phi-
losophy, in the 1980s of the previous century, there was a resurgence of pragmatism 
led by several so-called new or neo-pragmatists. Influential philosophers like Hillary 
Putnam and Philip Kitcher coming from the tradition of analytic philosophy have 
written about their gradual conversion to pragmatism, for which in the early days 
they were frowned upon by their esteemed colleagues. This new pragmatist move-
ment gained traction first in the US, in particular through works of Bernstein, 
Toulmin, Rorty, Putnam and Hacking, but also gained influence in Europe, early on 
though the works of Apel, Habermas and later Latour.
In the previous chapter I discussed the problems and distortions of the practice of 
scientific inquiry and of the organization of academia. These problems do not only 
affect how we do research, but also which research is being done or not done. The 
latter is what philosophers and sociologists designate the growth of knowledge, or 
to use Longino’s phrase ‘the fate of knowledge’. The latter reminds us that 
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knowledge claims can be reconsidered and refuted, but we also can think of knowl-
edge that never was. It was not produced because the required inquiry it was decided, 
or even never consciously considered nor decided, not to be pursued. This is, as 
discussed in Chap. 3, not the classical problem of the ‘invisible hand’, but directly 
reflects the politics of science and research in academia influenced by idiosyncratic 
or otherwise motivated scientists, public and private funders and government agen-
cies. This process is operated by very ‘visible hands’ belonging to a large number of 
individuals who are serving on boards and advisory or grant committees like NIH 
study sections of the many institutions and organizations of the science system, at 
the institutional, national and international level. These organizations still domi-
nantly use frontstage narratives that largely originate from two major sources one 
from the inside and the other from the outside. From the inside it was the Legend 
with all the preconceived ideas and its consequences, discussed in the previous 
chapters, and from the outside it was the capitalist ideas of economic power and 
profit and of technological control in the modern knowledge society. These two 
ideologies have in strong synergy since the 1980s shaped scientific inquiry with 
serious consequences for the growth of knowledge and thus for society at large and 
at the personal level for the lives we live. This is experienced daily and is being 
increasingly recognised by virtually all researchers in the international scientific 
community, which in the past ten years has led to a global discussion of how science 
is broken and how to improve or, if possible, fix it.
Before going to discuss the prospects, opportunities, pitfalls and dangers for 
change of the aims and institutional organization of scientific inquiry, I will take a step 
back and reflect on the consequences of the conclusion of the previous chapter that the 
academy and the practice of research are in need of serious change. To successfully 
make this change happen, a series of essential changes have to be made, with the 
required precautions taken, that will gradually promote and enable the required transi-
tion in the coming years. For this transition we need to understand (as Hacking would 
say, ‘take a good look at’) the modern practice of science, how it is done in the daily 
life of researchers, but also how researchers off the record talk amongst each other 
about what they do. It is as important to understand how in general the community of 
researchers in fosters a particular image of science especially when talking to lay 
audiences and when scientists or science administrators appear in the media. It has 
become clear in the previous chapters that the popular image is a Legend and does not 
at all match with what the practice of science is and how research is (and was) done. 
That classical myth, although obsolete and untenable, is still dominant, and more 
important, inhibitory to the required change to make science and research fit for the 
future. In this chapter I will argue for a powerful alternative theory and vision. This 
new narrative needs to provide a modern, more social and humanistic image which 
must have a firm basis in modern thinking in philosophy, history and sociology of sci-
ence. This modern image must thus not be a myth like the Legend but must be being 
recognized and practiced by active researchers and be an all-encompassing empirical 
account and theory about the many different styles and practices of scientific and 
scholarly research, in the past and at present.
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Several writers about science who have discussed the practice of science have 
described new modes of science as it has developed since the 1980s or should 
develop, using labels like ‘industrialized’ (Ravetz, 1971) and ‘post-normal’ (Ravetz, 
2011), ‘post-academic’ (Ziman, 1994, 2000), ‘Mode-2’ (Gibbons et al., 1994).
Ravetz (1971), Ziman (2000) and Nowotny et al. (2001) do elaborate on a gen-
eral practical theory and philosophy of science which explicitly refers to recent 
developments in the philosophy and sociology of science and more broadly in STS 
research after 1980. As discussed above, until the early 1990s, the truly multidisci-
plinary Science and Technology Studies, which is what these writers practiced, had 
still to come of age as a respectable academic discipline in its own right. Mainstream 
professionals guarded the tribal fences between philosophy, sociology, anthropol-
ogy, psychology, economics and history of science. This has not promoted our 
understanding of the interrelationships of society and science in history and modern 
times. Toulmin as we saw complained about it in the late 1950s. Even Bruno Latour 
who notoriously and successfully has been crossing these borders, which he argues 
is common in anthropological studies of tribal life in the Amazon or New Guinea, 
complained in his ‘We have never been modern” about these dualistic seams between 
nature, culture and the sciences. ‘We pass from a limited problem  - why do the 
(sociotechnological) networks remain elusive? Why are science studies ignored?- to 
a broader and more classical problem: what does it mean to be modern?- When we 
dig beneath the surface of our elders; surprised at the networks that- as we see it- 
weave our world, we discover the anthropological roots of the lack of understand-
ing. Fortunately, we are being assisted by some major events that are burying the old 
critical mole in its own burrows. If the modern world in its turn is becoming suscep-
tible to anthropological treatment, this is because something has happened to it. ….
we have known that it took a cataclysm like the Great War for intellectual culture to change 
it habits slightly and open its doors to the upstarts who had been pale before (Quotes are 
from section 1.3) (Latour, 1993).
Although Latour continues this observation with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, another cataclysmic global shock, for me his lines take us back to Chap. 1, 
and John Dewey who at the beginning of the twentieth century in fact before and 
after the Great War of 1914–1918, argued for another science and philosophy, that 
both are socially and culturally more inclusive and reflexive than the (natural) sci-
ences of his days. It is pragmatism that recently many became to believe provides 
the best approach for our understanding of and contributing to the complex of soci-
ety and science. The pragmatist theory of scientific inquiry, developed predomi-
nantly between 1870 and 1940 by the early American pragmatists, Peirce, Dewey 
and James, was rejuvenated and modernized by a group of high-profile ‘new prag-
matists’ (Misak, 2007) in the second half of the last century. In this chapter, I will 
briefly discuss the essential features of pragmatism and argue that it provides the 
default theory and concepts of the aims and practice of science since it is open, non- 
dogmatic and pluralistic, inclusive and contextual, lives up to our present state of 
hyper-modernism and acceleration with fluidity of place and time. For the research-
ers it does not provide a mythical ‘scientific method/idealistic, positivist Cartesian 
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certainty based on formal rules and foundations, however, it does provide rich guid-
ance and understanding of the objectivity of the reasoning, and functioning of the 
processes and practices of the communities of inquiry in the sciences and humani-
ties and how they may change over time. Pragmatism is clear about the intersubjec-
tive procedure of evaluation of our accepted scientific beliefs, importantly in 
applying and testing them in actions and interventions and is honest about the intrin-
sic fallibility of our beliefs. Pragmatism is fallibilistic but is in essence against scep-
ticism. Scepticism may be a fine attitude for the study room, academic debates and 
for papers, but it loses force in the outside world.
Pragmatism in principal sees scientific research as a means to an end. The ulti-
mate aim is to address and alleviate problems and issues that prevent people from 
living the good life. Therefore, science must constantly engage with the publics and 
their problems and science is thus seen a key component of the aspiration of the true 
idea of democracy, not naive but realizing all its issues (Dewey & Rogers, 2016). 
This all-encompassing concept of theory and practice can provide guidance for 
shaping the organization of modern science and inquiry, of aims and ownership and 
the common good, participation, processes, ideal deliberations and agenda setting, 
inclusive evaluation criteria - incorporating facts, values and goals, action, interven-
tions and implementation- and social reflexivity of all these steps which is needs 
[inside] because it hits us from [outside] from an ever more rapidly changing hyper- 
reflexive modern society (Beck et  al., 1994; Nowotny et  al., 2001). Outside and 
inside in the previous sentence were put in brackets because the classically defined 
boundaries between science and society, the experts and lay publics, are and have 
always been permeable, which was experienced with a negative connotation as 
leaky by those who had held on to the dualities of the scientific method of the Legend.
4.1  Pragmatism by Default
Given these considerations about science and society, and the demise of analytical 
philosophy, there are two main reasons why it is believed that pragmatism with the 
diverse new pragmatist interpretations of recent times is the best idea of science and 
philosophy of science. First, it provides insight and understanding which matches 
the practice of science since it starts from a realistic historical and sociological 
understanding of the social practice of science. Second, for philosophers of science 
who are active in the post-empiricist positivist era, pragmatism appears to be an 
acceptable and fruitful philosophical proposition that is not impeded by esoteric 
problems as empiricism and positivism both are.
For the philosophers who started their training and academic careers before the 
1960s or even 1970s and whose philosophical thinking until late in life has been 
dominated by positivism or various kinds of theories of empiricism and realism, this 
‘pragmatic turn’ has not been easy. All of them in their articles and books literally 
describe it as a process of conversion, a paradigm shift which was frowned upon or 
ridiculed by their peers and colleagues.
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Most writers about pragmatism describe how pragmatism in the USA was domi-
nant until the 1930s but was rapidly overtaken by the analytical tradition (Diggins, 
1994; Misak, 2013). With the rise of the analytic positivistic tradition -which the 
members of the Vienna Circle, after fleeing Europe in the 1930s have spread across 
the USA- pragmatism rapidly lost its influence. As we have seen (in Chap. 2), math-
ematics and the natural sciences as dominant models for science and the Cartesian 
system of dualisms shaped the analytical and linguistic turn in philosophy of sci-
ence. In the eyes of the diehard philosophers of those days, compared to the rational 
and formal approach of logical positivism and empiricism, pragmatism had little of 
epistemology and of a formal philosophical system to offer. Peirce’s philosophy 
was nearest to such a system with his analysis of the three methods of inference: 
induction, deduction and abduction. Because of this, Popper and the Popperians and 
some philosophers who came through the analytical tradition, like Nagel, Putnam, 
Hacking and later Misak, had strong affinity for Peirce. James and Dewey did not 
bother with that formal philosophy and explained their thoughts and argued and 
reasoned in plain language. The new-pragmatists, like Rorty, Bernstein and Kitcher 
where more engaged with James and Dewey’s broader view about the social and 
political, ‘science in democracy’ as Kitcher called it. Make no mistake, this writing 
style, reasoning and argumentation devoid of the esoteric ‘analytical-logical- formal’ 
however, is misleading regarding the depth of thought and insight proffered, as 
Putnam said about Dewey and Hacking said about Peirce and James.
4.2  Why Bother?
I believe that for practising scientists, both natural scientist and scholars from SSH, 
who have a certain degree of proper self-understanding of their methods, the mean-
ing of its intersubjectivity, the limitations of its claims and the social aspects of their 
practice of inquiry, pragmatism may well be considered a most realistic image and 
theory of their daily work. Moreover, even those who have not reflected a lot, or 
young professionals who not yet thought a lot about these issues, which we know is 
not unusual at least in the biomedical and natural sciences, pragmatism may come 
on to them as quite naturalistic descriptive. What then does pragmatism have to 
offer to them? Given what I discussed in Chap. 2, in the confined space of the prac-
tice of inquiry, studying and researching, doing experiments and interventions -in 
the library, the lab, the clinic or in societal practices- not too much. At that level, 
scientists, do adhere to validated and accepted methods, logics and procedures of 
their respective disciplines, but do not bother on a daily basis with the higher levels 
of philosophical assumptions. So why should they, or we, now bother about prag-
matism? They, and we, should very much care about pragmatism. We have seen in 
Chap. 3 that only one level up, where the mundane matters of management like 
strategy, policy and governance are discussed, the assumptions of the Legend still 
reign. This is most visible as soon as we have to consider issues of quality, excel-
lence, acceptability, impact, and evaluation. Then assumptions of the Legend 
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immediately become visible and are at the table in the deliberations which sets 
scene and tone and in part cause the distortions discussed in Chap. 3. It is at this 
level that pragmatism will provide realistic guidance for these deliberations and 
agenda setting, inclusive evaluation criteria - incorporating facts, values and goals, 
action, interventions and implementation- and social reflexivity of all these steps. At 
an even higher level, it likewise can be instrumental for shaping the mission and 
strategy of the organization and government of science at institutional and national 
level, regarding its higher purpose, aims and ownership and relation to the wider 
public. At this level, pragmatism because of its realistic, modern, open and demo-
cratic view of science, allows for a better narrative with responsibility in how we 
communicate about science and research to and importantly engage with the various 
public representatives and public debates and in the media. What forces were work-
ing against the pragmatic turn?
Reading the vast body, or even the top 10% of the literature of the past 30 years 
on pragmatism and the pragmatic turn is impossible and I believe not required for 
the argument to be made in this book. There is, paradoxically already a lot of eso-
teric writing about these philosophers whose thesis it was that philosophy should 
not deteriorate into esoteric writing that does not bother anybody in the real world 
anymore. The secondary literature on the classical philosophers, Russel, Popper, 
Kuhn and Wittgenstein, the famous Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School is also 
vast, and many have read not so much the original texts but overviews in the books 
about philosophy of science and modern science. Until very recently, textbooks of 
the philosophy of science, even philosophy of the humanities, social science and 
even sociology rarely mention or discuss the work of the early pragmatists, some do 
refer to Rorty’s progressive interpretations of James and Dewey. When I recently 
confronted some well-known Dutch authors of these textbooks who I knew clearly 
do  sympathize with pragmatism with this omission, they shrug their shoulders. 
They reply with the words ‘I thought it was not yet philosophically developed 
enough’ or that ‘it is not yet suitable for introductory texts books’. Instead, we offer 
our students mainly still the myth of The Legend vintage 1950s, with sometimes a 
small side dish of Kuhn vintage 1962 and a glims of the early works of Latour vin-
tage 1979 or 1983 with the explicit warning ‘watch out it’s spicy’.
Barker and Kitcher, however in their very nice textbook Philosophy of Science 
(2013), where the demise of logical positivism is spelled out, if not celebrated, dis-
cuss how we are now able to come to a realistic image of the pluriform practices and 
can be frank about the limitations of the sciences. Even there, no reference to an 
alternative realistic narrative of pragmatism is to be found (Barker & Kitcher, 2013). 
This is of interest given the life-long struggle of Kitcher with his conversion 
described in Chap. 2. In his ‘Preludes to Pragmatism’ and ‘The Ethical Project’ 
written in the same years as his 2011, he takes Dewey’s pragmatism as the leading 
philosophy to think about modern science and ethics in democracy (Kitcher, 2011, 
2012). Is it really the case that main-stream philosophers, sociologists and science 
and technology scholars writing about science consciously kept a safe distance to 
pragmatism because intellectually and emotionally the gap between the Legend and 
pragmatism was too big for them? Yes, and Kitcher is most frank about it on the 
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very first pages of Preludes: ‘Classical pragmatism is, I believe, not only America’s 
most important contribution to philosophy, but also one of the most significant 
developments in the history of the subject…‘Twenty years ago, I would not have 
made that judgement. Like most of my contemporaries in philosophy departments in 
the Anglophone world, I would have seen the three canonical pragmatists -Peirce, 
James and Dewey- as well-intentioned but benighted, labouring with crude tools to 
develop ideas that were far more rigorously and exactly shaped by the immigrants 
from Central Europe whose work generated what is (unfortunately) known as “ana-
lytic” philosophy.’pxi (Kitcher, 2012).
Because of this it has not resulted in a reform and its influence faded apart from 
a few philosophers who have kept the debate about it going. Is the pragmatic turn 
difficult, for them and most of us, because pragmatism does not offer a new myth or 
fresh ideology for the twenty-first century which provides a sense of certainty, an 
uncontested foundation, a legitimation with which we can assure ourselves and the 
public about the authority of science? Given Dewey’s severe criticism about this 
quest for certainty and the history of the demise of the Legend the deceptively 
common-sense philosophy of pragmatism clearly seems to contribute to the uncom-
fortable relation the philosophers and interested scientists have with pragmatism. In 
addition, we have seen that the Legend has had enormous impact on the politics of 
science in relation to society, as frontstage narrative, but that this narrative paradoxi-
cally is even in use within science, backstage (!) and there has distorted the general 
view of the sciences and the humanities. At both these levels of the scientific com-
munity the pragmatic turn thus will surely bring gains to many, but losses to others, 
the former academic elites that lose reputation, access to control and power and its 
many associated advantages. This institutional feeling of loss and uncertainty also 
may hold for the philosophers who did not want to be affiliated with non- mainstream 
philosophy and their proponents. Is it so that only after a successful mainstream 
professional career in academia, with independence of one’s peers, there is finally 
room and opportunity to engage with the non-mythical mundane pragmatism and 
does one have the guts to be frank about the Legend?
I will restrict myself here to a concise overview of the main concepts of pragma-
tism and discuss a bit more in detail the more recent works of the new pragmatists 
as far as it relates to the philosophical principles and ideas of inquiry.
Richard Bernstein, whose perspective is from the humanities and social sciences, 
and his experience in the US liberal arts college system, has written with great 
authority from the broader pragmatist perspective (Bernstein, 1983, 2010). His 
Overview (p1–49, (Bernstein, 1983)) is quite technical, but provides a comprehen-
sive history of the concept of rationality in modern philosophy which makes the 
strong case that pragmatism is the default (in my words). His discussion of the work 
of Habermas and the early influence of Peirce on Habermas (Habermas, 1970, 
1971) will be revisited in Chap. 5. Hacking’s Representing and Intervening 
(Hacking, 1983), I have quoted already, is very concisely discussing the problems 
of positivism, especially in the three last pages were the legacy of Peirce is brought 
in, and in the bit more than 5 pages on what pragmatism has to offer. Hillary 
Putnam’s Pragmatism (Putnam, 1995) especially the less technical chapters on 
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William James and the in total 18 pages of Chap. 2 on Pragmatism and the 
Contemporary Debates are very good reads.
The Metaphysical Club, by Louis Menand a professor of English, is a prize- 
winning highly praised, more literary intellectual history of pragmatism (Menand, 
2001). It discusses what prompted these thinkers to work out this unique truly 
American philosophy between 1870 and 1940. He describes quite colourfully, how 
they differed in the range of issues they wrote about, in their style and temperament 
and political engagement. We also get a view of the very different sometimes deeply 
troubled personal lives they have had, which especially relates to Peirce. Reading 
this book makes you realize how different the world and the philosophical, religious 
and political issues were only one hundred years ago. At the same time. it becomes 
clear how modern and humanistic the pragmatists were regarding their ideas about 
scientific inquiry, their critique of the Cartesian and positivistic philosophies, the 
relation with society and the publics, the methods and social structures. It becomes 
clear that they reflected on inquiry not only from the point of view of episteme 
(theoretical knowledge), but also techne (technological application and action) and 
phronesis (practical wisdom and reason) (Bernstein, 1983). Dewey later started a 
real pragmatist movement which took the thinking and philosophy to many other 
fields of humanities and social sciences, most of all educational theory, ethics, and 
political theory on for instance the workings of democracy in the Chicago Laboratory 
School. Menand provides a fine accessible summary of pragmatism in non- technical 
language in chapter 13 (p351–375), which starts as follows:
Pragmatism is an account of the way people think, the way they come up with ideas, form 
beliefs, and reach decisions’...there is no noncircular set of criteria for knowing whether a 
particular belief is true. No appeal to some standard outside the process of coming to the 
belief itself.
He cites James who had the most expressive style of writing and has been instru-
mental in promoting the work of Peirce and Dewey in the USA: ‘Truth happens to 
an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a pro-
cess, the process namely of verifying it.’ ‘Beliefs, in short, are really rules for action, 
and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of habits of 
action.’ He cites James’ most discussed and debated statement, which takes the 
philosophy of Peirce in the eyes of Peirce much too far, but has much inspired Rorty 
sixty years later years later: ‘..the true is the name of whatever proves itself to be 
good in the way of belief’ . This could in our days well have been a tweet.
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) was the real founder of pragmatism in the 
eyes of most philosophers of science. What he thought and wrote at the age of 29 in 
1870 is most impressively reflecting unbelievable intelligent, independent broad 
and original scholarship. Reading about him, his temperaments, his personal prob-
lems, the hardships that befell him, and how that has also affected his professional 
career makes you feel sad. Peirce was trained as a natural scientist with laboratory 
experience and made major contributions to mathematics and formal logics and is 
regarded as one of the most brilliant American philosophers (Nagel, 1940). He 
showed us the way out of Cartesian dualisms, the dichotomy of fact and value, the 
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problem of representation by theory of reality and the problem of foundations and 
‘truth’. The impact of his work outside the US was recognized in England by Frank 
Ramsey in the 1920s. Ramsey  discussed Peirce’ philosophy with Russel and Moore 
and in several sessions with Ludwig Wittgenstein in Vienna. (Misak, 2013; Putnam, 
1995) Peirce also influenced Popper who agreed with ‘his critique of the search for 
epistemological origins that has dominated so much of modern philosophy’ 
(Bernstein, 1983, 2010). Bernstein emphasizes that Peirce, next to more method-
ological ideas, has strongly proposed the concept of the community of inquirers and 
‘his relentless criticism of the subjectivism that lies at the heart of so much modern 
epistemology’ and connects to modern major influential thinkers, in the next lines: 
‘…he develops an intersubjective (social) understanding of inquiry, knowing, com-
munication, and logic. Jürgen Habermas has argued that at the turn of the twentieth 
century there was a major paradigm shift from a ‘philosophy of subjectivity’ or a 
‘philosophy of consciousness’ to an intersubjectivity (social) communicative model 
of human action and rationality. One of the primary sources of this shift is evident 
in Peirce’ early papers. The above passage also anticipates the centrality of the 
community of inquirers in Peirce’s pragmatism. ..To say that inquiry is self- 
correcting is to say that a critical community of inquirers has the intellectual 
resources for self-correction.’
It is only in and through subjecting our prejucies, hypotheses, and guesses to public criti-
cism by a relevant community of inquirers that we can hope to escape from our limited 
perspectives, test our beliefs and bring about the growth of knowledge (p35/36) 
(Bernstein, 1983).
We have seen in the previous chapter that this is an ideal of integrity, a major 
critical aspiration that the community has to effectively perform at all levels of 
inquiry. Peirce and especially Dewey have been criticized as being naïve in their 
views of communication and interactions in the process of inquiry and, in Dewey’s 
later works, engaging publics from outside academia. Popper (Popper, 1981) who 
also in the same vein emphasized the continuous process of criticism in science, 
also warned against distortions of the discourse by internal and external interests. 
As the founder, or one of the founders of pragmatism Peirce is favoured and admired 
especially by philosophers who came from the analytic tradition. Above I cited 
James’s popular version, we would now say ‘tweet’ of the pragmatic maxim, but 
Peirce as originator of the maxim was much more subtle on this. Misak, but also 
others have tried to correct the popular view that was instigated by James. Misak 
(p29) writes that his notorious statement is to be understood as follows: ‘Consider 
what effects, which might conceivable have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these is the whole of our 
conception of the object’. …‘we must look to the upshot of our concepts in order to 
rightly comprehend them’. And Misak’s favourite: ‘we must not begin by talking of 
pure ideas, − vagabond thoughts that tramps the public roads without any human 




He rejected given, timeless principles, stating that ‘there is no cognition “not 
determined by a previous cognition” or “something outside of consciousness” 
(p39). “he thought that ‘truth was a matter for the community of inquirers’ not for 
the individual inquirer’. Science and inquiry and rationality are matters of getting 
our beliefs in line with experience, evidence and reason in an ongoing community 
project. In our efforts to understand reality “each of us is an insurance company’ 
(p37). This process in practice does never stop. Peirce is categorical to state that this 
is the case since all our beliefs are imperfect and are subject to continuous testing. 
There are degrees of acceptance and of trust in a belief of course. It is, he proposes, 
by this process of Fixation of Belief we gradually improve and finally come to a set 
of converging true beliefs. But when is finally? This is problematic but not really: 
like Popper, Peirce proposed a metaphor: ‘its reasoning should not form a chain 
which is never stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may ever be 
so slender provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected 
(Collected Papers 5.265). He proposed no unique method, but deduction, induction 
and abduction, also designated inference to the best explanation. This reminds us in 
many respects of Poppers falsificationism of conjectures and refutations. It does 
sound familiar to active scientists in the natural and social sciences with respect to 
the hypo-deductive method starting with an idea, or hypothesis to be tested and 
proven, but falsification and refutation is not really the main goal in daily in practice.
John Dewey, a student of Peirce, was very much inspired by the work of Peirce 
but his view of philosophy and scientific inquiry was much broader. He was con-
cerned with the role of science in the broad scheme of the problems of society and 
its diverse publics and of democracy. He wrote extensively about the relation 
between science, the conduct of inquiry and the problems of these publics. This 
philosophy which naturally flows over in political theory is the pragmatism I will 
discuss in Chap. 5 where involvement and engagement of the publics with scientific 
inquiry will be discussed in terms of the present societal challenges in our modern 
times. Dewey had a background in educational theory and pedagogy, child upbring-
ing and development. In his thinking education was a major factor in building civic 
communities that could allow for public to participate in deliberation about inquiry 
and action. Education in his mind was life itself. For him inquiry must be prompted 
by a concrete situation of doubt or a problem and thus foremost had the obligation 
to contribute to mitigation or solving issues that hindered people from leading the 
good life. This was the short-term aim of science and he did not bother with the 
Peircean epistemological problems how in ongoing inquiry in the long run ‘truth’ 
comes about. Dewey was a true public intellectual who connected in a natural way 
inquiry with social action in which he himself engaged forcefully in political 
actions. He had high visibility in American public life, politics and its debates for 
instance at the times of McCarthyism.
Bernstein elaborates on Dewey’s vision of radical democracy which will be 
revisited in Chap. 5 (Bernstein, 1983). Dewey wrote widely and a lot. His contribu-
tion to the philosophy of science which is most relevant here has been summarized 
by Hacking where he divides pragmatism in two ‘Peirce and Putnam on the one 
hand and James, Dewey and Rorty on the other. ..It is interesting, for Peirce and 
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Putnam both to define the real and to know what, within our scheme of things, will 
pan out as real. This is not of much interest to the other sort of pragmatism. How we 
live and talk is what matters, in those quarters. There is not only no external truth, 
but there are no external or even evolving canons of rationality. Rorty regards all 
our life as a matter of conversation’. Dewey rightly despises the spectator theory of 
knowledge…the right track in Dewey is the attempt to destroy the conception of 
knowledge and reality as a matter of thought and representation. He should have 
returned the minds of philosophers to experimental science… in his opinion things 
we make (including all tools, including language as a tool) are instruments that 
intervene when we turn our experiences into thoughts and deeds that serve our 
purposes..’ (p 62/63) (Hacking, 1983).
Putnam, whom I introduced in Chap. 2, has made an intellectual journey from 
analytical philosophy to pragmatism, and even after 1981 apparently became more 
influenced by the works of James and Dewey than Hacking in 1983 had anticipated. 
In the collection of papers published with the telling title Words and Life (Putnam, 
1995; Putnam & Conant, 1994) there is deep admiration for Dewey’s philosophy of 
inquiry as shown in Pragmatism that same year. ‘Perhaps the most detailed case for 
the view just defended, the view that all inquiry, including in pure science itself 
presupposes values, is made by Dewey in his Logic (Dewey, 1939), here I want only 
to discuss one aspect of Dewey’s view, the insistence on a very substantial overlap 
between our cognitive values and our ethical moral values. I have already examined 
the claim that there is a fundamental ontological difference between cognitive or 
‘scientific’ values, and found that the reasons offered for believing that claim fail.’
Comparing Carnap’s (positivistic) view with Dewey’s: ‘For Dewey, inquiry is 
cooperative human interaction with an environment; and both aspects, the interac-
tive intervention, the active manipulation of the environment, and the cooperation 
with other human beings, are critical. For the positivists…the most primitive form 
of scientific inquiry, and the form that they studied first when they constructed their 
(otherwise very different) theories of induction, was by simply enumerating. The 
model is always a single scientist…For Dewey the model is a group of inquirers try-
ing to produce the good ideas and trying to test them to see which ones have value’.
Putnam then states: …cooperation must be of a certain kind in order to be effec-
tive,. It must, for example, obey the principles of “discourse ethics” [here he cites 
Habermas]…When relations among scientists become relations of hierarchy and 
dependence, or when scientists instrumentalize other scientists, again the scientific 
enterprise suffers.’ Dewey was as Putnam states, not naïve and was aware that there 
are power plays in the history of science as in the history of every human institution, 
‘“but he still holds that it makes sense to have a normative notion of science….Both 
for its full development and for its full application to human problems, science 
requires the democratization of inquiry.
“Dewey opposes the of the philosophers ‘habit of dichotomization of inquiry.’ in 
particular he opposed both the dichotomy “pure science/applied science” and the 
dichotomy ‘instrumental value/terminal value”. Pure science and applied science 
are interdependent and interprenetrating activities, Dewey argues. ..Science helps 
us to achieve many goals other than the attainment of knowledge for its own sake, 
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and when we allow inquiry to be democratized simply because doing so helps us 
achieve those practical goals, we are engaged in goal-oriented activity. ..we are 
not- nor ever were-interested in knowledge only for its practical benefits; curiosity 
is coeval with [= as old as] the species itself, and pure knowledge is always, to some 
extent, and in some areas, a terminal value even for the least curious among us 
(p172, 173) (Putnam & Conant, 1994).
I have in the previous chapter demonstrated, using Bourdieu’s theory of ‘the 
field’(Bourdieu, 1975), how the internal politics and power games of science have 
in the past 40  years developed into a system where the discourse ethics due to, 
among others these dichotomies of the Legend and other related interests is heavily 
plagued if not seriously distorted. I will discuss in the next chapter how I think the 
community of inquirers can be improved and organized based on these insights.
4.3  New Pragmatists
Philip Kitcher is widely considered to be one of the leading figures of contempo-
rary philosophy of science. I have in Chap. 2 referred to his profound intellectual 
struggles to release or even to liberate himself of the analytical tradition and the 
myths of the Legend. In his Science, Truth and Democracy (Kitcher, 2001), he 
takes his critique of the Legend quite some steps further than in The Advancement 
of Science published only eight years before.(Kitcher, 1993) His phrasing is cau-
tious, given the then still raging ‘science wars’ about foundations, objectivity and 
scientific authority, in order ‘to articulate a picture of the aims and accomplish-
ments of the sciences so that moral and social questions can be brought into clearer 
focus’ (p xii). He discusses in the first six short chapters the claims and problems 
of the Legend related to objectivity, theory choice and how next to cognitive val-
ues, social and ethical values play a role gradually introducing the context of 
inquiry: aims, theoretical and practical interests and social, moral, political and 
religious values. It feels as if he wants to take the believers of the Legend by the 
hand and lead them through the desert (of the demise of the Legend) to the other 
side where between the extremes fertile soil await scientific inquirers, no matter if 
they are from the ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ sciences. In this book, Kitcher does not explic-
itly  tell the reader that this fertile soil is to be found in  the land of pragmatism. 
Rorty, who wrote like Dupré some nice lines on the back of the paperback edition 
of 2003, put it like this ‘Kitcher navigates very skilfully between the extremes of 
positivistic science-worship and Foucauldian distrust of the regimes of truth’. 
Kitcher, reflects on representation and interventions (p52):‘Representations are 
constructed, but do not construct the world’. But…’ the impact of categories 
[claims and theories] on reality ‘by way of human intervention is more evident in 
the biological sciences than in the physical sciences and most striking in those 
areas of inquiry in which we study ourselves.’ ‘Categories are consequential. 
Accordingly, there is important work ….to do be done in reconstructing the ways 
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in which our most influential divisions (ideas about reality) were constructed and 
how they have left their mark on the world we inherit’.
The history of the ‘hard’ sciences provides excellent examples for this, but 
Kitcher mentions scientifically derived labels such as ‘insanity’, ‘race’ ‘homosexu-
ality’, we now would add ‘inequality’, ‘health’ or from a reflexive viewpoint ‘abso-
lute truth obtained by pure scientific inquiry’. Kitcher refers to the theoretical and 
social critique of Michel Foucault, a stranger in the land of the Legend, but thriving 
on the fertile soil of pragmatism. In the next step Kitcher moves to the idea that 
theories are to be regarded as maps, a powerful metaphor explicitly put forward 
before by Wittgenstein, Toulmin and Ziman. Maps are not to be taken to literary 
reflect the world, but always be a substitute that, when accurate, of great value to 
assist us in navigating and intervening in the world. To take actions, humans trust 
accepted beliefs that have been shown and proven to work. Users of a specific map, 
can improve the map (or have the map improved) based on problems they experi-
enced when they used it, applying new knowledge and technology. There are at the 
same time many maps possible of a given territory dependent on the changing 
interests of its users and with new knowledge other maps will be produced. These 
are different, but not per definition better maps. The key question for us now is: 
Who does, and how do we define what is good? With the metaphor of the map 
Kitcher arrives at the question of ‘the goals of inquiry, a specification of what con-
stitutes significant science that will apply across all historical contexts and, inde-
pendent of the evolving interests of human beings’ p62). Indeed using examples 
from biology, he concludes: ‘Like maps, scientific theories…reflect the concern of 
the age. There is no ideal atlas, no compendium of laws, or “objective explana-
tion” at which inquiry aims’. In an interesting intermezzo, the issue of value neu-
trality, autonomy and academic freedom, classical flaws of the Legend are 
addressed. These nearly six pages are thus very relevant for our discussion of the 
myth and how an alternative more realistic theory of scientific inquiry may help 
out. Kitcher approaches the problem via what he calls ‘the myth of purity’, the 
‘pure versus applied dichotomy’ rejected on conceptual grounds by scholars before 
(see Chap. 1).
Kitcher, agrees with Dewey that science for the sake of science, to add to the 
body of knowledge can be significant on pure cognitive grounds. ‘The aim of sci-
ence (pure science, basic research) is to find truth; the aim of technology (applied 
science) is to solve practical problems.’ But it is not that simple: ‘the aim of science 
is to discover significant truths’ (p87). It is recognized that there is always a chance 
of practical use somehow, but this is not the interest of the investigator who says to 
pursue curiosity for curiosity sake. Indeed, we know that, although these investiga-
tors virtually all proudly state that they do pure fundamental science, as soon as they 
are interviewed about their work because of a Nobel prize, a breakthrough paper or 
a major personal grant that they have won, they start to explain how their work may 
lead to a new method of treatment, medicine, help solve problems of green energy, 
etc. There are, says Kitcher always motives for the ‘pure’ scientist in the back-
ground or actually, as we saw in Chap. 3, in the foreground, as reputation, fame, 
career options, access to funding because of discoveries to be made. That is not 
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different for pure or applied science and not even for technical sciences. The distinc-
tion between pure and applied research is blurry, complex and ‘in extreme cases 
researchers can quite legitimately declare their intentions to be thoroughly epis-
temic. However, when only little curiosity is needed to see that the current [knowl-
edge] has been shaped by dubious ventures from the past, or when the propensity of 
others to engage in morally consequential applications ought be obvious, the 
researcher who proclaims solely epistemic intent is guilty of self-deception (at the 
very least). Pure researchers, then are not simply whose intentions are entirely to 
promote epistemic significance but whose lack of interest in the practical can be 
justified’(p89) Why has the distinction seemed so important? ‘It seems to be to limit 
the scope of moral, social, and political appraisal…to which the practice of science 
is accountable….but only in the context of applied science, or of technology. The 
myth of purity proposes that there is a distinction that fulfils these purposes.’(p89-90) 
Kitcher obviously rejects this myth for this specific reason of neutrality and evasion 
of responsibility. We have seen in the previous chapters that the myth of purity also 
implicitly and explicitly confers the message to and from academia that pure sci-
ence is morally and ethically pure and therefore the ‘high church’, whereas applied 
science and technology are stained with non-scientific bias and interests hence are 
‘low church’. This goes back to Greek philosophy and has survived until it was 
incorporated in the Legend but is firmly rejected by pragmatism. It are the inten-
tions, the value and impact, the actions it makes possible, not the practices and 
methods of inquiry that count.
In the following chapters, he takes the final step, beyond ‘the traditional philoso-
phy of science .. that provided a very narrow normative perspective science.’(p111) 
The next problem is how to organize well-ordered science in the larger community 
of inquiry in interaction with policy making and the publics knowing that for sig-
nificant science it must relate to contexts where the problems are. This is a central 
theme encompassing all sciences alike pure, applied and technology. Kitcher agrees 
with the pragmatists that it is the obligation and responsibility of scientists to strive 
for well-ordered science. The interests of the less powerful publics are to be cared 
for, taking into account as Kitcher states,  the problem of vulgar democracy and 
tyranny of the ignorant which is a nightmare scenario for scientists who believe any 
interaction with representatives of lay publics threatens basic science. On the other 
hand, scientific inquiry needs to be protected against the interests of the powerful 
private parties who have advantages in funding and protected from unwanted politi-
cal influences. A problem that has grown bigger and bigger since 1945.
In his Science in a Democratic Society published in 2011, Kitcher again takes on 
the problem of the ideal of well-ordered science in a well-ordered society, obviously 
much inspired by Dewey. In this book, Kitcher apparently deliberately abstains 
from explicitly presenting pragmatism as an alternative, or as I say, the default for 
the obsolete flawed views of the Legend. Still, Kitcher states that the problems of 
science, in his opinion, relates to the classical theoretical picture of scientific inquiry, 
designated the mythical Legend by him before. The legacy problems of the Legend, 
as we discussed in Chaps. 1, 2 and 3, also carry over to the way science and its elites 
interact with society. This I will address in the next chapters.
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Before doing so, I will briefly discuss Ian Hacking’s general thoughts about 
pragmatism mainly based on his contribution to Misak’s New Pragmatists (Misak, 
2007). Hacking (1936), who I have cited frequently already, has contributed sig-
nificantly to the philosophy of science. This not from within one particular school 
of thought, but always taking his own point of view and critically reflecting on the 
thoughts of others and himself. Hacking is a truly independent thinker who kept 
his intellectual distance to the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, to those 
who critiqued the positivists, to most of the new pragmatists and to pragmatism. 
He refuses to be labelled. He is however not a nihilist, nor a plain relativist or 
sceptic and he is not at all in total doubt about science. Like many of the philoso-
phers we mentioned until now, he started in physics and mathematics and then 
changed to philosophy in England in the 1950s. He thus escaped from the omni-
present formative influence of logical positivism in the USA in those days and 
confesses that the work of Popper has been his main influence, which lead Hacking 
to Peirce. With that philosophical background, he came to the USA in 1974. He 
says he had no idea why so many young American philosophers found Rorty’s 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Rorty, 1979) so exciting’ (p35). That book 
in fact was, Rorty’s very progressive rejection of positivism and rediscovery of 
pragmatism which for Hacking coming from the UK was not a surprise, but in 
these days for mainstream American philosophy it surely was. Hacking in his 
typical argumentative style refuses to be regarded a new pragmatist, but on several 
of the main themes agrees with the pragmatists: the idea that knowledge has no 
timeless foundation and is fallible, but that ‘science has the unusual virtue being 
intrinsically self-correcting’. That came to him via Lakatos and Popper but he 
says: ‘it never occurred to me that all knowledge needs foundations, so I did not 
well, understand what Popper opposed’. ‘Frege had a dream of understanding a 
pre-given truth that made arithmetic certain, but I never caught the dream’ 
(p36).‘When I was a student, the search for certainty seemed as dated as 
Edwardian clothing soon to be favoured by Teddy boys.’ In this context he agrees 
very much with Dewey ‘scathing phrase (of the) ‘spectator theory of knowledge 
which occupied the classical analytic philosophers. He agrees with the pragma-
tist’s idea, first proposed by Peirce of the community of inquirers that is instru-
mental in achieving and testing accepted beliefs. He applauds the pragmatists ‘for 
taking a look’ at the practice of inquiry in that sense he says he has always been a 
pragmatist looking at ‘real-life examples and real-life expertise’. He argues how-
ever that this ‘is now no more characteristic to pragmatism than it is to any other 
contemporary style of philosophizing’. Hacking as quoted in Chap. 2 before said 
that ‘his view (that) realism (of theories and claims) is more a matter of interven-
tion in the world than of representation on words and thought, surely owes much 
to Dewey’. I recognised that Dewey has there been before me. How did I get there? 
By talking to my scientific friends’ (p41). In a very interesting paragraph about the 
problem of the reality of non-observable theoretical entities in physics, he says 
that for physics it does not make the slightest difference. ‘Perhaps it does matter 
to the funding of physics: It was once alleged that in the journal Nature that the 
fallibilism of anti-realism of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend caused Mrs 
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Thatcher to put a spoke in the wheel of British physics.’ Actually, Hacking argues 
she wanted economic returns on investment, ‘cash value and saleable results.’ 
(p42) After much praise for Dewey, James and Peirce and after he connected 
Nelson Goodman and Erwin Goffman to pragmatism, at the end of the only 14 
pages of his contribution, he remembers how Goodman liked his review of Latour 
and Woolgar, Laboratory Life written nine (!) years after its publication 
(Hacking, 1988).
4.4  Beyond the Legend
In pragmatism and its view of scientific inquiry, the ‘external’ criteria and values do 
come in, at the stage of testing of reliability and robustness from the perspective of 
the potential user and stakeholder in society (p194) (Kitcher, 2001). This invasion 
of science by external values and perspectives of societal stakeholders, politics, 
governments and the diverse publics with their interests and problems is felt by 
many as a breach of Enlightenment, the ‘modern Cartesian’ ideas of rationality of 
science and investigation. Some of the new pragmatists, especially Rorty has gone 
to the extreme of this post-modernism with the apparent conclusion that it all comes 
down to ‘having a conversation’ (Rorty, 1979). Science in that view had no special 
claim on knowledge and is just a matter of politics and debates, where power and 
interest, money, emotions and vulgar democracy are at play. Unfortunately, but 
understandably this latter (‘post-modernist’) interpretation has in the 1990s led to a 
vigorous discussion between those who got carried away by it and defenders of sci-
ence. The defenders presented thoughtful reactions, as outlined in Chap. 2 and 
above, regarding the status of the knowledge claims of science without seeking 
refuge in unrealistic theoretical epistemologies, metaphysics or plain ideology of 
the Legend (Putnam, 1981, 1995, 2002; Putnam & Conant, 1990, 1994) (Hacking, 
1983, 1999) (Longino, 2002) (Bernstein, 1983) (Haack, 2003; Kitcher, 2001, 2012). 
Latour and Woolgar and especially Bruno Latour have fundamentally 
changed the discourse about science by ‘taking a very serious look’ indeed for 
two years in the 1970s at a biochemistry lab headed by Roger Guillemin. This 
happened to be the Salk Institute at La Jolla, where I had just in the spring of 
1984 visited a Dutch friend who did his post-doc there with another famous 
group leader. I discovered Laboratory Life, a truly seminal book in the sum-
mer of 1984 when I was finishing my PhD on the immunology of human 
leukaemia’s and had already started to work on HIV/AIDS. Kuhn’s book was 
absolutely an eye opener, but this approach of ‘taking at good look to science’ 
made a lot of sense to me while culturing cells, doing assays and playing the 
international games of conferences, publishing and the first experience with 
grantsmanship. Yet, it was totally different from anything I had read before 
(Miedema, 2012) (p15).
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Indeed, as we saw, some of the defenders, like Perutz leaned heavily on these empir-
ical positivistic myths of the Legend in their sometimes, resentful writing aimed at 
‘post-modernist’ writers (Perutz, 1995).
As we have seen in Chap. 2 and 4, philosophy, sociology and history of modern 
science have over the past 40 years converged to a more pragmatic naturalistic view 
of science. This is based on the study of the practice of science by sociologists 
and the so-called new pragmatists and scholars that are close to the philosophies of 
pragmatism but also by more independent scholars. The conclusion is that scientific 
knowledge is robust and trustworthy, not because science applies a unique method, 
with formal rules founded on a metaphysical framework, that provides an algorithm 
for arriving at ‘truth’. It holds the view that the way knowledge is produced in sci-
ence is based on a way of working that is very robust and rests on continuous col-
lective inquiry and intersubjective testing, to decide again and again what are the 
best insights, theories or beliefs. Testing, validation and failing, involves the testing 
of knowledge claims in the various theoretical and historical contexts, but including 
that of the practice of the corresponding problems in the real world. Knowledge has 
significant value if it proves to be useful, for peers, or if it is more than a consistent 
theory and whether it also successfully informs our actions in the real world. This in 
fact relates to science, all sciences and research, as it is how researchers in and out-
side academia and universities have come to know it by doing it – and not in the 
least, because it is how it is actually very successfully being done and has success-
fully been done since centuries.
Having shown the power of pragmatism in explaining how knowledge is pro-
duced and how in open two-sided interaction and communication with the relevant 
publics the impact of inquiry on the real world and our social life could be improved, 
one wonders why it has not become mainstream philosophy and sociology of sci-
ence. Why has it gone through a decline after 1945 until at least the late 1960s. I 
have in Chap. 2 discussed the epistemological side of this coin, in the philosophy 
and sociology of science the Legend was too strong to be replaced, or better said, to 
let is self be replaced. From the 1920s on, Dewey’s influence and the influence of 
pragmatism in particular on the educational system, liberalism and political think-
ing in the USA cannot be underestimated. After 1945, in that domain of society, an 
additional and possibly even more important debate with political and religious 
factions in the USA had to be fought by Dewey, and by his followers after his dead 
in 1952. The successful launch of Sputnik by the Soviets in October 1957 was a 
shock to the USA with major long lasting effects on its politics and its science 
(Lepore, 2018). Because of Sputnik, researchers engaged even more in basic natural 
science who since 1945 were already funded largely and generously by the military, 
and the NSF was told to deliver to the problems and needs of the military and the 
space race with ‘The Reds’.
After ‘Sputnik’ and with the Cold War getting more and more impact via the politi-
cal conservative factions, Dewey’s liberal and progressive educational method and his 
humanistic vision of science and society was openly blamed for the lack of educating 
competent natural (‘hard) scientists who could compete with the Soviets. Dewey was 
accused for not rejecting Soviet communism, especially Stalinism and of 
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anti-religious sympathies. This was, as we saw in Chap. 2, in support of the popular 
positivist and the Mertonian vision of science. Importantly, it resonated with the fears 
of the positivist philosophers of science who had before the war emigrated to the USA 
from Europe for influence from Marxist and dictatorial politics on science. Although 
the accusations of Dewey where very poorly supported and mostly derived from poor 
reading of his work, Dewey and pragmatism despite significant and diverse support 
from Sidney Hook and the more moderate Reinhold Niebuhr were side-lined through 
political and public pressure groups and also eventually by President Roosevelt him-
self. In addition, the subsequent wave in the 1970s when positivism was associated 
with technocratics and warfare,  the fact that the prominent initiators of the Frankfurter 
Schule, Marcuse and Horkheimer erroneously associated pragmatism with positivism 
and scientism and repression had its effects. This is important with respect to our 
understanding of the temporary decline of pragmatism and its impact on science and 
research in the twentieth century. The social and political analysis of this decline is of 
great interest, since it is a case in point how external influences of political, cultural 
and religious values and opinions shape the growth of modern science. It is however 
outside the scope of this book, and I refer for that to Patrick Diggins’ detailed history 
of The Promise of Pragmatism (Diggins, 1994).
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Abstract Gradually since 1990 a growing number of critical analyses from within 
science have been published of how science was organized as a system and discuss-
ing its problems, despite, or paradoxically because the growing size of its endeavour 
and its growing yearly output. Because of lack of openness with regards to sharing 
results of research, such as publications and data but in fact of all sorts of other 
products, science is felt by many to be disappointing with respect to its societal 
impact, its contribution to the major problems humanity is facing in the current 
times. With the financial crisis, in analogy, also the crisis of the academic system as 
described in Chap. 3 was exposed and it seemed that similar systemic neoliberal 
economic mechanisms operated in these at first sight seemingly different industries. 
Most of these critiques appeared with increasing frequency since 2014 in formal 
scientific magazines, social media and with impact reached the leadership of univer-
sities, government and funders. This raised awareness and support for the develop-
ment of new ways of doing science, mostly intuitively and implicitly, but sometimes 
explicitly motivated by pragmatism aiming for societal progress and contribution to 
the good life.
To get to this next level we need the critical reflection on the practice of science 
as done in previous chapters in order to make systemic changes to several critical 
parts of the knowledge production chain. I will discuss the different analyses of 
interactions between science and society, in the social and political contexts with 
publics and politics that show where and how we could improve. The opening up of 
science and academia in matters of problem choice, data sharing and evaluation of 
research together with stakeholders from outside academia will help to increase the 
impact of science on society. It ideally should promote equality, inclusion and diver-
sity of the research agendas. This, I will argue requires an Open Society with 
Deweyan democracy and safe spaces for deliberations where a diversity of publics 
and their problems can be heard. In this transition we have to pay close and continu-
ous attention to the many effects of power executed by agents in society and science 
that we know can distort these ‘ideal deliberations’ and undermine the ethics of 
these communications and possibly threaten the autonomy and freedom of research.
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In Chaps. 2 and 3, I discussed the current state of science and the underlying 
assumptions and images of science. I have shown how this has determined the main-
stream ‘idea of science and scholarship’ and how this has distorted the practice of 
scientific inquiry and academic culture. It was discussed in Chap. 3 how this still has 
major impact on science and on the community of scientists. In this Chapter, I will 
focus on how it disturbed the external relationship between science and society. In 
the previous chapter I have argued for a more realistic vision of scientific inquiry, 
beyond positivism and empiricism, as found in pragmatism. Pragmatism, I argue, 
may help to reshape science and the practice of inquiry to restore the practice of 
science and importantly its relationship with society and increase in a meaningful 
way its impact on our social life. The idea of inquiry in pragmatism’s theory of 
inquiry is ‘outside in’. Research starts with a problem in social life or something the 
scientists assume lacks proper understanding and is  a cause of uncertainty. It is 
concluded that the problem relevant for science and or social action based on new 
knowledge. As a result, knowledge claims are produced that are tested in the con-
texts where the problem of inquiry surfaced. In this chapter I will from this perspec-
tive discuss the current ideas about the relationship between the inside and the 
outside; science and experts and  the relevant publics in societal contexts. I will 
describe some very recent initiatives aimed at novel, or sometimes rediscovered 
methods to organize science in academia to improve impact. First let’s look at criti-
cal thinkers and social experiments in the field of Science and Society that have 
walked these roads before.
I have, in Chap. 1, discussed the critical reassessment of science mainly by poli-
tics in the late 1960s, that one may assume, has resulted in the first serious wave of 
Science and Society after WW 2, that lasted some twenty years between 1960 and 
1980. Inspired by the critical social science theorists of the Frankfurter Schule, 
Marcuse and Horkheimer, our thinking about the interactions between science and 
society went through a next phase of ‘critical theory’ in Europe. Dominant thinkers 
were Habermas, Foucault and Bourdieu and later Giddens, Beck, Lash, Barnes, 
Edge. They were highly critical about the role of science in society for different 
theoretical or socio-political reasons. Some argued against the technocratic domi-
nance with its alienating and distorting social effects (Marcuse, Foucault, Habermas, 
Toulmin, Illich, Beck, Giddens). Some, from a neo-Marxist but also social- 
democratic perspective, pointed out that not only government with its military inter-
ests, but increasingly multinationals had taken over science and that science should 
be regained and redirected to be an emancipatory force in society (Marcuse, 
Habermas, Rose and Rose). This movement of ‘humanizing modernity’ as Toulmin 
did describe it in 1990 (Toulmin, 1990), questioned the practice of science, its self- 
image and with it the ideological dichotomy between the ‘hard’ rational sciences 
and the ‘soft’ social sciences and humanities which also juxtaposed ‘timeless, 
abstract, universal, context free’ against ‘practical, local, transitory and con-
text bound’:
…the issues at stake were broached during the 1960s and 70s, in a public debate about the 
aims of higher education and academic research. The debate was dominated by two vogue 
words: on one side “excellence”, on the other side, “relevance”. The spokesman for 
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 “excellence” saw institutions for higher learning as conserving the traditional wisdom and 
techniques of our forefathers, while adding to the corpus of knowledge. The focus was on 
the values of established disciplines….: the subjects should keep their intellectual instru-
ments polished and sharpened….at all cost preserving their existing merits. The spokesman 
for “relevance” saw matters differently. In their view it was not valuable to keep our knowl-
edge oiled, clean and sharpened, but stored away: it was more important to find ways of 
putting it to work for human good. From this standpoint, the universities should attack the 
practical problems of humanity: if established disciplines served as obstacles in this enter-
prise, new interdisciplinary styles of work were needed… The inherited corpus of knowl-
edge was no doubt excellent in its way, but academics in the 1970s could no longer afford 
to behave like Mandarins (Toulmin, 1990)(p184,185).
In these days the call for societal relevance of academic research was strong and 
many university academics were visibly active in public and political debates. This 
shift was indeed also seen in the research agenda of academia as described very 
insightful by Toulmin (Toulmin, 1977). He wrote: from ‘the focus on disciplinary 
autonomy and excellence and the pursuit of pure knowledge and technical refine-
ment’, From ‘Leave us alone to do our own academic thing. Take away your con-
crete interdisciplinary problems, to knowledge focused on problems and issues that 
are relevant for human applications’.
Free Chemistry
After the twenty years of economic growth and prosperity after WW2, in the 
sixties a widely felt threat and danger of the Cold War, of global nuclear war 
and the war in Vietnam was felt. The war in Vietnam, which from at least 1967 
determined daily prime-time radio and TV evening news in the US and Europe 
was a dominant divisive political issue, also at the dinner table in my family 
home. Footage from the battle fields on a daily basis are considered catalysers 
of inducing a broader disappointment and distrust in the younger generation 
of the role of science and technology in society. The new generations had not 
experienced the effects of the war or the poverty of the Great Depression and 
experienced liberty and freedom to make up their own mind, less dependent 
on the ‘old politics’ and sociocultural ideas dominated by religion. It was a 
mix of worries about pollution and environmental threats expressed in the 
works of Rachel Carson and The Club of Rome, and in the seventies of reces-
sion and gloomy socioeconomics.
For this change of our appreciation of science therefore, historians and 
sociologists of science point to the cultural and political developments in the 
1960s. The historic anti-establishment movements of the summer of 1968, 
mainly from students in the US, France, Germany and also in some other 
countries in Europe were however short-lived (Miller, 1994). Still, for twenty 
years they have had a significant effect on science and its relationship with 
society. Science was seen as the main power in society that could do harm but 
when tuned to the needs of society could do a lot of good. Famous initiatives 
(continued)
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Several mostly local and national movements in the 1960s and 70s, both in aca-
demia as in the political domain, have responded to the disconnect between science 
and society. Science and Society and later Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
became an academic trans-discipline in the late 1970s with its critical stance and 
appeal for responsible science and societal relevance. The movement inspired the 
idea of legendary Science Shops, and many other quite different forms of public 
participation, public hearings, problem-driven bottom-up movements where citi-
zens and lay publics could meet with academic experts for help, advice but also 
influencing and building joint research agendas. In many countries, academics 
became organized to become politically and socially active. Conceptually, this in 
some respect developed in parallel with the development and critique of the popular 
image of science described in Chap. 2. Studies from sociologists, political theorists, 
and from the then newly established field of STS about positive and negative inter-
actions between science and society provided insights for these actions (Ravetz, 
Blume, Rose and Rose, Habermas, Sarewitz, Guston, Bijker, Rip, Meulen). These 
analyses, and actions, have led to many small-scale local actions and interventions 
to engage and increase societal relevance in the practice of research. Despite all this, 
these movements from outside and inside universities have not changed the practice 
of mainstream academic science in the longer run.
COVID-19: the public looks on and talks back.
were the ‘science shops’ in The Netherlands and a unique nationwide public 
debate in our country in the late seventies on nuclear energy in which many of 
my friends actively participated. When I entered university in 1971, vigorous 
debates went on about the role of science in society, social responsibility of 
scientists and who controlled the curriculum. Friends of mine after their B.Sc. 
in chemistry went on doing a M.Sc in Free Chemistry in Groningen, a mix of 
chemistry, science studies, social theory and sociology and easily found inter-
esting jobs in these fields after graduation.
As I am writing this, March 30, 2020, we are in the first surge of the Corona 
Crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic. In times of war and crises like the corona 
crisis the dangers and pressures are such that the response from government 
goes beyond partisan lines, one would think. Not always. Anthony Fauci and 
Deborah Birx have just yesterday convinced Donald Trump that the virus is 
not a hoax of the Democrats. That it really is a very serious health problem, 
with a high death toll to be expected even when the US government in close 
collaboration with experts in the public health system responds adequately. 
Experts these days are talking with the responsible politicians, are on news 
(continued)
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5.1  The ‘Pragmatic Model’ in Frankfurt
Most scholars in the philosophy of science and political theory recognize Habermas 
to be the most important link between American Pragmatism and European 
Continental philosophy. As discussed in Chap. 3, Habermas in his Knowledge and 
Human Interests discussed at length the work of Peirce on the logic of inquiry 
(Habermas, 1971). This is emphasized by Habermas in the Appendix which is his 
and talks shows everywhere you look. The people after some time in large 
majority accept their advice, no matter how disruptive to social life and econ-
omy. When this crisis develops, it is being asked why ‘we’ have not invested 
more in health care, public health intelligence and research and why there are 
no facilities and institutions who can ramp up to meet the scale of this pan-
demic. Indeed, we stare at the screens and start to reflect on who and on which 
grounds we are making the choices for all kind of things of science and tech-
nology and how that shapes our social life. This COVID-19 problem is a 
threat so immense and as its effects are highly visible on the evening news, 
that there is unanimity regarding expert opinion. In response politics and pub-
lics ask from science: ‘Screening, testing, treatment, therapy and a vaccine, 
now’. Dealing with uncertainty and its resulting insecurity about the course of 
the pandemic is unbearable. It happens that in some daily discussions in the 
media non-experts denounce the experts for lack of certainty and adjustments 
they make in their science analysis and advice. Risk of disease and death, in 
our times are unacceptable. Experts in the field of infectious diseases, how-
ever, know uncertainty from experience and from the recent history of pan-
demics, despite their excellent modelling based on high quality mathematics 
and sophisticated biology. They are openly and honestly declaring that there 
are many critical unknows and new data keep coming also to them, The pub-
lic, in parallel, via the media see on a daily basis new data coming that is 
immediately before their eyes and used by scientists  to update the models 
which changes the predictions and informs policy. This is hypermodernity. 
The scientists study the virology and public health but also social and eco-
nomic disruption and are weighing the evidence. The publics in the meantime, 
with a feeling to be subjects of the study, are aware and asked to adapt their 
behaviour to influence reality. Researchers, in fact are mediators between sci-
ence and politics, like Fauci, and politicians are deliberating every day to 
come to the best policies to deal with the pandemic. Weighing health risks, 
economical risks and social disruption, the politicians in the end have to 
decide. This functions best in democracies when free flow of information, 
communication and undistorted discourse is possible, which even in modern 
democracies is not obvious, as we have seen not only in the White House 
Corona briefings over the past months.
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inaugural lecture of June 1965. He explicitly endorsed the essence of pragmatism in 
the relation with real world problems and the values that in inquiry do come with 
them and the role of the community of inquirers in the process of defining accept-
able knowledge claims. In Technik und Wissenshaft als Ideology (Habermas, 1968, 
1970) that I bought in June 1976, he describes the penetration or in his words, the 
rationalization of the social sphere by science and technology in our modern late 
capitalist Western societies. Science refers in this context to the natural sciences 
with their positivistic philosophy. The classical separation, he argues, between sci-
ence and its knowledge and the social life in society does not exist anymore and this 
has two results. The sciences are coupled to and are drivers of economic and tech-
nologic innovation shaping and dominating our social life. At the same time, they 
became uncoupled from the humanities, ‘from the humanistic culture’, with which 
reflection on its practice is lost (p55) (Habermas, 1970). Habermas argues that the 
capacity to control nature and social life are assets of science, which has allowed for 
at least the most of us, to live a better life and in comfort, but that capacity has 
become the problem. The institutionalized rationalization that comes with science 
and technology, is largely uncoupled from the needs and problems of the diverse 
publics and has become dominant and repressive. The logic of science and technol-
ogy as a power, he argues, penetrates society and politics, has its own intrinsic 
dynamics, which brings the problems in social life as we see them unfold. Habermas 
proposes that science and the publics should work on their ‘self-understanding’ in 
order, citing Dewey, to be able to come to a ‘pragmatistic model’ that is associated 
with democracy in which ‘the strict separation between the function of the expert 
and the politician is replaced by a critical interaction. This interaction not only 
strips the ideological supported exercise of power of an unreliable bias of legitima-
tion but makes it accessible as a whole to scientifically informed discussion, thereby 
usually changing it’ (p66, 67) (Habermas, 1970). This model allows for social inter-
ests and their value systems to be played out in the deliberations and allows for true 
legitimation of policies before the public. He continues discussing Dewey:
For Dewey it seemed self-evident that the relation of reciprocal guidance and enlightenment 
between the production of techniques and strategies on the one hand and the value- 
orientations of interested groups on the other could be realized within the unquestionable 
horizon of common sense and an uncomplicated public realm. But the structural change in 
the bourgeois public realm would have demonstrated the naïveté of this view even if it were 
not already invalidated by the internal developments of the sciences p69.
He refers specifically to the confusion of ‘the actual difficulty of effecting permanent 
communication between science and public opinion with the violation of logical and meth-
odological rules. True, as it stands the pragmatic model cannot be applied to political deci-
sion making in modern mass democracy. The reason is….the model neglects the specific 
logical characteristics and the social preconditions for reliable translation of scientific 
information into the ordinary language of practice and inversely for translation from con-
text of practical questions back into specialized language of technical and strategic recom-
mendations.’ (p70).
He argues that in USA politics since the war this is being practiced and describes 
the necessary sequences of actions in such a case. He argues for a long-term science 
policy which ‘attempts to bring under control the traditional, fortuitous unplanned 
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relations between technical progress and the social life-word.’ (p72). He, with 
Dewey, is thus well aware that the ideal conditions for this pragmatic model are 
generally not present. Habermas, as Dewey and the pragmatists, is neither a nihilist 
nor hard-boiled sceptic paralysed by the idea that everything is determined and 
defined by power games and by unchangeable practices of repression and domina-
tion. Importantly, Habermas, despite coming from a Marxist tradition of political 
theory, and being the successor of Marcuse and Horkheimer at the Frankfurter 
Schule, does not see human values and interests per definition as distortive forces in 
the interaction between science and politics. It is the belief in human agency and the 
trust that communication and ethical discourse is possible and wanted by most, but 
they have to be consciously, monitored, regulated and managed in well-designed 
and carefully executed open democratic processes. As in most of his later works of 
political theory, communication, mediation and discourse ethics, freedom from 
domination and repression, is essential in all phases of societal development and 
social action where these deliberations need to take place. In his emphasis on com-
munication Habermas builds heavily on the work of the sociologist George Herbert 
Mead a prominent pragmatist in the early decade of the previous century.
Finally, citing D.J. de Solla Price’s now famous studies published a few years 
before, (Price, 1963) he mentions the problems of specialization and barriers 
between disciplines and scientific communication with the overwhelming numbers 
of articles and journals and issues of military research and secrecy. He describes the 
requirements of political and institutional advisory bodies, societal organization and 
the organization of the research process, that will facilitate the model. Remember, 
these were the days when environmental issues, nuclear energy, radioactive waste 
and the nuclear arms race, the first signs of the energy crisis and a war in Vietnam 
for which the motives and logic had long evaporated, were the topics of major pub-
lic concern, debate and protests. In this technocracy the publics felt alienated in all 
kind of respects as they felt that their issues and concerns were not being dealt with. 
These were seen as the consequences of blind belief in and application of the natural 
sciences not only to the war in Vietnam which aroused massive political movements 
and the student protests of 1968. In this stage of capitalist society, the old Marxist 
materialistic dialectics of ‘capital and proletariat’ had lost bite. Because of the 
atrocities of the Stalin regime that were generally acknowledged and condemned 
and because synergy of science and capitalism has brought enormous economic 
welfare, at least in the West. The discussion was whether science and technology are 
in the true humanistic meaning of the word being used to relieve hardship and 
inequality and promote ‘the good life’. It seemed that science and technology that 
claimed to be neutral, was exploited by commercial and military interests that were 
not effectively being controlled by public deliberation in our democracies. It has 
been argued that al lot of research can be initiated without the involvement and 
mediation of governmental agencies when a public focussed around a well- 
articulated problem talks with researchers. This can be at the national level but is 
increasingly happening at regional levels when networks have been established of 
citizens and representations of science and research around major themes like pub-
lic health, welfare or environmental policy. This problem of the relation between 
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experts, the public and politics thus concerns the democratic way to set the research 
agenda and how expert scientific knowledge is taking into account in the formation 
of national and local governmental policies. Leaving out the (neo-Marxist) jargon 
and undertones, this piece could after more than 50 years easily be mistaken to be 
part of a paper on Open Science in our time and age pointing to the Sustainable 
Development Goals of the United Nations, a list of societal issues that is in number 
and calamitous impacts not less compared to the list of 1968.
A Fellow Traveller in Science in Transition
The initiators of Science in Transition, as described in Chap. 3, had very dif-
ferent experiences and diverse perspectives on science and academia. 
Introducing one of them, Huub Dijstelbloem, in this particular chapter is 
appropriate and of relevance. Dijstelbloem, is since 2009 a Senior Researcher 
at the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) and since 2015 
also appointed professor of philosophy at University of Amsterdam. Before 
that he was a Program Coordinator at the Rathenau Institute, the institute of 
the Royal Academy in The Hague which advises government policy on sci-
ence, technology and innovation. I didn’t know Huub, but his straightforward 
contribution to the Spui25 debate of October 2012 was in agreement with my 
own views about science. We briefly met that evening after the debate and 
decided that we should keep in touch in order to jointly prepare for a public 
action. The end of November 2012, over a simple dinner in ‘The Ysbreeker’ 
overlooking the Amstel, we exchanged our views and ideas and started to talk 
about a plan. Our professional backgrounds were quite different, but we had a 
very important common interest, namely the problematic interaction between 
science and society. We had both come to the conclusion that there were two 
problems there: how science was organized and how its communication with 
politics and publics was thought of and organized. Just the year before he had 
edited (Dijstelbloem, 2011) with Rob Hagendijk a very nice book about trust 
in science with modern philosophical and sociological perspectives. When we 
started, I discovered his work on research evaluation done with Jack Spaapen 
(KNAW) which obviously was most relevant to our later discussions on 
Incentives and Rewards (Spaapen et al., 2007). The current chapter deals with 
one of the major topics that Science in Transition believed should be addressed 
to improve the practice and impact of science: science in the societal context. 
This happens to be the topic of Huub Dijstelbloem’s appointment with the 
Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) where he contributed 
his views to many advices and reports. His PhD thesis published in 2007 and 
much of his work since 2007 is about the science and society interface, mainly 
about policy advice. In his thesis he discusses the problems of the interaction 
and deliberation between scientific experts, representatives from the public 
and politics. He takes pragmatism as his main conceptual perspective, starting 
from Dewey’s The Public and its Problems, (Dewey & Rogers, 2012), 
(continued)
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5.2  The Problem of Power
The ideas of Dewey and also Habermas about deliberations between experts and 
representatives from the public and politics have by many scholars been seriously 
criticized for being naïve with respect to the distorting effects of all kinds of power 
and on too much reliance on the proper functioning of formal institutions. Although 
both men were aware of these distorting forces, they believed that in principle peo-
ple are to be considered moral beings that want to achieve the conditions that allow 
for the betterment of social life, ‘the good life’. Habermas has his whole life, liter-
ally until this day, worked to develop this concept of ‘discourse ethics’ and ‘com-
municative reason’ which provides the intersubjective foundation for actions of 
people and institutions. Dewey emphasized social and personal education to eman-
cipate the public and to provide them with the means to engage in civil society. This 
was not as much a believe, but for Habermas a moral principle on which most peo-
ple build, when they engage in social and political life. This communication, in 
contrast to dialectics and conflict was also the main theme in the work of George 
Herbert Mead (1863–1931) another major American pragmatist who was an inspi-
ration to Habermas. In this perspective communication and language are powerful 
instruments to deal with subjectivity, to achieve intersubjectivity as a form of objec-
tivity and importantly to expose the misuse of power in pursuance of particular 
interests. Here we see the concept of ‘objectivity’ making the same turn in social 
theory that in pragmatist epistemology turned from individual to ‘intersubjective’. 
Habermas disagreed with the philosophy and writings of Foucault, Nietzsche and 
others, in which the corruption and domination by language and communication is 
central in how power is executed and totally penetrates social life. Foucault and oth-
ers analysed and exposed the distortions of inequalities of power and the adverse 
and perverse effects of misuse of power in many major sectors and institutions of 
society like medicine, sexuality, education, law in which discipline and punishment 
are practiced from without positions of power using language and communication 
to achieve to discipline. With Nietzsche in the background, these analyses imply 
Latour’s work on Pasteur (Latour, 1988) and the work of Habermas discussed 
in this chapter. In his thesis he analysed in great detail the fascinating case of 
the response of the government and public institutes to the HIV epidemic in 
1982 in the Netherlands (Dijstelbloem, 2014a, b). He described the case in 
which the blood supply foundation asked the gay community to voluntarily 
refrain from donating blood, with major roles for Vincent  Eijsvoogel and 
Pim van Aken, directors of CLB Blood Transfusion Service at Amsterdam 
(now Sanquin), Roel Coutinho the director of the Municipal Health Service of 
Amsterdam and representatives of the community of gay men. This for me is 
special, as I was in these days doing research at CLB and knew the issue and 
nearly all the actors in this significant example of boundary work between 
science and the public.
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that it is hard to image how to curb these perverse effects of power and thus hard to 
avoid scepticism and nihilism.
Bernt Flyvbjerg in Making Social Science Matter (Flyvbjerg, 2001) criticizes the 
social sciences from within and starts from the perspective that power is pervasive 
in social life and politics and has to be dealt with when we are thinking about com-
munication as driver of social action in the public sphere. Flyvbjerg, inspired by 
Bourdieu and Latour, writes about social theory and he also empirically studied 
social actions at local levels of citizenship and governments. In these contexts, he 
sees values and power as prominent factors in debates. He concludes, correctly, that 
Foucault and Habermas are both very aware of the problem of power but approach 
them differently and complementary. Habermas indeed argues for engaging with 
publics focused around problems but believes this must be taken up by the institu-
tions and change the relevant institutions and agencies. Foucault sees institutions 
often as part of the problem, because they inevitably will define their own goals and 
agenda. He believes that issues of power will have to analysed, understood and dealt 
with in the specific contexts where they occur. Habermas, with Dewey, clearly tries 
to avoid and anticipate situations of conflict through proper communication and 
understanding of all sides, but Foucault of course interprets the evasion of conflict 
as suppression and restriction of freedom. In agreement with other scholars, 
Flyvbjerg sees conflict not as a danger per se, but believes that it can result in new 
opportunities and change. Hence if one engages about controversial issues of social 
action with parties with different interests, one has to choose, dependent on the 
context of the issues, which of these approaches to employ. Obviously, this also 
depends on the level of democracy of governance at the regional or national level 
where you are. It is of interest to read in exactly this context Diggins account how 
the American framers of the Constitution were not naïve romantics either, regarding 
the problem of power, private interests and the abuse of language. They ‘followed 
Locke and Hume but not Descartes and Kant’ and anticipated conflicts and saw to it 
that in the words of their criticizers ‘they (had been) burdening the young Republic 
with excessive reliance on controlling mechanisms, such as the separation of power, 
instead of centralizing all authority in a single national assembly that would repre-
sent a virtuous citizenry’ (p428–434) (Diggins, 1994).
5.3  Well-Ordered Science
The problem of power and distortion in philosophy and theory about ‘ideal delibera-
tions’ in a ‘well-ordered society’ are well known (Rawls, 1999). These theories 
about justice in society are to be read and used as aspiration and guidance for our 
thinking about how to act in social life. Philip Kitcher (Kitcher, 2001, 2011) has in 
that vein, proposed a theory for ‘well-ordered science’ where in a democratic fash-
ion the agenda for scientific research is being set in order that society will have 
optimal benefit of the research. This idea has been developed and discussed in detail 
in two books published ten years apart (Kitcher, 2001, 2011). He discussed all the 
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issues that are related to allowing external voices and opinions in the deliberations 
about science and the science agenda. Although Kitcher expresses his doubt and 
anticipates the critical opinions of the majority of scientists, he came to the conclu-
sion that we must somehow engage in this. He concluded that science based on the 
Legend was misguided and that we should aim for ‘significant knowledge’. 
Significant knowledge for Kitcher being knowledge that has impact directly or indi-
rectly on real world problems. He is clear about the purpose of science: ‘Even the 
slightest sympathy with pragmatism (in either the philosophical or the everyday 
sense) will recognize circumstances in which esoteric interests of scientific special-
ists ought to give way to urgent needs of people who live in poverty and 
squalor’(p110).(Kitcher, 2011).
Kitcher uses the term ‘significant knowledge’ for the type of results of inquiry 
which contrast with the ‘esoteric’ form of knowledge production. It is obvious that 
here problem choice in inquiry and values next to cognitive criteria to steer that 
process are central. This determines the quality of inquiry in terms of its potential 
contribution to the body of knowledge and to decide and structure social or political 
action in the context of problems and needs. Kitcher does analyse the situation of 
the research agenda in the institutions. He concludes that in the past one hundred 
years, research has shifted from private to public but there is no oversight of the 
research agenda, either at the institutional nor at the national level. It simply is a list 
of a series of actions ‘any institution of public knowledge’ has to do. This poses the 
question which problems to study based on their estimated significance (p101) 
(Kitcher, 2011) It is unclear at exactly what level the institution here referred to, 
should act. Kitcher as many others seems to consider this as a ‘black box’ or a prod-
uct of the legendary ‘invisible hand’ and states ‘Science has evolved by happen-
stance’. He does however mention with admiration the intervention by Vannevar 
Bush’ who with very visible hand ‘brilliantly developed a utilitarian case for public 
support of science’ ‘but preserves the idea of scientific autonomy; the public is to 
provide, but the community of scientists is to decide…’. ‘Optimistic visions like 
those…contrast with others that view any system of public knowledge as potentially 
oppressive’ (p101). Here he refers to Foucault who he says, despite his rhetoric, 
produced real insight in this problem, not citing many other influential scholars of 
Critical Theory as for instance Habermas. Fortunately, Kitcher explicitly discusses 
issues of power and interests and believes that ‘they should not be used to scoff at 
philosophical ideals on the grounds that they require a lot of changes.’ He mentions 
major aspects of the current practice of science that are obstructive or even do run 
counter to the ideal of well-ordered science which require several changes includ-
ing: competition in academia; flaws of vulgar democracy infested in public engage-
ment; privatization of university research; neglect of many publics and their 
problems in the less affluent parts of the world; myopia on the part of academics in 
problem choice options.
The problem of majority vote on issues where expert opinion is of great impor-
tance and the majority may not be well informed or able to come to a justified opin-
ion has been bothering Kitcher. He coined the very ominous terms ‘vulgar 
democracy’ and ‘tyranny of the ignorant’ describing all the fears and nightmares of 
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not only elitist scientists when they have to consider the idea that even well-informed 
and educated citizens get involved in decision making about the different agendas 
for inquiry or science driven policy making. Kitcher also has these fears and pro-
posed a form of ‘enlightened democracy’ in his earlier works to mitigate these 
threats (Kitcher, 1993). He considered the problem of elitism, but came to the con-
clusion that experts, who are to be trusted to be able to properly understand and 
make judgement, should inform groups of citizens and the experts then should 
decide based on the various perspectives (p133–135).(Kitcher, 2011).
Kitcher does not discuss, or only very indirectly discussed, one very obvious 
‘visible hand’ that already for ages is steering the national research agenda and the 
agenda of institutions, namely how economy shapes science (Stephan, 2012), fund-
ing policies and money from whatever source available to institutions, individuals 
or groups of researchers determine to a major degree the agenda. We have seen in 
Chap. 3 how the incentive and reward system, has developed into a distorted system 
and how it determines our problem choice and the research agenda and the more 
strategic choices made on daily basis by committees of researchers all around the 
globe. The research agenda of funders has in most cases until recently been deter-
mined by internal scientific arguments based on quality measures of science, as its 
scientific committees are preferably populated by elite scientists.
In the final pages on Well-Ordered Science (p131–137) (Kitcher, 2011) he dis-
cusses moral issues, rephrased here by me: Are scientists obliged to work on the 
research that will yield the most significant knowledge? Should this be organized by 
procedures, so they are made to do the research that is ethically required of them? 
This is, he says, of course not what we should want. When scientists with their goals 
and preferences take part in ideal deliberations, they express their motivations and 
will be heard. There are, however, situations of emergency, Kitcher correctly points 
out, when there will be overriding public demands and researchers must drop their 
work and join to work on major problems. Most famous, is the Los Alamos Project 
and other major research projects during WW2, but think of pandemics of Flu, HIV, 
microbial warfare, the financial crisis of 2008. At the time I am literally writing 
these lines, the COVID-19 pandemic is such a global emergency and we see that 
scientist, in international networks from many disciplines have started to work 
together sharing data, materials and concepts in order to limit the damage to indi-
vidual and public health and subsequently to try to avoid as much as possible the 
ensuing economic depression and its dramatic social effects.
Public representation is a problem for most writers on deliberation and the inter-
action between experts and the public it involves. This is most prominent in issues 
of political choice when they have complex technical or scientific components and 
the choice between policy options involves scientific advice and expertise next to 
social-economic and political arguments and values. Kitcher is very honest about 
the limitations of his philosophical position: ‘My original thoughts about well- 
ordered science and the potential of groups of citizens to participate in delibera-
tions that are simultaneously broadly representative and well-informed were 
advanced in ignorance of the actual experiments that have been carried out. ’(p223)
(Kitcher, 2011) Based on the two cases he discussed, he concludes rather gloomy 
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that one of the greatest stumbling blocks is loss of authority and trust of experts. He 
writes: ‘the situation of our democratic discussion is currently so dire that no 
redress along the lines proposed is possible: there will always be loud voices decry-
ing any efforts to rebuild trust in expertise’. He concludes with the observation that 
only if the majority becomes aware and we start to address this problem, delibera-
tive democracy will have a chance.(p226) (Kitcher, 2011).
5.4  The Legend Meets Reality and Pragmatism
Kitcher, influenced by Dewey and the new pragmatists, has converted since the late 
1990s in his thinking about science and inquiry from analytical philosophy to prag-
matism. This may explain why he writes about well-ordered science and the interac-
tion between science and society as he does in these two important books cited 
above. These books are important in my mind exactly because of his philosophical 
history. He was well aware of the intellectual and emotional struggle of what it was 
that he had to leave behind and to face the accusations of engaging in relativism, 
post-modernism and being anti-science. Because of his background it seems he 
does yet not fully engage with pragmatism on two accounts: the ideas of Dewey, 
who he otherwise cites as an important inspiration, about the essential engagement 
with the public and their problems in inquiry and the more theoretical work of 
Peirce on that same issue. The pragmatic idea that the results of inquiry are really 
tested for value and acceptability by the community when translated into action, 
within or outside science depending on the problem they started with, is of great 
relevance to his idea of significant knowledge and well-ordered science. Mark 
Brown and Huub Dijstelbloem, and several others have in their essayistic reviews 
commented on these issues (Brown, 2004, 2013; Dijstelbloem, 2014a, b). A major 
criticism was that Kitcher did not mention the wealth of studies that were published 
between 1990 and 2010 on the many cases of public and citizen engagement and 
about prominent public debates with problematic interactions of scientist/experts 
and the public. To understand the major aspects of this interaction, Mark Brown in 
his own work goes from philosophy, sociology, STS to political and social theory 
(Brown, 2009). He explicitly observes science and society from an integral pragma-
tist perspective. Dijstelbloem, like Brown, suggest that the idea of ‘the public’, and 
more general groups of selected citizens, does not hold, as in many issues of policy 
making and expert advice, the debates and interactions are between designated 
groups of citizens who are concerned and directly affected by the respective politi-
cal, public or private actions in their community. This indeed agrees with Dewey’s 
idea of publics that are focussed and get organized in time and place around well- 
defined problems. Compared to the established governmental institutions, these 
publics are dynamic and fluid like their problems are. Dijstelbloem, as an example 
of such a public, performed a detailed analysis of the history of the initial institu-
tional response in 1982 to the HIV epidemic in The Netherlands (Dijstelbloem, 
2014a, b). The most interesting thing was that around that time in the AIDS 
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epidemic, HIV was to yet be discovered. Yet, several affected and concerned parties 
from society convened through an initiative of CLB, a national not-for profit foun-
dation doing blood research, diagnostic services and a major national producer of 
blood products, clotting factors and other blood plasma derived medicines. The 
board of CLB was worried about the unknown pathogen that they anticipated caused 
AIDS and apparently was transmitted by blood products produced from blood 
donations from infected donors. To protect patients receiving blood transfusions 
and other blood products and specifically haemophiliacs who regularly need blood 
products produced from blood plasma batches involving pooled donations of thou-
sands of donors, the idea was to ask gay men to refrain from donating blood. This 
directive was discussed before action was taken, with respect for feelings of dis-
crimination on part of the gay community. At the table were the representatives and 
experts of CLB, representatives from physicians who treated haemophiliacs, repre-
sentatives from the gay community (Men who have Sex with Men, MSM). The 
chairman was Roel Coutinho, director of the Municipal Health Service of Amsterdam 
and involved in a Hepatitis B vaccine study in gay men. The gay men objected as 
expected, casted doubt on the relevance for the local situation of the scientific argu-
ments mainly based on data from the USA. It took four months to agree on a direc-
tive in which not homosexuality, not promiscuity, but having ‘multiple sexual 
relations’, which was quantitated to more than five in the previous six months, was 
the consideration on which one was asked to refrain from donating blood. 
Interestingly, no representatives of haemophilia patients, government, governmen-
tal agencies nor intravenous-drug users had been involved. Apparently, not all rele-
vant concerned publics were aware and organised yet. The process showed that 
formal institutions need not to be at the centre. The latter contradicts the believe that 
Dewey’s social approach via publics, in contrast to more formal institution 
approaches, would not have the power required to change and impact policies. This 
successful activist type of actions by the gay community in the history of AIDS and 
HIV have been quite common as has been shown by Steven Epstein’s Impure 
Science (Epstein, 1996) and are badly needed in many fields of biomedicine, as he 
showed in his Inclusion, The Politics of Difference in Biomedical 
research(Epstein, 2007).
Dijstelbloem’s study and its theoretical interpretation is a nice example of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) done since the 1980s. Major researchers in 
early STS are amongst others Brian Wynne, Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch (see 
Oudshoorn and Pinch eds, How Users Matter; The co-construction of users 
(Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003). Sheila Jasanoff has since the 1980s produced an 
impressive body of in-depth scholarly work on the interaction and relationship 
between science, science advice and policy making which has guided many 
researchers since 1990. She is most interested in the dynamics of the policy making 
process, and I refer to (Jasanoff, 2012), a collection of her papers and especially 
Chap. 6. In that paper published in 1987 she very concisely discusses how philoso-
phy and sociology of science have revealed the real practice of science and the flaws 
of the classical image and limited self-understanding of science, which has a major 
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effect on science advice at the boundary when scientists are meeting with represen-
tatives and opinions of publics and politics (p103).
Irwin and Wynne’s Misunderstanding Science? The public reconstruction of sci-
ence and technology is an excellent series of papers on case studies in which various 
fields of expertise and its experts are involved (Irwin & Wynne, 1996). Among them 
is Wynne’s famous study on the Sellafield sheep farmers and nuclear fallout in 
which scientist discovered that the sheep farmers had expertise and ideas of their 
own which were highly relevant to the problem. The authors thoroughly analysed 
the cases to understand the problems in the interaction of experts and the lay public. 
I will not go in detail, but many common issues concerning science and experts 
become evident when their scientific claims have to face up to public scrutiny, 
which Irwin and Wynne in quite clear language summarized in their Conclusions 
(p213–221). They start with their own definition of what Kitcher later termed ‘sig-
nificant knowledge’. They more prosaically call it ‘useful knowledge’, meaning 
‘valid and socially legitimate as well as being of immediate practical relevance and 
use’. Social groups often ignore expert (scientific) knowledge because ‘it is not 
tailored to the needs, constraints and opportunity structures of the social situation 
into which it has been interjected as authoritative knowledge’. Experts must be 
sensitive to ‘local contexts and need to listen to and to try to understand user situa-
tions and knowledges.’ For social legitimation of expertise it is required to ‘reopen 
..expert knowledge and its validation all over again  - but in more complex, less 
reductionist circumstances. Often,…the prior context of scientific validation has 
been shaped by social assumptions and these have been ‘black boxed..’. They latter 
have not been made explicit and in addition the classical idea is that validation of 
expert knowledge is completed before (and insulated from) its social deployment or 
use’.(p214) This is as discussed in Chap. 2 in agreement with the scholars who have 
concluded that in the practice of science ‘universal validity’ was limited by strict 
experimental conditions which are hardly ever met in the world outside the labora-
tory or ideal research setting, which is the reason why despite positive clinical trials 
in a less ideally selected patient group many medicines fail (Cartwright, 1999).
This is, Irwin and Wynne say: ‘the public understanding of science problema-
tique’, the projection on to ‘the public of the internal problems and insecurities 
about legitimation, public identification, and negotiation of science’s own identity. 
They conclude that this is the heart of the problem: ‘all of the troubling experiences 
of apathy, resistance, plain distortion, and exaggeration which disfigure the public 
life of science in modern scientific democracy have led to little or no consideration 
of whether they imply anything might be wrong with the organisation, control, and 
conduct of ‘science’ (in addition to its communication).’(p214). They conclude that 
the expert’s idea of the public is wrong seeing them as a socially amorphous aggre-
gate of individuals with erroneous unchecked assumptions about what the public 
wants and needs. This is a major point, as argued above and follows Dewey’s propo-
sition engaging the relevant citizens, although his work is not cited. Policy issues 
get a very different, more practical context if representatives of the public that is 
concerned and affected are involved (Marres, 2007). Several issues relate to the lack 
of understanding of the specifics of local contexts and their publics. Irwin and 
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Wynne anticipate that these will be ‘uncomfortable conclusions for the scientific 
community since it suggests a pressing need for debate over the limitations of sci-
ence as well as its putative benefits. However, in a situation where public groups 
more often see science as obstacle to development rather than a facilitator, there is 
little choice.’ (p219). To come to ‘more progressive relationships between knowl-
edge and citizenship’ they propose ‘new institutionalized forms which attempt to 
deal with these issues’ and are sympathetic to small scale experiments and projects 
from which a lot is to be learned. They realized however that ‘such localized and 
specific initiatives struggle to gain credibility within scientific institutions…not 
being seen as belonging to the preferred and more cloistered world of science..’ 
They emphasize that it all comes down to the institutions and the organization of 
science to achieve the required change in the attitude and practice in order to have 
more impact and with it more social legitimation. We have seen other scholars who 
analyse the problems of science and come to the same conclusion, although such a 
strong call for organizational change for instance in the incentive and reward system 
are rare. In terms of the analysis in Chap. 2 and 4, this sounds like The Legend meets 
Reality and Pragmatism. Flyvbjerg, (Flyvbjerg, 2001) with his advocacy for phro-
nesis, the method of understanding and interpreting in inquiry, accompanies his plea 
to leave the idea of the Legend behind, as its method that may work for some of the 
natural sciences, is inadequate for other natural and biomedical sciences and the 
social sciences. We have seen in the previous chapters how difficult it is to achieve 
this systemic organizational change, as also in science and academia knowledge, 
power and interests are entangled (Bourdieu, 1988, 2004; Rouse, 1987, 1996).
 
ACT UP at the National Institutes of Health, 1990
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My blog on interactions with the participants from the 
Amsterdam Cohort Studies: To confront 21st century challenges, science 
must rethink its reward system: One of Science in Transition’s founders 
describes how his experience as a young HIV/AIDS researcher convinced 
him that science needs to change. The Guardian, 12 May 2016. https://www.
theguardian.com/science/political- science/2016/may/12/to- confront- 
 21st- century- challenges- science- needs- to- rethink- its- reward- system
‘HIV/AIDS research in the early 1980s was a new and exciting field of 
science. I had started working as a biomedical researcher in Amsterdam, a city 
with a large and visible gay community. The new disease was a threat to pub-
lic health and was highly contagious. It was transmitted by sexual contact and 
in the developed world affected young healthy gay men and recipients of 
blood and blood products. It took some time to realise that a truly immense 
and devastating epidemic was going on in sub-Saharan Africa affecting men, 
women and children. This disease attracted bright scientific minds all over the 
world, working feverishly to understand the origin and biology of the virus. 
We wanted to know how the virus moved through the population, entered and 
killed immune cells and how to counteract it. AIDS patients were dying in the 
hospitals and we were working as fast as we could towards better therapies for 
HIV-positive patients. Or were we?
I was very proud when results of experiments from my laboratory were 
published in prestigious academic journals like Nature, Science and The 
Lancet. I felt I had made a significant contribution to understanding and bat-
tling HIV. As well as at scientific conferences, we presented our results to 
participants of the Amsterdam Cohort Studies which started in the late 1980s. 
These were mainly gay men who helped our research by donating blood sam-
ples and filling in lifestyle questionnaires. One evening I presented with my 
usual enthusiasm new results on how HIV destroyed white blood cells of the 
immune system. Then a man came to the microphone. “Doctor Miedema, 
thank you for your interesting talk, but to be honest, it was a bit over my head, 
with apoptosis, virus particles and what have you. However, what I would like 
to know from you is whether we should practice safe sex even when my part-
ner and I both are already HIV-positive.” I was of course flabbergasted. Here 
I was with my clever immunological experiments and detailed molecular 
understanding of the virus, but I couldn’t answer this real-world question. 
And the question made sense. Rephrased in viro-immunological research 
questions: is it possible and, if so, is it bad to become co-infected with a dif-
ferent virus strain? Can mosaic viruses with increased pathogenicity emerge? 
We, the smart boys and girls in the lab, hadn’t thought of that question. Why 
not? Because it hadn’t come up in the lab. We had informed the patients but 
forgotten to talk to them, the people we were supposedly working so hard 
for’. In my ‘academic reflex’ I translated his question into a research question 
(continued)
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Public participation is a complex two-way process in which the scientist and 
experts must reflect on their practice and on needs and motivations of the lay partici-
pants. Of course, we must not be naïve and overly optimistic. Complexity reaches 
the next level as soon as policy making is discussed and the debate is organized 
tripartite with politician, local or national. There is a host of critical research on how 
the dynamics of these processes can be gamed by politicians who may well have 
their own motives and plans which do not a line with that of the public it concerns. 
It has been shown that in these cases participation is sham democracy and not real 
deliberation but simple a means to win the public over. (Felt & Fochler, 2010; 
Wilsdon et al., 2005; Wilsdon & Willis, 2004)
5.5  Rethinking Science
Most authors writing about science, for obvious reasons have evaded the issue, but 
it is clear we need to re-think the system of inquiry and academia, no matter how 
hard that may seem to be. A collective of authors lead by Helga Nowotny and 
Michael Gibbons, however, have just done that and published two remarkable books 
in 1994 and 2001 (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 2001). Both books com-
municate a strong, nearly tangible sense of urgency for change. In ‘Re-Thinking 
Science’, they present a thorough comprehensive and dazzling analysis of ongoing 
parallel developments in society and science driven by socio-economic, scientific 
and technical, digital innovations that disrupt the way we live with due references to 
the seminal work of Giddens, Lash and Beck. These developments are the cause of 
persistent but rapid change that comes with disruption and fundamental uncertainty 
in society. It affects and changes our basic ideas and concepts about the good life: 
human interactions, community, communication, identity and belonging, ethics and 
responsibility, commitment and freedom in the personal, the national and the global 
public sphere. They point to the blurring of boundaries between science and society, 
they refer to the ‘agora’, the many physical but increasingly also virtual regional and 
national marketplaces where science and society meet and become entangled. 
Science is invading society, society is ‘talking back to science’, with at the same 
which could give my team a nice publishable result and a paper. Indeed, not 
only didn’t we talk to the patients to hear their needs, but it was felt that pay-
ing too much attention to those needs might be bad for our academic career, 
unless it would yield top publications. At that moment I realized how detri-
mental for societal impact the reward system and the corresponding research 
strategy is when the journal paper is the goal instead of a means to and end of 
having true societal or clinical impact.’
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time science and research closing the gaps between investigation, action and 
application.
Giddens, Beck and Lash have argued that it is a logical consequence of post- or 
hyper-modernity for science to have to be reflexive regarding its own functioning, 
concepts,  results and instruments. Doing sociological research on problems and 
issues in society, subjects and publics of these studies will immediately be able to 
know the results and want to become or are engaged. This will affect the social 
practices and behaviours of the subjects who have an interest in that research. 
Researchers must deal with this public reflexivity by reflexivity on their part in the 
practice of their research. This is one of the consequences of modernity, where ini-
tially clear boundaries between science and society (church, state, politics) were 
needed to provide freedom for investigation, in our time of hypermodernity science 
and social practice are developing and organized in parallel and in continuous inter-
action. This happens in a common public sphere where their relationship is based on 
communication, ideally  the ethical discourse that Habermas believes is required 
(Beck et al., 1994; Giddens, 1990; Habermas, 1971).
As a consequence, science also has entered a much more uncertain time and age 
in which is asked to be agile and to be able to rapidly adept to changes in the real 
world. Nowotny et al. (2001) are politically not naïve, open to all kinds of interac-
tions between science and society for all kinds of aims and goals, be it public, gov-
ernment and private. They conclude presenting a set of seventeen cultural, ethical, 
political and socioeconomic issues to be discussed in the agora where science and 
society meet. Nowotny et al., clearly go beyond the Legend, when they state that the 
‘epistemological core is empty’, or ‘there is no foundation’ as it has been concluded 
by post-positivism (Chap. 12). Here they refer to the Legend and the lack of contri-
bution analytical philosophy of science has had to the actual practice and method-
ologies of science in agreement with the discussion in Chap. 2. The value of research 
in the new way of doing research has, they argue in an outright normative stance, 
thus become dependent not on its ‘eternal’ abstract epistemic value, but on its reli-
ability. Reliability and value in the epistemological meaning, but very much also 
when applied and tried out in action and set to work in the real. Here they refer 
specifically to Ziman’s Reliable Knowledge (p157) (Ziman, 1978).
The thinking in Mode-2 differs very much from the ‘solution’ of Collins and 
Evans, two major scholars on the topic, who in 2017 wrote: ‘In contemporary sci-
ence and technology studies the predominant motif is to eliminate the division of 
powers between science and politics in order that science and technology become 
socially responsible. In contrast, our motif is to safeguard the division of powers so 
that science and technology can act independently of society’ (p7,8) (Collins & 
Evans, 2017) In a ‘last defence’, they argue that despite that we accept that no abso-
lute value-free truth is produced by science, to regain its consequential loss of self- 
evident authority, science must be rescued by explaining science better and more 
honestly to society by those academics (‘owls’) that have that oversight of science 
and meta-science. Not by reflecting on the deficiencies of science, but through the 
moderation of these ‘owls’, they believe that society can be brought round to accepts 
the values of science. Then scientific experts can effectively play their role in the 
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deliberations again. They discuss the work of relevant scholars, but the Mode-2 
books discussed here are not mentioned. They do not trust the discourse in open 
debates with the public or within the scientific community, because of the interests 
and powers that are at play in non-ideal situations. They therefore do not take the, in 
my eyes, necessary reflexive next step to opening up science (p124–127).
Most of the critical scholars who’s work I have discussed thus far, did blame the 
organization of science, its poor self-understanding, its flawed self-perception and 
some even courageously pointed at the reward system. They have, however, been 
much less bold with regards to proposing explicit ideas of how system change is to 
be made to the incentive and reward system to mitigate the observed problems. 
From the analyses presented in Chap. 3, it is clear why they did not discuss this 
highly sensitive issue. In contrast to most other scholars, Nowotny et al., do not at 
all duck at the difficult questions which relate to ideology and the self- understanding 
of science. In fifteen wonderful very confrontational pages which will still be dis-
turbing for many scientists to read, they discuss the problems of The Legend 
(p50–65) (Nowotny et  al., 2001). They have high hopes of Mode-2 research in 
which ‘society speaks back to science’. They at the same time realized that those 
who are still in the classical mode of science consider Mode-2 not ‘real science’, 
since they fear it obstructs ‘real science’ to be done. These critics will say it is not 
‘objective’, disinterested and value free as science should be (Rouse, 1996; Douglas, 
2009; Longino, 1990). Contextualization of science, in this classic vision, as we 
saw, is incompatible with the ideal and dream of ‘objectivity’ in the sense of the 
Legend. In line with post-positivist philosophy, Nowotny et al., argue that Mode-2 
type knowledge production is done in a community of inquiry. Its claims are 
accepted by, and validated in social life and thus are intersubjective, reliable and 
socially robust. This is much more meaningful idea of ‘objectivity’. Contextualization, 
that is starting with a problem and do the inquiry in that context or with that context 
in mind, is doing science the way of pragmatism. Despite that active scientists know 
that this is how science as a mature modern professional institution is being done, 
we saw that they are afraid to openly confess to their fallibility and limitations and 
are anxious of external influences and criticism. This, they believe, may hurt the 
image of purity and trustworthiness of their research. As Latour (1993) has con-
cluded, this classical inward attitude and knee-reflex shows that science has not 
reflected and not made the full transformation, past positivism to real modernity. In 
our times in society it is recognized as ‘scientism’ which Habermas called ‘halbi-
erten Rationalismus’, partial rationality, a science that operates from a positivistic 
frame in which it is insulated from social and cultural values.
Nowotny et al., are convinced of the opening up of science as the way forward to 
improve the impact of science. Science, the authors say, in our modern times should 
be reflexive and truly modern and thus have other worries: ‘Today’s scientists have 
to confront different, but analogous fears- their fear of the social world, with its 
imputed interests and ideological distortions, of cultural influences and of their 
own, subtle and not-so-subtle, accommodations to political and economic pres-
sures….As public controversies proliferate, the trust of the public..has to be care-
fully nourished. If scientists would openly acknowledge these perceived threats, it 
5 Science in Social Contexts
149
might be possible to develop another model of knowledge production, in which 
knowledge becomes socially robust.’
They argue that ‘contextualisation has surreptitiously crept into what was once 
held the be the inner core of science whereas it has been embraced by more outward- 
oriented parts of science’ and argue that …the actual practice of science …might be 
set free to explore different contexts and perhaps to evolve in different direc-
tions…more as a comprehensive, socially embedded process’ (p64, p65).
Given the different ideologies, interests, fears and powers that are at play in the 
field of science, it is clear that this involves many actors and for some their most 
existential professional feelings. In short, this reorientation is not a small thing. 
Nowotny et al. describe the institutional changes toward the practices of Mode-2, 
for instance the alternative movements in the EU research area, where in Framework 
Programma (FP) 4 that ran from 1994–1998 a contextualized research programme 
was successfully launched which aims at targeted and problem-driven research pro-
grammes (EU, 2017). They use the term ‘core’ for the classical core of academia 
that is in Mode-1 and ‘periphery’ for the research and researchers that engage with 
problems and stakeholders from outside. They describe the tensions between them 
when governmental funding agencies are programming for problem-oriented 
research like in the EU FP 4 and 5. This is conceived by the core as ‘undermining 
the peer review system’ and the role of experts. Nowotny et al., correctly state that 
these directed programmes even are only ‘Weakly Contextualized’ as ‘they were 
designed to solve yesterday’s problems’ and still operate in the classical linear mode 
of innovation. They discuss in depth the practice of Strong Contextualization, which 
starts with a policy agenda for research, prioritizing actual problems against each 
other as Kitcher has been describing in the ideal philosophical setting of well- 
ordered science.
The idea that Mode-2 was winning ground was not uncontested. In the boards 
and advisory committees of national and European Research Councils, they say, 
discussions, power struggles, between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernists’ in the com-
plex field of science was pushing Mode-2 modernists out of the mainstream (high 
church) ‘core’, back into the ‘periphery’. As the Mode-2 practice aims for robust 
reliable results and application, research, applied science and technology is being 
performed close to and many times with agents in the relevant societal contexts 
where urgent problems are being experienced and where it will present themselves 
to researchers. This type of research will have many different products, needs many 
forms of competences, skills and attitudes, demands different measures of quality 
control. Nowotny et al. wrote these observations on the practice of science in the 
present tense in the years just before the year 2000. Flyvberg, (2001) writing in the 
same years about ‘how to make social science matter’, points to this dynamics and 
to ‘physics envy’ as the wrong road for the social sciences. He makes for the social 
sciences a similar strong case for Mode-2 by revoking Aristotle’s concept of phro-
nesis which is a ‘true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regards to things 
that are good or bad for man’ and goes beyond techne and episteme since it is 
involved in social practice’ and he argues that ‘attempts to reduce social science 
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and theory to episteme (analytic) and or techne (technical knowledge) or to compre-
hend them in those terms, are misguided’ (p2). These authors in the year 2000 cau-
tiously, but optimistically, concluded that the practice of Mode-2 science and 
research -which is problem-driven, cross-disciplinary and pluriform in methods and 
approaches using modern and pre-modern humanistic ways to human understand-
ing- had already reshaped part of science and research. However, we have seen in 
Chap. 3 that Mode-2 research in 2020 is still struggling with its image and standing 
in academia, despite the obvious problems of ‘traditionalist’ Mode-1 research.
5.6  Mode-2: Not the Highway of Academic Science
There thus have been strong local and even larger movements in academia and soci-
ety in the 1960s and 1970s driving the case for social relevance. In addition, and 
derived from that until 2000, powerful and convincing academic analyses were pro-
duced to show the urgency to optimally connect science with society and to remodel 
research and academia for that reason. As Nowotny (Nowotny et  al., 2001) and 
others (Rip & van der Meulen, 1996) (Rip, 1994; Sarewitz, 2016) observed, in par-
allel and in reaction to the inward looking well-organized academic community, in 
many countries a system of intermediary institutions and (semi-)government agen-
cies had been established and was going to be even more firmly established to pro-
gram science in Mode-2 style.(Whitley, 2000) Top down programming and research 
management ‘seek to reconcile the upholding of standards of scientific quality with 
new demands that transcend them and need to be incorporated. The difficulty of 
setting priorities in funding in basic research highlights how the system is strug-
gling to embrace a kind of social reflexivity- to which there is no alternative’ (p47). 
Nowotny et al., did realize that Mode-1 disciplinary science and scholarship, sci-
ence for its own curiosity sake, aiming to add objective ‘eternal’ truths to the body 
of knowledge would not cease to exist. In their vision it is one of the consequences 
of the self-organizing capacity of science to manage ‘the failure of scientific elites 
(Mode-1 elites) to accommodate to demands for accountability and priority setting 
and to accept additional criteria of judging the quality and relevance of scientific 
work’ (p47). They express their good hope for change in the very last lines: ‘Just as 
‘publish or perish’ is underpinned by certain rules of the game, to which scientists 
and their peers have agreed to adhere, so the opening up of science towards the 
agora presupposes and necessitates ‘rules’ of a game that partly still wait to be 
established.’…Not everyone will be able or willing to participate, and not anything 
goes-but the often feared ‘contamination’ of science through the social world should 
be turned around. Science can and will be enriched by taking in the social knowl-
edge it needs in order to continue its stupendous efficiency in enlarging our under-
standing of the world and of changing it. This time, the world is no longer mainly 
defined in terms of its ‘natural’ reality but includes the social realities that shape 
and are being shaped by science’ (p262).
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Helga Nowotny: Reflecting on the Modes of Science
It was 7 November 2017 that I met Helga Nowotny at a half-day invitational 
workshop at the Robert Bosch Stiftung in Berlin. The debate was on ‘Science 
and Science Policy: Is Knowledge Losing Power? Towards a More Resilient 
Science System for the 21st Century’. Among the select group of participants 
were also Sir Mark Walport, Prof. Chief Executive Designate, UK Research 
and Innovation, United Kingdom, Sir Philip Campbell (Editor-in-Chief, 
Nature, London, United Kingdom), J-P Bourguignon (Director of the ERC), 
Dianne Hicks, Jack Stilgoe (UCL) and Tracey Brown (Sense about Science, 
UK). I was invited and explicitly instructed by the organisers to give the short 
opening statement of the workshop about Science in Transition in the ‘pro-
vocative style’. I believe, judging from the report of the meeting*, that I man-
aged to live up to these expectations. The reactions from the participants, 
given their positions in the field, were totally predictable. Walport and 
Bourguignon acted as if professionally offended, did not recognise the prob-
lem analysis at all. Campbell argued, as other publishers, publishers were not 
to blame. Stilgoe, Hicks and Brown joined me in adding their own critiques of 
science. Helga Nowotny, sitting at a corner of the table, did not appear to be 
shocked at all, but seemed rather slightly amused by the discussion. She qui-
etly looked on. After the lunchbreak, Nowotny presented her reflections on 
the position and responsibility of science in society as to be found in here 
recent book The Cunning of Uncertainty (Nowotny, 2016).
I was familiar with Nowotny’s work. We had discussed science as she gave 
a seminar at UMC Utrecht in our PhD course This Thing Called Science a 
year before, which was concluded with a small group dinner with Frank 
Huisman at the Faculty Club. Given the Re-Thinking Science book it puzzled 
me that she was also a founder of the ERC. Why in 2005 did she think we 
needed the ERC, a Mode-1 ‘high church’ science build on the myth of 
Legend? That day in Berlin, I again wondered how to properly understand and 
interpret Helga Nowotny’s work. According to her CV, on her website and 
interviews (Nowotny & Leroy, 2009) she was born in 1937, studied law in 
Vienna, and after that moved with her partner to New York and took to study 
sociology of science at Columbia in New York, studying with Robert Merton 
in the 1960s. Back in Austria in the 1970s, she researched political issues 
which involved scientific expertise, such as the debate about nuclear energy 
and got deep into STS ever since. She was affiliated with the Institute of 
Advanced Studies in Vienna, Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, 
École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris; Institute for Theory and 
Social Studies of Science, University of Vienna, professor at ETH Zurich. She 
was vice-president and until 2013 president of the European Research Council 
(ERC) of which she was one of its main founders. Reading her work, the 
books discussed in this chapter, but also her latest book The Cunning of 
Uncertainty, it is clear that Nowotny is a fine scholar and an exceptional 
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Despite these calls to contribute to the needs and urgent problems of society 
main-stream academia, science and scholarship in universities, Learned Societies, 
Royal Academies remained largely in Mode-1. Moreover, in academia the credit 
system with the typical metrics giving Mode-1 the highest esteem and the dominant 
academic career path was further embraced (Hicks et  al., 2015; Wilsdon, 2016). 
This was not what the Mode-2 authors had hoped for. It was caused by a general 
development of government policies based on the idea that organized and pro-
grammed knowledge production is driving national economic and military competi-
tiveness. This idea of ‘the knowledge economy’ started to fully play out in the late 
expert on science, research and its interaction with society. She personally 
knows or has known the main scholars of her time, most of them discussed in 
these pages. She is completely aware of the conflicting interests, tensions, 
factions, politics and power struggles in academia. She was raised on the nor-
mative functionalism of Merton, knows the works of Habermas, Bourdieu, 
Foucault and Latour, but also has a broad overview of post-Merton, post- 
Popper philosophy and sociology of science. With this in mind, reading her 
work it is obvious that Nowotny at least in her writing evades the ‘raw’ poli-
tics of science. She does however not evade the problems of the Legend, she 
is leaving the myth of positivism behind and without explicitly mentioning 
Dewey, promotes the practice of American pragmatism. In my terminology, 
she moved from Mode-1 Legend to Mode-2 Pragmatism. Commentators on 
The New Production of Knowledge and Re-Thinking Science have correctly 
concluded that she and her co-authors seem scientifically and politically neu-
tral with regards to Mode-1 and Mode-2 (Pestre, 2003). Mode-2, as the com-
mentators argue, in their vision is thus open and vulnerable to the penetration 
by economic goals and the powers of the private sector. Nowotny et  al., 
responded (H. Nowotny et al., 2003) adequately to these comments, taking all 
interests in scientific inquiry, economic and social into account, but staying 
out of issues of power and politics. The remark on the poor position they see 
for fundamental ‘blue skies’ research, explains the link with the ERC. Did 
they really believe that in academia Mode-2 would drastically displace 
Mode-1? I was inclined to read Re-Thinking Science as being a mix of descrip-
tive and normative, that Mode-2 is a necessary complementation given the 
limitations of Mode-1. Nowotny even at the November 2016 small group din-
ner table in the Utrecht University Faculty Club could not be tempted to 
engage into too informal exchanges about the ‘raw politics of science’. She 
reflects and presents the different options to us. To whom? I guess to the 
Deans and Vice Chancellors, boards of funding agencies who have to act in 
the real world once these academic insights have been presented.
*https://www.bosch- stiftung.de/en/project/berlin- science- debate/
berlin- debate- 2017
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1980s in the global economy for which the size and performance of national or 
regional (EU) science and technology systems were absolutely crucial. These 
national and in the EU international and regional science and innovations systems 
are however not to be thought of as ‘an institutional set up somehow geared towards 
innovation. There is no inherent purpose of the overall system to work to some 
goal’(Rip & van der Meulen, 1996).
A multitude of non-synchronous interactions between the various bureaucratic 
organizations that acted as intermediate -sociologically designated as boundary- 
organizations on behalf of the government in relation to research organizations, 
universities and other public knowledge institutes (Whitley, 2000; Ziman, 1994). 
This was and is not a level playing field for researchers from the natural sciences, 
social sciences and the humanities and their subdisciplines. Some field thrived, 
others barely survived, waned or completely disappeared depending on internal 
academic ideas about autonomy, academic esteem and reputation; levels of proac-
tive organization; external socioeconomic and all kinds of political developments. 
Probably the most significant of these ‘fluctuations’ after 1980 is the major 
decrease of investments mainly in physics and some natural sciences and the 
simultaneous enormous increase in biomedical and health research. This was 
directly related to the overall increasing expenditure on science and research, the 
end of the Cold War and amongst others the fight against cancer, increasing aware-
ness of the effects of aging causing rapidly increasing health care expenditures 
(Stephan, 2012). Of note, for the same reasons, even within the field of biomedi-
cine and health, but in fact in all fields, some researchers did benefit enormously 
compared to others from this increased public spending which depended mainly 
of what scientific advisory boards thought was excellent, held promise and should 
be funded. For instance, in biology and biomedicine from about 1970 on, due to 
major rapid breakthroughs in molecular biology, molecular genetics and protein 
chemistry, with its various more physical and chemical methods, this type of 
research in scientific advisory boards from many funding agencies became the 
norm for excellence. The molecular reductionist approach (the molecular turn) 
has ruled, from research on cancer, cardiovascular disease, paediatrics, infectious 
diseases, neurology to mental health and psychiatry. The role of the scientific 
committees at NIH, INSERM, CNRS, DFG, NWO, MRC, ERC, but also at 
Welcome Trust and other institutes and charities around the world is in this respect 
of interest (Miedema, 2012; Sarewitz & Guston, 2006). These institutes are at the 
boundaries were governments meets with universities and other public research 
institutes. It is their task to advance the societal missions and goals (the higher 
purpose) the government funder or charity has in view. On the other hand, to get 
the research properly done, it has to deal with the ideas and fashions and taste, 
about excellence, and internal politics of the different scientific fields (Lamont, 
2010). This complex so-called ‘principal- agent’ problem has to be managed by 
esteemed scientists that are active in their fields and are appointed to the scientific 
committees. Complex it is, because the goals of funders and researchers in aca-
demia and public institutes are at best partially aligned. President Johnson, as 
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mentioned above, in 1966 already expressed his doubts about the NIH. The MRC 
(Miedema, 2012) and most charities and also, as a national example the Dutch 
Cancer Society (KWF) for many years were ‘hijacked’ by the basic science 
approach of mainly molecular geneticists, disconnected from clinical care or pub-
lic health. Writing in 2015 therefore about a new approach to funding, KWF cou-
rageously declared:
Our present approach to assessing grant requests is to focus on the scientific quality of the 
project or programme in question. From now on, we will place greater emphasis on the 
potential of the research in question to make a genuine contribution to our mission. The 
only way to obtain a clear picture of this is to examine each study in terms of its strategy for 
developing the results obtained into new treatments for patients. This calls for flexibility in 
the types of funding used: every effort must be made to ensure that the results genuinely 
reach patients. Throughout the entire research chain, from the laboratory to the patient, 
those working in the research field put forward research proposals, and we facilitate the 
flow of results. There is still a substantial focus on basic cancer research, as this is the 
source of new insights. Yet there is also scope for promising initiatives in the field of infra-
structure, for example. https://www.kwf.nl/sites/default/files/2019- 10/dcs- policy- -
vision- 2015- 2019.pdf
The Bill and Melissa Gates Foundation must have realized this problem fully 
when the multi-billion Grand Challenges which started in the beginning of this cen-
tury was evaluated. My laboratory was involved in a Mode-2 research project in 
which a large consortium, including researchers from Sub-Saharan Africa was 
addressing major problems on protective immunity to HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB 
with the goal of developing vaccines. Investments over ten years yielded many aca-
demic publications. The application, implementation and evaluation of the new 
knowledge in practice was a different game and appeared to be hard.
5.7  Re-visioning Science is Opening Up Science
Nowotny et al., in a chapter with the title Re-Visioning Science (Nowotny et al., 
2001) briefly summarize the major issues with the following buzz words: realistic, 
reflexive, autonomy in localized forms, reliable knowledge, no universal objectivity, 
anticipate contexts. ‘Co-evolution with society, demands a historically unprece-
dented openness on the part of science. Merely to add to the supposedly hard scien-
tific core an additional outer layer consisting of ‘softer’ institutions, ‘softer’ norms 
and ‘softer’ behaviour on the part of scientists, all of which are designed to give 
greater weight to economic and social issues… cannot work. Science should attempt 
to reconstruct its image and authority ….: science is more heterogeneous, diverse, 
local and disunited than the public and science itself realizes (p233). As I will dis-
cuss in Chap. 7, it took more than fifteen years to get broad institutional and inter-
national follow up of this call to the opening up of science.
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Chapter 6
Science in Transition Reduced to Practice
Abstract In the true spirit of Dewey and pragmatism, knowledge, insights and 
experience have to be translated into interventions and actions. Only when knowl-
edge is ‘reduced to practice’ its social robustness and value will be determined. In 
light of the conclusions of the previous Chapter, to be able to have more impact and 
to hold up our promise to society we have to reflect who our science is organized 
and how it could be improved. From these reflections, several interventions in the 
practice of research have been proposed. When we, the Science in Transition Team, 
started to make public our critical accounts of the practice of science, I was ‘friendly 
advised’ by influential older scientists to first clean up the mess in my own institu-
tion, instead of pointing to others and to the system. As a matter of fact, that is what 
we have been doing at University Medical Centre Utrecht (UMC Utrecht) since 
2009. In this chapter I present a brief outline of our actions ‘on the ground’ in UMC 
Utrecht and some early actions to promote these activities abroad.
UMC Utrecht is a large academic medical centre, to give an impression, key figures 
of 2009 that I typically used to show in my introductory talks about UMC Utrecht, 
are depicted below. I am happy to see that the slide did not show JIF’s and numbers 
of citations, the position on the Shanghai Ranking and amount of grant money won. 
At that time, some 1200 researchers were working on a PhD thesis project, which 
saw an enormous increase over the 15 years before.
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University Medical Center Utrecht
Research, education and care
• The UMC Utrecht was founded in 2000 through the merger of the
Academic Hospital, Wilhelmina Children’s Hospital (WKZ) and the Medical




• 2200 scientific papers
• 200 PhD thesis defenses
• 2,340 births
• 634 deceased
• 41,400 hours of surgery
• 1,620,928 website visitors
• 820,000 meals
• 2,210 tons of waste
 
6.1  The Matrix
In September 2008 in the USA the Lehman Brothers Bank was not bailed out and 
had fallen. Because of these and other ominous signs in the months before, we real-
ized that the financial crisis was imminent and visible and was going to hit major 
banks and financial instituters in Europe as well. We anticipated a serious collapse 
of the economy in Europe but also in our country when we started the first of January 
2009 in a new composition of the Board of UMC Utrecht. The chairman, Professor 
Jan Kimpen was a paediatrician who had, before joining the board, been chairman 
of the Wilhelmina Children’s Hospital, a division of UMC Utrecht. The third board 
member, Herman Bol, came from the financial sector. I had left Sanquin in 2004 to 
chair the department of immunology and of the Division Laboratory and Pharmacy 
since 2005. After a couple of months, we started to work on a new five-year strategy. 
We had held discussions with our regional partners, the partners in university and 
corporate partners and patient-advocacy groups. We, in fact our our staff, evaluated 
the two strategies of the past decade and looked at potentially interesting examples 
of institutional research strategies abroad. The conclusions were quite interesting 
and refreshing. Our UMC had since 2000 been organized as a collection of divi-
sions, small hospitals each based on a set of related medical disciplines like internal 
medicine, surgery, paediatrics, neurology and psychiatry, gynaecology, cardiology 
and pulmonology. A number of divisions were about enabling methods and tech-
nologies, as laboratory sciences, epidemiology, medical imaging, radiology, 
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molecular biology and clinical genetics. The divisions were very well organised, 
performed according to finance- and production-related key performance indicators 
(KPI’s) very well. The institute had because of that an excellent financial position. 
The divisions had their own overall strategies and goals which were discussed 
yearly with the board. For research, there had been a top-down formulated five-year 
strategy, which the organization had experienced as very nice but abstract, not 
including very concrete milestones and goals. As division management was held 
accountable for staying with in their budgets, the incentives for entrepreneurship 
were low and collaborations over ‘the borders’ of divisions was problematic. There 
was a wide gap between basic pre-clinical research, most of it done in a semi- 
separate building and the more clinically oriented research in the hospital. The peo-
ple in interviews complained that this was inefficient for research and innovation of 
care but also for daily delivery of clinical care. This down-side to the governance 
model had been consciously considered against its advantages in 2000 by our pre-
decessors in the Board, but as the institute came from an instable financial situation 
in 1998, sound financial results were the first priority, and it was hoped that the 
organizational issues could be mitigated by wise leadership in the divisions. In our 
opinion, based on the evaluation of the past ten years, this appeared to have become 
increasingly problematic and required an intervention to facilitate and incentivize 
necessary collaborations between the divisions, both in clinical care as in research 
and innovation.
In light of this, after much deliberation, we decided to aim for a maximum of six 
large strategic research programmes that should be goal-oriented and connect rele-
vant classical disciplines and divisions. The programmes should by definition thus 
be multidisciplinary, bring the more fundamental, pre-clinical work in the context 
of the relevant clinical departments or extramural domains of prevention and public 
health. We anticipated that the programmes would be quite large but still should be 
focussed on a small number of concrete short-term and long-term public health or 
clinical targets. These programmes, we emphasized, should truly aim for impact in 
science and society. A small group of professors drafted ‘terms of reference’ to 
provide guidance to the writing of proposals and broadly also defined criteria for 
quality and feasibility once choices had to be made. Based on this groundwork, we 
invited our professionals to present ideas for strategic programmes.
In a one-day session early in 2010, with forty senior colleagues in the room, we 
democratically picked 22 of the best proposals from over sixty proposals that had 
been submitted. They were merged into six major disease-oriented programmes that 
each covered for their domain the whole spectrum of basic, applied and clinical 
research from the disciplines that involved. For example, in Personal Cancer Care 
researchers from epidemiology, medical oncology, molecular genetics, surgery, 
radiology but also representatives of patient advocacy groups and other stakehold-
ers participate. Eventually, it was realized that we needed rehabilitation sciences 
and bioethics in such programmes as well. Because of the interactive loop, beyond 




6.2  The Innovation Loop
 
It is a bit beyond the scope of this book, but obviously most critical for the change- 
management we had engaged in, were management and administrative problems 
that come with building such multidisciplinary programs in a matrix organization 
with ten divisions that are disciplinary with respect to science and medicine. 
Building this type of programmes required collaboration and discussion across the 
classical boundaries of basic-applied, preclinical – clinical and between the differ-
ent clinical disciplines that were organized in divisions with strong classical struc-
tures. Clinical disciplines are far more distinct that disciplines and fields of research. 
They link up to years of professional medical training and clinical work with severe 
and often distinct patterns of socialization for their professionals. In the case of 
oncology, professionals from internal medicine, pathology, surgery, radiotherapy, 
geriatrics and rehabilitation medicine need to seamlessly work together to achieve 
optimal patient care. As I discussed with regards to research, also here professional 
hierarchies, in which the professionals are socialized, covertly or explicitly are at 
play. In an academic (university) medical centre the ‘field’ of research is intertwined 
with ‘the field’ of the medical profession each with their own power struggles and 
stratification as described in Chap. 3 for research. With Bourdieu’s Distinction in 
the back of my mind, I often realized that surgeons and internal medicine doctors 
are very different people indeed (Bourdieu, 2010). The complexity of this dual 
world of science and medicine should not be underestimated.
Because of this, successfully building consortia to form strategic programmes, 
requires real leadership and brinkmanship from many senior professionals. 
Negotiations between program and divisions about choices to be made regarding 
research topics and clinical work, investments and joint decisions about human 
resource management, hiring and promotion of personnel, were complex. These 
issues of ‘alignment to the higher purpose’* are classical and abundantly discussed 
in the literature on innovation, R&D and research management in research inten-
sive industries (* I borrowed ‘the higher purpose’ from Manfred Kets de Vries who 
has advised us on management issues in 2015). Even in institutions and 
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corporations, like Philips or pharmaceutical companies were problem- and prod-
uct-oriented research is normal, and despite a much higher corporate identity and 
shared value with the overall corporate goals, these interactions pose managerial 
challenges. It took literally years for, us, the institute to get used to the new organi-
zational scheme. During my time as director of research in Sanquin, given the mis-
sion of Sanquin, our research was for a large part to be directed at the development 
of products and services related to development and safety of blood products. In 
those days I read the literature about managing top professionals and now and then 
in UMC Utrecht  I went back to some of those books such as Maister’s True 
Professionalism and Third Generation R&D by Roussel, Saad and Erickson 
(Maister, 1997; Roussel, Saad, & Erickson, 1991). Interestingly, Mirko Noordegraaf 
and Paul Boselie, colleagues from the Utrecht School of Governance in 2012 
showed interest to study our management intervention as a real-live case in their 
long-term research programme on public management. The key question in that 
program is how public organizations and private organizations with a public task 
deal with current social issues, how they shape their public responsibilities and 
deliver public value. Also though Noordegraaf’s contact in an EU project I was 
invited to present our case in Bologna in April 2012 to thousand (!) representatives 
of hospital management in the Italian Region of Emilia Romagna. Later, in 
September 2014  I did my talk at a meeting with the Karolinska and Stockholm 
hospital system. Noordegraaf and Boselie joined forces with Margriet Schneider to 
establish the Utrecht University Focus Area Professional Performance in 2015. 
Margriet Schneider then was chair of the Division of Internal Medicine and later 
that year became Chair of the Board of UMC Utrecht.
The next five-year strategy, was initiated in 2014  when Mirjam van 
Velthuizen- Lormans, who had a long career already in UMC Utrecht before, 
became Board member. With this strategy  that started January 2015 we took it 
to the next level.    The ‘innovation loop’ was shown to be totally interactive 
engaging with regional, national and international academic and non-academic 
partners outside the walls of the institute. Therefore, the strategy was appropri-
ately called ‘Connecting U’. When I proudly presented the strategy at a 2014 
Christmas party to our retired colleagues, a lady in the front loudly remarked 
that she thought it was a nice name, but perhaps better suited for an Utrecht 
public transport company. I agreed of course with a big smile, but politely 
retorted that we felt it was also very appropriate, and nice for an academic hos-
pital serving and connecting with the greater Utrecht region.
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6.3  How Do You Want to Be Judged?
There had been in our institute for over fifteen years already a strong focus on 
research. In line with what at these days was pretty normal, the more fundamental 
pre-clinical science was regarded the best, as was measured by the JIF of the venue 
of publication. Publication output, citations, JIF and top 10% of journals of the field 
and in addition high profile personal grants and the amount of grant money that was 
brought in were used to score the research performance of divisions. This type of 
metrics was every three-year period used to determine the number of professors 
each of the divisions was entitled to have. As the total number of professorships was 
capped, this was a zero-sum game where every three years some divisions lost, 
some gained. Fortunately, only a limited fraction of intramural money was allocated 
to the divisions based on these indicators, in addition to monetary rewards for the 
number of awarded PhD’s. As we have seen in Chap. 3, this was since the years 
2000 common practice in the Dutch and the wider European and international 
research landscape. UMC Utrecht in that respect was not at all atypical. In this strat-
egy we did very well in publications, numbers of PhD’s and grant money that was 
brought in. With our new strategy a year or two underway, however, we after some 
time had to admit that this incentive and reward system was not aligned with the 
different forms of science and academic output in the six multidisciplinary pro-
grams. In fact, we also realized that our research evaluation system did not acknowl-
edge top professionals and clinicians engaged in more practical patient-driven 
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research where journal impact factors are lower and no prestigious personal career 
grants are to be won. The more your research was to the left of the innovation loop, 
the better your chances were for high JIF publications and thus academic promo-
tion. Of course, there were exceptions. When regarding clinicians who performed 
extremely well and were scarce because they did and thought surgery at stellar lev-
els, after fierce debates in academic appointment advisory committees, their publi-
cation lists and grants won were regarded less important  compared to 
their professional academic performance and impact.
The Higher Purpose
In 2014, the need to change the system of research evaluation forced itself upon 
us in UMC Utrecht. This was a couple of years after we had made the change 
in the organization of our research environment. For us this was quite logical, 
conceptually and in time but, to be honest, it had not been planned in 2010. 
This struck me again in January 2017, at a Washington DC bookstore- restaurant 
having a breakfast meeting with Paul Wouters and Dan Sarewitz. The three of 
us attended a special one-day meeting on incentive and rewards organized by 
Metrics Stanford. Sarewitz made it quite clear, he was not much into the prob-
lem of metrics, but had been thinking for decades about the organization of 
science and how to effectively change it. Sarewitz is well-known from his criti-
cal well-informed pieces about the science system in Nature and his book, 
Frontiers of Illusion, his book chapters and his opinionated excellent long read 
‘Saving Science’ (Sarewitz, 1996, 2016). His work has focused on the politics 
of science and how all kinds of forces and powers keep science from living up 
to the promise to optimally contribute to society and the good life. He is highly 
critical of those who are pursuing intellectual interests of ‘blues skies’ research 
with reference to the linear model of innovation and value-free inquiry. It is an 
endless frontier, but in his analysis with a lot of illusion indeed.
Sarewitz, asked me why and how we had been able to agree on and then 
implement a new system of research evaluation at UMC Utrecht. I told him 
the story of our intervention in UMCU 3.0 and that it thus was a logical con-
sequence of our strategy. It was the diversity of goals and academic roles 
defined in the six strategic programs, that after a couple of years forced us to 
implement a research evaluation system that matched with these goals and 
with the ‘higher purpose’ of UMC Utrecht. We had assigned this task to a 
group of midcareer young researchers and clinical professionals chaired by 
Marieke Schuurmans, professor of Nursing Science and secretarially sup-
ported by Rinze Benedictus who was by then already quite an expert on 
Incentives and Rewards. We invited them in August 2015 to start on the ques-
tion ‘How do you want to be judged and evaluated?’ After six months they 
presented a more inclusive and less metrics-driven evaluation protocol. The 
result was a very open and generic scheme which allowed to honour the plu-
riform excellences related to the diversity of academic roles in the system. 
Not only papers published, or funding obtained had to be considered, but also 
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The worry about basic science, as we have seen in the previous chapters is of all 
times. Here I refer to Stoke’s ‘Pasteur’s Quadrant where the concept of ‘user- 
inspired basic science’ is explained as the kind of research most researchers in basic 
science do (Stokes, 1997).
Structure Leadership & culture
Collaborations with stakeholders
Continuity and infrastructure
Process Setting research priorities
Posing the right questions
Incorporation of next steps
Design, conduct, analysis
Regulation and management (OA, FAIR data sharing)
Outcomes Research products for peers
Research products for societal groups
Use of research products by peers
Use of research products by societal groups
Marks of recognition from peers
Marks of recognition from societal groups
UMC Utrecht: Inclusive set of generic indicators
for research quality and impact
 
results being used and applied closer to users by peers or by users and stake-
holders themselves. Think of application in the clinic, in medical products and 
technical appliances via private partners, in a treatment advise by the Health 
Council, in the organisation of health care in the region, or in policy making 
of any kind. In addition, a lot of emphasis was on the ex-ante, or ‘how’ the 
research was organised in order to enhance on beforehand its potential impact. 
For instance, we asked, if there was early engagement of stakeholders. The 
scheme and its implementation were not uncontested. Some warned that ‘it 
would come at a cost to the quality of our research, was to hurt basic science 
and the reputation of our institute. ‘It very much depends on how, and who 
defines ‘research quality’, was my response. Of course, although we all 
believed we were moving in the right direction, I very well understood the 
issue. The risk of a first-mover disadvantage posed a serious and realistic 
worry in those days when DORA was barely known and there was a global 
addiction amongst academics and university administrators to JIF, h-indexes 
and the Shanghai Ranking. Even in 2020, when a lot has happened regarding 
Incentives and Rewards, nationally and internationally, understandably this is 
the worry still most frequently aired by young research professionals.
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User-inspired basic science takes on problems in the context of a larger problem 
in a given practice and investigates ‘blind spots’ and missing links in knowledge and 
understanding in that particular field. As we have seen, basic science has a higher 
standing than applied science, even with the public, and this still feels like a prob-
lem for the investigator. In a typical early evening show that until recently ran on 
Dutch TV and was famous for a host with boundless admiration of scientists, we 
often see the invited scientist first explain how terribly fundamental the work is, to 
demonstrate its scientific quality, in order to then proudly explain how it can be used 
to solve a clinical or social need. Even our recent Nobelist, the synthetic organic 
chemist Ben Feringa, who started his career at Shell Research, did not escape this 
knee-jerk reflex when in 2016 he explained in the Dutch evening news his price- 
winning work as totally ‘blue skies’, but a moment later proudly explained that his 
molecular motors once may be used to direct medicines to the right spot in the body 
of patients among other applications in practice.
How to Make the Right Choices
One day, at my job in the department of immunology of UMC Utrecht, I got 
a phone call from my sister that my brother, who was more than ten years my 
senior, had suffered a very serious stroke and was in hospital. I went to see 
him at the hospital, near where he lived. He was in very bad shape. It was a 
devasting sight. He was paralysed on his left side, but the most terrible thing 
was that he could not speak and probably had serious cognitive problems. He 
was moved to a well-known rehabilitation centre in the heart of Amsterdam. 
During visits we sat in a common room, with a view of the Vondelpark. His 
ability to move the left leg and arm returned pretty quickly. His speech did not 
return and communicating with him during visits and ever thereafter was very 
difficult, which frustrated him enormously. Looking around at the facility, its 
ambiance, shocked also by the sight of also relatively young patients and their 
visitors, I was reading the information leaflets about the rehabilitation therapy 
my brother was receiving. I could not help myself to think of the enormous 
investments made over the years in research on the pathogenesis of stroke, 
involving numerous PhD positions, sophisticated animal models, laboratory 
equipment and large expensive devices and the most innovating molecular 
and imaging technologies. As the fast majority of patients survive stroke but 
badly need medical rehabilitation for recovery of speech and mobility and 
cognitive recovery, the low academic priority and very modest investments in 
innovation in research and development of rehabilitation and mobility 
research, I realised, were a disgrace.
After a few years I became the dean and I was confronted with this problem 
in my own UMC Utrecht and later realised it had been noted at that time by the 
national Health Council. Because of the reward system, its metrics and defini-
tions of excellence, rehabilitation sciences were suffering. Typical career 
advice to young MD’s therefore was: ‘go for a PhD on a topic of ‘hard science’ 
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6.4  The Call for Health from Society
At that time, a general resistance was rapidly rising against the dominant idea that 
even in the public sphere, literally all public services, should be left to private par-
ties and in our case the market of health care. The classical economist’s idea was 
that ‘automatically’ this competition would result in more efficient and cost- 
effective services, compared to the situation in which non-profit semi-government 
organizations offered these services. This neoliberalism (and globalization), with its 
focus on the mechanism of the (international) corporate markets and competition 
steered by shareholder value or the principles of New Public Management, however, 
did not apply to schools and higher education, but also not to health care. Apparently, 
these services are not typical consumer products, but more of the type of common 
goods essential for the quality of social life and of the public sphere in civil society 
and democracy and must be regulated and provided through government. In the 
Netherlands but also in the wider EU in a similar vein, politicians both liberal- 
conservatives and social-democrats realized the down sides that the politics of the 
Third Way have had. In in our country since 1994 this is designated as ‘Paarse 
Politiek’. Science in Transition did not put all of the blame for problems in aca-
demia on the politicians and government, that was thought to be too easy. We real-
ized and showed, as discussed in Chap. 3, that academia and academics, but also 
administrators in university and other academic and funding institutions had quite 
willing adjusted their strategies and practices to these neoliberal policies.
The Netherlands Health Council in response to a request of the Minister of 
Health, Welfare and Sport, in October 2016 published an advice on how to improve 
the impact on the Dutch health care system by the research done in the eight 
University Medical Centres. In the letter of request to the Health Council, to our 
pleasant surprise, the minister cited the analysis of Science in Transition on ‘how 
metrics shapes science’, and would that not be a problem? The committee installed 
by the Health Council that produced the above-mentioned advice was clear: to a 
great extend research is not driven by the needs of public health, of the care or cure 
system, but is too much focussed on research driven by parameters of esteem, 
such as molecular pathogenesis. It has more esteem, gives better papers and a 
better CV than to work on applied problems of mobility and rehabilitation’. Be 
sure, such problems caused by ‘the system’ is nobody’s fault. People, even 
highly educated people ‘read the system’, behave according to the system and 
adept strategically to seek possibilities of advantage for themselves and their 
set up. I could fill many pages with similar problems of agenda setting being 
distorted by the incentive and reward system. Molecular cancer biology versus 
research on living with adverse effects of chemo, total immune ablation, radio-
therapy and a bone marrow transplantation. The tumour is hopefully gone, but 
the patient is still there struggling with her poor quality of life.
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clearly related to the metrics used in academia. The report specifically pointed out 
the fields with high societal and clinical relevance that got too little research atten-
tion and investment in the current system. These included mostly public health and 
prevention and research to improve the health care system focused on problems in 
the region around UMC’s and national issues. The mismatch between investments 
in biomedical research and disease burden at patient and societal level has over the 
years been regularly reported in Lancet or BMJ. The novelty was that it was causally 
linked to the perverse effects of the incentive and reward system. The Council, cit-
ing the relevant international literature, understood that researchers, make strategic 
choices in which field and on what topic to do research. That this was increasingly 
based on the chances of building a resume mainly with particular journal articles to 
get credit and esteem from peers, required for the next round of grants. The current 
JIF dominated metrics game, the committee concluded, steers researchers away 
from the fields where they are closer to patients in the wards and away from citizens 
in the region. Is seemed as if the idea was, in my words, ‘the further away from the 
patient, the cleverer you are’. The Boards of UMC’s were not all that amused by the 
Health Council’s advice, and in a knee-jerk reflex which made it to the frontpage of 
a national newspaper it was rebutted that the Council did not show respect for ‘the 
beautiful basic research with high international visibility that is being done in 
UMC’s which is the basis for excellence in Dutch health research’. Initially the 
usual evasive and defensive voices played the Council’s critique down, saying that 
there was not at all a problem with regional collaboration. After some months of 
discussion though, it was realized that the Health Council and the Minister were to 
be taken very seriously. It was a problem for patients, the public and society at large 
and thus action required from the UMC’s, since most of their research was paid for 
by tax money. With professor Albert Scherpbier, the Dean of UMC Maastricht, in 
the lead we got a group of national experts together to compose an action plan for 
the UMC’s, for which we consulted virtually every stakeholder in society. As a 
result, a bold plan was designed in response to the Health Councils advice.
https://www.nfu.nl/img/pdf/19.5200_Research_and_Innovation_with_and_for_
the_healthy_region.pdf
The plan basically was to adjust the research agenda to better respond to societal 
needs with regard to public health, prevention and clinical care. A clear shift to more 
regional and national societal impact was one of the major aims. The UMC’s com-
mitted themselves to setting up a regional network around each UMC to deliberate 
on the most urgent problems and how to work together, through research and social 
action, to improve cure, care, health and welfare in the region. This transition was 
not going to be easy, as was realized by the Council and the UMC’s, this would not 
happen without explicitly changing the incentive and rewards system of research 
and researchers in the UMCs. Proper incentive and rewards are required to acknowl-
edge the diversity in research excellence of researchers in for instance public health 
doing quantitative social research and work on lifestyle, nutrition, and quality of life 
in mental disease. In our own backyard in the larger Utrecht region, in line with this 
advice, we had already invested in setting up this type of regional collaborations for 
the treatment of high complex rare cancer types with the four hospitals https://www.
umcutrecht.nl/nl/ziekenhuis/regionaal- academisch- kankercentrum- utrecht- 
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 raku,and had initiated a round table Gezond Utrecht that brought together all health 
care providers in the region. https://bestuurstafelgezondutrecht.nl
During the COVID-19 crisis in the spring of 2020, this type of non-competitive 
collaborations were top-down enforced and became highly visible when health care, 
and in particular clinical ward and ICU capacities, personal protective equipment 
and the testing for COVID-19 had to be nationally and regionally organized. With 
respect to the need to improve collaboration and dismiss market-type competitions 
between cure, care and health providers, it became clear that COVID-19 had the 
most devasting effect on the elderly that were not in hospital, but in dedicated care 
homes. In the first two months of the pandemic internationally the focus was on the 
ICU and hospital care and cure but medical care in care homes did get little atten-
tion. We thus were confronted with the hierarchy in the medical profession between 
cure and care but also of insufficient ‘scientific’ appreciation of research and inno-
vation potential of fields like geriatrics, rehabilitation and preventive medicine, 
despite its immense social impact in our ageing populations, not only times of 
Corona. We now hear a serious call to rethink this policy, will it last after COVID-19 
is under control? Do we, in ‘the cold phase’, then still want to invest and pay more 
to have better and reliable availability of medicines and be better prepared for the 
‘hot phase’ of the next pandemic?
6.5  Science in Transition Abroad
We reassured our public that our initiative and most of our agenda was part of a 
larger emerging international movement. In all our talks we therefore took great 
pains to point to some of the high-profile initiatives already ongoing abroad in bio-
medical research. Most of them as discussed in Chap. 3 were mainly focused on 
quality with respect to design, clinical impact and reporting of research and not so 
much about change of the system. With two of those initiatives we got connected in 
2015. I think this was good for visibility and crucial for our credibility, nationally as 
well as internationally. Apparently, as I had learned in the field of AIDS research 
30 years before, also in the field of meta-science, although its funding was at least 
three orders of magnitude smaller and less defined as a research field, one had to 
spot the ‘right people’ and their international network to connect with, in order to 
enhance impact. I will pay due credits to two very different men.
6.6  EQUATOR, Meeting a True Pioneer: Doug Altman 
(1948–2018)
February 19, 2014 a small-format symposium was held at UMC Utrecht under the 
title Science in Transition. I was asked by the organiser, Carl Moons, to say a few 
words of warm welcome as an introduction to Doug Altman, as the Dean is expected 
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to do. It was a month after the publication of the high-profile series of papers in The 
Lancet of which Doug Altman was a major initiator and author. (discussed in Chap. 
3) Altman was one of the co-founders of The EQUATOR health research reliability 
network and has written major papers since the beginning of the century on quality 
issues in biomedical research and its reporting. Some of his early papers in BMJ are 
classics that are still widely read. In the midst of the launch of Science in Transition, 
knowing his strong position about science, I did not do my courteous Dean’s intro, 
but a strong pitch ‘how science went wrong and what should be done about it’. 
Altman, a bit surprised at first, but then feeling free to speak up, very British but 
passionately gave his talk. The next year, as he obtained an Honorary Doctorate 
from Utrecht University, we met again. Doug was a very nice, soft-spoken scientist 
who was really worried about the quality of science and not fond of a lot of attention 
and being in the spotlights. I still think though, he was truly pleased with ‘the hon-
our bestowed upon him’ by our University.
I believe as a result of these informative interactions during dinners before and 
after the University Dies Natalis of March 2015, Dough invited me to speak at the 
Reward/Equator Conference in Edinburgh, September 2015. This was a meeting 
organized by the group of authors of the Lancet papers of January 2014. (P. Glasziou, 
2014; Paul Glasziou et al., 2014; Macleod et al., 2014) It were mostly biostatisti-
cians and methodologists, most of whom were present. In fact, many major players 
from all over the globe, who actively worked to improve biomedical science, at 
journals, funders and universities were present. I was the only one that day arguing 
for a systems approach to the problem from the ‘Dean’s Perspective’. My call was 
that we needed to break free from that perverse credit cycle, but in order to do so we 
needed to engage the people how have power in the system: university administra-
tors, deans, board members of the Royal Societies, patient advocates, charities and 
government funders. Unfortunately, too few of them were to be found in the audi-
ence that day.
6.7  METRICS, the Relentless John Ioannidis
From the speaker’s podium he could not be overlooked, seated attentively in the 
front row, dressed in his habitual spotless white summer costume, often complete 
with a bright red tie. John Ioannidis (1965) is C.F.  Rehnborg Chair in Disease 
Prevention, Professor of Medicine, of Health Research and Policy, of Biomedical 
Data Science, and of Statistics; co-Director, Meta-Research Innovation Centre at 
Stanford. Ioannidis is a Greek-American physician-scientist and writer who has 
made contributions to evidence- based medicine, epidemiology, and clinical 
research. Ioannidis nowadays is well-known for his studies of scientific research 
itself, primarily in clinical medicine and the social sciences. He writes on his 
Stanford webpage: ‘Some of my most influential papers in terms of citations are 
those addressing issues of reproducibility, replication validity, biases in biomedical 
research and other fields, research synthesis methods, extensions of meta-analysis, 
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genome-wide association studies and agnostic evaluation of associations, and 
validity of randomized trials and observational research.’ We all know and keep 
citing his famous paper ‘Why Most Published Research Findings are False’. 
(Ioannidis, 2005) He has since 2010 published continuously at a dazzling speed on 
that same subject in different fields and from different angels. He was involved in 
the Equator initiative and established METRICS in 2014. (https://metrics.stanford.
edu/about- us) METRICS is a meta-research and innovation centre at Stanford. 
Ioannidis is worldwide recognized as one of the scientists with Doug Altman, 
Richard Smith and some others who started the debate about issues of quality and 
reproducibility in biomedical research. Until the COVID-19 pandemic, he travelled 
almost continuously around the world to deliver his passionate presentations. In the 
spring of 2015, I was formally invited to become a METRICS affiliate and to give a 
talk about Science in Transition at the METRICS inaugural conference in November 
of that year at Stanford Campus. As in the good old days of my AIDS research team, 
we had organized some visits in the Bay Area the day before the meeting. At 
Berkeley we met with the Vice Chancellor for Research Christopher McKee and his 
policy advisors and representatives of the Center for Science, Technology, Medicine 
& Society. A group of people involved in actions to improve the relationship 
between science and society. The latter were enthusiastic, the former more critical 
and even a bit cynical in reaction to my short pitch on how to improve science. ‘You 
think you can change a system?’ Leaving the campus, we came across a number of 
reserved parking spots for Noble Laureates. It was a bit weird, as we had just been 
talking about the skewed appreciation of different types of science. Here I have to 
admit, at UMC Utrecht I used to have the privilege of reserved parking close to my 
office which came with the membership of the board. So, I should be quiet.
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At the new UCSF campus we met with Ron Vale a pioneer who was about to 
found ASAPbio (Accelerating Science and Publication in Biology), promoting the 
use of preprints and an open and transparent peer- review process. Ron did believe 
we can change a system. Downtown San Francisco, we discussed with Paul 
Volberding and his team who were involved in an interesting novel funding scheme 
(RAP) at UCSF to ‘foster collaborative, novel, or preliminary research activity, and 
to further institutional research strategic goals. Paul was in the first decades of the 
AIDS epidemic a well-known pioneer in the organization of clinical care, anti-viral 
therapy and had deeply engaged with the gay community. We only knew each oth-
er’s names from these days, but still it helped to make the connection.
California Dreamin’
A bit gloomy from these encounters, we drove down Highway 1, from San 
Francisco, via Half Moon Bay and then through the foothills to Palo Alto. It 
was clear, the project of Science in Transition had a very long way to go. My 
colleagues Rinze Benedictus and Susanne van Weelden had carefully observed 
the various responses to my ‘elevator pitches’ in the meetings that day. They 
did what was to be expected from them and during the ride provided a critical 
analysis of the different reactions we had gotten. The higher in office the more 
evasive the responses appeared to be, which of course made perfect sense, 
given the reputational and financial interests linked up to the reward system 
we were all in. This did made it very clear, we were up against a major force. 
Fortunately, the foothills in the magical afternoon Californian light to the left 
and the sight of the incoming rolling clouds above the cold ocean to the right, 
cheered us up at least a bit. We reassured ourselves, we have to keep the ball 
rolling, we were doing a good thing for science and mankind. Sometimes ‘on 
a winters day’ you need these maybe naïve idealistic moments to keep you 
going. It’s a shame though, that I could not locate the oceanfront hippie- style 
restaurant that I remembered, or I thought I remembered, where we liked to 
go during my sabbatical at DNAX in 1994.
The METRICS conference was hosted in a venue at the heart of Stanford 
Campus, with its bright sunny sky and the skyline of the Foothills in the back-
ground. With a lot of well-groomed outdoor sports accommodations, Stanford 
Campus misleadingly looks like a Spanish holiday and golf resort. At the time 
of my sabbatical at DNAX, then an amazing academic-style small biotech 
institute, the age of biotech and of internet companies just had started. I saw 
again how misleading and seducing the leisurely appearance of Palo Alto, like 
most of Silicon Valley and its people, is. In Boston, New York and Chicago, 
you can tell from the way the cities look and how the people in public spaces 
behave how tough life must be, but for some mysterious reason not so in 
Silicon Valley. Yet, Stanford University and the biotech and fintech companies 
are the engine of that most competitive region in science and innovation of the 
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The meeting was a warm bath, vibrant and full of positive energy. Everything and 
everyone was in tune, aiming in some way or another to improve the practice of sci-
ence and inquiry. To be honest, at that time I did not realize how much experience, 
knowledge and involvement had been brought together in that meeting. There was a 
lot on methods, design and reporting, but fortunately the program was much broader 
in its approach. We also heard talks about preregistration, about animal studies and 
about education of representatives from patient advocacy groups, which reminded 
me very much of the AIDS advocacy we had seen in the 1980s. It was not only about 
biomedical research, as Jelte Wicherts from Tilburg University and Brian Nosek 
spoke about the ongoing actions with respect to reproducibility in the field of psy-
chology. Nosek is the founder of the Centre for Open Science (COS) (https://cos.io/
about/mission/) and only later I realized that Brian Nosek’s talk was my first con-
scious encounter with the broader movement of open data, data sharing and repro-
ducibility in the frame of Open Science. I did my ‘Change the Incentive and 
Rewards’ pitch going through the Credibility Cycle and our ongoing initiative to 
implement a novel evaluation system.
At the meeting Monya Baker, of the journal Nature had expressed her interest in 
our actions a UMC Utrecht and wanted to stay informed. Rinze Benedictus met 
with her at the meeting and kept her up-to-date. When the evaluation scheme and 
our CV portfolio was accepted for use at our institute, we wrote a small piece about 
it for Nature telling the story but also discussed the problems that we had seen and 
still anticipated for the process of implementation. We were happy with this piece 
since it clearly signalled that this type of action to change an important aspect of the 
system can be done at the institute level. The article came out in October 2016 and 
was picked up by Dutch newspapers, probably because it was in Nature, which in 
light of our mission was paradoxical since it said that a paper in Nature is not per se 
top class science. But anyhow, it had impact because it reached a large public. 
(Benedictus & Miedema, 2016). Through these international contacts we set up an 
exchange and collaboration with Ulrich (Ulli)Dirnagle and his team who have set 
up QUEST, as part of The Berlin Institute of Health (BIH). The BIH and its QUEST 
Center is focused on improving and transforming biomedical research, in analogy 
to the Science in Transition movement with emphasis on reproducibility and trans-
lational medicine but also on changing the recognition and rewards system working 
closely with Equator and METRICS Stanford. 
world. They don’t show it, but people are very eager and work long hours with 
for most of them also long daily commutes across the bay where housing is 
affordable. The right place, I would say, to discuss the perversities and adverse 
effects of hyper-competition for social and professional credit to obtain 
research grants or investments from venture capital companies in order to 
make it to the next round. This is the world of science that Steven Shapin 
described and analysed in his The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late 
Modern Vocation. (Shapin, 2008).
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6.8  Academic Rewards and Professional Incentives
At the METRICS meeting, we decided to work jointly on the problem of incentive 
and rewards. We focussed on the criteria applied in the career advancement system 
in medical schools. Steven Goodman, David Moher and I took up that task, working 
towards a workshop on Academic Rewards and Professional Incentives. David 
Moher and colleagues did almost all of the work. Luckily the committee working on 
this  in my institute had delivered in the first quarter of 2016 and our evaluation 
scheme was included.
Provide incentives and rewards
for academics to work on Open
Science and use of Open
Science
Funders (public and private)
want us to work according to
Open Science and Open Access
Change scientific incentives and rewards for broader impact &
open science
BMJ Open Science, January 2018
“Who are we answering to?”
 
We decided to invite a select group of participants of whom most were happy to 
take part and could make it on Monday 23rd of January to Washington DC, just 
around the corner where Donald J. Trump the Friday before had been inaugurated 
as president of the United States.
We were most happy to welcome among the participants: Michael Lauer (NIH); 
Marcia McNutt (National Academy of Sciences); Jeremy Berg (Editor in Chief 
Science); Robert Harrington (Chair of Medicine, Stanford); James Wilsdon 
(University of Sheffield), Paul Wouters (CWTS, Leiden); René Von Schomberg, 
PhD (Team Leader–Science Policy, European Commission); Paula Stephan 
(Georgia State University); Ulrich Dirnagl (Charité –Universitätsmedizin, Berlin); 
Chonnettia Jones, (Director of Insight and Analysis, Wellcome Trust); Malcolm 
MacLeod, MD, Professor of Neurology and Translational Neuroscience, University 
of Edinburgh); Sally Morton (Dean of Science, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg); Deborah 
Zarin, (Director clinicaltrials.gov), Alastair Buchan (Dean of Med School, Oxford); 
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Trish Groves (BMJ, BMJ Open); Stuart Buck (Laura and John Arnold Foundation). 
John Ioannidis was chairing the meeting.
Guess what we talked about during the pre-workshop dinner that Sunday night. 
With this presidency, what had the future in store for the world, the US and US sci-
ence, the EPA and the NIH? Uncertainty and great worries prevailed. The meeting 
was productive in the unique sense that, many different perspectives on the prob-
lems of the current practice of science were exchanged. The methodologists, the 
bibliometricians, Open Access advocates and the people focused on the systemic 
problems were in the same room.
A paper, written by Moher et al. to share the information and insights discussed 
at the meeting, was published early 2018. (Moher et al., 2018) The abstract of the 
paper was clearly a call for action:
Assessment of researchers is necessary for decisions of hiring, promotion, and tenure. A 
burgeoning number of scientific leaders believe the current system of faculty incentives and 
rewards is misaligned with the needs of society and disconnected from the evidence about 
the causes of the reproducibility crisis and suboptimal quality of the scientific publication 
record. To address this issue, particularly for the clinical and life sciences, we convened a 
22-member expert panel workshop in Washington, DC, in January 2017. Twenty-two aca-
demic leaders, funders, and scientists participated in the meeting. As background for the 
meeting, we completed a selective literature review of 22 key documents critiquing the cur- 
rent incentive system. From each document, we extracted how the authors perceived the 
problems of assessing science and scientists, the unintended consequences of maintaining 
the status quo for assessing scientists, and details of their proposed solutions. The resulting 
table was used as a seed for participant discussion. This resulted in six principles for 
assessing scientists and associated research and policy implications. We hope the content 
of this paper will serve as a basis for establishing best practices and redesigning the current 
approaches to assessing scientists by the many players involved in that process.
6.9  The Future of Science in Transition
In the meantime, in the spring of 2015, we decided to explore the future, if any, and 
we invited a few persons with visibility and authoritative in the field of science and 
society to join our core team of Science in Transition. Frank Huisman because of 
heavy duties, could not contribute anymore. These workshops were the basis for the 
program of the Third Symposium held in March 2016 again at the Royal Society. 
The problems and opportunities of the academy, the position of the PhD’s, the 
small-scale colleges and our relationship with society and the publics were the main 
themes. James Wilsdon, a long-time key opinion leader in the UK and Europe was 
the major guest speaker who presented the findings and recommendations of ‘Metric 
Tide’. (Wilsdon, 2016) The symposium was quite optimistic in tone, given the 
actions that were already ongoing in the field, but it was clear that in the next phase 
‘academic leadership’ should step up and act. We concluded with a discussion on a 
typical Dutch experiment in the spirit of the Science Shops of the 1970s: The 
National Science Agenda. This much debated initiative from Jet Bussemaker, the 
Minister of Higher Education sought to invite proposals from the public about 
issues for scientific inquiry. As of this writing, after 16.000 proposals and allocation 
of the first rounds of money, the funding agency is still struggling how to deal with 
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it and how to continue the next years. The question obviously is whether this was 
the right framework. Engaging the publics is critical, but that should be beyond an 
inventory or wish list of all kinds of questions for research (like ‘why is the sky 
blue?’). As argued above, engagement is not to be thought of as interests at the indi-
vidual level, but a social action of publics focused on problems that have social and 
political priority, which may change over time.
 
From 2016, the agenda and activities of Science in Transition very much 
resonated with Open Science in The Netherlands and the EU were experts 
wrote excellent reports on the main issues related to implementation of Open 
Science in the member states. At several institutes in member states and around 
the world actions especially regarding Recognition and Rewards and use of 
meaningful metrics were started. The responsible administrators of universi-
ties and funders many times went for advice to experts from the field of 
research evaluation like Sarah de Rijcke, a senior staff member and now a full 
professor and Scientific Director at CWTS Leiden, who had joined our ‘team’ 
in the spring of 2015. Sarah, co-author of the Leiden Manifesto then already 
for many years had specialized in social studies of research evaluation and had 
as group leader been engaged in many large international EU projects. She had 
then already started a large research effort to empirically evaluate interven-
tions in the incentives and rewards system. This included our intervention at 
UMC Utrecht with Rinze Benedictus as one of the PhD students. Sarah, with 
James Wilsdon, in 2019 established a new high-profile institute, the Research 
on Research Institute, with international support from major relevant parties. 
http://researchonresearch.org. Sarah is  an internationally  recognized expert 
involved in international outreach activities related to use and meaning of met-
rics and science management and policies. Finally, but promising for the future 
of science, at ‘my own’ UMC Utrecht, a group of four young female PhDs 
took the initiative to launch Young Science in Transition with highly relevant 
and visible activities: ‘How young researchers can re-shape the evaluation of 
their work. Looking beyond bibliometrics to evaluate success.
https://www.natureindex.com/news- blog/how- young- researchers- can- re- 
 shape- research- evaluation- universities
Sarah de Rijcke, photo taken by Bart van Overbeeke
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Abstract Many initiatives addressing different types of problems of the practice of 
science and research have been described or cited in this book. Some were one-issue 
local actions, some took a broader approach at the national and some at EU level. 
Some stayed on, others faded after a few years. Many of the issues addressed by 
these movements and initiatives were part of the system of science and appeared to 
be systemically interdependent. This is how they converged and precipitated in the 
movement of Open Science, somewhere at the beginning of the second decade of 
this century. I discuss the major move that was made since 2015  in the EU to 
embrace the Open Science practice as the way science and research are being done 
in Europe. This elicited tensions at first foremost relate to uncertainty regarding 
scholarly publishing, of how and where we publish open access. But also, with 
respect to what immediate sharing of data and results in daily practice of researchers 
means, how we value and give credit for papers and published data sets. It thus 
poses the question of how, if at all, we must compare incomparable academic work, 
how we get credit and build reputations in this new open practice of science. It is 
indeed believed that Open Science with its practice of responsible science will be a 
major contribution to address the dominant problems in science that we have anal-
ysed thus far, or at least will help to mitigate them. Open Science holds a promise to 
take science to the next phase as outlined in the previous chapters. That is not a 
romantic naive longing for the science that once was. It will be a truly novel way, 
but realistic way of doing scientific inquiry according to the pragmatic narrative 
pointed out.
The Transition to Open Science as can be anticipated from the analyses above 
will not be trivial. The recent discussions have already shown that the transition to 
Open Science, even between EU member states, is a very different thing because of 
specific national, societal and academic contexts.
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7.1  The Big Elephant in the Board Room
In the previous chapters I have discussed the origin and history of the, in my opin-
ion, most relevant developments in the philosophy and sociology of science. They 
were discussed in the wider context of changes in society in the past hundred years 
and how sociologists and scholars in political and social theory have reflected on 
them. In most cases the scholarly work was ‘academic’ in style and reflective about 
the practices of science and research and its problems. I have shown how many 
scholars despite the demise of the Legend, found that its legacy still had and has 
distorting effects on our image and the practice of science, even until this day. The 
fact, that there is no claim to truth based on absolute timeless foundations, for phi-
losophers of science was hardly bearable, but as it appears, was also hard to swallow 
for practicing researchers in academia. But this problem goes beyond science as we 
saw in the Chap. 6, and what Anthony Giddens articulated in 1994: ‘What seems to 
be a purely intellectual matter today – the fact that, shorn of formulaic truth, all 
claims to knowledge are corrigible (including any meta-statements made about 
them) – has become an existential condition in modern societies’. Not only science 
but our whole everyday life ‘is built on the shifting sand; it has no grounding at all’ 
Giddens concludes with Popper (p87) (Beck et al., 1994). Despite having demon-
strated the serious distorting effects of the Legend, in our times mainly via the 
incentive and rewards system on the agenda and impact of scientific research, very 
few authors have questioned these practices at the political and organizational level 
in academia. Even fewer still started to propose concrete interventions to be done by 
responsible academic leadership to improve science and abolish these problematic 
practices. We have seen in the previous chapters that the reputational reward system 
is most likely the most critical process in academia. Almost every relevant aspect of 
scientific research is, directly or indirectly determined by it. The response of the 
establishment, that it is ‘not about power and the execution of power, but all about 
quality and excellence’ is as we have seen obvious. In defence of research, we are 
told that ‘researchers follow their altruistic voice of vocation in search for truth, 
independent of personal advantage or gains’. Although most researchers, I am 
I will conclude this chapter reporting some of my first-hand experiences, in 
Brussels and during visits to several EU member states in the course of a 
Mutual Learning Exercise, but also encounters in North America, South East 
Asia and South Africa where we in the past years have discussed Open 
Science. Although we know science and scholarship have many forms and 
flavours and that wherever you go, there is not one scientific community. For 
me discussing the Transition to Open Science in the past four years was really 
a Learning Exercise, an amazing, mostly encouraging, but many times quite 
shocking, even saddening adventure.
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convinced, still aspire to that ideal, this is not a helpful defence as it blocks the 
attempts to make the changes to facilitate researchers to really do the research they 
and stakeholders from society consider as most relevant with the most relevant 
results and impact. The institutionalization of science as a major social system of 
great importance to society has however developed its own economic laws. These 
are inhibitory to the idealistic motivations and aims with which the individual 
researchers entered the field. It appeared that problem in academia that have in the 
past twenty years been exposed in analyses of various movements -open access 
publishing, data sharing, public engagement and outreach, poor reproducibility and 
waste- cannot be properly addressed and solved without taking on this problem of 
the system. As said before, it is the ‘Big Elephant in the (Board) Room’. Only by 
taking the systems approach and its corresponding interventions, we are able to 
gradually, but fundamentally change the practice of science by which the different 
actors in the field are incentivized and empowered to ‘do the right science right’.
The movement of Open Science as it has come of age in 2020, aims to truly 
integrate concrete actions that take on virtually all of the problems of science that 
have been revealed by previous analyses and movements. In 2016, the EU explicitly 
adopted Open Science, including the change of the indicators used in the practice of 
Incentives and Rewards. Like Science in Transition, ‘Equator/Rewards’ that came 
from the Lancet ‘Reduce Waste, Increase Value’ initiative by an international con-
sortium in collaboration with Lancet, clearly since the start in 2014 have engaged 
with the ideas op Open Science, as has the Meta-Research Innovation Center at 
Stanford (METRICS).
In this chapter, I will briefly discuss the major movements that can with hindsight 
be regarded, in one way or another, as preludes to Open Science, as each of them has 
focussed on different issues from different scientific and societal perspectives. I 
regard the Responsible Research and Innovation program critically important as 
groundwork to make the full-fledged adaptation of Open Science by the EU in 2016 
possible. I realize that this may not be a generally shared perspective and recollec-
tion of the developments at the EU DG Research and Innovation. In my opinion the 
EU Open Science program worked on the technical issues enabling Open Access 
and Open Data, but these were means to an end. The program aimed for an optimal 
and open relationship between science and academia and the various stakeholders 
in society for which Open Access and Fair Open Data. It also integrated in the Open 
Science Program a program on the required change in the reward system. The EU 
Open Science Program did not look away from that elephant in the room. I will 
discuss the Open Science movement as it has been developed since 2016 in the EU 
and elsewhere in the world. I will refer to the present-day use of Open Science prac-
tices in the heat of the COVID-19 pandemic, but also duly pay attention to concerns 
regarding some practices of Open Science. Finally, the promise and future of Open 
Science will be discussed in light of recent geopolitical developments in which the 
USA, China, but also the EU are re-thinking their science and technology strategies.
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7.2  Responsible Research and Innovation
Brussels in the Meantime
Jan Staman, the Director of the Rathenau Institute, invited me to give a short 
presentation about Science in Transition at a meeting in Rome in September 
2014. The meeting was about an EU project with the title Responsible 
Research and Innovation. I had recently been in a couple of public debates 
with Staman who was very supportive about our initiative. For Staman, a vet-
erinarian trained in Utrecht, the relationship between science and society was 
not only real, but urgent. This was fuelled by the recent outbreaks of SARS, 
MERSH and Q fever, all caused by zoonotic pathogens leading to serious 
public health problems when they jump from animals to humans. In my quite 
impolite one-line reply, I was very blunt to say that I had no idea what RRI 
was about, but that I was interested to spread our message on an EU podium. 
This, I now realize, must have hurt Jan Staman. After twelve years he was just 
about to leave his job as director of Rathenau handing over to Melanie 
Peters from Utrecht University, who we knew well from her interest in Science 
in Transition. In a fare-well interview in a national newspaper, he complained 
loudly that Rathenau had a hard job engaging the elite institutes and scientists 
to do research on the grand societal challenges and that this was a battle that 
had been going on for more than forty years or so. He was mild about the 
Academic Medical Centres and the Technical Universities who were, he said, 
closer to societal problems. He apparently had been too loud and got backfire 
from Carel Stolker, the Rector of Leiden University and Hans Clevers, the 
President of the Royal Academy. They argued that this was a caricature of 
science, since many researchers were very engaged in societally relevant 
research. Indeed, there are those who are, but is it respectable, is it  facili-
tated and do we reward them enough? For most the issue still is the response: 
‘The ERC, yes, but must we really engage with these large, messy less- 
focussed problem-driven consortia in Horizon 2020?’
In Rome, I admit, I was embarrassed that I had not noticed and researched 
RRI before. There were not the fifty people I had expected, but more than 
thousand people in the meeting with impressive talks and lively sessions 
about major EU programmes and investments amounting to literally hundreds 
of millions of euro’s and 400 million to come until 2020 in actions on Public 
Engagement, Diversity and Open Science. The closing talk was to be given by 
Bryan Wynne, whose work I introduced in the previous chapter. How could it 
be that I did not know this highly relevant program in which major key opin-
ion leaders in European STS and of the movements of citizen science and 
even already Open Science were involved? It did not seem to be uniquely my 
problem. The overall penetration of the RRI movement in academia was low. 
There was, however, little to be found in terms of analyses why this EU 
(continued)
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The roots and development of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in the 
EU, from 2000 on, have been adequately described (Owen et al., 2012) (Stilgoe 
et al., 2013; René von Schomberg & Hankins, 2019; ESF, 2013). RRI stems from a 
series of different initiatives to increase integrity, ethical, legal and social responsi-
bility and to intensify multidisciplinary research to integrate social science with 
technical sciences and innovation. Programs preceding RRI where of the type dis-
cussed in Chap. 5, on public participation and deliberation with a theoretical per-
spective but also based on cases studies of problematic issues like GM crops, ICT 
and genetic engineering and on ‘real time’ technology assessment. I referred already 
in Chap. 5 to the work of Wilsdon, Owen, Wynne, Irwin, Felt, Stilgoe, Rip, von 
Schumberg and Sarewitz and their colleagues in the first decade of the century. Here 
and there in these studies, open innovation an openness to the public is mentioned 
as a tool to enhance impact. These authors are strongly in favour but share concerns 
about responsible research and development – the design and introduction and use 
of innovations- with respect to collaborations with private and commercial partners. 
They also are cautious of the problematic and most often unanticipated social and 
economic effects upon implementation of technology. Most of them do argue for 
up-stream participation by stakeholders in the knowledge production process, which 
was in some fields, most prominently in medical research, already being used but 
mostly not in an institutionalized way.
As Felt et al. have shown graphically, (ESF, 2013)(p11), these flavours of RRI 
were already visible in the programmes of the EU between 2000 and 2013. In RRI, 
through the practice of Knowledge Transfer and Public Engagement, societally 
responsible research and innovation requires a broad and deep understanding of its 
ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI) or aspects (ELSA). For a thoughtful 
series of papers on management of RRI, with emphasis on these responsibilities of 
the different parties involved, I refer to a collection of papers by experts in 
Responsible Innovation (Owen et  al., 2013). They analyse in detail the public 
debates about innovation in nanotechnology, geoengineering, information technol-
ogy (AI) and finance.
programme, after many years and major investments, still was not mainstream 
policy in academia. There was no systemic organizational bottle neck identi-
fied and hence there was no action plan for academic leadership to make the 
required change. This program would, as it was, not become mainstream and 
would not bother the ‘high church’ too much. That was exactly my pitch at the 
end of the second day, just after I met briefly during the coffee break with Arie 
Rip, one of the key players of STS since the 1980s and one of the founders of 
The Rathenau Institute.
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In 2011 the EU took the initiative to unite these movement and ideas under the 
banner of RRI as part of Horizon 2020, the framework program for 2014–2020. 
Owen et al., describe this process and point to an influential paper by René von 
Schomberg (Owen et al., 2012; Rene Von Schomberg, 2011). René von Schomberg 
at the time of this writing still is a thought-leading and senior policy advisor at the 
EU DG Research and Innovation. Rene von Schomberg’s paper was circulated and 
was crucial in this development because it was according to Owen ‘outlining his 
emerging philosophical thinking, …(that) included a thoughtful discussion concern-
ing the normative targeting of research and innovation towards the ‘right impacts…’. 
This was science aiming at economic, but also health and social problems, based on 
external social and political values and goals which were broadly expressed in the 
Treaty of the European Union. Von Schomberg in the paper discusses that in our 
times the Aristotelian concept of ‘the good life’ as the purpose of science may be 
problematic, but that missions and challenges defined in the debates and the delib-
erations that are found in the EU treaty can give normative guidance. He provides 
philosophical depth, how research that has been brought in the context of a public 
controversy is being analysed and deconstructed. In that interaction, the debate is 
often, not about the concrete claims of research, but about which type of research is 
best suited to be taken in to account in a specific social and technological contro-
versy. In addition, the problem for science is that while an epistemic debate (about 
scientific knowledge) is going on and not yet closed, it has induced, or fired up 
public debate. “Which group of scientists can we believe, and should we endorse? 
Plausible, epistemic approaches on the acquisition of knowledge in science are 
associated with problem-definitions, which in turn frame (although, often, only 
implicitly) policy approaches.” He argues for a strong science-policy interface 
which allows for ‘deliberation based on normative filters such as proportionality 
and precaution’ with respect to societal intervention or actions which are EU prin-
ciples (Rene Von Schomberg, 2011).
We have seen in the previous chapters in the cases described by Wynne and Irwin 
how this asks for reflexivity from the researchers and obviously adds complexity to 
the process of policy making. Von Schomberg writes explicitly about the issue of 
problem choice and its coupling to research policy and investment and in a later 
paper: ‘Under the European Framework programme for Research and Innovation 
Horizon 2020, a number of ‘Grand Societal Challenges’ have been defined, which 
followed the call in the Lund Declaration for a Europe that ‘must focus on the 
Grand Societal Challenges of our time’ (Lund Declaration 2009 during the Swedish 
EU presidency). Sustainable solutions are sought in areas such as “global warm-
ing, tightening supplies of energy, water and food, ageing societies, public health, 
pandemics and security. Arguably, the Grand Societal Challenges of our time reflect 
a number of normative anchor points of the Treaty in relation to the ‘promotion of 
scientific and technological advance’ and which thus can be seen as legitimate. 
However, the promotion of scientific and technological advance has until now 
served as a goal in itself. The promotion of scientific and technological advance has 
not been coupled to other, all interrelated, normative anchor points such as ‘ensur-
ing a high level of protection’ that, ‘sustainable development’, ‘competitive social 
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market economy’ that drive all other EU policies. It does not require much political 
initiative to couple the promotion of scientific and technological advance with all 
other major normative anchor points in the EU treaty to give a broader base for the 
justification of research and innovation beyond assumed economic benefits and 
increase of competitiveness.’ (René von Schomberg, 2019).
RRI included science for society with early participation by the public, acknowl-
edging all these complexities. It is about  science with society in which the relation-
ship with society was integrate and institutionalized such that it could be anticipated, 
reflected upon and be opened up to the diverse stakeholders and publics. Owen et al. 
emphasize that this ‘confers new responsibilities: and not only on scientists but 
universities, innovators, business, policy makers and research funders.’ This regards 
to program choice and responsiveness to their delivery. Owen et al. state that ‘The 
framing of responsibility itself is perhaps one of the greatest intellectual challenges 
for those wrestling with responsible innovation’. How can you deal with that in 
issues where high risk and high uncertainty is involved? This asks for reflection on 
the goals of research and innovation and a reflexive mode of research that is respon-
sive to all kinds of social impacts that it will bring or has brought about. Obviously, 
this demands more inclusive codes of conduct, research ethics and scientific integ-
rity. This is quite different from the classical idea of the Legend that scientists pro-
duce neutral knowledge which can in the next stage be translated, applied and used 
either to the good or bad causes for which the scientists feel they cannot not be held 
responsible. The Rome Declaration on Responsible Research and Innovation stem-
ming from the EU program is reproduced that provides a clear overview of the 
program (Supplement 5). Almost all of the authors writing about RRI and men-
tioned above had European affiliations, so it seemed logical that in the EU the next 
step was going to be Open Science. That is with hindsight, because when the EU 
launched Open Science in 2016 this was for many still a surprise, but a pleasant 
surprise.
7.3  The Early Voices of Open Science
In the preliminary phase, before the different movements that aimed to improve sci-
ence and research were organically brought under the banner of Open Science, we 
have seen several important movements that with hindsight each have had major 
effects. In the late 1990s, the field gradually became aware of what librarians called 
the ‘serials crisis’. Subscription prices of scholarly publications were increasing 
much vaster than inflation. This was going on to the effect that even in the developed 
countries and at well-endowed institutes, librarians to stay within their allocated 
budgets, had to selectively stop subscriptions.
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Some visionary scientists already in 1991 sensed this problem and, like the pub-
lishers, taking advantage of the novel digital developments, started arXiv.org a 
repository for STE and economics, where researchers could publish their work for 
all free to read, fully open access, before it is submitted to a journal. In 2006 the 
Public Library of Science (PLOS) series started that published papers that  are 
reviewed, are free to read, but ask the authors to pay Article Processing Costs (APC). 
In 2013 bioXiv.org, a repository for biological sciences and in 2019 medRxiv.org 
for biomedical sciences was launched. Repositories can be institutional or disciplin-
ary in nature. In times of COVID-19 all research was immediately made available 
through repository publishing, an obvious thing to do.
The best-known movement within Open Science, no doubt, is the Open Access 
movement. Open Access formally started with the Budapest Open Access Initiative 
in February 2002, the Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing in June 2003, 
and the Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and 
Humanities in October 2003. For a detailed and thoughtful analysis, I refer to Peter 
Suber who wrote a concise book as an introduction (Suber, 2012) followed up in 
2015 by his vast collection of blogs in Knowledge Unbound.(Suber, 2016) There 
also is the excellent Wikipedia site and Peter Suber’s own personal webpage.
We learn from that reading that interesting, stand-alone initiatives and actions 
have been taken place already a long time ago. These initial actions have slowly 
resulted in more recent actions to make research papers and data openly available. 
They were still sometimes local, but now are mostly national and institutional in 
nature. These actions were inspired and made possible by the world wide web and 
When I started as research director of Sanquin Research in January 1998, 
this was one of the problems that was waiting for me. The institute was an 
independent non-profit foundation with a small research division and limited 
internal funding. Given the yearly financial pressures of the publishers, it felt 
logical to modernize the library. The library, as elsewhere, thus changed to 
digital subscriptions, with less physical librarian support. Fortunately for me 
this coincided with retirement of a librarian, that however did not reduce the 
reading costs of the journals. On the contrary, they were growing every year. 
So, we had to stop subscriptions based on the interests of the researchers. 
Later, as the dean at UMC Utrecht, I saw how this this dossier had developed 
even further in the same manner. The emphasis on the ‘better’ journals, drop-
ping subscriptions of the ‘lesser’ journal, started a vicious cycle of increasing 
prizes of the ‘better’ journals who were in high demand, since the researchers 
appeared to be addicted to them. The higher the JIF, the more dramatic the 
addiction, the higher the subscription prizes. The publishers know how to play 
the game and offered package deals of subscriptions in order to sell also their 
serials who are in lesser demand. This happened not only for the publications 
of the ‘Big Five’ (Suber, 2012), but also for journals published by the so-
called learned societies where these profits were used to fund their scientific 
activities.
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the possibility to read journals ‘electronically’. Since the year 2000, I have not held 
in my hands one of the journals that I as an active researchers physically, in hard 
copy, used to browse in the library every Monday afternoon since 1979. 
Now Scientific papers can be assessed everywhere. For our kids this is the new nor-
mal, but in the 70s and 80s one still had to go to the library to browse the contents 
of the journals and take a Xerox photocopy of articles of interest. The well-known 
space limits in printed journals required deletion of experimental data which editors 
used to impose on authors, but that could now be more easily allowed as supplemen-
tary data. This access was, for almost all journals only available to those who could 
afford the subscription fees, that were steeply rising, despite its scale up in reaching 
libraries in the word-wide electronic markets. Already in the late 1990s some jour-
nals made themselves open, readable for free on the web, and somewhat later the 
first Open Access journals, like the Public Library of Science (PLOS) series, started 
that are free to read, but do ask the authors to pay Article Processing Costs (APC). 
Because of these partial technical and financial solutions and the JIF game explained 
in Chap. 3, it took a long time for Open Access to reach the level of penetration that 
it has obtained in Europe and around the world in 2020.
Another important initiative that many have heard of and that logically started 
from the digitalization of science and society is related to Open Data and Open 
Code. Among the many advocates of this movement which sometimes was desig-
nated as Science 2.0, in analogy to the participatory Web 2.0, I like to mention 
Michael Nielsen, a remarkable quantum physicist, science writer, and computer-
programming researcher whose book ‘Reinventing Discovery, The new era of net-
worked science’ had much impact (Nielsen, 2012). Nielsen has been a scientist/
activist for Open Access and Open Science in the early years before he published 
the book and left academia to pursue his own projects. Nielsen has been a scientist/
activist for Open Access and Open Science in the early years before he published 
the book and soon after, he left academia to pursue his own projects. Nielsen shows 
how scientists together, but also on collaboration with non-scientists, have used the 
internet to solve problems, to collect and exchange data in, an in principle, world-
wide digital space. He discusses the Open Access actions and in addition gives 
examples of how a new way of doing science and discovery work, as a networked 
science, has been applied already to many different problems in different fields of 
science and society. He mentions theoretical work on mathematical problems and 
work by the Centres for Disease Control in the US on influenza epidemics, which 
for the reader in 2020 is already quite normal.
At the time of writing in the COVID-19 pandemic, we experience the power of 
this networked research on a daily basis by which via different platforms data is 
being shared immediately in order to inform policy making around the world. He 
makes a strong case for networking and data sharing and concludes for that Open 
Science involves a cultural change for science and scientists that is seriously inhib-
ited as it is in the old system not incentivised and rewarded (p6–8; p187–197). That 
these networks can be truly open is illustrated by the story of Hanny van Arkel, a 
27-year old Dutch schoolteacher with an interest in cosmology who got engaged in 
an effort to characterize galaxies which involved 200.000 volunteers. One day in 
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2007 she spotted a blue bob on a photograph of Galaxy Zoo which later the scien-
tists concluded must be a quasar mirror (p129). For Nielsen digitization is a tool 
which makes science open and more democratic. He is passionate about the contri-
bution that science can have to society and hopes that this Networked Open Science 
way of discovery can help us to close the ‘ingenuity gap’, he mentions the dangers 
of HIV/AIDS, proliferation of nuclear arms, bioterrorism, shortages of water and oil 
and the effects of climate change (p171). Obviously, in the summer of 2020, the 
dangers we think of are COVID-19 and the pandemics to come, the immense refu-
gee problems caused by local wars and its disasters and the social and economic 
problems caused by increasing global economic and social inequality.
Recently Bernard Rentier published a handy and informative overview of Open 
Science (Rentier, 2019). A very informative collection of papers about Open Science 
also is ‘Opening Science, The Evolving Guide on How the ‘Internet is Changing 
Research, Collaboration and Scholarly Publishing’ (Bartling, 2014). Both are pub-
lished Open Access. In the chapter written by Fecher and Friesike in the latter book, 
Five Schools of Thought are presented which each combine specific aims and the 
tools to achieve these aims (see Table and Figure) (Fecher & Friesike, 2014). In the 
‘fifth school’ the need for a change in the practice of research evaluation is empha-
sized, taking into account the typical academic activities of Open Science. Friesike 
has recently published commentaries in Nature, Science and an LSE blog on these 
issues and in his subsequent studies provided ample evidence that the individual 
system of academic reputation and reward is the reason why researchers in many 
different fields do not to practice open access and data sharing, despite its benefit to 
the science (Table 7.1).
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7.4  Politics, Policy and Open Science
‘Biting the bullet:…the practice of having a patient clench a bullet in his or her teeth as a 
way to cope with the extreme pain of a surgical procedure without anesthetic’ (wikipedia)
The EU and the Dutch government do not and did not always agree, but they com-
pletely agreed on the promise of Open Science and on actions to make the transi-
tion. As discussed in Chap. 3, the Dutch ministers of Higher Education and Science 
responded very positively to the Science in Transition initiative. This was reflected 
in the Science Vision of November 2014 by policies on Open Access and Open Data 
and renewed emphasis of the interaction with citizens and the public. This ran in 
2014 parallel to the Science 2.0 Science in Transition initiative of the EU DG 
Research and Innovation. The latter started with a background paper for a survey to 
get a feel for the ideas and problems of science in the field of the various stakehold-
ers. As mentioned in Chap. 3, this may be considered the prelude for Open Access 
and Open Science in the EU (Burgelman et al., 2019).
In the fall of 2015, the ministry of Education, Science and Culture (OCW) began 
work on the agenda for the first half of 2016 when the Netherlands was to hold the 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union. For science and innovation, the 
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emphasis was on Open Access and a better relationship of science with politics and 
public to enhance innovation, and economic growth. These items were put in the 
larger context of Open Science that came out of the EU Science 2.0 project. The 
larger Open Science framework has a lot of overlap with that of Science in Transition 
and joining forces was logical. For Science in Transition, Open Access (OA) was 
believed to be relevant but was regarded as mainly a technical problem of the orga-
nization of academic scholarly publishing. We, perhaps a bit naively reasoned that 
it would be automatically (en passant) solved when we adopted DORA to get rid of 
the ‘impactfactormania’. The most important thing that would promote the wide-
spread implementation of OA thus for sure was the simultaneous change in incen-
tives and rewards. The reasoning is that open access journals that are totally open 
and have no subscription costs have a lower JIF compared to the classical ‘top’ 
journals that have steadily and consciously build their reputation. So, as long JIF’s 
still are overvalued and dominantly used, scientists don’t like to publish OA. For 
sure, making authors or their institutions paying extra to make a paper OA in Nature 
or Cell is not the way to solve the problem, if alone because that this would be 
double dipping, paying the publishers twice. The latter is broadly recognized, the 
idea that we needed to change research evaluation criteria however was not a gen-
eral awareness, or as we have seen in the previous chapters, simply thought of as a 
political ‘no go area’.
Getting his attention
One of our staff members, who was into national politics, introduced me to 
Sander Dekker, the State Secretary for Science who was leading the Science and 
Innovation theme in the program for the Dutch EU Presidency the first half of 2016. 
In November 2015, I had the opportunity to talk for an hour with Dekker at the end 
of one of his many busy days. He is a sociologist by training and curious and eager, 
so when I opened my laptop and walked him through Bourdieu’s credit cycle in 
which JIF is ‘the real thing’ and Open Access thus is nice the have at max. It was 
immediately clear to him that the problem of incentive and rewards should be part 
of the ‘Amsterdam Call for Action on Open Science’. In January 2016 there was a 
meeting in Brussels organized by the Dutch ministry to prepare for The Presidency 
Conference in Amsterdam where the agenda for Open Science for the EU was to be 
drafted. The meeting showed a for me unanticipated enthusiasm and drive for 
actions to make the transition to Open Science among the participants of the EU 
offices in Brussels, LERU but also from several members states. There were two 
breakout sessions on incentives and rewards, but also about research infrastructures 
needed to facilitate data sharing. In the following months I was invited to make the 
case for changing incentives and rewards, based on our UMC Utrecht pilot, at the 
EU Presidency Conference held on April 4 and 5 in Amsterdam.
At the closure ceremony of that meeting a preliminary draft of the ‘Amsterdam 
Call for Action on Open Science’ was presented to Sander Dekker and Robert-Jan 
Smits, Director-General of DG Research and Innovation (RTD) of the European 
Commission. The plan was comprised of five action lines that focus on open access 
to publications and optimal re-use of research data, but also on necessary changes 
7 Transition to Open Science
191
within the science system in order to attain a new and sustainable situation with 
respect to an open science system. I still tend to believe that this call, although of 
course very much a symbolic act of the Netherlands Presidency and of the EU, has 
been a major step in the transition to Open Science in Europe and beyond. As the 
EU is a major factor in global science, one may expect and hope that it may eventu-
ally turn out to be an important action for the global transition to Open Science. 
(Supplement 4) This Action Plan, which was based on a Draft Agenda published 
two months before, makes it very clear that with Carlos Moedas in his role of com-
missioner and main political figurehead, the EU was going for Open Science with 
everything that had to come with it. In this movement, the EU was going to prover-
bially ‘bite the bullet’ at least two times. First by proposing to reform the incentive 
and reward system (Action 1, shown above), and second by taking actions to change 
the system of scholarly publishing (Actions 4, 7–10). The other actions, surely 
where brave and would also require major efforts but were not thought to meet with 
the resistance from the academic institutions that Action 1 might experience. This 
was the ambitious EU Open Science agenda for the years to come and in fact it had 
already had a flying start in Brussels. In the course of 2015, Carlos Moedas, the 
Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science had already given a couple of 
visionary talks in which he outlined the Open Science program of the EU. It was, at 
least as it looked to me, to me based on the RRI programmes, now put in the per-
spective of Open Science. The full narrative of these preliminary messages was 
published in the book ‘Open Innovation, Open Science, Open the World’ that was 
written by a collective of authors from DG R&I at the end of 2015 and formally 
published by the EU in May 2016 (EU, 2016). The classical narrative of entrepre-
neurial science and innovation in open collaboration with major partners around the 
world, in this agenda was put in the frame of Open Science.
For the Open Science movement, in Europe but also in the world, this in my 
opinion was a truly historic moment. This program did put the by now well-known 
issues of Open Access and Open Data in a much wider conceptual and science- 
policy frame. It explicitly advocated a different way to do science and research in a 
truly co-operative open and responsible relationship with society. You could see it 
as a movement to fully embraced the RRI program and transform it to the top level 
of EU science policy. Open Science was to be the founding principle of EU research 
and Innovation. It was the declaration of ‘the way how we do science in Europe’ 
with emphasis on fruitful interactions in the different societal contexts. Experts rec-
ognized the ideas of ‘well-ordered science’ and deliberative processes in modern 
democracy.
7.5  EU Stakeholder Consultation on Open Science Policy
The transition to Open Science and research, as it has also been termed, was a 
change to the mainstream practice and would require complex systemic changes 
which involved cultural-behavioural interventions as well as infrastructural 
7.5  EU Stakeholder Consultation on Open Science Policy
192
solutions. It was foreseen to have a number of Expert Groups giving advice to the 
Commission on issues for which advice was thought to be badly needed. The eight 
policy ambitions that needed to be addressed in line with these five broad action lines.
In 2016 already two of these Expert Groups had been started, one on Altmetrics 
and one on Rewards. Fortunately, they appeared to have already broadened their 
tasks to problems of rewards and research evaluation when they reported in the 
spring of 2017. In ‘Next-generation metrics: Responsible metrics and evaluation for 
open science’. James Wilsdon and colleagues, among whom Paul Wouters, dis-
cussed not only the problem of the abuse of metrics but also the broader criticisms 
of recent scholars and movements and recommended the development of responsi-
ble metrics to incentivise and reward the practices of Open Science to come to a 
more inclusive evaluation of results of academic work.(EU, 2017b).
Through 2019, Paul Wouters chaired a second Expert Group to further delve into 
the problem of research indicators for Open Science, providing a broad approach 
with room for freedom in the choice of indicators and room to develop more appro-
priate indicators dependent on the widely differents contexts of the research. They 
appropriately did take into account that indicators, to the disappointment of some 
higher management, often are incomparable because very much dependent on the 
research contexts of the respective fields and sub-fields. Interestingly, clearly show-
ing the theoretical and practical experience of the group, they called for cautious-
ness when implementing new indicators, warning for unintended harm they might 
cause to the practice of science (EU, 2019).
The Expert Group on Rewards started in July 2016 with the following task:
 1. Promote a discussion with stakeholders on the current reputation system in the 
context of the standing ERAC groups and the Open Science Policy Platform 
(OSPP) which will work on the concretisation of a European Open Sci-
ence Agenda;
 2. Within the OS environment, reflect about and propose alternative methods to 
recognise contributions to OS, including ‘rewards and incentives’ taking into 
account diversity in experience and career paths, while guaranteeing fair and 
equal career development of individual scientists;
 3. Propose new ways/standards of evaluating research proposals and research out-
comes taking into consideration all OS activities of researchers, possibly recom-
mending to pilot them under certain calls of Horizon 2020;
 1. FAIR open data
 2. European Open Science Cloud
 3. Altmetrics
 4. New business models for scholarly communication
 5. Rewards
 6. Research integrity
 7. Open science skills
 8. Citizen Science
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 4. Identify existing good practices on how OS issues are already taken up by 
researchers, research performing institutions and research funding institutions 
in Europe.
This Expert Group reported in July 2017 its advice on Indicator frameworks for 
fostering open knowledge practices in science and scholarship (EU, 2017a). It is 
written from the perspective of University Human Resource Management and 
prominently features a set of indicators that can guide career assessment evaluation. 
Interestingly, the working group took this to a broader perspective and emphasizes 
more inclusive and behavioural aspects, as team science and leadership. A thorough 
analysis of current evaluation practices of researchers was presented, including an 
adequate discussion of the recent critiques, including JIF and DORA, and of some 
early pilots on better measures. The ‘Open Science Career Assessment Matrix 
(OS-CAM)’ presents a range of evaluation criteria for assessing Open Science 
activities’, a practical overview that should be taken into account when evaluating 
scientists for using and applying Open Science practices in their research. This 
OS-CAM has since then been well received and propagated since.
Open Science on Tour in the EU
In a videocall with staff of DG Research and Innovation, beginning of 
February 2017, I was approached to chair an MLE on Open Science, espe-
cially focused on Incentives and Rewards. In the call were present the three 
experts who were going to take part, but also René von Schomberg, and the 
persons from DG R&I who were going to organize the MLE. It was explained 
what an MLE was all about and what was expected from us in the coming ten 
months or so. I had never been involved in committees or working groups of 
the EU, but I thought it was going to be a fascinating exercise and we all 
agreed to go for it.
An MLE, a Mutual Learning Exercise, appeared to be a project to support 
member states at "improving the design, implementation and evaluation 
of R&I policies”. It appeared that nine members states had shown interest 
and a relevant and stiff program had been laid out already by the staff at DG 
R&I.  The team consisted of: Katja Mayer, Rapporteur and Expert; Sabina 
Leonelli, Expert; Kim Holmberg, Expert; and Ana Correia, DG RTD-Unit A4. 
(Analysis and monitoring of national research and innovation policies); Rene 
Von Schomberg, DG RTD- Unit A6. (Data, Open Access and Foresight); 
Irmela Brach, DG RTD- Unit B2. (Open Science and ERA Policy) and Nikos 
Maroullis, from Technopolis for support.
Being a novice in the field of Open Science and Altmetrics, I at that time 
only vaguely knew René von Schomberg, whom I had met just the month 
before at the METRICS meeting in Washington. After the first meetings I 
already knew somebody had done a great job at selecting the experts. My 
teammates were excellent and very experienced experts who were used to 
deliver high quality work on time. They were three scholars in Science and 
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 Topics/Sessions of the MLE on Open Science
The main topics that would be discussed are described in this section (the topics are 
labelled A, B, C and D in the remainder of the document). Please note that these 
topics may be organised differently based on the feedback from the participants dur-
ing the kick-off meeting, and of the experts whose services are requested in this 
document.
 Topic A: Different Types of Altmetrics
Identify and discuss different types of altmetrics that are being used or developed by 
universities or research funding bodies. The aim is to explore new ways/standards 
of evaluating research proposals and research outcome taking into consideration all 
Open Science activities of researchers. Evaluation criteria should take due account 
of the engagement of researchers in Open Science.
 Topic B: How to Use Altmetrics in the Context of Open Science
Identify and discuss practical examples/best practices of how altmetrics is being 
used for evaluating research and rewarding researchers for engagement with Open 
Science The aim is to review/assess the current reputation system and adapt 
researcher career reward systems for engagement with Open Science practices.
 Topic C: Incentives and Rewards to Engage with Open Science Activities
Identify and discuss ‘good’ practices for incentivising and rewarding researchers to 
engage with open science activities. The aim is to credit activities which are 
Technology Studies with quite different scientific backgrounds: Sabina 
Leonelli (Exeter), winner of the 2018 Lakatos Award in the Philosophy of 
Science for her book Data-Centric Biology: A Philosophical Study (2016); 
Katja Mayer (Vienna) an experienced social science researcher affiliated with 
several institutes on science, technology and policy and Kim Holmberg 
(Turku) an expert on scientometrics, social media and altmetrics. Sabina and 
Katja were energetic, outspoken and totally focussed, Kim in true Scandic 
Style, took his time to reflect before speaking adequately and in a low voice. 
With this team and the participants from several member states we met several 
times in Brussels and went on tour to Helsinki, Dubrovnik and Zurich to learn 
what Open Science would mean for the different science systems in the mem-
ber states.
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important for Open Science, such as open review and evaluation, as well as citation, 
curation and management of research data.
 Topic D: Guidelines for Open Science
Review current state of play and share experiences in developing and implementing 
national policies and related actions for incentivising researchers and research insti-
tutions to engage with Open Science. The aim is to contribute to the ongoing discus-
sion on whether/which/how common Open Science principles and requirements 
could be set up to affect the roles, responsibilities and entitlements of researchers, 
their employers and funders.
In contrast to the Expert Groups were the experts wrote one paper, in ‘our’ MLE 
the experts did write papers, concurrent with and following our discussions with rep-
resentatives from the member states at the meetings held in Brussels, Helsinki, 
Dubrovnik and Zurich. From these conversations, speaking notes were taken that are 
still accessible as background information. These documents are very rich in that they 
demonstrate opportunities, inhibitions and caution about Open Science. In general, 
and in principle the attitude of the MLE participants was very positive but they very 
clearly pointed out the resistance and problems they anticipated. This informed us 
what type of action and support from the EU they would be needing in their country. 
They at least needed a clear ‘unisono’ voice from the different DG’s of the Commission 
and the Commission that this was going to happen because it was a necessary inter-
vention if science was to really contribute to the grand social and economic challenges.
The MLE final report, adopted by the EU Open Science Policy Platform 
(EUOSPP) and became part of its integrated advice to the Commission, in the spring 
of 2018 (EU, 2018). In the Supplements section, I reproduce the MLE Summary 
Article of January 2018 of which Katja Mayer was the main author.
I refer to the MLE Open Science website where all information about the MLE 
in a very handy format is findable, accessible and downloadable. These products 
written by Sabina Leonelli, Kim Holmberg and Katja Mayer reflect the way the 
MLE has been working, covering nearly all aspects of Open Science in explicit 
discussions regarding implementation, monitoring and evaluation. https://rio.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/policy-support-facility/mle-open-science-altmetrics-and-rewards
In these ten months, we were discussing in depth the cultural changes required for 
transition to Open Science, defined much broader than Open Access. By doing so, 
we discussed the way the science systems in the respective member states were orga-
nized and how they would be able to adopt Open Science. The differences in aca-
demic culture were amazing and highly relevant to the topic. We were introduced, to 
the different path-dependent, histories and evolutions of science, in which the legacy 
of national political history, religion, the effects of WWII, and the Balkan wars in the 
1990s, could be clearly distinguished. Differences in opinion about some of the prac-
tices of Open Science could only be fully understood after we were explained the 
deeper socio-economic politics of the country at informal evening diners of the coun-
try visits. We were made aware that in some countries the ministry appoints profes-
sors at the national level and research evaluation and its criteria are determined by the 
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ministry. Some countries, totally understandable to avoid potential nepotism, just 
had decided to use ‘objective’ indicators as JIF and h-index, other countries just 
decided to leave such use of metrics behind and go for narratives, interviews and peer 
review. The most prominent example maybe the fact that after WWII autonomy of 
scientists has been safeguarded in Article 5 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, which by some implies that scientists have full autonomy to not engage 
in Open Science. These cultural differences that exist even within the EU, make you 
wonder how Open Science will be received and what is needed to have it adopted in 
China and Russia, India, African and Latin and South American countries.
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Follow-up activities include many presentations of the MLE – nationally and internationally – broad
online and offline discussions of the outcomes, and several dedicated events (e.g. presentations in
OS-related committees and meetings), as well as a broader dissemination event in Brussels in
November 2018. Experts and country delegates alike will ensure the wide dissemination and
discussion of the MLE outcomes and thus contribute to European leadership in Open Science in all
that it represents.
For further information:
The Final Report of the PSF Mutual Learning Exercise on Open Science: Altmetrics and Rewards
https://rio.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/library/mle-open-science-altmetrics-and-rewards-final-report
The PSF Mutual Learning Exercise Open Science: Altmetrics and Rewards
https://rio.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/policy-support-facility/mle-open-science-altmetrics-and-rewards
Thirteen countries participated in the MLE: Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,
France, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland. Over
the course of one year, the participants met to explore the best ways to tackle the
challenges identified, trigger change and optimise the design and implementation of
Open Science policy instruments. Several country visits provided the opportunity to learn
from hands-on experience.  
7.6  Open Science, the Next Level
In the EU the action plan on Open Science, next to Open Access and Open Data, 
has now been directed to a series of Missions in which multidisciplinary teams will 
take on research on themes which have been defined in deliberation with the public, 
policy makers and private parties. The research aims at the broader fields defined by 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and derived concrete issues in sci-
ence and society. In that respect it seems that in HORIZON EUROPE RRI will meet 
Open Science in a sphere of deliberative democracy and value driven research.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/horizon-europe-next-research-and-innovation-frame-
work-programme/missions-horizon-europe_en
To boost the transition to Open Access, CoalitionS an international consortium 
of funders, including the Wellcome Trust, the Bill and Melissa Gates Foundation 
and Science Europe, supported by the EU and ERC started in September 2018 
PlanS. In January 2018, Robert Jan Smits, who worked closely with Carlos Moedas, 
after nearly eight years stepped down from his position as Director-General of DG 
Research and Innovation to become the figurehead of CoalitionS. Open Access pub-
lishing and the DORA principles have been promoted by PlanS in a paper  that 
CoalitioS published in September 2018 with a final version in the early months of 
2019. The idea of PlanS is very much based on APC’s which means that authors and 
their institutions pay to get articles published. PlanS does not allow for paying extra 
by authors to make their article open in subscription journals, which as argued 
before is the way researchers could still publish in top tier journals (Nature, Science 
and Cell for instance) that are in principle not open. PlanS must be regarded as 
transformatory, aiming in the longer run for true open access journals and platforms 
which are owned by academia and/or funders and are not commercially or privately 
managed. PlanS was met with criticism from some scientists who wanted freedom 
to publish, and as anticipated from the publishers but also from scientists from the 
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Global South and from institutes and countries where research funding is also hard 
to get. As researchers in less wealthy countries can neither afford subscription nor 
APCs, major inequality in science results from APC’s and we must consider how to 
move beyond APC’s. PlanS unfortunately still is very much a European Consortium 
although major institutes and funders in the USA are part of it. It is working to 
change this rapidly in order to be able to induce the required change in scholarly 
publishing at a global scale. Therefore, at least China and the USA, but also partners 
in Africa, South America and South-East Asia must be persuaded that PlanS will 
also be in line with their needs and cultural values. I refer to a recent publication 
edited by Martin Paul Eve and Jonathan Gray that provides insightful analyses of 
the dynamics of the scholarly publishing system with emphasis on the problems of 
inclusivity and inequality that I here touched up on only briefly.(Eve & Gray, 2020).
In many countries around the world the Open Science movement is gaining 
momentum. Open Science is boosted right now, since at the time of writing the prac-
tices of Open Science daily show their value in the fight against COVID-19. In many 
countries there are encouraging initiatives and interventions ongoing, but I realize 
how lucky we are that The Netherlands wants to be a front runner with since 2017 a 
National Open Science Platform, with a national open science coordinator, Karel 
Luyben who is also the chair of the EOSC and with the GO FAIR group at Leiden. 
Moreover, we have a recently launched nationwide program to change the Incentive 
and Reward System in academia (VSNU, 2019) and a newly designed Strategy 
Evaluation Protocol (SEP) (VSNU, 2020) for all research in the country, both which 
are taking the practices and goals of Open Science and a corresponding Recognition 
and Rewards model fully into account. This is a powerful sign that academic leader-
ship together with the ministry joined forces. In Utrecht in 2018 an ambitious com-
prehensive Open Science Programme was launched integrating  the four major 
themes Open Access, FAIR Data and Software, Public Engagement and Recognition 
and Rewards. Next to writing position papers and designing infographics the teams 
are engaged in bringing the activities with the Board and the Deans to the faculties 
but also to the different support services of the universities, like Communication and 
Marketing, HRM, the Library, Student,  Research and Education Services and 
Information and Technology Service. This university wide implementation is a logi-
cal component of the 2020–2025 UU Strategy with a choice for Open,  Sharing 
Knowledge, and Shaping Society (www.uu.nl/en/research/open-science.nl). Bottom 
up, we have seen very interesting and reassuring movements of early career scien-
tists that started Open Science Communities in almost all Dutch universities. 
Reassuring because it shows that Open Science has reached ‘the trenches’ where the 
scientists are in their daily practice but often do not see much change yet.
It Is All About Strategy
In the first weeks of January 2019 something happened to us. We, that is the 
five members of a committee that had been given the task to revise the 
Standard Evaluation Protocol (SEP). We met in November 2018 for the first 
time, two physicists, a social scientist, a historian/philosopher and a 
(continued)
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biochemist. The SEP is a national research evaluation protocol that is agreed 
upon by the federation of universities (VSNU), The Royal Society (KNAW) 
and the Dutch research Council (NWO). The first SEP was in 2003 in use. The 
protocol is revised every six years. Before the use of a SEP the University 
federation had a national protocol to evaluate whole disciplines. Interestingly, 
and luckily I would add, based on the numerical scores there was reputational 
competition but not (re)allocation of research funds or university lump sum 
funding (van Drooge et al., 2013). At the start of our committee work we were 
told that the feeling was that the SEP 2015–2021 was satisfactory and that 
only minimal changes were required. We realized however that new research 
evaluation protocols had been proposed in 2013 by KNAW committees for 
engineering, the social sciences and a national protocol for the humanities. At 
the same time, a consortium under the name of Quality and Relevance in the 
Humanities (QRIH) had produced a protocol for the humanities, which in 
2019 was a few years in use (https://www.qrih.nl). It was no coincidence that 
one of us, Frank van Vree, had been prominently involved in QRIH as Dean 
of the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Amsterdam. Finally, there 
was a national debate on incentives and rewards going on. 
We in November and December 2018 in two meetings discussed the previ-
ous SEP which at first sight indeed looked very good (VSNU, 2014). It was 
written in 2014 with amendments added in 2016. Compared to its predecessor 
it had downplayed the emphasis on quantity, productivity, metrics and thus 
the aspect of national competition. It stressed relevance to society and, a bit to 
our surprise I believe, made it clear that ‘the research unit’s own strategy and 
targets are guiding principles when designing the evaluation process.’ (p5) 
The working group that in the background supported us had obtained an eval-
uation report on how SEP had been actually used by research evaluations in 
the recent past. There was limited data, but it left the impression that the inten-
tions and prescriptions of the SEP had not been followed. With respect to 
huge differences in research practices and academic output, the degrees of 
freedom offered by SEP had also not been taken advantage of. Audits still 
very much were focused on quantitative output (papers, JIF and h-index, 
books published by specific publishers) and research grants won.
These first days of the new year it dawned on us that the SEP was not the 
problem, it could be easily updated with new developments like DORA, Open 
Access, Open Data and the other aspects of Open Science that are less well 
known. The problem was the way the evaluations were done and how poorly 
that connected to the context of the researchers, their research and to our rela-
tionship with society. The research evaluations were experienced as a heavy 
burden, with little noticeable effect and not thought of as an interesting oppor-
tunity for reflection on strategy and goals looking for improvement in discus-
sion with colleague’s, peers but also with Deans and the Board of the institute. 
We decided to take time to think this through and organized in February and 
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March several combined lively meetings with the working group who 
responded enthusiastically to this intervention. We made a choice to not only 
assess ‘the what’, the quality and diverse impacts of research results, which is 
more or less the usual assessment. We wanted in the new SEP to emphasize 
the evaluation of ‘the how’. How is a research unit managed and organized, is 
there a deliberate strategy for research, but also with respect to leadership, 
HRM, integrity, safety and diversity? How is the unit connected to scientists 
in other disciplines and to stakeholders in society? Is there awareness of rel-
evant developments in science and the world? This turn was generally under-
stood and well received. Working towards a draft version of the new SEP after 
the summer, we discussed in small and larger national meetings the new items 
like DORA, Open Science, the use of narratives and numerical scores and the 
idea of academic culture with deans, rectors, directors of institutes, research-
ers and university policy advisors.
There were issues and worries. The idea that researchers in departments 
and research centres should have a research strategy beyond production 
of papers and winning grants which would be the start of the evaluation pro-
cess was not always immediately accepted. It was felt to be problematic that 
the evaluation looked to the  strategy of a unit  and thus was  incomparable 
between units doing research in the same discipline in another universi-
ties with different strategic aims. This and abandoning the use of numerical, 
‘absolute’, scores was felt to introduce subjectivity since it made comparisons 
within and over disciplines impossible. We argued that this sense of objectiv-
ity in comparing apples with pears was anyhow false to begin with. There was 
a feeling that narratives of researchers, which were proposed to explain stra-
tegic aims, plans and results might be used to cover up weaknesses by smooth 
and slick language. The narratives of the audit committee, it was expected, 
would be vague, non-critical and useless. Some, as expected, suggested: 
‘Wouldn’t journal metrics and a final score of 1 to 5 be more objective and 
thus better? It takes also much less time than reading and discussing the sci-
ence.’ We listened during the year carefully to these very diverse opinions, 
worries and comments which we used to improve the SEP until its final ver-
sion of December 2019 (VSNU, 2020). We knew that for the use of this pro-
tocol with a new, more meaningful, way of reflecting on and assessment of 
research, researchers and policy makers will need help from experts. We real-
ized as I conveyed in this book, that science is in transition, more than we had 
anticipated a year before and that therefore the gradual change of the SEP, the 
research evaluation indirectly linked to the academic incentive and rewards 
system, was logical if not inevitable. Finally, but importantly it was decided 
and accepted to change the name of Standard Evaluation Protocol to the more 
appropriate Strategy Evaluation Protocol.
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With these developments with respect to our thinking about the way we should 
do research evaluations, in our country and also abroad, I would say clear progress 
has been made. We are in transition to begin using evaluation schemes that recog-
nize and respect that science and scholarship in its goals and practices are in essence 
pluriform, must be open, inclusive and diverse and should allow for the ‘outside-in’ 
perspective by those who are stakeholders to our research in the wider society. It 
puts emphasis next to its products also very much on the process and practice of 
research. Finally, and most importantly the evaluation has to be performed inte-
grally from the perspective of the aims and strategy of the research unit that is being 
evaluated. Strategy and aims may be confined to the domain of science and knowl-
edge for its own sake but may very well also be inspired by societal challenges, 
regional, national or international. This changes the credit cycle as shown below to 
be truly open to and collaborating and sharing with relevant agents in society.
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7.7  The Sceptics: ‘Open Science is either naïve or the next 
neoliberal trick’
The unwanted influence and distorting effects of political, economic or other 
forms of abuse of power was discussed in relation to Dewey’s deliberative 
democracy and Rawls’ well-ordered society, Kitcher’s well-ordered science, the 
Public Engagement movements and Mode-2 science in Chap. 4 and 5 (see for the 
critique for instance (Halffman & Radder, 2015) (Fuller, 2000). Some have 
argued that Open Science is either naïve or the next neoliberal trick. There are 
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those who have a deep concern, if not a total distrust, regarding the pervasive 
influences of late capitalism and its neoliberalism in current politics in almost all 
countries around the world. The same worries have been expressed and apply in 
the context of Open Science (Mirowski, 2018). There are two main and very dif-
ferent responses to the worries about public engagement in a ‘post-truth’ age, 
which resonate the Dewey-Lipmann debate one hundred years ago discussed in 
previous Chapters. The first response is Open Science, Deweyan, as is well-
ordered science and in a sense Mode-2. The other reaction is returning to a more 
classical insulated way of doing science, distrusting external influences and pro-
tecting science and research from these influences and in essence going back to 
Mode-1. I have argued that this response does not seem to take into account the 
major changes in society, which are undeniably of great relevance for the prac-
tice of science and its relationship with the citizens in society and its role in 
policy making in democracies (Habermas, 1970, 1971; Jasanoff & Simmet, 
2017). Jasanoff and Simmet correctly stated that ‘post-truth’ and ‘alternative 
facts’ are powered by, but not caused by the internet or social media, and have 
existed in different forms in any human civilization. Science and experts have to 
deal with that by engaging and debating. Romanticising the authority of the clas-
sical myth of science and scientism is not the way to go.
With regard to Open data and Open Access it has been noted correctly that in 
these movements the perspective is mainly that of the richer countries. I refer to a 
book on the different perspectives and worries about Open Access in Science and 
the politics of openness (Nerlich et al., 2018). including a chapter by Stephen Curry 
who is the leading person of DORA. I already referred to the book edited by Eve 
and Gray elaborating on these issues (Eve & Gray, 2020).
Subscription fees, especially in combination with Article Processing Costs 
(APCs) the latter now central in most OA models, are beyond financial capacities 
of researchers in large parts of the world – for instance South-East Europe, Africa, 
South America, Indonesia and India. Will the richer more powerful countries ben-
efit more from Open Data? From that perspective as a reflex, some argue science 
must be insulated and not be made more open and not be rendered more vulnera-
ble to these external powers than it already is. As I have argued above, based on 
recent history, that is not the way science should develop, given the socio-eco-
nomic and public health issues we are facing now and will be facing in the 
near future.
Open Science, Open Eyes to the World
Isn’t it obvious that implementing DORA, which forbids the use of JIF as a 
proxy for quality is a blessing to all those who were for the wrong reasons left 
behind? Isn’t making journal articles Open Access, by having the authors pay 
Article Processing Costs (APCs) an important step? Now everybody, every-
where can read without costs. Don’t we all agree?
(continued)
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Not that afternoon, December 2019. I was in KU Leuven and took part in 
a discussion on: ‘Open access in a global perspective: comparing policies and 
practices’. Three expert speakers presented their views of the Open Access 
movement, including PlanS.  From their perspective from the East and the 
South (Mexico, South Africa and Indonesia), Plan S was no good. Subscription 
fees but also APCs, ranging from 550–5000 USD per article, are in their part 
of the world far beyond financial reach of scientists. Even worse, at the same 
time they are required by their institutions, who want to climb the Rankings, 
to publish their work in the high impact journals. Moreover, regarding pub-
lishing Open Data, because of the minimal research options and budgets, 
despite their good ideas, they would not be able to profit from Open Data. But 
others with more budget will be able to use their data, they said. One of the 
speakers shared with us his deep-felt worry that in his country where half of 
the population lives in poverty, universities demand papers in high ranked 
internal journals which forces researchers away from badly needed research 
on local and national problems.
(continued)
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7.8  Beyond the Metrics: Why Care About How We Assess 
Research Impact?
Prof. Mamokgethi Phakeng, June 26, 2018.
UCT has been grappling with the challenges of how to measure the impact of 
science beyond bibliometrics – in particular, the effect of the current system on the 
progress of young researchers and on encouraging socially responsive, interdisci-
plinary research that addresses South Africa’s and the continent’s problems. At a 
recent symposium intended to bring together thought-leaders to challenge our 
thinking and help us start to develop alternative tools, Professor Mamokgethi 
Phakeng introduced the event during the week before she assumed her position as 
UCT’s vice-chancellor. What follows are her thought-provoking words.
Why do you do the research that you do? What has been the impact of your 
research so far? What has it informed? What has it changed? What difference has 
it made?
After these for us confrontational talks, in the debate session I could 
only humbly admit that the speakers were totally right and fully entitled to 
put this critique to us, scientists from rich countries. I realised, we have 
these experiences, but we must work much harder to reflect on them and 
have them influence our way of doing and improving science. I referred to 
my learning experience in a multidisciplinary ten-year project on HIV/
AIDS in Ethiopia. In the Ethiopian Netherlands AIDS Research Project 
(ENARP), the Amsterdam HIV/AIDS researchers in close collaboration 
with The Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute in Addis Ababa 
between 1993 and 2003, had set up a large prospective study on HIV and 
AIDS. In that very productive international project, we were continuously 
reminded by our Ethiopian colleagues about their vision about how the 
project should be executed and about research on the local needs of the 
public. HIV/AIDS was in Ethiopia a very different disease which for 
instance affected women and children much more then in Europe. Doing 
scientific research also was a different social endeavour compared to 
Amsterdam because of the local socio- economic situation and of course 
totally different cultural values and beliefs. At times we were reminded that 
because we had more money, we should not think that we were smarter and 
better scientists. In addition, I mentioned my more recent experience at a 
meeting at Cape Town University in June 2018 with the topic: Beyond the 
Metrics: Measuring the Impact of Research. There young researchers 
working in the Townships showed us what science has to offer when 
addressing the needs of local populations struggling with poverty and dis-
ease. This was preceded by an impressive introduction by Professor 
Mamokgethi Phakeng the Vice-Chancellor of UCT about science and 
democracy which I here reproduce in its entirety.
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How different would our society be without it? If you hadn’t done the research 
that you have done so far, what is it that we would have missed? Most importantly, 
how do you know that your research is making an impact? What is it that tells you 
that your research has had impact?
These questions are as relevant to individual researchers as they are to university 
management, funders and government, and this is the reason why we need to con-
sider the important issue of moving beyond metrics to measure research impact.
Measuring the impact of our research is about considering what happens as a 
result of our research. That’s the tricky part, because it means a researcher can’t 
actually “do impact”. You can only undertake activities that enable impact to hap-
pen. The questions we ask, the theories, approaches and methodologies we use, as 
well as how we do our analysis and present our findings are all important and can 
enable impact. And of course, impact will happen when others take-up and use our 
research to change something.
I want to offer three provocations with a hope that they filter into our conversa-
tions about this important topic.
What are the shared values between sound research and sound democracy?
The first provocation is that research impact is a result of not only the knowledge 
that is produced. We should look at the impact of research also from the perspective 
of the values that the practice and process of research inculcates, especially in a 
young democracy such as ours.
But does research have a place in building democracy?
There are important similarities between research and democracy: the sound 
conduct of research and the sound conduct of democracy both depend on the same 
shared values. The very virtues that make democracy work are also those that make 
research work: a commitment to reason and transparency, an openness to critical 
scrutiny, a scepticism towards claims that too neatly support reigning values, a will-
ingness to listen to countervailing opinions, a readiness to admit uncertainty and 
ignorance, and a respect for evidence gathered according to the sanctioned best 
practices of the moment.
Looking at research impact from this perspective not only elevates research, but 
it also elevates democracy. Of course, we can argue about whether research has a 
unique claim on these shared values. That is not important at this stage: what is 
important is that these values are critical, especially in our country where we must 
build a culture of democracy.
In strengthening democratic values, we also renew the preconditions for scien-
tific discovery and technological innovation, and thus, high-impact research. The 
converse of this is also true – research with impact can serve as a precondition for 
building a vibrant democracy.
Should all of our research be for the public good?
The second provocation is that questions about research impact are often about 
the contestation of resources: where we invest them and why. We spend billions in 
public money on research annually, so we have to be accountable and consider its 
social, economic and environmental impact, as well as its impact on health and 
well-being and technological developments.
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Questions about research impact also force us to consider whether our research 
spending is the best way to use our very limited resources. Considering the source 
of our research funding, it is very easy to argue that research should be for public 
good. But the question is, should all of our research be for the good of the public?
My view is that it is important to have a balance between curiosity-driven and 
mission-oriented research; research that tackles fundamental questions and research 
that serves corporate interests; and research for pleasure and research for pay.
Despite the need to engage in research for the public good, it is also necessary to 
create safe spaces where smart minds can tackle hard questions without any expec-
tation of immediate applications. Like democracy, research is also a value to pursue 
for its own sake. The argument for engaging in curiosity-driven research that tackles 
fundamental questions or research for pleasure is always going to be difficult to sell 
because in a developing country, such as ours, research has a big responsibility to 
respond to the triple-challenge of unemployment, inequality and poverty. But scien-
tific knowledge is a public good, therefore courageous policymakers and funders 
should be prepared to pay for that resource without imposing a utilitarian approach 
on all publicly funded acquisition of knowledge.
How does the way we measure impact shape our research?
The third provocation is that the way we measure impact has implications for 
how we recognise and reward performance. It will therefore shape our research 
activity, research output and research training. If metrics drive research, the danger 
is that research can become formulaic – focused only on getting citations and impact 
factors right for purposes of career advancement and winning grants. This will 
encourage unethical behaviour and destroy our scholarship. We can already see this 
in the increase in the number of predatory journals as well as people who publish in 




7.9  Open Science in an Open Society
These problems and threats to science are very real as we do witness these days both 
in democracies and less democratic state-capitalist systems. Obviously, from the 
economic perspective, Research and Innovation is a main driver of economic growth 
and job creation. This is clearly stated in most national, EU or international plans 
about science and technology and has been the dominant driver in the recent past. 
At the same, because of hard work and lobby, I am sure, societal targets and societal 
impact have a firm place in the agenda and the social sciences and humanities are 
increasingly building their case in these times of the Covid-19 pandemic. SDG’s 
and Grand Challenges are inclusive and perceptive to social needs and values. As 
argued in the previous chapters, in a true pragmatist vision, research and its subse-
quent social actions must be inclusive and continuously reach beyond classical tech-
nocratic scientism. In this book I have focussed on the role of science and research 
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and how it must be organized and reshaped to contribute more and differently. It is 
clear that Open Science, which engages in a truly open relationship with the public 
can only optimally contribute to an Open Society with a certain minimal degree of 
democracy. It is not for science to decide how politics and the public sphere is orga-
nized and regulated. Given the above, however, the engagement of scientists, irre-
spective of their political views, to contribute as public intellectuals in this debate, 
and thus in political discussions about institutions and the proper functioning of 
democracy is required.
Finally, one may wonder, will there ever be One Science in the sense of a world-
wide truly Open Science Practice? That was the belief of the previous generations 
after WWI and WWII, but we have seen how this, despite modernization and glo-
balization, has developed in our present hyper-modern times. It seems we are not 
even near, but my hope is that Open Science may well be one of the best instruments 
to align science under a global banner and Europe must be optimistic and lead the 
way as it successfully did in the COVID-19 crisis at the time I wrote these lines.
The New York Times, May 4, 2020
World Leaders Join to Pledge $8 Billion for Vaccine as U.S. Goes It Alone
The E.U. organized a teleconference to raise money for coronavirus vaccine 
research, drawing contributions from around the world.
President Trump skipped the chance to contribute, with officials in his admin-
istration noting that the United States is pouring billions of dollars into its 
own research efforts.
BRUSSELS – Prime ministers, a king, a prince and Madonna all chipped in 
to an $8 billion pot to fund a coronavirus vaccine.
A fund-raising conference on Monday organized by the European Union 
brought pledges from countries around the world – from Japan to Canada, 
Australia to Norway – to fund laboratories that have promising leads in devel-
oping and producing a vaccine.
(continued)
7 Transition to Open Science
209
References
Bartling, S. (Ed.). (2014). Open Science: The evolving guide on how the internet is changing 
research, collaboration and scholarly publishing. SpringerLink.
Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive modernization : Politics, tradition and aesthet-
ics in the modern social order. Polity Press.
Burgelman, J.-C., Pascu, C., Szkuta, K., Von Schomberg, R., Karalopoulos, A., Repanas, K., & 
Schouppe, M. (2019). Open Science, open data, and open scholarship: European policies to 
make science fit for the twenty-first century. Frontiers in Big Data, 2. https://doi.org/10.3389/
fdata.2019.00043
EBRARY. Restricted to UCB IP addresses. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/berkeley-ebooks/
detail.action?docID=3339454.
ESF. (2013). Science in society: Caring for our futures in turbulent times. Retrieved http://archives.
esf.org/uploads/media/spb50_ScienceInSociety.pdf
EU. (2016). Open innovation, Open Science, open to the world. Retrieved from https://op.europa.
eu/s/sTsE
EU. (2017a). Evaluation of research careers fully acknowledging Open Science activities. 
Retrieved from https://orbi.uliege.be/bitstream/2268/215460/1/os_rewards_wgreport_final.pdf
EU. (2017b). Next-generation metrics: Responsible metrics and evaluation for Open Science. 
Retrieved https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b858d952-0a19-11e7-8a35- 
01aa75ed71a1
EU. (2018). Open Science policy platform recommendations. Retrieved from https://www.go-fair.
org/2018/07/02/2351/.
EU. (2019). Indicator frameworks for fostering open knowledge practices in science and scholar-
ship. Retrieved https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b69944d4-01f3-11ea-
8c1f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-108756824
Eve, M. P., & Gray, J. (2020). Reassembling scholarly communications: Histories, infrastructures, 
and global politics of open access (pp. 1 online resource (xxvii, 438 pages)). Retrieved from 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?bknumber=9255850 IEEE Xplore.
Fecher, B., & Friesike, S. (2014). Open Science: One term, five schools of thought. In F. S. Bartling 
(Ed.), Opening science. Springer.
Fuller, S. (2000). The governance of science : Ideology and the future of the open society. Open 
University Press.
Habermas, J. (1970). Toward a rational society. Heinemann Educational Books.
Habermas, J. (1971). Knowledge and human interests. Beacon Press.
Halffman, W., & Radder, H. (2015). The academic manifesto: From an occupied to a public univer-
sity. Minerva, 53(2), 165–187. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-015-9270-9
Jasanoff, S., & Simmet, H. R. (2017). No funeral bells: Public reason in a ‘post-truth’ age. Social 
Studies of Science, 47(5), 751–770. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312717731936
Impact factor abandoned by Dutch University in hiring and promotions, Nature June 25, 2021.
For more than three hours, one by one, global leaders said a few words over 
video link and offered their nations’ contribution, small or large, whatever 
they could muster. For Romania, it was $200,000. For Canada, $850 million. 
It was a rare show of global leadership on the part of the Europeans, and a 
late-hour attempt at international coordination. Countries the world over have 




Mirowski, P. (2018). The future(s) of Open Science. Social Studies of Science, 48(2), 171–203. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312718772086
MIT Press Direct. (If available from multiple sources, select The MIT Press Direct). Restricted to 
UC campuses https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9286.001.0001.
Nerlich, B., Hartley, S., Raman, S., & Smith, A. T. T. (2018). Science and the politics of openness: 
Here be monsters. Manchester University Press.
Nielsen, M.  A. (2012). Reinventing discovery: The new era of networked science. Princeton 
University Press.
Owen, R., Macnaghten, P., & Stilgoe, J. (2012). Responsible research and innovation: From sci-
ence in society to science for society, with society. Science and Public Policy, 39(6), 751–760. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scs093
Owen, R., Bessant, J. R., & Heintz, M. (2013). Responsible innovation: Managing the responsible 
emergence of science and innovation in society. Wiley-Blackwell.
Project MUSE. https://muse.jhu.edu/book/46989.
Project Muse. Restricted to UCB IP addresses. https://muse.jhu.edu/book/46989/.
Rentier, B. (2019). Open Science, the challenge of transparancy. Académie Royale de Belgique.
Stilgoe, J., Owen, R., & Macnaghten, P. (2013). Developing a framework for responsible innova-
tion. Research Policy, 42(9), 1568–1580.
Suber, P. (2012). Open access [text]MIT Press essential knowledge (pp. 1 online resource (xii, 242 
pages)). Retrieved from MIT Press via IEEE Xplore. Restricted to UCB, UCD, UCI, UCLA, 
UCM, UCR, UCSC, and UCSD http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?bknumber=6267549
Suber, P. (2016). Knowledge unbound selected writings on open access, 2002–2011. MIT Press.
van Drooge, L., de Jong, Stefan, Faber, Marike, Westerheijden, Donald F. (2013). Twenty 
years of research evaluation. Retrieved https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/
twenty-years-of-research-evaluation
Von Schomberg, R. (2011). Prospects for technology assessment in a frame of ressponsible 
research and innovation. In R. Dusseldorp & M. Beecroft (Eds.), Technikfolgen abschätzen 
lehren:Bildungspotenziale transdisziplinärer Methoden. Wiesbaden Verlag.
von Schomberg, R. (2019). Why responsible innovation. In R. von Schomberg (Ed.), The inter-
national handbook on responsible innovation. A global resource (pp. 12–32). Edward Elgar 
Publishing.
von Schomberg, R., & Hankins, J. (Eds.). (2019). International handbook on responsible innova-
tion : A global resource. Edward Elgar, Publishing.
VSNU. (2014). Standard evaluation protocol 2015–2021. Retrieved from https://www.knaw.nl/nl/
actueel/publicaties/standard-evaluation-protocol-2015-2021
VSNU. (2019). Room for everyone’s talent., towards a new balance in the recognition and 
rewards of academics. Retrieved from https://vsnu.nl/recognitionandrewards/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/Position-paper-Room-for-everyone%E2%80%99s-talent.pdf
VSNU. (2020). Strategy evaluation protocol 2021–2027.Retrieved from https://www.vsnu.nl/files/
documenten/Domeinen/Onderzoek/SEP_2021-2027.pdf
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
7 Transition to Open Science
211© The Author(s) 2022
F. Miedema, Open Science: the Very Idea, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2115-6_8
Chapter 8
Epilogue: Open Science in an Open Society
Abstract The European Union has chosen Open Science as the way to do science 
and research based on its cultural and social values. Open Science can only really 
thrive in democracies and Open Societies to the benefit of humanity. This relation-
ship between science, scientists and society is not trival and sometimes endangered, 
therefore we need to continuously engage in research with and for society. 
I have described in detail  the changes in science and more briefly the changes 
in society since 1945 that are of greatest relevance to the current practice of science 
and research. The old way of thinking about and doing science does not fit with the 
dynamics and needs of social life and society in this age of hyper-modernity. I have 
discussed in depth why and how research and academia have to change to make 
both of them fit for the future.
I have followed experts, philosophers, sociologist, historians and STS scholars in 
the evolution of their thinking about science. I have shown that since the 1980s they 
have gone back to old, but realistic concepts of pragmatism of how science produces 
reliable knowledge and how it will increase its impact. These concepts are still valid 
and since 1980 have been revitalised and modernized by the most influential and 
visionary thinkers about science in society. This intellectual journey eventually, and 
I argued in many respects inevitably, led us to Open Science, an inclusive delibera-
tive and democratic way to set the agenda of science and research in connection 
with ‘the publics and their problems’ in society. By doing research according to the 
practice of Open Science we will in a truly inclusive way, appreciate and accom-
modate all kinds of academic research and their different excellences and products. 
I have argued that this is required to successfully take on the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and the Grand Societal Challenges of our time having said this, it 
must be realized that Open Science needs an Open Society, and vice versa the Open 
Society needs Open Science to contribute in a balanced way to its social and eco-
nomic future.
That future has already started and is badly in need of knowledge produced by 
science performed according to the model of Open Science. Writing these lines, we 
are daily witnessing how the COVID-19 pandemic since March 2020 has devasting 
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effects on global health and prosperity and hence our societies and the lives we live 
all over the world. In the final lines of the previous chapter on Open Science I asked 
the question: ‘Will there ever be One Open Science in the sense of a worldwide 
community committed to practice Open Science?’ In the midst of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the relationship between science and society becomes immediate and 
urgent and is shown to be absolutely critical to our future, for the short and for the 
longer term. When the damage to public health and the personal drama of literally 
hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by the virus are in the daily news, and the 
worries about its effects, both on health and economics in the other parts of the 
world are increasing, experts and their science were immediately on the problem 
and at the heart of policy advice and policy making. The general insecurity and the 
broadly felt lack of control caused by an invisible virus directs the attention of the 
public to the scientific experts and they look up to them with expectation and hope. 
Virologists and epidemiologists first, and then social scientists and economists were 
asked to comment and give their views, on how to keep us healthy and on what will 
happen to the economy and our social life. How come we didn’t see it coming? Can 
we get back our control? Can a next pandemic by such a virus be prevented or at 
least more rapidly controlled by science?
Fortunately, the scientists were almost all honest brokers, giving honest answers 
about what science is and what its limitations are. We have to admit, and anticipate, 
this leaves the public behind with fears of high risk, lack of control and insecurity 
with respect to their personal future. As expected in major crises, populist parties 
and other groups in society playing to the emotions of their electorate and followers 
showed distrust of science and experts in a wave of anti-elitism. Experts and politi-
cians in the meantime try to be as transparent as possible with respect to the incom-
plete data, that was literally changing and improving day by day, for their analysis 
and advice, and the seperate process of  political decision making, respectively. 
Apart from some loud minorities who did not believe COVID-19 existed or was 
harmful at all, the trust in science was high. It is quite disturbing that President 
Trump and other elected presidents for shorter or longer times seemed to openly 
sympathize or belong to these minorities. Geopolitics interfered with the free flow 
of scientific data on the origin of the virus and resulted in the usual blaming and 
scapegoating. This explains Trump’s no-evidence accusations on the part of China 
and the censoring and silencing of researchers and civilians by the Chinese 
government.
In the meantime, the international scientific organization of the open exchange of 
data on the molecular biology, receptor use, sequence of the viral RNA of the virus 
and specimens and research material and data on the course of the pandemic -preva-
lence, hospitalization, ICU needs, mortality and morbidity- was a true example of a 
near global Open Science practice. Despite Trump’s believe May 9th, 2020 that the 
virus would spontaneously go away without a vaccine, subsequently, initiatives to 
establish (pre)competitive global initiatives to develop therapy and vaccines were 
launched. Of course, given how we have decided to organize the production of vac-
cines and medicines in our societies, the interaction with pharmaceutical companies 
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is economically complex. They normally have to please their shareholders while 
operating in the international markets, but now for COVID-19 were made to commit 
to affordable prizes based on transparent costs, but patents are allowed. As of this 
writing a couple of vaccines have already been approved, have shown excellent 
protection and vaccinations have started and shown success. With a pandemic which 
appears to be extremely difficult to control, this is a major achievement and hope-
fully will have a major effect on the course of the pandemic worldwide. The devel-
opment of COVID-19 tests and treatment modalities, but in particular the historic 
quick and large-scale development of different vaccines is widely heralded as a 
major triumph for science, comparable by some to the Manhattan project. The aca-
demic publishers have opened up their paywalls to provide open access to articles 
related to corona viruses and COVID-19. After the applause dies away, it prompts 
the obvious question why this is not common practice because thinking about bio-
medicine and health alone, cancer, stroke, cardiovascular disease, asthma, demen-
tia, and Alzheimer’s and many other diseases aren’t they not also a major threat to 
our health. Wouldn’t this be very helpful for research and innovation on climate 
change and our thinking how to work on inequality, institutions in open societies 
and the many other fields of research and scholarship including ethics, political 
philosophy, research on socioeconomics badly needed to guide our actions in com-
plexities of the real world?
Why can we only mobilize science and scientists and academic publishers in 
times of intense crises and of war? I agree with Marianne Mazzucato who has with 
endless energy and high visibility and impact argued for more direction and guid-
ance from governments in democracies to organize our science and development 
according to large societal missions (Mazzucato, 2013) (Mazzucato, 2018). In the 
EU, as I discussed in Chap. 7, this has already started in Horizon 2020 and is an 
even more pronounced founding principle of the Horizon Europe program that will 
from 2021.
8.1  Open Society
This idea of an Open Society, or rather the lack of it, may be the problem for optimal 
development and implementation of Open Science in certain regions of the world. 
In the COVID-19 crisis, because it started unquestionably in mainland China, we 
were on a near daily basis tutored on Chinese history and politics. This tutoring 
already began with the trade conflicts between the USA and China and by the 
increase of Chinese interventions in Hong Kong in 2019. For some reason, we in the 
EU, with the Obama administration, had high hopes for reforms in China which 
would we thought bring the country more towards personal freedom and some form 
of liberal democracy. In the past 15  years many universities started very active 
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collaborations with counterparts in mainland China. Many had such collaborations 
in Hong Kong and Singapore to keep in contact with the Far East and its huge 
investments in higher education and research. The Chinese Academy of Science 
actively started efforts to improve the quality of the research which was being cri-
tiqued in recent years in Nature and Science. In the more recent years however, 
these expectations of societal and political change did not materialize. On the con-
trary, the Chinese Communist Party and their leader who holds absolute power, 
have adopted state capitalism and gone back to their old concepts about politics, the 
state and society. Their goal clearly is not only to become an economic and politi-
cal superpower, but also to show that their model of the state and society is superior 
to the Western liberal or social democracies. In this major scheme, it places inter-
ests of the state, determined by the CCP, above personal freedom of its citizens. It 
is exactly the latter that has, with the Enlightenment, brought Modernity to the 
West which allowed for the development of modern science. The experts on China 
tell us how to understand these developments in the context of the past hundred 
years of Chinese history, and in the present, China’s interventions among others in 
Hong Kong. China is rapidly developing to become a global superpower in sci-
ence and technology, which for science and open science means that there will for 
years to come not be one global community, not one way of doing science and 
research.
There actually never was one global science community, but after 1989 there was 
a brief moment in time when we believed that it might be possible to have a global 
science, which we in the West erroneously thought per definition would be our way 
of doing science. The way Chinese society and its science are governed does not 
allow for science and research to be performed in open deliberative relationship 
with the publics and their problems as I have depicted in Chap. 5 as the ideal. This 
does not mean that there will not be collaboration, exchange and discussion with 
Chinese researchers. There are many grand and global challenges, such as 
COVID-19, economics and climate change in which global collaboration in research 
consortia are to the benefit of us all, no matter our different national political sys-
tems. To investigate these problems and their solutions, normative political choices 
with regards to science have to be made. For this academic leadership at every level 
of the science system, national and international, funder or academia has to step up 
to the plate. The EU has chosen Open Science as the way to do science and research. 
It are the political, cultural and social values of the EU in which we have to keep 
investing to see to it that Open Science can thrive in democracies and Open Societies 
to the benefit of all people (Wilsdon & Rijcke, 2019).
Hong Kong, Where the West meets the East.
Utrecht University has in the past seven years invested in an institutional 
research collaboration with Chinese University of Hong Kong. This has been 
established by several professors and members of their research groups and 
by spin outs of UMC Utrecht. I first visited CUHK with a UU life science 
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delegation in December 2013, at which occasion a collaborative agreement 
between the universities was signed by Marjan Oudeman, the Utrecht 
University President and the Vice Chancellor Joseph J.Y. Sun. There are many 
common research interests, from regenerative medicine, 3D printing of carti-
lage to be surgically applied to the knees of the affected elderly, to large cohort 
research on schizophrenia and public health in relation to air pollution. 
Professor Tuan, a very open and dynamic personality, was the leader of the 
orthopaedic regenerative medicine program. He had an impressive career in 
medicine in several top-notch universities the USA before he returned to 
Hong Kong. Opportunities for collaboration were discussed with major uni-
versities in mainland China and especially with the enormous new research 
and biotech facilities that were being build, just across the border, in Shenzhen. 
We fully realized these opportunities and the commitment of China to science 
and technology, since we had just arrived from Beijing where we visited 
Peking University and had meetings over dinner with government officials. I 
remember the magnificent view overlooking Hong Kong from the high hilltop 
on which the Board of CUHK has her offices and where we discussed science 
and research over lunch in a very friendly and open atmosphere.
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Things have taken another course though. It happened that I was again in 
Hong Kong in the first week of June 2019, to give a talk at the 6th World 
Congress on Research Integrity (https://wcrif.org/wcri2019). The meeting 
was hosted by Hong Kong University in the person of Mai Har Sham, 
Associate Vice-President (Research), a biomedical researcher by training 
who has a strong track records in research integrity. It was a very international 
meeting with a program that touched upon the different levels of academic 
integrity, including students, PhD’s, professors but also at the institutional 
Board level of Deans and Vice Chancellors. As discussed in Chap. 7, I dis-
cussed Open Science as a practice of science and research which may help to 
improve research integrity at all levels. I stressed that for this to be success-
fully achieved, we have to reflect on our way of doing research, how we orga-
nize academia, and about our ideas about the relationship with society. This 
resonated well with the opening statement of the congress, which emphasized 
the need to reflect on cultural differences and how they influence our ideas 
about science. There were plenary presentations by colleagues from universi-
ties and government agencies around the world and from the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences. In her presentation professor Mai Har Sham touched upon the 
current issues regarding scientific integrity and the actions that were ongoing. 
In January 2019, I returned to CUHK, with an Utrecht University delega-
tion now lead by our President Anton Pijpers. A warm welcome was expressed 
by professor Rocky Tuan, the CUHK’s Vice Chancellor since January 2018. I 
passionately delivered my short opening talk on Open Science in UMCU and 
UU and our aim to increase impact by public engagement. I was, I am afraid, 
a bit hyped-up since because of delays, we came straight from the airport. 
Besides, that the speaker on behalf of the host started with the usual figures, 
metrics and the Shanghai ranking of CUHK, the idea of science for real 
impact was met with sympathy and we heard that similar actions had started 
in CUHK. We again had very constructive conversations and exchanges and, 
though we did not visit CUHK at Shenzen, were impressed by what had there 
been achieved. This clearly was a big opportunity with indeed major invest-
ments coming also to the advantage of CUHK. In the evening we took part in 
a meeting with UU students and alumni at the Dutch Consulate. The Consul 
reassured us, in a private talk, that Hong Kong was politically stable, and that 
Beijing was more than happy with Hong Kong as an international business 
and science hub. The recent unrests were to be regarded as minor incidents, no 
need to worry about.
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Taking stock of science in the COVID-19 crises, it seems that science and scien-
tists as an international community are committed and more than ready to practice 
Open Science. However, the open society- with its plurality, economic inequality, 
the speed and the use and abuse of social media, the higher levels of education, but 
also the increasing differences in education levels, the populism fuelled by politi-
cians- is often felt to make the connection between science and the public no less 
complex and to someeven dangerous. Social media and the role of the tech giants 
since 1990 have had an enormous impact on how, when and where the debates in the 
public sphere take place. Fuelled by ugly partisan battles, the internet it seems has 
divided countries and people more than it has resulted in open debates, in which 
listening to each other’s fears and opinions is being practiced, to reach mutual 
agreements. This is a major problem for science and society. Recently we have seen 
the worst of it in the USA, where partisan battle lines already since the 1980s are 
raging. Despite the ideals of the Founding Fathers and the Constitution, before and 
after the Progressive Era of 1890-1920 or FDR’s New Deal, the USA has seen such 
ugly episodes before Google, Facebook, Twitter, the internet and cable news with 
CNN, Fox News nearly wiped out serious media and national newspapers. These 
episodes have to a great extend determined politics in general and the politics of 
science in particular (Diggins, 1992, 1994). Lepore’s impressive history of the 
USA, through the lens of the Declaration of Independence (1776) and the 
Constitution (1787), is a surprisingly gloomy reading experience (Lepore, 2018). 
The Founding Fathers clearly anticipated the ugly episodes with partisan battle 
lines, so we must, nor in politics nor in science be naïve, but we must from academia 
engage in continuous debate with policy makers and the various publics. There are 
many experiences showing that engaging in serious discourse about contrasting 
ideas and convictions is helpful to reach levels of understanding, if not common 
ground about issues in social life. Moreover, as Habermas argues, these 
After a presentation by a colleague from a Chinese university about the uni-
versity’s actions and code of conduct, critical questions from the floor regard-
ing problems with integrity and intellectual autonomy caused inconvenience 
by the speaker and the audience. Here we witnessed that Open Science needs 
to take into account, reflect on and continuously discuss cultural and political 
differences, that are deep seeded in society and ingrained in its practice of 
science. That evening, when the first of many marches against the influences 
of the Chinese government on Hong Kong democracy took to the streets, at 
the congress dinner party I shared a table with young successful civil servants 
from Beijing confining ourselves to small talk about science, their lives in 
Beijing, kids and parents.
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deliberations, more than our voting, make our society truly republican and demo-
cratic and ‘we must find knowledge through these deliberations and utterances in 
the social context were the action is’ (Diggins, 1994)(p365).
The time is long gone that the claims and views of science and experts were 
automatically accepted because of mythical ‘God given’ authority or a ‘unique sci-
entific method’. As I have argued and demonstrated, the sciences, in their many 
different communities of inquirers do produce reliable and robust knowledge that 
has proven successful and has in the past contributed enormously to the quality of 
life. Much is still to be done and at this very moment scientist around the world are 
working 24/7 on therapies and vaccines for COVID-19 which are badly needed. To 
make clear what science has to offer we have to engage tirelessly in continuous 
conversation, debate and discussions about science and society. With the same 
energy and perseverance, because of geopolitics, ugly partisan politics and outright 
suppression we have to keep campaigning for open debates and deliberative democ-
racies, as the stakes for humanity are higher than ever, this needs to be done within 
our own region, country, in the EU and in global collaborations around the globe.
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Dies Natalis, Dinner Speech, Utrecht University, 26 March, 2012.
Most progress in studying infectious disease (flu and AIDS) but also non- 
communicable diseases (AIZ, CVD, Alzheimer) is made when in multidisciplinary 
approaches the skills (techniques, concepts, logic) of distinct disciplines are inte-
grated. As a result of this approach in Life Sciences, for instance, diseases that had 
nothing or very little in common 30 (15??) years ago are now believed to have com-
mon underlying pathogenic causes resulting from inflammatory processes.
It has become very clear that problems of the real world cannot be solved by 
research from within a single Life Science discipline (epidemiology, genetics, 
imaging neurology). Even more, to be successful and to significantly move the fron-
tiers of science, high level convergence of medical engineering, chemistry, mathe-
matics and life sciences has to be facilitated and achieved (Sharp). This means that 
science that aims to address real world  - and hence complex- problems requires 
large scale multidisciplinary collaboration and large-scale investments. Principal 
investigators with their labs join large-team efforts, in concerted actions to approach 
pathogenesis, diagnosis and therapy of complex diseases. Since the early eighties, 
Life Science has been in transition to become Big Science, like Particle Physics has 
been since World war II. This is already going on for some time, but be aware, we 
have seen nothing yet….!
In addition to the shift to multidisciplinary research and convergence of engi-
neering, physics and life science we have since the nineties seen the shift to what the 
commentators of science have designated Mode-2 Science (Novotny et al) or for 
which John Ziman coined the term Post-Academic research. This is the shift from 
curiosity-driven science to demand–driven research which starts when priorities 
have to be decided and the research agenda is set. It has been convincingly argued 
that science, not even pure science ever was value-free, but since science is an inte-
grated part of society all its disguises predictably have major impact on our life and 
the life of billions around the globe, and of course the life of the generations to come.
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Our choice for the research agenda, given limited resources of talent, money, 
time and facilities, ideally has to reflect the needs of society. This is in principle a 
good thing since it may help to optimally engage science in addressing the most 
significant problems that we are facing. In that way science will produce societal, 
robust (Novotny et al) or as Philip Kitcher calls it significant knowledge. In this 
process of setting the research agenda’s, which is of course imperfect even in our 
western democracies, the needs of the poor, the less powerful, children and future 
generations have to be actively tutored in order to balance their interests to the inter-
ests of the affluent parts of the world, of private parties with commercial interests 
and of lobby groups that are well-sponsored by special interest groups (Kitcher).
We have to realize that this may be hard for the ‘ordinary’ scientist who may feel 
threatened because she feels her scientific and professional autonomy affected. It 
may even be resisted by some from within their disciplinary turf, and this is not only 
true for medical disciplines, because they have to leave their comfort zone to work 
with these other MD’s, engineers, preclinical scientists but also representatives from 
outside science to be eligible for the next round of funding. Indeed, to be able to do 
research successfully and happily in this new area of Life Science, social and man-
agement skills are required different from what was required when most of us 
started our PhD work in the late seventies or early eighties of the last century. It 
requires teamwork, deliberation with patients and patient-interest groups and 
increasingly private parties to decide which clinical needs have priority and which 
can be solved first and quickly or for which more basic work should be done. This 
truly is a co-creation process in which the client/patient, or as some like to call it 
‘stakeholder’, and the developer/scientist work together from beginning to end. The 
ideal end product of course is implementation and evaluation of innovation in care 
or preventive medicine accompanied by scientific publications that duly report the 
findings to the community.
Educating Scientific Literacy
This needs explicit and implicit (tacit) training in the classroom and in labs and clin-
ics. In order to get the required level of scientific literacy, we must expose our stu-
dents to as much a possible multidisciplinarity in teaching, clinical care and research 
during their training in Medical School and the Life Sciences. The ethical problems 
of scientific choice, the almost mythical idea of value–free science, the involvement 
of values in all phases of the practice of science, the historical strong emphasis in 
the universities on basic and preclinical science at the cost of translational and 
applied science, the shift from individual to predominantly team work, the collabo-
ration with societal stakeholders, it has to be put in the philosophical/ sociological 
context for our students because these issues determine the world in which they will 
be doing their science. We have to show them our excitement about the power and 
potential of modern science and help them to get a realistic picture of the practice of 
science, which as we all know is in all aspects human, muddy, political and imper-
fect but despite that produces fantastic reliable knowledge that can address our 




For us, the leaders and administrators in science, university, medical schools, etc 
this coming of age of modern- twenty- first- century science, for which I coined the 
name Science 3.0, has huge implications. They relate to the use of the so-called 
credit cycle, the economic reward system of science. In that system scientists pro-
duce data, that are written up and published and based on the quality of the journals 
where these publications appear, credit points are distributed (Stephan). Given the 
developments I just sketched, how should we recognize the contributions of indi-
vidual scientists in such large scale multi-authored multidisciplinary ‘productions’. 
A recent example from my former department: it took 3 PhD students, many lab 
techs, supervised by more than 3 PI’s from different faculties and departments years 
of work to get a very nice ground- breaking paper in Immunity, a leading journal in 
our field.
How is credit to be dispersed? We have excellent researchers who produce not as 
much highly cited papers but design, develop and implement novel radiotherapeutic 
procedures to treat cancers. Techniques that are groundbreaking and significant 
because they address serious patient needs. Do we in the current system give proper 
credit for that type of work? It is a special interest for this audience to point to a 
recent thoughtful paper in Nature Immunology (!) by two leading American immu-
nologists, Ron Germain and Pamela Schwartzenberg. They brought this problem ‘of 
the changing sociology of academic translational research’ up and urged us ‘to 
define viable career paths’ and ‘special tenure track considerations for authors on 
such team-science publications’. Away with bean counting and back to content- 
based and science-informed professional management to steer our science? 
Although this may be much tougher than bean counting, I whole heartedly say yes! 
We must realize that it is the ‘credit cycle’ we use to manage research institutions, 
to give out or deny grants and accept papers, to decide on promotions and tenure and 
for hiring and firing Let’s be honest here, these modern developments in the practice 
of science are a problem for the ‘ bean counters’ that we have become, that the gov-
ernment has made us become, that -let’s face it- we find sometimes handy and 
convenient.
It has been suggested that this reward system may be one of the causes for loss 
of actual quality of published work even in high impact journals (Begley and Ellis) 
which causes serious problems and loss of time and money for those who based on 
trust followed up on that work. The current system as it is may not be sustainable 
because it is focused on short term results which does not encourage risk taking and 
major breakthroughs but scientific projects with quick but incremental results. This 
works against the young scientists which is aggravated in particular by the increas-
ingly unrealistic demands from reviewers and journal editors in order to increase 
quality and impact of their journals which does allow for a realistic development of 
career paths of young scientists (Ploegh, Stephan).
Here, I took the opportunity to paint the bigger picture of how science is rapidly 
developing, literally while we are watching. I pointed out what is expected from us 
in order to properly steer our institutions and to help facilitate career- development 
for our people, scientists and others. We have to come up with measures that 
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regulate the ‘free-market’ in the system of science, modulating drivers and incen-
tives of the various actors to ideally redirect it at the societal aims, avoiding the 
problems of the current system and make it sustainable. That could mean that we 
have to go, not for numbers of papers, impact factors, Hirsch factors, citation fre-
quencies, the numbers of grants won in competition, but measures for societal 
(social and economic) significance.
Our academic community must realize that in this modern world of science, the 
public and government in return on investment want to see us producing Real 
Knowledge that addresses real felt societal needs and problems. I am convinced that 
can be done, it will not be easy, but it can be done if we work together.
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My contribution to the First Science in Transition Workshop, with minor edits 
anno 2020 was:
The Enchanted View
Analyses of the historical, philosophical and sociological origins of the various ste-
reotypes of science and scientists may help us understand where the enchanted view 
of science comes from. Here we always refer to positivistic and sometimes Popperian 
philosophy of science which is understood to implicate that science is about facts 
directly derived from experiments that can thus be rather objectively and directly 
verified. Based on this unique ‘scientific method’ science yields objective knowl-
edge. The other important source is the Mertonian sociology: in order to see to it 
that scientists resist temptations, science is organized around the well-known 
Mertonian principles. Peer pressure is organized in a sociological system. Although 
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Merton’s sociology was designed and required because scientists are human, para-
doxically the Mertonian world view is romantic and idealized and free from (con-
flict of) interests and politics.
It has been pointed out that Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) 
describes science as a system separated from the rest of society. However, he allows 
for psychological and sociological influences in debates about content, paradigm 
change is brought about by new data, but not without fierce negotiation between 
humans which involves all the game playing seen elsewhere in society. Economic 
interests coming from stakeholders outside are not explicitly referred to. In SSR 
professional conflicts of interest are obvious and are treated as normal and healthy 
in scientific debates, probably because Kuhn assumed that it was all taking place in 
a perfect Mertonian system were the players voluntarily adhered to the well- 
known values.
External values not directly relevant to the content or to the practice of science 
do not play a role, are not believed relevant and are not allowed. Issues of problem 
choice are thus treated as totally internal affairs to science and scientists. Problem 
choice therefore is not considered an issue apart from ideas that at every stage of a 
paradigm or field automatically a limited set of problems comes forward that the 
field agrees to be the top issues to be studied. Merton obviously, but also Kuhn, 
allows for elitism and stratification. Not all debaters are equal, but this is within the 
accepted way the game is played. The Matthew effect is pointed out as a sociologi-
cal given, and not felt to be very problematic. This picture of science shows that 
science is intrinsically conservative, will resist change and innovation despite the 
Mertonian value system. Many have criticized Kuhn suggesting that he has written 
a normative and not a descriptive account of science because he seems to like the 
initial resistance to rejection of old theories and programs to allow for stable devel-
opment and evolution of them avoiding loss of potential.
The enchanted view of science that results from these very influential descrip-
tions or (to put it correctly) normative ideas about scientific activity is still largely 
the default mode when science and scientist are discussed in a public or more for-
mal debate. The gossip and stories about clashes and fights between prominent sci-
entists are of course all over the newspapers, TV and internet, and are enjoyed 
much, but the formal and official response is that those all are harmless because it is 
happening in ‘Mertonian space’. As a consequence, there are a few issues that are 
increasingly felt to become problematic:
 1. The idea that there is somehow always a high degree of consensus in science, or 
that it is possible at every given moment for any issue to generate that consensus 
for practical use by policy and public.
 2. It is generally believed that problem choice is guided by ‘an invisible hand ‘ 
determined by internal developments that we agree on based on the prevailing 
paradigms in a given field of research.
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Ideological Use of the Enchanted View
It is relevant to analyse the use of this dominant stereotype in the different contexts, 
and specially for what purpose it is used and sustained. Of course, many especially 
those who are ignorant of the practice of modern science, naively teach and dissemi-
nate the classical view. This holds for high school teachers and even many who 
teach undergraduates. Those who have been exposed to the practice at the frontiers 
of science, often do not want to be or do not see why they should be, the cause of 
disillusion (disenchantment) that scare potential students away. In other more for-
mal and public cases the enchanted view it seems is used with a political aim. This 
enhanced view is propagated and used to formally react to questions from outside 
science to defend science as unique and the only system we have to make reliable 
knowledge. The unique virtues of the system and its players, protection from non- 
scientific influences and interests and of course the scientific method are the defence 
lines. Fraud and bad science are in this reaction, universally treated as exceptions in 
an otherwise perfect system of self-cleansing peer review and post-publication criti-
cism. All representative appearances of Robbert Dijkgraaf, the former president of 
the Royal Society, are typically in that style. Interestingly and in fact worrisome, he 
was never critically approached by a critical interviewer on this point. He was to all 
of us the ideal son-in-law and was given special programs on public TV. The Royal 
Society was most happy with four of these years of enchanted science. It was for 
instance well covered in the news that Dijkgraaf went to Princeton and Hans Clevers 
took over. It is believed that by sticking to this position and telling this version of 
science, public trust and trust at the part of key persons in administration and their 
representatives is maintained. It is felt that if we would tell the truth about how sci-
ence works, how we know what we know, why we believe what we believe, how and 
to what extent interests shape our knowledge and scientific opinions, the public will 
lose faith and science will fall.
There thus seems to be an omerta (or, conspiracy of silence) regarding the prac-
tice of science. This has been shown early on by Gunther Stent in his wonderful 
analyses of the reviews of The Double Helix by Jim Watson. Gunther Stent wrote 
1968 a ‘Review of the Reviews’ (Quarterly Review of Biology and Stent book). Stent 
documents why Watson was either cheered or reviled by respectable colleagues: he 
had as one of the top scientists broken ‘the omerta’. The issue was not whether 
Watson had been unfair and critical about his colleagues and himself (!). The 
reviewers were embarrassed by the honesty and shamelessness by which he informs 
the reader how ‘unscientifically’ they behaved and how by all kind of sneaky tricks 
important parts of the critical data were gathered by Watson and Crick. Wilkins 
wrote Watson that he also was ‘tired of the polite covering up and misleading inad-
equate pictures of how scientific research is done’, but Watson had gone too far, 
showing the less mythical backstage practices of science. It is no secret that the first 
version of the book, which the was still entitled ‘Honest Jim’, had been seen by 
some of the reviewers and one of them thought the book had been ‘bowdlerized here 




When we break the omerta, will we gain more in the long run than we lose short 
term? The use of these stereotypes may reassure some, but at the same time it con-
fuses the public about what science has to offer to solve specific societal issues. For 
instance, it does not help to explain the debates and pluralism about climate change, 
the use of Flu and HPV vaccines, the battle against cancer, the coming epidemics of 
CVD and dementia, the cause and solution of the economic crisis, the approaches to 
multicultural societies, etc. It does not help to understand the interaction between 
scientific advisers and policy makers and governments. Sometimes scientists seem 
to agree, sometimes not, but it is unclear to the public why that is. It is difficult to 
explain to outsiders from within the classical view what type of pluralism can occur 
and for what reasons. The difference between professional and economic conflict of 
interest and how this affects integrity and trust. Will we be better able to explain bad 
science, bad pharma and fraud and that it will happen more and more by honestly 
explaining the system and its problems?
Questions to Be Discussed
How to avoid these stereotypes? How to exchange them by - in our view - a more 
realistic view of science and scientists? (if one can at least to some extent agree on 
that?) Can this be done without a further loss of trust in science and scientists? How 
to avoid a general distrust and loss of faith - and even nihilism - regarding modern 
science when we explain truthfully how science really works? How is knowledge 
constructed and produced in physics, experimental psychology, economics, life sci-
ence, geology? How do we account for and explain the influence of internal and 
external forces and interests on science and still say that we believe that ‘science can 
be trusted’? Or don’t we? How do we think the well-known ‘politics of science’ can 
be explained without disturbing the trust and faith in science?
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Conclusions & Recommendations of the Position Paper
Images of Science: We cherish an image in which scientists, through curiosity, 
provide undeniable knowledge. Knowledge society is in touch with. This image is 
however be incomplete. But besides incomplete it is even harmful. Any deviation of 
that image affects the trust of citizens in science and ultimately threatens the enter-
prise of science. While science is one of the driving forces of modern society, how 
does the image differ from reality? To begin with, science does not provide absolute 
certainty and consensus. Scientists can have different opinions. At the forefront of 
science rages a continuous conflict of professional interest, in which new knowl-
edge is filtered in pruning debates. But where obsolete knowledge sometimes sur-
vives too long. In addition, scientists for producing interesting results are rewarded 
with reputation, promotion and sometimes personal economic gains. Scientists are 
ordinary people, with personal and social preferences, problems and needs. They 
sometimes do ‘trimming and cooking of measurement data, get payments by indus-
try, or just are not so good with methods in their field.
Recommendation: We need to inform the public about the uncertainty of scien-
tific results, the way in which results are achieved and the everyday motives of sci-
entists. This prevents theatrical public incomprehension of discussing scientists, 
about knowledge that does not prove to be true and misleading scientists.
Quality: Does the taxpayer get value for money? It is a valid question at a time 
when science is funded largely by public funds. The answer is unfortunately that 
many scientific results are more important for the scientist than for society. It is the 
result of the misuse of quantitative bibliometrics in the assessment of science. 
Scientists are judged by the number of publications in magazines with high impact 
factors. This makes publishing papers the highest goal of scientists. Whether they 
answer socially relevant questions is secondary. It also means that risky long-term 
research is hardly financed. In particular, life sciences have turned into a PhD fac-
tory. PhD students and postdocs do the bulk of the work, but without a lot of career 
prospects. But they will not hear from their mentors because they do not want to 
discourage their cheap labour forces.
Recommendation: Formulate new criteria for assessing scientists and scientific 
results, and emphasize the social value of the research emphatically.
Recommendation: Involve social stakeholders in the distribution of research 
money and in setting priorities in the research.
Trust: The public has high rust in the institute of science, more than in politics, 
journalism or business. But the time we trust a scientific “expert” is long gone. Their 
opinions are often contradictory. It can be traced to information crime and changed 
authority relations. The huge global knowledge production leads to hyper- 
specialization, resulting in a loss of overview. At the same time, the Internet makes 
it easier to interpret the information beyond the traditional frameworks. A range of 
public opinions is the result.
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Recommendation: Be open and frank and show the public how science and 
research really is being done. At the front of research, both the natural and the social 
sciences, seriously different insights do exist, sometimes even for prolonged periods 
of time. Science has a lot to offer. Policy problems and their debates need science 
advice, although they are not decided but are informed by scientific knowledge as in 
the end not the scientists but the politicians decide. Scientific discussions very often 
also have moral, political and cultural aspects which relate to ideas and opinions 
about the world and how to life our lives.
Reliability & Corruption: The current organization of the scientific system puts 
pressure on the integrity of individual researchers. Emphasis on the number of pub-
lished articles, plus the personal career motivations of scientists, means that the 
quality of research is under pressure. Many moderate, uninteresting, sometimes 
bad, and once-even fraudulent publications are produced. Although this is bad for 
science and society, those researchers need these papers to survive. In addition, 
more and more research takes place in cooperation with private parties. Such col-
laborations often yield useful results, but they also may create institutional and per-
sonal economic conflicts of interest. That is inevitable and also not fundamentally 
wrong, but it requires great vigilance
Recommendation: The interactions and financial dependence on third parties is 
associated with risks that can only be minimized by strict agreements in advance 
and strict supervision.Let public view how scientific decisions about social issues 
are taken. Make clear that the interests that play a role are not per se harmful, nego-
tiation is part of the process. When speaking to researchers at congresses, in the 
public and in the media, one has to think that they also have personal motives and 
analyze and value their arguments based on it.
Communication: Communication departments of universities have been estab-
lished in order to show the public how tax money is being used to do research that 
contributes to society. By default, the communications by these professionals aim-
ing at the lay public are written in the logic of the ‘ideal’ university spreading the 
myth of certainty and absolute knowledge. Science journalism, pressed for time and 
limited by their own perverse incentives convert news from universities and the 
scientific journals into pretty short stories and footage. No room for nuances, uncer-
tainty and depth.
Recommendation: Journalists should trained to expose and explain the mecha-
nisms for science to the public which will increase mutual understanding. We have 
in mind investigative journalism such as how Joris Luyendijk researched the City of 
London about the origins of the financial crisis.
Democracy and Policy: Science has become an institutionalized capital- 
intensive social activity and must be treated as such. In a democratic society the 
public has the right to decide on the science agenda. For example, do we invest in 
the Higgs particle or in a malaria vaccine? Science is indispensable in political judg-
ment and decision-making, and for informed social debate. However, her role is 
under pressure. Politicians and policy makers go selectively with findings from 
research. Job Search does not get too full since. Continuously there are experts who 
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dispute the judgment of others. Social organizations come with counter-expertise. 
Science that wants to give advice is often politicized.
Recommendation: Both in basic and applied research, society must help to 
identify research priorities. Science can not scientifically determine its own course. 
This requires broad debates and considerations. The agenda of science is a matter of 
society. Contradictory insights about scientific research that want to advise policy 
and politics should not be heard in the background but on an audience stage. More 
often, researchers come to the House of Representatives, be less afraid of conflict-
ing advice, try to find out where the differences are, cut any problems in parts if 
there is no overall solution. Allow experiments, learn from wrong paths.
A Crisis of the Entire University: Problems of production-driven scientific 
research not only play in life sciences and science, but also in the humanities and 
social sciences. The humanities discipline has set aside its task of educating teach-
ers and is now focusing mainly on research. But the direct social justification for 
this is unclear and it produces many results that nobody’s waiting for. Social sci-
ences also play the main role in the international debate and are getting less atten-
tion from social issues in their own country. University width means that the ideal 
of higher education for many has gone out on a fiasco. There are good reasons to 
doubt the level of today’s graduates. The quality of secondary education leaves 
much to be desired and many graduates have difficulty finding a job on a level. The 
perverse funding stimuli already explain a lot. If society increases the number of 
graduates, it should not be surprising that the quality per unit of product decreases. 
Moreover, the excessive growth of the number of students has undermined the uni-
versity system too much.
Recommendation: Reinstate the university studies humanities and social sci-
ences, focus less on research and more on education. Teaching as a professional 
profile for academics must be honored, with matching rewards.
Science in Transition Conference: November 7 and 8, 2013, KNAW 
Amsterdam
Over the next few years, science will have to make a number of important transi-
tions. There is deeply-felt uncertainty and discontent on a number of aspects of the 
scientific system: the tools measuring scientific output, the publish-or-perish cul-
ture, the level of academic teaching, the scarcity of career opportunities for young 
scholars, the impact of science on policy, and the relationship between science, 
society and industry.
The checks and balances of our scientific system are in need of revision. To 
accomplish this, science should be evaluated on the basis of its added value to soci-
ety. The public should be given a better insight in the process of knowledge produc-
tion: what parties play a role and what issues are at stake? Stakeholders from society 
should become more involved in this process, and have a bigger say in the allocation 
of research funding. This is the view of the Science in Transition initiators Huub 
Dijstelbloem (WRR/UvA), Frank Huisman (UU/UM), Frank Miedema (UMC 
Utrecht), Jerry Ravetz (Oxford) and Wijnand Mijnhardt (Descartes Centre, UU).
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Location: Tinbergenzaal, KNAW Trippenhuis, Kloveniersburgwal 29, Amsterdam
Suggested reading material: the SiT-position paper (in Dutch, or in English), and 
the Agenda for Change.
Program Thursday, 7 November
9:30–10:00 Registration, coffee and tea
10:00–10:30 Welcome, and historical perspective by Jerome Ravetz (Associate 
Fellow Saïd Business School, University of Oxford)
10:30–12:30 Morning session: Quality and corruption
Chair: Sally Wyatt (Professor of Digital Cultures in Development, Department 
Technology and Society Studies, Maastricht University)
Key note: Jan Vandenbroucke (Professor of Clinical Epidemiology, Department of 
Clinical Epidemiology, Leiden University Hospital)*
Commentators:
Henk van Houten (General Manager Philips Research)
Prof. Carl Moons, (professor in clinical epidemiology (UMC Utrecht)
Frank Miedema (Dean and vice-chairman of the Board, Professor of Immunology, 
UMC Utrecht)
12:30–14:00 Lunch, on own account
14:00–16:00 Afternoon session: Image and trust
Chair: Rob Hagendijk (Associate Professor Department Political Science, University 
of Amsterdam)
Key note: Sheila Jasanoff (Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology 
Studies, Harvard Kennedy School)
Commentators:
Ruud Abma (Assistant Professor Social Sciences Utrecht University / 
Descartes Centre)
Hans Altevogt (Greenpeace)
Jeroen Geurts (Chairman Young Academy KNAW, Professor Translational 
Neuroscience VU Medical Center)
Rudolf van Olden (Director Medical & Regulatory Glaxo Smith Kline Netherlands)




*Drummond Rennie (Editor Journal of the American Medical Association, adjunct 
Professor of Medicine in the Institute for Health Policy Studies, University of 
California, San Francisco was scheduled, but unfortunately had to decline for 
health reasons the day before the meeting.
Science in Transition Conference, Day 2. 8 November 2013
Program Friday, 8 November




10:15–10:25 Column Maartje ter Horst (Student Universiteit Utrecht): De harde 
waarheid: er zijn veel en veel te veel studenten
10:25–12:30 Morning session: Communication and Democracy
Chair: Peter Vermij (Director Bird’s Eye Communications)
Key note: Mark Brown (Professor in the Department of Government at California 
State University, Sacramento)
Commentators:
Peter Blom (CEO Triodos Bank)
Jasper van Dijk (Member of Parliament Socialist Party)
Rinie van Est (Coordinator Technology Assessment division Rathenau Institute)
Arthur Petersen (Chief Scientist at the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, PBL) / Professor of Science and 
Environmental Public Policy in the IVM Institute for Environmental Studies at 
VU University Amsterdam)
Huub Dijstelbloem (Senior staff member Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(WRR) / Department Philosophical Tradition in Context, University of 
Amsterdam)
12:30–14:00 Lunch on own account
14:00–14:10 Column Hendrik Spiering (Chef Wetenschap NRC): Nieuwe tijden, 
nieuwe wetenschap
14:10–16:00 Afternoon session: General debate and conclusions
Chair: Mirko Noordegraaf (Professor of Public Management, Utrecht School of 
Governance, Utrecht University)
Key note: Hans Clevers (President of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
Sciences (KNAW))
Commentators:
Jos Engelen (Chairman Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO))
André Knottnerus (Chairman Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR))
Lodi Nauta (Dean Faculty of Philosophy, Professor in History of Philosophy, 
University of Groningen)
Wijnand Mijnhardt (Director Descartes Centre for the History and Philosophy of 
the Sciences and the Humanities / Professor Comparative History of the Sciences 
and the Humanities, Utrecht University)
16:00- 16:30 Discussion
16:30 Drinks
A Toolbox for Science in Transition
17 September 2013, KNAW Symposium about Trust in Science
Reflections
 1. Science in Transition: a science of science project.
The first tool we need is comprehensive scientific research on the current system 
of science. This involves multidisciplinary theoretical, but also empirical work 
mainly on the sociology and economy of science, but also historical analyses of the 
changes that science has gone through, since World War II. This project has started 
@SciTransit, website www.




The evaluation of research impact needs to change. We have to move on from the 
now used intransience, self -referential metrics to integral evaluation. Measures 
both for in-science use and for societal impact, value attributed by potential users in 
society must be developed. Although many colleagues are still very cautious, this 
process has started already. Much ideas and material are being produced in several 
countries, including but especially UK and in NL. KNAW, VSNU and NFU are 
involved in what in the NFU is known as the ‘Impact’ project. At UMC Utrecht we 
are moving to hybrid fora, inviting representatives from outside science to partici-
pate in research evaluation and to more integral metrics in science excellence 
evaluation.
Internationally, the simple use of impact factors is on the way out, see the San 
Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment. This and the evolution of altmetrics 
will challenge the standard practice of commercial journals and they know it and are 
in anticipation taking all kinds of action.
 3. Incentives and rewards
This comprehensive measurement of research impact thus has forward looking 
effects. Based on these ‘3.0 evaluations’, we must manage and facilitate science. 
Research management will have to take into account the various types of impact and 
provide career opportunities for the different types of researchers. This is going on 
here and there already but must become the dominant practice in public research 
management.
Grants from the respective institutions, NWO, ZONMW and charities should 
explicitly be awarded based on the same principles. The classical metrics using IF, 
citations and H factors should be complemented by an accepted list of measures of 
societal impact. This must result in a mix of basic and targeted research, where also 
basic science is judged in a wider context, since also pure basic science is a ‘politi-
cal’ choice
 4. Dealing with Risk Avoidance
NWO, ERC and other high-profile personal grants tend to select classical 
researchers, based on the usual metrics, that produce knowledge for the internal sci-
ence market mainly. Because of risk reduction, notwithstanding what the members 
of these panels say, and tend to believe, too much emphasis is on high impact pub-
lications. This results in too little diversification of leading investigators in the 
institutes.
In addition, there is a skewed emphasis and overrated valuation of these laureates 
over many other non-laureates who are very good researchers as well, but just were 
not selected because of lack of funds at NWO or ERC. Many of these should be 
brought in university talent programs which may and should select for quite differ-
ent capacities that are not detectable at a snapshot 10 minutes interview and from 
classical metrics. Universities are able to go for less risk avoidance and long-term 
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innovation and may and should invest in that. Real world problems are complex and 
require intense collaboration by several disciplines. Obviously, we have to work 
from and with realistic expectations regarding research output. If we start from 
excessive demands, researchers will be tempted to play the system in order to sur-
vive to the next level.
 5. PhD Talent management and education
As a recent Rathenau report bravely pointed out, granting organizations should 
give grants, but the university must take up the talent and career management of its 
staff, because getting prestigious grants clearly is only for the top 3%, but for the top 
30% getting funded is a random and subjective process indeed. Talent management 
in general is a problem given the huge PhD factories we have established and the 
poor prospects these PhDs and postdocs have to make a career in academia. Indeed 
as Solla Price 50 years ago predicted, science breeds scientists faster than economy 
wants to pay for. See Stephan’s recent book ‘How economics shapes Science’. We 
have to rethink and redesign these streams to better coach the careers of our students 
for careers in and outside science. This is a major challenge for universities. How 
much PhD should we produce? Do MD’s in those high numbers need a PhD at all. 
How are we to promote transdisciplinary work via the talent programs? We have to 
promote scientific literacy among our Master and PhD students by courses like 
‘That Thing Called Science’ that we started in Utrecht in 2009. This education of 
scientific literacy has recently started in many of our universities.
 6. Targeting societal problems
As the KNAW advice Vertrouwen/Trust correctly points out, trust in science and 
scientists is not only about how trustworthy and careful we do and report our sci-
ence, it is as much about the question whether we do the rights things. For charities 
and other targeted science funding this is not problematic. These funders are already 
changing practice in that they steer for large problem-oriented multidisciplinary 
programs involving teams from several institutes. This in most cases is a mix of lab 
and patient-oriented translational work.
For universities that fortunately still have their own intramural funding, this calls 
for change. They have to relate more with stakeholders in society to (re)orient their 
research, both basic and targeted in a mode-2 fashion. Not only in Utrecht this has 
already started to varying degrees, in anticipation of EU HORIZON 2020 which 
targets the so-called Societal Grand Challenges.
Also, NWO has been advised by a recent committee to take this programmatic/
thematic orientation. NWO because of its inward looking, rather positivistic & 
reductionist orientation is not trusted by societal partners for starting programs on 
real world problems. This of course is played out not even subtle by parties from the 
private sector who want to try to secure a bigger piece of the pie. It is to me a ques-




Finally, how to tell and sell the story of modern science to improve our relations 
with and trust by the public. My proposal is to be honest and open, also to our stu-
dents and young researchers about how science in practice really works. Let’s do 
away with our stories about the myth of science as a perfect method performed by 
individuals with high moral values without any bias or interests. Let’s explain how 
science does make objective facts but that a lot of uncertainty remains. Let’s tell 
about science as a job, as a career and how the economy of science shapes science 
and the content of our science. Be honest, that in particular regarding complex real- 
world problems a lot of uncertainty remains and that scientists have personal beliefs 
that shape their scientific ideas. I recommend Paul Wouters’ paper in Dijstelbloem 
and Hagendijk’s book.
 8. Problem choice
Finally, problem of agenda setting in a democratic society presents itself. How 
are we organizing this process designated by Kitcher the ‘ideal deliberation’? In our 
country, as probably elsewhere, this is an imperfect and haphazard process that is 
not really transparent and not really democratic. How did we arrive at the TOP 
SECTORS? How ideal were these deliberations? Is there in the future a role for the 
KNAW? The KNAW has produced in 2011 a little book with 49 big questions com-
ing up from the scientific fields, as sort of a national research agenda. This was, 
however, not in deliberation with representatives from society. Much change is 
needed but this is very complex indeed.
 Supplement 2
 The Metric Tide, 2015
Recommendations
Supporting the effective leadership, governance and management of research 
cultures
 1 The research community should develop a more sophisticated and nuanced 
approach to the contribution and limitations of quantitative indicators. 
Greater care with language and terminology is needed. The term ‘metrics’ is 
often unhelpful; the preferred term ‘indicators’ reflects a recognition that data 
may lack specific relevance, even if they are useful overall. (HEIs, funders, man-
agers, researchers)
 2 At an institutional level, HEI leaders should develop a clear statement of 
principles on their approach to research management and assessment, 
including the role of quantitative indicators. On the basis of these principles, 
they should carefully select quantitative indicators that are appropriate to their 
institutional aims and context. Where institutions are making use of league 
tables and ranking measures, they should explain why they are using these as a 
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means to achieve particular ends. Where possible, alternative indicators that 
support equality and diversity should be identified and included. Clear commu-
nication of the rationale for selecting particular indicators, and how they will be 
used as a management tool, is paramount. As part of this process, HEIs should 
consider signing up to DORA, or drawing on its principles and tailoring them to 
their institutional contexts. (Heads of institutions, heads of research, HEI 
governors)
 3 Research managers and administrators should champion these principles 
and the use of responsible metrics within their institutions. They should pay 
due attention to the equality and diversity implications of research assessment 
choices; engage with external experts such as those at the Equality Challenge 
Unit; help to facilitate a more open and transparent data infrastructure; advocate 
the use of unique identifiers such as ORCID iDs; work with funders and pub-
lishers on data interoperability; explore indicators for aspects of research that 
they wish to assess rather than using existing indicators because they are readily 
available; advise senior leaders on metrics that are meaningful for their institu-
tional or departmental context; and exchange best practice through sector bodies 
such as ARMA. (Managers, research administrators, ARMA)
 4 HR managers and recruitment or promotion panels in HEIs should be 
explicit about the criteria used for academic appointment and promotion 
decisions. These criteria should be founded in expert judgement and may reflect 
both the academic quality of outputs and wider contributions to policy, industry 
or society. Judgements may sometimes usefully be guided by metrics, if they are 
relevant to the criteria in question and used responsibly; article-level citation 
metrics, for instance, might be useful indicators of academic impact, as long as 
they are interpreted in the light of disciplinary norms and with due regard to 
their limitations. Journal-level metrics, such as the JIF, should not be used. (HR 
managers, recruitment and promotion panels, UUK)
 5 Individual researchers should be mindful of the limitations of particular 
indicators in the way they present their own CVs and evaluate the work of 
colleagues. When standard indicators are inadequate, individual researchers 
should look for a range of data sources to document and support claims about 
the impact of their work. (All researchers)
 6 Like HEIs, research funders should develop their own context-specific 
principles for the use of quantitative indicators in research assessment and 
management and ensure that these are well communicated, easy to locate and 
understand. They should pursue approaches to data collection that are transpar-
ent, accessible, and allow for greater interoperability across a diversity of plat-
forms. (UK HE Funding Bodies, Research Councils, other research funders)
 7 Data providers, analysts and producers of university rankings and league 
tables should strive for greater transparency and interoperability between 
different measurement systems. Some, such as the Times Higher Education 
(THE) university rankings, have taken commendable steps to be more open 
about their choice of indicators and the weightings given to these, but other 
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rankings remain ‘black- boxed’. (Data providers, analysts and producers of uni-
versity rankings and league tables)
 8 Publishers should reduce emphasis on journal impact factors as a promo-
tional tool, and only use them in the context of a variety of journal-based 
metrics that provide a richer view of performance. As suggested by DORA, 
this broader indicator set could include 5-year impact factor, EigenFactor, 
SCImago, editorial and publication times. Publishers, with the aid of Committee 
on Publication Ethics (COPE), should encourage responsible authorship prac-
tices and the provision of more detailed information about the specific contribu-
tions of each author. Publishers should also make available a range of article-level 
metrics to encourage a shift toward assessment based on the academic quality of 
an article rather than JIFs. (Publishers)
 9 There is a need for greater transparency and openness in research data 
infrastructure. A set of principles should be developed for technologies, 
practices and cultures that can support open, trustworthy research infor-
mation management. These principles should be adopted by funders, data pro-
viders, administrators and researchers as a foundation for further work. (UK HE 
Funding Bodies, RCUK, Jisc, data providers, managers, administrators)
 10 The UK research system should take full advantage of ORCID as its pre-
ferred system of unique identifiers. ORCID iDs should be mandatory for all 
researchers in the next REF. Funders and HEIs should utilise ORCID for grant 
applications, management and reporting platforms, and the benefits of ORCID 
need to be better communicated to researchers. (HEIs, UK HE Funding Bodies, 
funders, managers, UUK, HESA)
 11 Identifiers are also needed for institutions, and the most likely candidate for 
a global solution is the ISNI, which already has good coverage of publish-
ers, funders and research organisations. The use of ISNIs should therefore be 
extended to cover all institutions referenced in future REF submissions, and 
used more widely in internal HEI and funder management processes. One com-
ponent of the solution will be to map the various organisational identifier sys-
tems against ISNI to allow the various existing systems to interoperate. (UK HE 
Funding Bodies, HEIs, funders, publishers, UUK, HESA)
 12 Publishers should mandate ORCID iDs and ISNIs and funder grant refer-
ences for article submission, and retain this metadata throughout the pub-
lication lifecycle. This will facilitate exchange of information on research 
activity, and help deliver data and metrics at minimal burden to researchers and 
administrators. (Publishers and data providers)
 13 The use of digital object identifiers (DOIs) should be extended to cover all 
research outputs. This should include all outputs submitted to a future REF for 
which DOIs are suitable, and DOIs should also be more widely adopted in inter-
nal HEI and research funder processes. DOIs already predominate in the journal 
publishing sphere – they should be extended to cover other outputs where no 
identifier system exists, such as book chapters and datasets. (UK HE Funding 
Bodies, HEIs, funders, UUK)
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 14 Further investment in research information infrastructure is required. 
Funders and Jisc should explore opportunities for additional strategic invest-
ments, particularly to improve the interoperability of research management sys-
tems. (HM Treasury, BIS, RCUK, UK HE Funding Bodies, Jisc, ARMA)
Recommendation
Research funders need to increase investment in the science of science policy. There 
is a need for greater research and innovation in this area, to develop and apply insights 
from computing, statistics, social science and economics to better understand the rela-
tionship between research, its qualities and wider impacts. (Research funders)
 Supplement 3
 The Leiden Manifesto
Ten principles1 
 1. Quantitative evaluation should support qualitative, expert assessment. 
Quantitative metrics can challenge bias tendencies in peer review and facilitate 
deliberation. This should strengthen peer review, because making judgements 
about colleagues is difficult without a range of relevant information. However, 
assessors must not be tempted to cede decision-making to the numbers. 
Indicators must not substitute for informed judgement. Everyone retains 
responsibility for their assessments.
 2. Measure performance against the research missions of the institution, group 
or researcher. Programme goals should be stated at the start, and the indicators 
used to evaluate performance should relate clearly to those goals. The choice of 
indicators, and the ways in which they are used, should take into account the 
wider socio-economic and cultural contexts. Scientists have diverse research mis-
sions. Research that advances the frontiers of academic knowledge differs from 
research that is focused on delivering solutions to societal problems. Review may 
be based on merits relevant to policy, industry or the public rather than on aca-
demic ideas of excellence. No single evaluation model applies to all contexts.
 3. Protect excellence in locally relevant research. In many parts of the world, 
research excellence is equated with English-language publication. Spanish law, 
for example, states the desirability of Spanish scholars publishing in high- 
impact journals. The impact factor is calculated for journals indexed in the US- 
based and still mostly English-language Web of Science. These biases are 
particularly problematic in the social sciences and humanities, in which research 
is more regionally and nationally engaged. Many other fields have a national or 
regional dimension — for instance, HIV epidemiology in sub-Saharan Africa.
1 Source: Hicks, D., Wouters, P., Waltman, L., de Rijcke, S., & Rafols, I. (2015). Bibliometrics: The 
Leiden Manifesto for research metrics. Nature, 520 (7548), 429–431.  https://doi.org/10.1038/520429a
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This pluralism and societal relevance tends to be suppressed to create papers of 
interest to the gatekeepers of high impact: English-language journals. The 
Spanish sociologists that are highly cited in the Web of Science have worked on 
abstract models or study US data. Lost is the specificity of sociologists in high- 
impact Spanish-language papers: topics such as local labour law, family health 
care for the elderly or immigrant employment. Metrics built on high-quality 
non-English literature would serve to identify and reward excellence in locally 
relevant research.
 4. Keep data collection and analytical processes open, transparent and sim-
ple. The construction of the databases required for evaluation should follow 
clearly stated rules, set before the research has been completed. This was com-
mon practice among the academic and commercial groups that built bibliomet-
ric evaluation methodology over several decades. Those groups referenced 
protocols published in the peer-reviewed literature. This transparency enabled 
scrutiny. For example, in 2010, public debate on the technical properties of an 
important indicator used by one of our groups (the Centre for Science and 
Technology Studies at Leiden University in the Netherlands) led to a revision in 
the calculation of this indicator. Recent commercial entrants should be held to 
the same standards; no one should accept a black-box evaluation machine.
Simplicity is a virtue in an indicator because it enhances transparency. But sim-
plistic metrics can distort the record (see principle 7). Evaluators must strive for 
balance — simple indicators true to the complexity of the research process.
“Simplicity is a virtue in an indicator because it enhances transparency.”
 5. Allow those evaluated to verify data and analysis. To ensure data quality, all 
researchers included in bibliometric studies should be able to check that their 
outputs have been correctly identified. Everyone directing and managing evalu-
ation processes should assure data accuracy, through self-verification or third- 
party audit. Universities could implement this in their research information 
systems and it should be a guiding principle in the selection of providers of 
these systems. Accurate, high-quality data take time and money to collate and 
process. Budget for it.
 6. Account for variation by field in publication and citation practices. Best 
practice is to select a suite of possible indicators and allow fields to choose 
among them. A few years ago, a European group of historians received a rela-
tively low rating in a national peer-review assessment because they wrote books 
rather than articles in journals indexed by the Web of Science. The historians 
had the misfortune to be part of a psychology department. Historians and social 
scientists require books and national-language literature to be included in their 
publication counts; computer scientists require conference papers be counted.
Citation rates vary by field: top-ranked journals in mathematics have impact 
factors of around 3; top-ranked journals in cell biology have impact factors of 
about 30. Normalized indicators are required, and the most robust normaliza-
tion method is based on percentiles: each paper is weighted on the basis of the 
percentile to which it belongs in the citation distribution of its field (the top 1%, 
10% or 20%, for example). A single highly cited publication slightly improves 
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the position of a university in a ranking that is based on percentile indicators, 
but may propel the university from the middle to the top of a ranking built on 
citation averages.
 7. Base assessment of individual researchers on a qualitative judgement of 
their portfolio. The older you are, the higher your h-index, even in the absence 
of new papers. The h-index varies by field: life scientists top out at 200; physi-
cists at 100 and social scientists at 20–30 (ref. 8). It is database dependent: there 
are researchers in computer science who have an h-index of around 10 in the 
Web of Science but of 20–30  in Google Scholar. Reading and judging a 
researcher’s work is much more appropriate than relying on one number. Even 
when comparing large numbers of researchers, an approach that considers more 
information about an individual’s expertise, experience, activities and influence 
is best.
 8. Avoid misplaced concreteness and false precision. Science and technology 
indicators are prone to conceptual ambiguity and uncertainty and require strong 
assumptions that are not universally accepted. The meaning of citation counts, 
for example, has long been debated. Thus, best practice uses multiple indicators 
to provide a more robust and pluralistic picture. If uncertainty and error can be 
quantified, for instance using error bars, this information should accompany 
published indicator values. If this is not possible, indicator producers should at 
least avoid false precision. For example, the journal impact factor is published 
to three decimal places to avoid ties. However, given the conceptual ambiguity 
and random variability of citation counts, it makes no sense to distinguish 
between journals on the basis of very small impact factor differences. Avoid 
false precision: only one decimal is warranted.
 9. Recognize the systemic effects of assessment and indicators. Indicators 
change the system through the incentives they establish. These effects should be 
anticipated. This means that a suite of indicators is always preferable — a sin-
gle one will invite gaming and goal displacement (in which the measurement 
becomes the goal). For example, in the 1990s, Australia funded university 
research using a formula based largely on the number of papers published by an 
institute. Universities could calculate the ‘value’ of a paper in a refereed jour-
nal; in 2000, it was Aus$800 (around US$480  in 2000) in research funding. 
Predictably, the number of papers published by Australian researchers went up, 
but they were in less-cited journals, suggesting that article quality fell.
 10. Scrutinize indicators regularly and update them. Research missions and the 
goals of assessment shift and the research system itself co-evolves. Once-useful 
metrics become inadequate; new ones emerge. Indicator systems have to be 
reviewed and perhaps modified. Realizing the effects of its simplistic formula, 
Australia in 2010 introduced its more complex Excellence in Research for 
Australia initiative, which emphasizes quality.
Next steps
Abiding by these ten principles, research evaluation can play an important part in 
the development of science and its interactions with society. Research metrics can 
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provide crucial information that would be difficult to gather or understand by means 
of individual expertise. But this quantitative information must not be allowed to 
morph from an instrument into the goal.
The best decisions are taken by combining robust statistics with sensitivity to the 
aim and nature of the research that is evaluated. Both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence are needed; each is objective in its own way. Decision-making about sci-
ence must be based on high-quality processes that are informed by the highest qual-
ity data.
 Supplement 4
 Amsterdam Call for Action on Open Science
Amsterdam conference on ‘Open Science – From Vision to Action’ hosted by 
the Netherlands’ EU presidency on 4 and 5 April 2016.
Open science Open science is about the way researchers work, collaborate, inter-
act, share resources and disseminate results. A systemic change towards open sci-
ence is driven by new technologies and data, the increasing demand in society to 
address the societal challenges of our times and the readiness of citizens to partici-
pate in research.
Increased openness and rapid, convenient and high-quality scientific communi-
cation - not just among researchers themselves but between researchers and society 
at large - will bring huge benefits for science itself, as well as for its connection with 
society.
Open science has impact and has the potential to increase the quality and benefits 
of science by making it faster, more responsive to societal challenges, more inclu-
sive and more accessible to new users. An example of this potential is the response 
to the outbreak of viral diseases such as Ebola and Zika. Access to the most recent 
scientific knowledge for a broad group of potential contributors, including new or 
unknown users of knowledge, has brought solutions closer. Open science also 
increases business opportunities.
The speed at which innovative products and services are being developed is 
steadily increasing. Only companies (notably SMEs), entrepreneurs and innovative 
young people that have access to the latest scientific knowledge are able to apply 
this knowledge and to develop new market possibilities.
Citizen science brings research closer to society and society closer to research.
 A Speedy Transition Is Needed
For Europe to remain at the forefront and to ensure sustainable growth in the future, 
open science holds many promises. Reality, however, has not caught up yet with the 
emerging possibilities. The majority of scientific publications, research data and 
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other research outputs are not freely accessible or reusable for potential users. 
Assessment, reward and evaluation systems in science are still measuring the 
old way.
Although these issues are recognised and countless initiatives have been devel-
oped during recent years, policies are not aligned, and expertise can be shared more 
and better. There is a strong need for cooperation, common targets, real change, and 
stocktaking on a regular basis for a speedy transition towards open science.
The good news is that there is political and societal momentum. More and more 
researchers are supporting the transition and are moving towards open science in the 
way they work. Organisations from the scientific community are urging politicians 
to act. The European Commission and the Council of the European Union have 
expressed that they are prepared to take a leading role to facilitate and accelerate the 
transition towards open science.
 From Vision to Action
This Call for Action is the main result of the Amsterdam conference on ‘Open 
Science – From Vision to Action’ hosted by the Netherlands’ EU presidency on 4 
and 5 April 2016. It is a living document reflecting the present state of open science 
evolution. Based on the input of all participating experts and stakeholders* as well 
as outcomes of preceding international meetings and reports, a multi-actor approach 
was formulated to reach two important pan-European goals for 2020:
Full Open Access for All Scientific Publications
This requires leadership and can be accelerated through new publishing models and 
compliance with standards set.
 1. A fundamentally new approach towards optimal reuse of research data
Data sharing and stewardship is the default approach for all publicly funded 
research. This requires definitions, standards and infrastructures.
To reach these goals by 2020 we need flanking policy:
 2. New assessment, reward and evaluation systems
New systems that really deal with the core of knowledge creation and account 
for the impact of scientific research on science and society at large, including the 
economy, and incentivise citizen science.
 3. Alignment of policies and exchange of best practices
Practices, activities and policies should be aligned and best practices and infor-
mation should be shared. It will increase clarity and comparability for all parties 
concerned and help to achieve joint and concerted actions. This should be 
accompanied by regular monitoring-based stocktaking.
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 Twelve Action Items with Concrete Actions to Be Taken
Twelve action items have been included in this Call for Action. They all contribute 
to the transition towards open science and have been grouped around five cross- cut-
ting themes that follow the structure of the European Open Science Agenda as pro-
posed by the European Commission. This may help for a quick-start of the Open 
Science Policy Platform that will be established in May 2016. Each action item 
contains concrete actions that can be taken immediately by the Member States, the 
European Commission and the stakeholders.
ACTION 1. Change assessment, evaluation and reward systems in science
 The Problem
Open science presents the opportunity to radically change the way we evaluate, 
reward and incentivise science. Its goal is to accelerate scientific progress and 
enhance the impact of science for the benefit of society. By changing the way we 
share and evaluate science, we can provide credit for a wealth of research output and 
contributions that reflect the changing nature of science.
The assessment of research proposals, research performance and researchers 
serves different purposes, but often seems characterised by a heavy emphasis on 
publications, both in terms of the number of publications and the prestige of the 
journals in which the publications should appear (citation counts and impact factor). 
This emphasis does not correspond with our goals to achieve societal impact along-
side scientific impact. The predominant focus on prestige fuels a race in which the 
participants compete on the number of publications in prestigious journals or mono-
graphs with leading publishers, at the expense of attention for high-risk research 
and a broad exchange of knowledge. Ultimately this inhibits the progress of science 
and innovation, and the optimal use of knowledge.
 The Solution
• Ensure that national and European assessment and evaluation systems encourage 
open science practices and timely dissemination of all research outputs in all 
phases of the research life cycle.
• Create incentives for an open science environment for individual researchers as 
well as funding agencies and research institutes.
• Acknowledge the different purposes of evaluation and what ‘right’ criteria are. 
Amend national and European assessment and evaluation systems in such a way 
that the complementary impact of scientific work on science as well as society at 
large is taken into account.
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Engage researchers and other key stakeholders, including communications plat-
forms and publishers within the full spectrum of academic disciplines. Set up 
assessment criteria and practices, enabling researchers to exactly understand how 
they will be assessed and that open practices will be rewarded.
 Concrete Actions
• National authorities and the European Commission: acknowledge that 
national initiatives are reaching their limits, and that this is an area for a harmon-
ised EU approach.
• National authorities, European Commission and research funders: reform 
reward systems, develop assessment and evaluation criteria, or decide on the 
selection of existing ones (e.g. DORA for evaluations and the Leiden Manifesto 
for research metrics), and make sure that evaluation panels adopt these new 
criteria.
• Research Performing Organisations, research funders and publishers: fur-
ther facilitate and explore the use of so-called alternative metrics where they 
appear adequate to improve the assessment of aspects such as the impact of 
research results on society at large. Experiment with new approaches for reward-
ing scientific work.
• Research communities, research funders and publishers: develop and adopt 
citation principles for publications, data and code, and other research outputs, 
which include persistent identifiers, to ensure appropriate rewards and acknowl-
edgment of the authors.
• Research communities and publishers: facilitate and develop new forms of 
scientific communication and the use of alternative metrics.
 Expected Positive Effects
• An end to the vicious circle that forces scientists to publish in ever more presti-
gious journals or monographs and reinforcement of the recognition for other 
forms of scientific communication;
• A wider dissemination of a wider range of scientific information that benefits not 
only science itself but society as a whole, including the business community;
• A better return for the parties that fund research.
https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2016/04/04/amsterdam- call- 




 Rome Declaration on Responsible Research and Innovation 
in Europe
November 2014
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is the on-going process of aligning 
research and innovation to the values, needs and expectations of society. Decisions 
in research and innovation must consider the principles on which the European 
Union is founded, i.e. the respect of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and the respect of human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities.
RRI requires that all stakeholders including civil society are responsive to each 
other and take shared responsibility for the processes and outcomes of research and 
innovation. This means working together in: science education; the definition of 
research agendas; the conduct of research; the access to research results; and the 
application of new knowledge in society- in full respect of gender equality, the gen-
der dimension in research and ethics considerations.
More than a decade of research and pilot activities on the interplay between sci-
ence and society points to three main findings. First, we cannot achieve technology 
acceptance by way of good marketing. Second, diversity in research and innovation 
as well as the gender perspective is vital for enhancing creativity and improving 
scientific quality. And third, early and continuous engagement of all stakeholders is 
essential for sustainable, desirable and acceptable innovation. Hence, excellence 
today is about more than ground-breaking discoveries  – it includes openness, 
responsibility and the co-production of knowledge.
The benefits of Responsible Research and Innovation go beyond alignment with 
society: it ensures that research and innovation deliver on the promise of smart, 
inclusive and sustainable solutions to our societal challenges; it engages new per-
spectives, new innovators and new talent from across our diverse European society, 
allowing to identify solutions which would otherwise go unnoticed; it builds trust 
between citizens, and public and private institutions in supporting research and 
innovation; and it reassures society about embracing innovative products and ser-
vices; it assesses the risks and the way these risks should be managed.
European regions and countries are already engaged in this approach. Societal 
demands for ambitious environmental policies led to creative social and technologi-
cal innovations such as fuel efficient vehicles, solar devices or mobility and recy-
cling solutions based on sharing.
Therefore, we, the participants and organisers of the conference “Science, 
Innovation and Society: achieving Responsible Research and Innovation” held in 
Rome on 19–21 November 2014 under the auspices of the Italian Presidency, con-
sider it as our collective duty to further promote Responsible Research and 
Innovation in an integrated way.
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We call on European Institutions, EU Member States and their R&I Funding and 
Performing Organisations, business and civil society to make Responsible Research 
and Innovation a central objective across all relevant policies and activities, includ-
ing in shaping the European Research Area and the Innovation Union.
The present declaration builds on the 2009 Lund Declaration, which called for an 
emphasis on societal challenges, and on the 2013 Vilnius Declaration, which under-
lined that a resilient partnership with all relevant actors is required if research is to 
serve society.
We believe the conditions are now right for responsible research and innovation 
to underpin European research and innovation endeavour and therefore call on all 
stakeholders to work together for inclusive and sustainable solutions to our societal 
challenges.




 Summary Article MLE Open Science – Enabling Systemic 
Change Through Mutual Learning
Small fixes are not enough to reach Open Science’s full potential. Systemic and 
comprehensive change in science governance and evaluation is needed across 
the EU and beyond, report experts in a recent Policy Support Facility mutual 
learning exercise. As a truly global movement, Open Science strives to improve 
accessibility to and reusability of research practices and outcomes. But the benefits 
of Open Science touch almost every aspect of society, including the economy, social 
innovation, and wider sustainable development goals.
Open Science is more than Open Access and Open Data; it is a way of looking at the world, 
with the intent of building a better society. Bart Dumolyn, Policy Advisor on Open Science 
and Responsible Research and Innovation for the Flemish Government.
In its broadest definition, Open Science covers Open Access to publications, 
Open Research Data and Methods, Open Source Software, Open Educational 
Resources, Open Evaluation, and Citizen Science. But openness also means making 
the scientific process more inclusive and accessible to all relevant actors, within and 
beyond the scientific community.
With its many initiatives and programmes, Europe has long championed Open 
Science practices as a powerful means and excellent opportunity to renegotiate the 
social roles and responsibilities of publicly-funded research – and to rethink the sci-
ence system as a whole.
The Horizon 2020 Policy Support Facility (PSF) gives Member States and 
Associated Countries the opportunity to request and take part in mutual learning 
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exercises (MLE) addressing specific research and innovation policy challenges. The 
transition to Open Science represents such a policy challenge which is best tackled 
in close cooperation with all stakeholders and on an international scale.
Given that there is no common baseline for how to implement Open Science 
nationally, the MLE embraced a hands-on, ‘learning by doing’ approach supported 
by external expertise. Concrete examples, models, best practices and knowledge 
exchanges fostered broader understanding of the implications and benefits of Open 
Science strategies.
Problems and concerns were discussed in an ‘open’ and constructive fashion. 
The final PSF report. entitled ‘Mutual Learning Exercise on Open Science: 
Altmetrics and Rewards’, builds on this rich exchange of experiences, both positive 
and negative, and provides an overview of various approaches to Open Science 
implementation across Europe, which include different stakeholders and research 
communities.
MLE participants agreed that small fixes are not enough: implementing Open 
Science requires systemic and comprehensive change in science governance and 
evaluation. Crucial for a successful transition to Open Science will be strategic 
shifts in the incentives and reward systems.
 Key Lessons on the Transition to Open Science
The scope of this first MLE on Open Science was narrowed down to address three 
topics, all of which are key elements of the European Open Science Agenda:
 1. The potential of altmetrics  – alternative (i.e. non-traditional) metrics that go 
beyond citations of articles – to foster Open Science
 2. Incentives and rewards for researchers to engage in Open Science activities
 3. Guidelines for developing and implementing national policies for Open Science
There can be no mission- oriented approach to research and innovation without Open 
Science. Michalis Tzatzanis, Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG).
Many MLE participants voiced concerns that altmetrics may encourage a 
business- as-usual scenario, with users focusing only on what is measurable and 
ending up with proxies far too simplistic for decision-making. Generally it was 
agreed that altmetrics have the potential to foster a major shift in the way research 
activities are evaluated and rewarded, providing they are open and reproducible in 
their method and data, as well as clearly indicate what qualities they measure.
So, what research qualities and societal benefits matter the most, how can they be 
tracked and measured, and for what reasons? Altmetrics can only help to break 
away from traditional indicators and publishing avenues, and establish themselves 
as responsible metrics if they cover diverse types of research practices and out-
comes, according to the report, instead of “overly-simplified one-stop shops”. Here, 
the MLE confirmed the concerns and recommendations put forward by a dedicated 
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Expert Group on Altmetrics and endorsed the coming activities of a European 
Forum for Next Generation Metrics.
MLE participants further called for clear goals and missions against which Open 
Science should be evaluated. Based on cross-national exchanges in the use of alt-
metrics in policy, the report called for more research on how they could be used not 
only to promote openness, but also as tools for more profound change – diversifying 
innovation landscapes and raising awareness of niche pockets of excellence. 
Altmetrics could also provide visible links between education and science and help 
to overcome the problem of research fragmentation across Europe and beyond.
Participation in the MLE provided a great opportunity to get closer and deeper insight into 
the implementation of various practices of Open Science. The established contacts and 
information provided encouraged me to propose concrete measures to our leaders. Aušra 
Gribauskiene, Chief Officer of the Science Division of the Ministry of Education and 
Science of the Republic of Lithuania.
It is extremely difficult for researchers to adopt Open Science practices without 
a broad institutional shift in support and evaluation structures governing their work. 
Discussions during the MLE revealed that very few Open Science incentives and 
rewards are currently being implemented in participating countries. MLE partici-
pants underlined the necessity to develop incentives for different stakeholders: 
researchers, research organizations and funders, national governments and 
policymakers.
Since incentives for researchers need to include radical shifts in hiring and pro-
motion procedures, a very good blueprint for future approaches is the Open Science 
Career Assessment Matrix (OSCAM). This scheme details the different ways that 
researchers’ less visible work and other types of research outputs can be acknowl-
edged or measured.
Given the highly international nature of research networks, international coordi-
nation is crucial to the effective implementation of comparable measures. Each 
country, research funder and research- performing organisation needs to review the 
extent to which specific incentives will work on the ground, and adapt the require-
ments discussed in the final MLE report accordingly. MLE participants strongly 
advocated the further development of EU strategies and policies fostering systemic 
change in the scientific reward system, including pilot programmes and new instru-
ments for human resources, skills and training.
Where next? A roadmap for Open Science With diverse positions and national 
initiatives for Open Science at play, the MLE clearly reflected the importance of 
modular approaches based on monitoring and regular stakeholder exchange. A 
model roadmap and recommendations for implementing Open Science is described 
in detail in the MLE report.
However, in order to trigger systemic change in research and research policy, and 
to make countries fit for the next EU framework funding programme Horizon 
Europe, several considerations apply:
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• The implementation of Open Science needs to be part of the bigger picture, with 
discussion on the roles and functions of science in society right now, and an 
agenda and mission for science and innovation based on openness.
• National strategies for the implementation of Open Science are essential to better 
understand and align the links between Open Science policies and general STI 
policies. ERA should be the central platform for the development of national OS 
strategies.
• Champions and role models are needed to foster the uptake of Open Science 
practices and create a sustainable transition towards more openness.
• Open Science is enhancing knowledge markets and improving innovation. The 
synergies of scholarly commons (open-access digital repositories) and the com-
mercial exploitation of research outputs require a systematic review and substan-
tial evidence.
Follow-up activities include many presentations of the MLE – nationally and 
internationally – broad online and offline discussions of the outcomes, and several 
dedicated events (e.g. presentations in OS-related committees and meetings), as 
well as a broader dissemination event in Brussels in November 2018. Experts and 
country delegates alike will ensure the wide dissemination and discussion of the 
MLE outcomes and thus contribute to European leadership in Open Science in all 
that it represents.
Thirteen countries participated in the MLE: Armenia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden 
and Switzerland.
For further information:
Reports, minutes and presentations:
https://rio.jrc.ec.europa.eu/policy- support- facility/mle- open- science- altmetrics- 
and- rewards
Supplements
